THE QUEEN v Evans

Factual and Procedural Background

On 8th November 1999, the Defendant was convicted at a Magistrates' Court of three harassment offences against neighbours and a restraining order was issued prohibiting abusive conduct, trespass, and depositing waste on specified neighbours' properties. The Defendant, aged 78, lived next to one of the protected persons. In February 2003, the Defendant allegedly breached the restraining order by parking her car so close to a tradesman’s van that it blocked it, causing distress to the protected neighbour. The Defendant was charged with six counts of breaching the restraining order; she was acquitted on five counts and convicted on one count at the Crown Court. The Defendant was fined £1,000 or 45 days imprisonment in default. The Defendant appealed against the conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the act of parking a car close to the tradesman’s van amounted to an "abusive action" within the meaning of the restraining order;
2. Whether the trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury that, in determining reasonable excuse, they should consider how the Defendant might reasonably have understood the restraining order’s terms.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The act of parking the car close to the tradesman’s van did not constitute "abusive action" under the restraining order.
• The phrase "abusive actions" is unclear and should be narrowly interpreted to avoid redundancy with other prohibitions in the order.
• The neighbour could have allowed the tradesman to speak to the Defendant to move the van; no refusal to move the car was alleged.
• The trial judge should have instructed the jury that reasonable excuse includes consideration of the Defendant’s reasonable understanding of the restraining order.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by affirming that the phrase "abusive actions" in the restraining order should be given its ordinary English meaning, determined by the fact-finder, rather than a narrow or strained interpretation. The court relied heavily on the principle from Cozens v Brutus that the meaning of ordinary words is a question of fact, not law, and that the jury must apply contemporary understanding to the facts.

The court emphasized that the trial judge correctly refused to withdraw the case from the jury, as the video evidence and context of longstanding hostile neighbour relations could support a finding of abusive conduct. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the phrase was ambiguous or vague beyond the understanding of an ordinary person.

Regarding the appellant’s submission on redundancy of order terms, the court noted that drafting of court orders does not require the precision of parliamentary legislation and that the other prohibitions in the order are sufficiently distinct from the "abusive actions" limb.

On the issue of reasonable excuse, the court held that since the appellant did not raise the issue by evidence or otherwise, the judge was not obliged to direct the jury on how to consider reasonable excuse beyond instructing them that the prosecution must prove lack of reasonable excuse. The court reasoned that detailed directions on this issue become necessary only if the defendant adduces evidence raising it.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL.

The direct effect is that the appellant’s conviction for breaching the restraining order by abusive conduct stands. The court confirmed that ordinary language in restraining orders should be interpreted by fact-finders in their ordinary sense without undue narrowing. The decision reinforces that reasonable excuse must be raised by the defendant to trigger specific jury directions. No new precedent was established beyond applying existing principles to the facts of this case.