Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Braganza v. BP Shipping Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
Between 01:00 and 07:00 on 11 May 2009 the Chief Engineer (“the Employee”) on Company A’s oil tanker disappeared in the North Atlantic. Company A concluded that the disappearance was due to suicide, which would trigger an exclusion in clause 7.6.3 of the Employee’s contract and deny his widow (“the Plaintiff”) a contractual death-in-service benefit of US $230,265.
The Plaintiff sued in negligence and in contract. After an eight-day trial, Judge A (High Court) dismissed the negligence claim but held that Company A’s “suicide” opinion was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense and awarded the contractual benefit. The Court of Appeal (three-judge panel led by Judge B) reversed, declaring the opinion reasonable. The Supreme Court (majority: Judge C, Judge D, Judge E; dissent: Judge F, Judge G) restored the High Court’s decision, allowing the Plaintiff’s appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- What implied standard governs a contractual discretion/opinion bestowed on one party—does it incorporate both limbs of Wednesbury “reasonableness,” i.e., proper decision-making process and rational outcome?
- In the specific context of suspected suicide, must the contractual decision-maker require cogent evidence commensurate with the inherent improbability of suicide before denying contractual benefits?
- Applying that standard, was Company A’s conclusion that the Employee committed suicide irrational or otherwise in breach of the implied term?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- Company A’s investigation ignored relevant alternatives, notably an accidental fall while inspecting weather conditions.
- The decision-maker failed to recognise that suicide is inherently improbable and therefore requires especially cogent evidence.
- The six “bullet-point” indicators relied on were speculative and in several respects factually inaccurate.
- An employer acting under the duty of trust and confidence must observe both limbs of Wednesbury reasonableness; that duty was breached.
Defendant's Arguments
- The contractual test is limited to whether no reasonable employer could have reached the conclusion; detailed “legal directions” are not required of a lay decision-maker.
- The investigation was thorough and ruled out competing hypotheses; a mechanism for accidental death was lacking.
- Even if minor factual errors existed, they were immaterial and could not vitiate the conclusion.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 | Two-limb test: (i) relevant/irrelevant considerations, (ii) perverse outcome | Majority held both limbs apply to contractual discretions; employer failed on limb (i) |
The Vainqueur Jos [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 557 | Wednesbury principles extend to contractual discretions | Cited to support process-based review and burden on decision-maker |
Abu Dhabi National Tanker v Product Star (No 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397 | Discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably | Used to anchor modern “irrationality” terminology |
Paragon Finance v Nash [2002] 1 WLR 685 | Implied term restraining mortgagee’s interest-rate discretion | Illustrative of courts implying limitations to prevent abuse |
Ludgate Insurance v Citibank NA [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 221 | Discretion must align with contractual purpose | Analogy drawn to employment context |
Gan Insurance v Tai Ping (No 2) [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 299 | Reinsurer’s withholding of approval must be rational and bona fide | Supports inclusion of relevant-matters limb |
Socimer International Bank v Standard Bank Ltd [2008] Bus LR 1304 | Decision-maker constrained by honesty, good faith, absence of irrationality | Quoted as comprehensive summary of contractual review standard |
Hayes v Willoughby [2013] 1 WLR 935 | Distinction between rationality and reasonableness | Used to explain mental-process review |
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 | Lord Diplock’s definition of “irrationality” | Paralleled to contractual setting |
R v West London Coroner ex p Gray [1988] QB 467 | Need for cogent evidence before finding of suicide | Foundation for majority’s “inherent improbability” reasoning |
The Popi M [1985] 1 WLR 948 | Where two improbable causes exist, court not obliged to choose | Supports possibility of “no opinion” outcome |
In re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563 | Only one civil standard of proof; inherent improbability requires stronger evidence | Applied to justify need for cogent evidence of suicide |
In re B (Children) [2009] AC 11 | Confirmed single civil standard of proof | Reinforced distinction between seriousness and probability |
Laker Airways v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 | Consistency with statutory purpose in public-law discretion | Cited in analogy to contractual purpose |
British Telecommunications v Telefónica O2 UK [2014] Bus LR 765 | Discretion must be exercised in good faith and for proper purpose | Supports majority’s alignment of contractual and public-law standards |
Equitable Life v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408 | Purpose-based limitation on contractual discretion | Referenced to illustrate same principle |
Clark v Nomura International plc [2000] IRLR 766 | Employer’s bonus discretion reviewable for perversity | Analogy for intensity of review in employment contracts |
Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518 | Employment as a “relational contract” | Used by concurring judgment to justify heightened scrutiny |
Keen v Commerzbank AG [2007] ICR 623 | Implied mutual duty of trust and confidence | Supports employment-specific analysis |
Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald International [2005] ICR 402 | Court’s role in reviewing discretionary bonuses | Contrasted with fact-finding discretion at issue here |
Biogen Inc v Medeva PLC [1997] RPC 1 | Appellate caution in reversing primary fact-finder | Cited by dissent to advocate deference to employer’s conclusion |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Majority (Judge C, joined by Judge D and Judge E)
- Implied term: a contractual decision must be made in good faith, for proper purpose, and rationally; “rationally” imports both limbs of Wednesbury.
- Because suicide is inherently unlikely, a rational decision-maker must require cogent evidence before forming that conclusion; Company A’s investigator and General Manager did not apply that standard.
- The investigation overlooked a clearly relevant alternative explanation—an accidental fall while checking weather—thereby breaching the first Wednesbury limb (failure to consider relevant matters).
- Positive indicators of suicide (“bullet points”) were weak; no suicide note, no psychiatric history, religious prohibition on suicide, and normal behaviour shortly before disappearance. Collectively these were insufficiently cogent.
- Employment context and the implied duty of trust and confidence justify an intensity of review comparable to public-law rationality.
- Consequently, Company A’s decision was Wednesbury unreasonable and the contractual benefit is payable.
Concurring (Judge D)
- Employment is a “relational contract”; duty of trust and confidence survives death and heightens scrutiny.
- Evidence of suicide was “paucity and insubstantial”; inherent improbability not overcome.
Dissent (Judge F, joined by Judge G)
- Court’s role is appellate/review only; must respect primary fact-finding by Company A’s investigation.
- Reports were thorough; alternative accident theory highly improbable given safety features and weather.
- Employer’s conclusion not arbitrary, capricious or irrational; majority sets review threshold unrealistically high.
Holding and Implications
HELD: Appeal allowed; contractual death-in-service benefit payable to the Plaintiff.
Direct effect: Company A must pay US $230,265 plus interest. Broader implications: The decision confirms that contractual discretions, especially in employment contexts, are subject to review akin to public-law rationality, including scrutiny of both the decision-making process and outcome. Employers must have cogent evidence before attributing death to suicide under exclusionary clauses. The judgment clarifies but does not create new precedent; it aligns contractual review standards with established administrative-law principles.
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