Sanghera & Anor v R

Factual and Procedural Background

On 5 August 2010, after a trial lasting approximately seven weeks before Judge Jack J and a jury in the Crown Court at Birmingham, two appellants, both in their mid-twenties, were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with minimum terms of 28 and 29 years respectively, less time on remand. Both appellants appealed their convictions with leave, and one appellant also appealed the minimum term imposed. The appeals were heard on 16 December 2011 and dismissed, with written reasons provided subsequently.

The murder victim was the owner of a sports bar in Bilston, Wolverhampton, who died from a single fatal gunshot wound. The prosecution's case was that the first appellant fired the fatal bullet with murderous intent towards a crowd, although without intent to kill the victim specifically. The second appellant was alleged to have been a secondary party to the murder through a joint enterprise.

Seven other defendants were tried alongside the appellants. Five were initially charged with murder but had no case to answer on that charge; all seven were convicted of conspiracy to commit violent disorder and received various custodial sentences. Two additional defendants were convicted of witness intimidation and sentenced accordingly.

The incident originated from an earlier altercation involving a laser pen shone into a vehicle driven by a female associate of the second appellant. The second appellant became angry and gathered a group, including the first appellant, purportedly recruiting the first appellant as the gunman. The group traveled in two cars to the bar, where a confrontation ensued, culminating in the first appellant firing a handgun into a crowd, killing the victim.

The prosecution case against the second appellant was based on two alternative bases: (1) that he called the first appellant out with intent for him to fire the gun with intent to kill or cause serious injury; or (2) that he was party to a plan to threaten and use violence against certain individuals, realizing that a gun might be used with intent to kill or cause serious injury during the plan. The first appellant's defence was an alibi, denying involvement, while the second appellant denied knowledge of the gun.

The trial involved complex evidential issues, including the admission of defence statements to the jury, the introduction of a handwritten note by the first appellant implicating himself, and applications to sever the trial or discharge the jury, which were refused. The jury ultimately convicted both appellants of murder and the related conspiracy offences.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge erred in permitting the jury to see the defence statements under section 6E of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
2. Whether the first appellant’s trial should have been severed or the jury discharged due to prejudicial inadmissible evidence.
3. Whether the handwritten note introduced without advance warning violated section 76A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and prejudiced the first appellant’s trial.
4. Whether the directions given to the jury regarding the second appellant’s liability on the second basis of joint enterprise were flawed.
5. Whether certain hearsay evidence and statements were improperly admitted or insufficiently directed upon in relation to the second appellant.
6. Whether the minimum term imposed on the second appellant was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
7. Whether the convictions against the appellants were unsafe given the volume and nature of admissible and inadmissible evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Sanghera's Arguments

• The judge erred in allowing the jury to retain and consider defence statements that were not evidence and prejudicial.
• The trial was unfair due to the volume of inadmissible evidence implicating him, including co-defendants’ interviews and statements, which the jury could not realistically ignore.
• The handwritten note introduced without prior notice constituted a confession under section 76A PACE and should have been excluded or admitted only after a voir dire.
• The judge should have discharged the jury or severed his trial from the others due to prejudicial evidence and procedural irregularities.
• The only admissible evidence against him (witnesses KMT and Scott) was unreliable and insufficient to sustain conviction.

Appellant Takhar's Arguments

• The jury directions on the second basis of joint enterprise liability were flawed because they failed to account for a change in circumstances at the bar, specifically that the intended target was absent and another individual was involved in the argument when the shooting occurred.
• Certain hearsay evidence (e.g., that the first appellant wore body armour) was inadmissible against him and the judge failed to give appropriate directions to the jury.
• Evidence from a prison witness about the first appellant’s statements was improperly admitted against him without clear directions that it was not evidence against the second appellant.
• The minimum term of 29 years was excessive given his age, lack of intention to kill, and other mitigating factors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed analysis of the evidential and procedural issues arising from the trial. Regarding the admission of defence statements under section 6E of the 1996 Act, the court held that the judge’s discretion was properly exercised, as the statements helped the jury understand the case and resolve issues, and the statements themselves were not evidence. The court rejected the argument that the defence statements should have been edited or withheld.

On the issue of severance and discharge, the court found that the judge correctly balanced the interests of a fair trial against the public policy favoring joint trials. The judge’s directions to the jury to disregard inadmissible evidence were deemed sufficient, and the judge’s refusal to sever or discharge was upheld.

The court considered the handwritten note introduced during cross-examination and assumed it constituted a confession under section 76A PACE. However, even assuming the appellant had been given notice, the court was satisfied the judge would have admitted the note as it was not obtained by oppression or in circumstances likely to render it unreliable. Thus, no miscarriage of justice arose from the lack of advance notice.

Regarding the directions to the jury about the second appellant’s liability on the second basis of joint enterprise, the court rejected the argument that the direction was flawed. The court accepted that the entire incident at the bar was a single plan or joint enterprise, and the directions properly encompassed the risk that the gun might be used in the course of that plan.

The court further addressed allegations of improper admission of hearsay and other evidence against the second appellant, finding no real risk that the jury would misuse such evidence given the judge’s directions and the absence of objections during trial.

On the sufficiency and reliability of evidence, the court found that the jury was properly directed to assess the credibility of key witnesses, including the cautionary directions on evidence from a prison informant, and that the convictions were supported by compelling evidence including witness identifications and corroborative material.

Finally, the court considered the sentence appeal of the second appellant, concluding that the minimum term of 29 years was appropriate given the degree of planning, the appellant’s leading role, his criminal record, and the statutory starting point. The sentence was held not to be manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED both appellants’ appeals against conviction and dismissed the appeal against sentence brought by the second appellant.

The direct effect is that the convictions and sentence stand as imposed by the Crown Court. The court found no procedural or evidential irregularities sufficient to render the convictions unsafe. No new legal precedent was established; rather, existing principles relating to joint enterprise, evidential admissibility, and trial management were applied and affirmed in the context of a complex multi-defendant trial.