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ZP (South Africa) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, a South African national, applied for a permanent residence card in the United Kingdom as the former spouse of an EEA national. The Secretary of State refused the application on 12 June 2013. Subsequent appeals to the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal were dismissed on 27 January and 11 April 2014 respectively. Permission to appeal to the court was granted on 7 July 2014, but the Appellant lodged the appeal late, on 21 November 2014, after the expiry of the deadline. The Appellant’s former spouse, a Polish national, had worked in the UK, primarily at Heathrow Airport, and the Appellant sought to establish that she continuously exercised her EEA rights until their divorce on 16 December 2010.
The core dispute concerned whether the Appellant met the requirements under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 to qualify for permanent residence, which required demonstrating continuous exercise of EEA rights by the former spouse during the relevant period. The First-tier Tribunal found gaps in the evidence and was not satisfied continuity was established. The Upper Tribunal upheld this decision, concluding no material error of law was made.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether time should be extended to allow the late appeal to proceed.
- Whether the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal erred in law by failing to properly address the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and the evidence concerning continuous exercise of EEA rights by the former spouse.
- Whether it was inevitable on the evidence that the former spouse continuously exercised her rights up to the date of the divorce.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appeal was lodged shortly after legal aid was granted, justifying an extension of time.
- The First-tier Tribunal erred by applying a "principle of continuity" test not recognized in EEA law.
- The evidence given by the Appellant and witnesses demonstrated continuous exercise of EEA rights by the former spouse until the divorce.
- The court should conclude the Appellant is entitled to a permanent residence card and not remit the matter back to the Upper Tribunal.
Secretary of State's Arguments
- The appeal was lodged well out of time and no sufficient reason exists to extend the time limit.
- The decisions of the tribunals were not plainly wrong in their assessment of the evidence.
- The principle of finality should preclude extension of time in this case.
- There were flaws in the tribunals’ reasoning, justifying remittance to the Upper Tribunal for redetermination.
- The Appellant’s rejection of the offer to remit the case was noted but does not affect the Secretary of State’s position.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Lassal [2011] 1 CMLR 31 (CJEU Case C-162/09) | Interpretation of Directive 2004/38 on acquisition of permanent residence after continuous lawful residence for five years. | Used to confirm the requirement that the former spouse must have continuously exercised EEA rights for the qualifying period. |
| Rasheed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1493 | Proper framing of grounds of appeal and submissions under CPR. | Referenced to criticize the muddled presentation of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal. |
| R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1663; [2015] 1 WLR 2472 | Principles for extension of time and relief from sanctions, including assessment of delay and merits. | Applied to assess whether to grant extension of time for the late appeal. |
| Mitchell [2013] EWCA Civ 1537; [2014] 1 WLR 795 | Guidance on relief from sanctions and assessment of seriousness and reasons for breach. | Referred to in the context of the three-stage test for relief from sanctions. |
| Denton [2014] EWCA Civ 906; [2014] 1 WLR 3926 | Detailed approach to relief from sanctions and extension of time under CPR 3.9. | Used to guide the court’s assessment of the delay and reasons for it in this case. |
| Gudanaviciene v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2014] EWCA Civ 1622 | Availability of exceptional funding legal aid. | Distinguished as not relevant to extension of time applications. |
| R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19 | Limits on appellate courts making factual inferences better left to specialist tribunals. | Supported the decision to remit the case rather than the court making its own factual findings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first considered the procedural issue of whether to extend time for the late appeal. Applying the three-stage test from Mitchell and Denton, the court found the delay of three months to be serious and significant. The Appellant’s reliance on late legal aid funding and solicitor instruction was not considered a good reason for delay, as earlier self-help steps could have been taken. However, no prejudice to the Secretary of State was established, and the Secretary of State conceded that the tribunal decisions contained flaws justifying remittance.
Balancing these factors, the court granted the extension of time, emphasizing the strength of the Appellant’s grounds and the absence of prejudice.
On the substantive issue, the court analysed the evidence regarding continuous exercise of EEA rights by the former spouse. The First-tier Tribunal had found gaps in both documentary and oral evidence, concluding it was insufficient to confirm continuity. The Appellant argued that the evidence showed continuous employment up to the divorce, but the court found the tribunal’s reasoning did not amount to acceptance of this argument. Given the gaps and cross-examination summaries, the court held that it was not bound to find continuity on the evidence before it.
Invoking the principle from Jones, the court declined to make factual inferences itself and emphasized that such determinations are best made by the specialist appellate tribunal. Accordingly, the court concluded the matter should be remitted to the Upper Tribunal for redetermination, allowing it to decide whether further evidence is needed or whether the existing evidence suffices to establish continuity.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED the appeal for an extension of time to lodge the appeal.
The substantive appeal was not decided on the merits by this court. Instead, the court ordered the case to be remitted to the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration of whether the Appellant’s former spouse continuously exercised her EEA rights for the relevant period, including whether further evidence should be heard. The decision does not establish new precedent but clarifies procedural expectations concerning extensions of time and the proper role of appellate courts in factual determinations in EEA residence cases.
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