Williams v Fanshaw Porter & Hazelhurst

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff commenced an action for professional negligence against the Defendant, a firm of solicitors, in the Manchester County Court. The Defendant admitted negligence but asserted that the claim was time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980. The cause of action arose on 25 August 1994, and the Plaintiff needed to commence proceedings by 24 August 2000 to avoid limitation. However, the claim was not started until 14 December 2000. The District Judge directed a preliminary issue to determine whether the claim was barred by limitation. The Recorder held that the relevant statutory provisions (s.32(1)(b) and s.32(2) of the Limitation Act) did not apply, resulting in the claim being time-barred. The Plaintiff appealed this decision.

Relevant factual background includes the Plaintiff’s original claim against a doctor for prescribing a drug allegedly causing a stroke. The Defendant solicitors, through an employee, consented to a court order dismissing the claim against the doctor without informing the Plaintiff, which was later found negligent. Attempts to rejoin the doctor to the action failed, and the Defendant did not inform the Plaintiff of these developments for a significant period. The appeal concerned whether the Defendant deliberately concealed relevant facts, thus delaying the start of the limitation period.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 applies, such that the limitation period did not begin to run until the Plaintiff discovered or could with reasonable diligence have discovered the deliberate concealment of facts relevant to her cause of action.
2. Whether the Defendant deliberately concealed from the Plaintiff any fact relevant to her right of action.
3. The interpretation and application of the mental element and conduct required for "deliberate concealment" under section 32(1)(b).
4. Whether the Plaintiff’s claim was statute barred or within the limitation period due to delayed discovery caused by concealment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Plaintiff argued that section 32(1)(b) applied because the Defendant deliberately concealed facts relevant to her right of action, specifically the consent order dismissing the claim against the doctor and subsequent failed attempts to rejoin the doctor.
• The limitation period did not begin to run until the Plaintiff was informed of the concealment, which occurred less than six years before the commencement of the action.
• The Plaintiff did not challenge the Recorder’s decision regarding section 32(2), focusing solely on section 32(1)(b).
• The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant’s motive of embarrassment did not negate the deliberate nature of the concealment.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant, while accepting the Recorder’s conclusion that section 32(1)(b) did not apply, conceded that if it did, the limitation period would have started too late for the limitation defense to succeed.
• The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s solicitors did not deliberately conceal the relevant facts but rather failed to appreciate the consequences at the time.
• It was submitted that an honest desire to avoid embarrassment is distinct from an intention to conceal and thus does not satisfy the deliberate concealment requirement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully analysed the wording and legislative intent of section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980, focusing on whether the Defendant deliberately concealed facts relevant to the Plaintiff's cause of action. The Court emphasized that the statute requires concealment of any relevant fact, not necessarily all facts, and that the concealment must be deliberate, meaning a conscious decision not to disclose a fact which the Defendant had a duty to disclose or would ordinarily disclose.

The Court found that the two key facts—the Defendant solicitor's agreement to the consent order dismissing the original claim and the making of that order—were relevant to the Plaintiff's right of action and were deliberately concealed. Although the Defendant's motive was to avoid embarrassment rather than to prevent a claim, the motive was irrelevant; the existence of deliberate concealment sufficed.

The Court rejected the Recorder's reasoning that the Defendant was unaware of negligence until a later date, distinguishing between realizing a mistake and realizing its irremediable consequences. The Defendant knew by December 1994 that agreeing to the consent order was a mistake and failed to inform the Plaintiff, deliberately concealing the facts.

The Court also examined the nature of "deliberate concealment," referencing authoritative speeches from the House of Lords in Cave v Robinson Jarvis & Rolf, and concluded that in the solicitor-client relationship context, deliberate suppression of information known to be relevant and which ought to be disclosed constitutes deliberate concealment.

Furthermore, the Court considered whether the Plaintiff discovered or could with reasonable diligence have discovered the concealment before commencing the action. It accepted the factual finding that the Plaintiff first learned of the concealment on either 15 July 1995 or 10 June 1996, both dates within six years of the action commencement date, thus postponing the start of the limitation period.

The Court declined to definitively resolve whether a narrower or broader interpretation of the mental element required by s.32(1)(b) is appropriate but found that the facts satisfied even the narrower reading, requiring the Defendant to have known or been reckless as to the relevance of the concealed facts.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and declared that the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant is not time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Plaintiff may proceed with the professional negligence claim despite the delay in commencing proceedings. The Court held that deliberate concealment by the Defendant delayed the start of the limitation period. No new precedent was established beyond the application of established principles to the facts of this case.