Casey v Cartwright

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a low-velocity road traffic collision on 6 September 2004, where the Defendant collided with the rear of the Plaintiff's vehicle. The Defendant admitted liability, and proceedings were issued in March 2005 with damages limited to £10,000. Medical reports from the Plaintiff's expert concluded a typical soft tissue whiplash injury with an expected full recovery within nine months. The Defendant's insurers challenged causation, asserting the collision's low speed (approximately 2 mph) made injury unlikely.

The District Judge initially permitted both parties to instruct a joint orthopaedic expert, Mr RJ Williams, who produced a report in February 2006. However, His Honour Judge Holman later revoked this permission in a case management decision dated 6 April 2006, leading to the Defendant appealing with permission. The appeal concerned important policy issues, particularly in light of the Court of Appeal's decision in Kearsley v Klarfeld [2005] EWCA Civ 1510.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether permission to rely on expert evidence on causation in low-velocity road traffic claims should be granted, particularly regarding the admissibility of joint expert evidence.
2. What is the appropriate case management approach to expert evidence on causation in such claims, balancing proportionality, fairness, and the interests of justice.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in revoking permission to rely on the evidence of the joint expert due to concerns about the expert's suitability and objectivity.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judge erred in principle by revoking permission to rely on the joint expert's evidence, as the identified defaults in the expert's report could have been remedied.
• Expert evidence on causation is important and helpful in low-velocity impact cases, and the judge was wrong to downplay its utility.
• The judge failed to consider that expert evidence supports robust cross-examination, which is crucial to testing the Plaintiff's credibility.
• The Defendant's position is not adequately protected by merely questioning the Plaintiff's medical expert; there exists a "self-reinforcing" group of experts who may validate claims without sufficient analysis.
• The judge's reliance on a selective set of first instance cases to argue that expert evidence rarely influences outcomes was misplaced and unhelpful.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reviewing the factual background and procedural history, focusing on the role of expert evidence in low-velocity road traffic claims where causation is disputed. It acknowledged the complexity and variability inherent in such cases, noting the differing expert opinions on whether injury can result below certain impact velocities (Delta V).

The court analyzed the case management decision by Judge Holman, who had revoked permission to rely on the joint expert's evidence due to concerns about the expert's objectivity and the quality of the report. Judge Holman emphasized the importance of proportionality, expense, and expedition, suggesting that in many such cases, the credibility of lay witnesses is decisive and expert evidence may be disproportionate.

However, the court recognized that the guidance from Kearsley required amplification due to inconsistent judicial approaches. It highlighted that while expert evidence should generally be permitted where causation is genuinely in issue, there are circumstances—such as late notification, trivial injuries, or proportionality concerns—where it may be justifiably refused.

The court outlined a procedural framework for raising the causation issue, including early written notification by the Defendant, clear identification of grounds in the defence, and provision of witness statements. It stressed that the court retains discretion to refuse expert evidence if overriding objectives require it.

The court also discussed the limited role of single joint experts in this context, noting the controversy surrounding causation and the desirability of authoritative guidance through test cases.

Ultimately, the court found that Judge Holman's revocation of permission to rely on the joint expert's evidence was a case management decision within his discretion, particularly given the expert's perceived lack of objectivity and the proportionality concerns. The court declined to interfere with this decision.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Defendant's appeal against the case management decision revoking permission to rely on the joint expert's evidence.

The direct effect of this ruling is that the Defendant cannot rely on the joint expert evidence of Mr Williams in this case. Instead, the Defendant may question the Plaintiff's medical expert and seek oral evidence from that expert if necessary. The decision represents a significant shift in the approach to expert evidence in low-velocity impact claims, emphasizing proportionality and judicial control over evidence.

No new binding precedent was established; rather, the court provided amplified guidance on the application of existing principles, particularly those in Kearsley v Klarfeld, to promote consistency in future case management decisions concerning expert evidence on causation in low-velocity road traffic collision claims.