Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns a renewed application for permission to appeal against a decision by Judge Wyn Williams Q.C. in the Swansea County Court dated 25 November 2005. The original appeal arose from a refusal by District Judge Evans to grant summary judgment in favour of the defendants, as he considered the claim had a real prospect of success. The preliminary issue before the designated trial judge was whether the defendants' refusal to consent to the installation of a stair-lift at the claimant's expense constituted discrimination under section 22(3) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 ("the 1995 Act").
The claimant, an 81-year-old disabled lessee of a third-floor flat in a block of 16 flats at Richmond Court, Swansea, suffers from mobility issues and requires a stair-lift to access her flat. The defendants, as landlords and managers of the premises, refused consent for the stair-lift installation, which would be at no cost to them. The claimant's lease prohibits structural alterations without landlord consent. The freehold is owned by an investment company, which had consented subject to conditions that also required the defendants' approval, which was withheld.
Additional context includes the claimant's eligibility for a disabled facilities grant and an ongoing appeal by the local council against refusal of building regulations consent for the stair-lift, creating uncertainty about the possibility of installation even if the defendants' refusal is overturned.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendants' refusal of consent to the installation of a stair-lift constitutes discrimination within section 22(3) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The claimant argued that the refusal to consent to the stair-lift installation amounted to discrimination under the 1995 Act because it denied her a benefit or facility which others could enjoy.
- The claimant relied on the analogy of the "guide-dog example" to argue that refusal to permit a stair-lift, which relates to her disability, was less favourable treatment compared to able-bodied lessees.
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendants contended that they did not discriminate as their refusal to consent was not related to the claimant's disability but based on broader reasons such as other tenants' opposition, aesthetics, repair costs, inconvenience, and health concerns of other residents.
- They argued that all lessees, disabled or not, would be refused permission to install a stair-lift, so the claimant was not treated less favourably than others.
- They emphasized that the 1995 Act does not impose a positive duty on premises managers to make reasonable adjustments, distinguishing this from other parts of the Act that impose such duties.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Clark v Novacold Limited [1999] ICR 951 |
Definition and approach to discrimination under the 1995 Act focusing on the reason for treatment and comparators. |
Distinguished on the facts as it concerned employment and absence due to disability; used to illustrate the statutory focus on the reason for treatment rather than circumstances. |
| Manchester City Council v Romano [2005] 1 WLR 2775 |
Application of section 24(1) in eviction cases relating to disability; establishing that if reason for eviction relates to disability, it is unlawful unless justified. |
Distinguished on the facts as it involved eviction due to disability-related antisocial behaviour; used to support the framework for assessing discrimination. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by examining the statutory framework of the 1995 Act, particularly sections 22 to 24, which address discrimination in relation to premises. It noted that while the Act imposes positive duties to make reasonable adjustments in employment, education, and services, no such positive duty exists for managers of premises under sections 22 to 24.
The court identified the relevant treatment alleged to constitute discrimination as the defendants' refusal to consent to the installation of the stair-lift. It then analyzed the reason for that refusal, concluding that it was not related to the claimant's disability but was instead based on general considerations affecting all tenants.
The court emphasized the importance of comparing the treatment of the claimant with that of appropriate comparators, which were agreed to be able-bodied lessees in the same building. It found that all tenants would be refused consent to install a stair-lift, so the claimant was not treated less favourably than others.
The court criticized the trial judge for failing to conduct a two-stage analysis: first, identifying the act or omission constituting treatment of the claimant; second, identifying how comparators were treated. The trial judge had only identified the refusal as treatment of the claimant but did not analyze the treatment of comparators.
In considering analogies such as the "guide-dog example," the court found them inapposite because the defendants' refusal was uniformly applied to all tenants, unlike the selective refusal in the guide-dog scenario.
The court concluded that the defendants' refusal did not amount to discrimination under the 1995 Act because it was not motivated by the claimant's disability, and no less favourable treatment was shown.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the claimant's case failed on the pleaded facts.
The direct effect is that the claimant cannot succeed in her claim that the defendants discriminated against her under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 by refusing consent to install a stair-lift. The decision confirms that under the 1995 Act, managers of premises are not under a positive duty to permit or facilitate adaptations to common parts for disabled tenants. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the statutory interpretation and application of sections 22 to 24 of the Act.