REGINA v Ashiq

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against conviction and sentence brought with the leave of the single judge. On 13th October 2014, following a trial in the Crown Court at The City before Judge Plumstead and a jury, the Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to blackmail and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. A co-accused, Defendant, was acquitted on the conspiracy charge but pleaded guilty to transferring criminal property and was sentenced accordingly.

The conspiracy charge arose from events surrounding the attempted sale of a luxury car by a complainant to the Defendant. The Defendant brought a large sum of cash in person, which aroused suspicion at a bank, leading to police involvement and seizure of the car and money. Subsequent to release, the parties agreed to complete the deal once their property was returned. The car was returned to the complainant, but the cash was withheld on grounds of criminal property.

The complainant received threatening calls demanding the car be handed over, which the Crown alleged were made by the Defendant and the Appellant to recover the money or its equivalent. Recorded telephone calls, linked by evidence to the Appellant and Defendant, contained veiled threats and demands. The Appellant admitted making one such call during the trial but did not provide evidence or explanation. The Appellant's Defence Case Statement denied conspiracy and knowledge of co-defendants but did not address the critical call until late in the prosecution case.

The appeal raised four grounds regarding jury directions and burden of proof, with leave granted solely on the ground concerning the judge’s direction about the burden of proof relating to the "unwarranted" nature of the demand under section 21(1) of the Theft Act 1968.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge failed to direct the jury properly on the mens rea required for conspiracy to blackmail.
2. Whether the judge failed adequately to sum up the defence case.
3. Whether the judge reversed the burden of proof by directing the jury that it was for the Appellant to satisfy them that the demand was not unwarranted under section 21(1) of the Theft Act 1968.
4. Whether the judge failed to direct the jury on how to approach the conspiracy charge if uncertain about the co-conspirator's guilt.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judge's direction on the mens rea for conspiracy to blackmail was inadequate.
• The judge failed to adequately sum up the defence case or did so not at all.
• The judge misdirected the jury by placing the burden on the Appellant to prove the demand was not unwarranted, contrary to section 21(1) of the Theft Act 1968.
• The judge failed to instruct the jury on how to consider the conspiracy charge if unsure about the guilt of the co-conspirator, particularly given the acquittal of the co-accused on the conspiracy charge.
• The Appellant contended that the telephone call admitted was insufficient to establish conspiracy and that the threats were implicit rather than explicit.
• The Appellant argued that no evidence linked him to other acts of the conspiracy, and that the jury should have been directed on the possibility of multiple conspiracies.

Crown's Arguments

• The judge’s directions were adequate and correct, particularly regarding the burden of proof on the issue of whether the demand was "unwarranted".
• There was no live issue at trial concerning the Appellant’s belief about the demand, so no special direction was required.
• The telephone call made by the Appellant was an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to blackmail.
• The judge properly directed the jury on the law of conspiracy and the evidence before them.
• The Appellant’s previous convictions were a significant aggravating factor relevant to sentencing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first considered the ground alleging misdirection on the burden of proof concerning the "unwarranted" nature of the demand under section 21(1) of the Theft Act 1968. The judge had directed the jury that even if the demand was reasonable, they must be persuaded that the use of menaces was a proper method of enforcing it. The court acknowledged that this direction, if isolated, might have suggested the Appellant bore the burden of proof. However, established legal principles require the defendant only to raise the issue of belief; the Crown must then disprove it. The court found no evidence that the Appellant raised such an issue at trial, as he did not give evidence nor make relevant statements. Thus, the direction was not misleading in context.

The court also found that the judge’s summing-up, when read as a whole, correctly explained the burden of proof and the law to the jury. The Appellant’s silence and the judge’s direction on drawing inferences from it were proper and did not support the appeal.

Regarding other grounds, the court found no merit. The mens rea direction was adequate given the absence of a live issue on belief. The judge was not required to direct that the Appellant specifically agreed to make the telephone call, which was properly considered an overt act in the conspiracy. The defence case was adequately summarized given the lack of evidence from the Appellant. The judge fairly instructed the jury on the conspiracy charge, including the possibility of multiple conspiracies, and the acquittal of the co-accused did not undermine the Appellant’s conviction.

On sentence, the court acknowledged the seriousness of blackmail offences and the wide sentencing range. The judge rightly considered the Appellant’s previous convictions for related serious offences as aggravating factors. The sentence of seven years was severe but not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal against conviction and sentence.

The conviction was held to be safe despite the alleged misdirection, as no live issue was raised at trial regarding the Appellant’s belief about the demand’s justification. The judge’s directions were proper and sufficient. The sentence was appropriate given the nature of the offence and the Appellant’s criminal history. No new legal precedent was established; the decision confirms the application of existing principles concerning burden of proof in blackmail and conspiracy cases and the assessment of evidential issues relating to co-conspirators.