Tower Hamlets v Deugi

Factual and Procedural Background

On 13th February 2000, the Respondent, an Indian national, arrived in the United Kingdom with her two children and initially lived with her husband in Morecambe. Around May 2000, the Respondent and her children left the matrimonial home. In June 2000, she applied to the Appellant local housing authority for housing assistance, initially housed under the Housing Act 1996, then supported under the National Assistance Act 1948 and the Children Act 1989. The Respondent and her husband divorced in October 2000.

By December 2003, the Appellant sought to withdraw housing support. The Respondent applied again under the Housing Act 1996, asserting eligibility based on a derived right of residence (the "Baumbast exception") as the primary carer of a dependent child in full-time education. The Appellant rejected this application in January 2004, considering her subject to immigration control. The Respondent sought review, which was upheld by the Appellant but quashed by the Bow County Court due to flawed reasoning.

Following delays and the Respondent threatening judicial review, the Appellant conceded in October 2004 that the January 2004 decision was wrong regarding eligibility but suggested a fresh decision was necessary. In March 2005, the Appellant issued a fresh decision denying eligibility, arguing the Baumbast exception no longer applied as the child was no longer in education. The Respondent appealed the January 2004 decision, and the county court judge allowed the appeal in May 2005, varying the January 2004 decision to find the Appellant owed a housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. The Appellant appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant local housing authority was entitled to withdraw their January 2004 decision regarding the Respondent's eligibility for housing assistance.
2. Whether the Appellant could replace the January 2004 decision with the March 2005 decision denying eligibility.
3. Whether the court could vary the January 2004 decision to find that the Respondent was owed a housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996.
4. Whether the Respondent was intentionally homeless within the meaning of the Housing Act 1996.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant argued that they were entitled to withdraw the January 2004 decision and replace it with a fresh decision reflecting changed circumstances.
• They relied on precedent to support the ability to revisit decisions during the appeal process and conduct non-statutory reviews.
• They contended that the appeal was futile because the eligibility status had changed by March 2005, thus negating any continuing duty under section 193(2).
• The Appellant submitted that the existence of the January 2004 decision prevented them from properly issuing the March 2005 decision unless the earlier decision was withdrawn.
• Regarding intentional homelessness, the Appellant submitted that further inquiries were necessary before concluding the Respondent was not intentionally homeless.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent argued that the Appellant had a statutory duty to determine eligibility and consequential duties properly, which they failed to do in January 2004.
• She contended that the appeal was not academic, as a finding of priority need was a once-for-all determination that should endure beyond changes in circumstances.
• The Respondent submitted that the Appellant had no statutory power to withdraw the January 2004 decision once the review and appeal process had been invoked.
• She maintained that she was not intentionally homeless, having left the matrimonial home due to domestic violence, and that there was no realistic prospect of the Appellant establishing otherwise on further inquiry.
• The Respondent sought a variation of the January 2004 decision to reflect her eligibility and priority need status as at that date.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework of the Housing Act 1996, particularly section 193, which imposes a duty on local housing authorities to provide accommodation where an applicant is homeless, eligible, in priority need, and not intentionally homeless. The Respondent's eligibility was grounded in the Baumbast exception, conferring a derived right of residence as a primary carer of a dependent child in full-time education.

The court acknowledged that the Appellant conceded the Respondent's eligibility and priority need status as at January 2004 but challenged the judge's variation of the decision based on the absence of a concluded inquiry into intentional homelessness. The court distinguished the present case from Crawley, noting that in Crawley there was a solid argument for intentional homelessness, whereas here the Appellant had not completed inquiries and had not satisfied themselves that the Respondent was intentionally homeless.

The court held that the Appellant did not have the power to unilaterally withdraw the January 2004 decision once the statutory review and appeal processes had been invoked, but could revisit decisions during those processes. However, the judge was correct in concluding that the Respondent should not be deprived of a benefit she would have been entitled to if the original decision had been lawfully made.

Nonetheless, the court found that the judge erred in concluding there was no realistic prospect that further inquiries by the Appellant could lead to a finding of intentional homelessness. The material before the court raised legitimate questions requiring further investigation. Therefore, the judge should not have varied the January 2004 decision to the extent of conclusively finding that the Respondent was not intentionally homeless.

The court substituted the judge's order with a variation confirming eligibility and priority need as at January 2004 but remitted the issue of intentional homelessness back to the Appellant for reconsideration, preserving the statutory process for review and appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court's final decision was to ALLOW THE APPEAL IN PART.

The holding substituted the lower court's variation of the January 2004 decision with a finding that, as at that date, the Respondent was eligible for assistance and in priority need. However, the court held that the question of intentional homelessness was not conclusively determined and must be reconsidered by the Appellant. The Appellant was not entitled to unilaterally withdraw the January 2004 decision once the appeal was initiated.

The direct effect is that the Respondent retains the benefit of a lawful finding of eligibility and priority need as at January 2004, while the Appellant must complete inquiries regarding intentional homelessness under the statutory framework. No new precedent was established beyond clarification of the procedural limits on decision withdrawal and the necessity of proper inquiries on intentional homelessness.