Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
CATT and T, R (on the applications of) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
Factual and Procedural Background
These conjoined appeals concern two separate challenges to the police practice of retaining personal data on searchable databases:
- Respondent 1 is an elderly political demonstrator whose attendance at public protests was recorded between 2005 and 2011 and stored within a national “Domestic Extremism” database. He has never been convicted of any offence arising from those events.
- Respondent 2 received a “Prevention of Harassment” letter after an isolated verbal altercation with a neighbour in 2010. The letter and an associated incident log were stored on the Metropolitan Police electronic records system.
Both individuals accepted that initial recording of the incidents was lawful, but contended that subsequent retention violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Their applications failed at first instance, succeeded on appeal, and were ultimately heard together before the Supreme Court on the present appeals by the Appellant Police Commissioner.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does the systematic retention of non-intrusively obtained, publicly sourced personal data engage the “private life” protected by Article 8(1) ECHR?
- If Article 8 is engaged, is the retention:
- “In accordance with the law” for the purposes of Article 8(2)?
- Proportionate to the legitimate aims of public safety and the prevention or detection of crime?
- Do the differing factual contexts of Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 require separate proportionality analyses?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), the statutory Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information and associated guidance together provide a clear, enforceable legal regime; retention is therefore “in accordance with the law.”
- Retention is necessary for legitimate policing purposes: risk assessment, investigation of crime, understanding protest-group tactics and cross-referencing potential patterns of harassment.
- The information is neither intimate nor sensitive; periodic review and strict non-disclosure safeguards render the interference with privacy minimal and proportionate.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Article 8 is engaged because systematic storage—even of public-domain facts—interferes with personal autonomy.
- The regulatory framework is too discretionary and unpredictable, permitting arbitrary retention contrary to the “in accordance with law” requirement.
- Retention is disproportionate: Respondent 1 is a peaceful protestor of advanced age posing no threat, while Respondent 2’s single minor incident could not justify seven- or twelve-year storage periods.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 | Broad scope of “private life” under Article 8 | Affirmed that personal autonomy extends beyond classic privacy interests. |
| Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 | “Reasonable expectation of privacy” test | Adopted as domestic measure for determining Article 8 engagement. |
| Kinloch v HM Advocate [2013] 2 AC 93 | Public-domain acts may still attract Article 8 protection | Supported engagement where systematic recording occurs. |
| Rotaru v Romania (2000) 8 BHRC 449 | Public information can engage Article 8 if systematically stored | Relied on to hold that police databases interfere with private life. |
| Segerstedt Wiberg v Sweden (2007) 44 EHRR 2 | Same principle as Rotaru | Cited for systematic storage as an interference. |
| PG v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 51 | Need for systematic or permanent record to engage Article 8 | Used to distinguish mere observation from database retention. |
| Bouchacourt v France (2009) ECHR 2276 | Mere storage of data engages Article 8 | Reinforced necessity of justification for retention. |
| S v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 | Requirement of clear safeguards on duration and usage of retained data | Benchmarked adequacy of UK safeguards. |
| R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police [2006] 2 AC 307 | “In accordance with the law” demands protection against arbitrariness | Framework evaluated against this standard. |
| MM v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 1906 | Mandatory disclosure without safeguards violates Article 8 | Distinguished: current cases involve retention, not mandatory disclosure. |
| R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2015] AC 49 | Disclosure provisions must include rational assessment of risk | Distinguished on same basis as MM. |
| R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2004] 1 WLR 2196 | Earlier, more permissive approach to DNA retention | Noted as having been overtaken by later jurisprudence. |
| Chief Constable of Humberside Police v Information Commissioner [2010] 1 WLR 1136 | Old approach to retention of conviction data | Similarly noted as superseded. |
| R (GC) v Commissioner of Police [2011] 1 WLR 1230 | Tighter proportionality scrutiny of DNA retention | Part of evolution toward more exacting standards. |
| Brunet v France (2014) App 21010/10 | Retention must be time-limited and safeguarded | Cited in proportionality discussion for both respondents. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Engagement of Article 8. The Court confirmed that systematic storage of information, even if gathered publicly and without intrusion, triggers Article 8 protection.
Legality. The Data Protection Act 1998, the statutory Code of Practice and detailed guidance collectively supply accessible, foreseeable rules with enforceable safeguards—satisfying the “in accordance with law” criterion. Discretion within that framework is limited, reviewable by the Information Commissioner and the courts, and thus not arbitrary.
Proportionality – Respondent 1. The retained data comprised only dates, locations and the fact of attendance at demonstrations. No sensitive biometrics or covert material were involved. Retention served three policing purposes: (i) risk assessment for future protests, (ii) investigation of offences that do occur, and (iii) mapping leadership, organisation and cross-links among extremist groups. The Court emphasised that intelligence value often emerges only retrospectively and that removing every non-suspect’s name would severely diminish database utility. Periodic reviews, deletion of the respondent’s photograph and large-scale weeding following an Inspectorate report evidenced functioning safeguards. The interference was therefore minimal and justified.
Proportionality – Respondent 2. The warning letter legitimately aimed to forestall a potential “course of conduct” under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and to evidence prior notice. However, retaining the letter for seven years and the incident log for twelve would rarely be defensible for a single, minor allegation. In practice, the police deleted both after two-and-a-half years once no further incidents arose. The Court held that this actual retention period, coupled with demonstrated policy flexibility, fell within proportional bounds.
Dissenting View. Judge Toulson would have struck down retention relating to Respondent 1 as disproportionate, stressing the absence of any personal wrongdoing and the citizen’s right not to be catalogued indefinitely for lawful protest. The majority disagreed, finding adequate policing justification.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: APPEALS ALLOWED; BOTH CLAIMS DISMISSED.
For Respondent 1, the Court reinstated the first-instance decision, validating continued retention of protest-attendance data. For Respondent 2, while criticising the template harassment letter, the Court found actual retention duration lawful.
Implications. The judgment confirms that:
- Police may systematically retain non-intrusive, public-domain personal data where robust statutory and administrative safeguards exist.
- Proportionality analysis is context-specific; minor incidents do not justify lengthy, inflexible retention, but actual practice—not stated maximums—determines legality.
- Challenges to retention should ordinarily proceed through Data Protection Act mechanisms before resorting to judicial review.
The decision does not create new precedent on disclosure regimes but clarifies acceptable parameters for data retention in law-enforcement databases.
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