Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
New London College Ltd, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
Factual and Procedural Background
Under the points-based immigration system, an educational institution must hold a Tier 4 sponsor licence before it may issue a Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies (“CAS”) to non-EEA students.
Company A held such a licence until 18 December 2009, when the Defendant suspended it for alleged breaches of sponsorship duties. After considering representations, the Defendant revoked the licence on 5 July 2010 and, following an internal review, confirmed that decision on 19 August 2010. Company A sought judicial review. It succeeded in part before Judge Williams but failed in the Court of Appeal, and now appeals to the Supreme Court.
Company B became a licensed sponsor on 9 March 2011. It progressed from a probationary “B-rating” to an “A-rating” but, after regulatory changes, all sponsors were required to obtain “Highly Trusted Sponsor” (“HTS”) status by April 2012. Company B’s application for HTS status was refused on 23 August 2012 because more than 20 % of its sponsored students had subsequently been refused leave. Its judicial review claim failed in the Divisional Court, but it obtained a leap-frog appeal to the Supreme Court under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969.
Both appeals focus on whether the Tier 4 Sponsor Guidance—containing mandatory licensing criteria—was lawfully issued without being laid before Parliament.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the mandatory requirements in the Tier 4 Sponsor Guidance are “rules” within section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 that had to be laid before Parliament, rendering decisions based on them unlawful if they were not.
- Whether paragraphs 245ZV and 245ZX of the Immigration Rules unlawfully delegate immigration control to educational sponsors.
- Whether the Defendant possessed statutory (or other) authority to operate a sponsor-licensing system at all if the Guidance fell outside section 3(2).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The Sponsor Guidance imposes mandatory conditions that determine whether a migrant will obtain leave; therefore it is a “rule” under section 3(2) and had to be laid before Parliament.
- Because it was not laid, the Defendant’s decisions revoking or refusing licences were ultra vires.
- Requiring sponsors to decide key matters (e.g., genuineness of study) amounted to an unlawful delegation of immigration control.
- If the Guidance is unlawful, Company A’s licence withdrawal and Company B’s refusal of HTS status should be quashed.
Defendant’s Arguments
- The Guidance regulates sponsors, not migrants; migrants need only hold a valid CAS from a licensed sponsor, a requirement already contained in the Immigration Rules.
- Accordingly, the Guidance is outside the scope of section 3(2) and need not be laid before Parliament.
- No unlawful delegation occurs because immigration officers retain power to refuse entry or leave even where a CAS has been issued.
- The Sponsor-licensing scheme is an incidental administrative power necessarily implied by the Immigration Act 1971.
Interveners’ Arguments (Companies C and D)
- Put a “radical” alternative: if the Guidance is outside section 3(2), there is no statutory authority at all for a sponsor-licensing system; consequently, every sponsor licence would be unlawful.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R (Munir) v Secretary of State [2012] 1 WLR 2192 | Immigration control must be exercised under statutory, not prerogative, powers; rules require parliamentary laying. | Cited to confirm that section 3(2) is the sole source of rule-making authority for entry and stay. |
| R (Alvi) v Secretary of State [2012] 1 WLR 2208 | A “rule” is any requirement non-compliance with which results in refusal of leave. | Major reference point for deciding whether sponsor-licence criteria are “rules” regarding migrants. |
| ZH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State [2009] Imm AR 450 | Distinction between rules (with legal effect) and internal instructions (without). | Used to illustrate why Guidance affecting migrants would require laying, unlike internal instructions. |
| MO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State [2009] 1 WLR 1230 | Immigration Rules can create individual rights enforceable on appeal. | Supports analysis that only migrant-facing requirements engage section 3(2). |
| R (Barry) v Liverpool Council [2001] EWCA Civ 384 | Incidental administrative powers may be implied from statutory functions. | Analogy used in concurring judgment to justify vetting of educational sponsors. |
| Hazell v Hammersmith LBC [1992] 2 AC 1 | Scope of implied/incidental powers must be assessed by reference to the statute. | Relied upon by concurring judgment when analysing implied powers under section 1(4). |
| R (Hooper) v Secretary of State [2005] 1 WLR 1681 | Discussion of “third-source” governmental powers. | Mentioned and doubted; court preferred statutory implication over “third source.” |
| Shrewsbury & Atcham BC v Secretary of State [2008] 3 All ER 548 | Limits of non-statutory executive powers. | Cited in examining, then rejecting, reliance on a broad “third-source” theory. |
| R v Secretary of State for Health ex p C [2000] 1 FLR 627 | Corporation-sole theory of governmental capacity. | Referenced in discussion of the potential (but unnecessary) common-law basis for administrative action. |
| Pankina v Secretary of State [2011] QB 376 | Guidance cannot be used to impose substantive immigration requirements not in the Rules. | Appears in concurring judgment when reviewing later regulatory amendments. |
| Attorney-General v Great Eastern Railway Co (1880) 5 App Cas 473 | Any implied power must be linked to and limited by the statute granting functions. | Supports need to trace incidental powers back to section 1(4). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Unlawful Delegation Argument. The court held that immigration officers retain the final decision on entry or stay through general grounds of refusal. A CAS is persuasive but not conclusive; therefore, no unlawful delegation occurs.
2. Whether the Sponsor Guidance Is a “Rule” Under Section 3(2). Applying Alvi, Judge Sumption reasoned that section 3(2) covers only requirements that, if unmet by the migrant, cause refusal of leave. The Guidance regulates sponsors, not migrants; thus it falls outside section 3(2) and need not be laid before Parliament.
3. Statutory Authority to Operate the Licensing System. Even if the Guidance is outside section 3(2), the Defendant possesses implied administrative powers ancillary to her statutory duty under section 1(4) to arrange for student admissions. Licensing and vetting of educational institutions are reasonable, non-coercive conditions of participation and are neither irrational nor inconsistent with the Act or the Rules.
4. Concurring Analysis. Judge Carnwath agreed in the result but located the implied power more narrowly within section 1(4) rather than the “general system of immigration control.” He emphasised that parts of the Guidance are clearly “rules” in the ordinary sense but accepted that, per Alvi, only migrant-facing rules must be laid before Parliament.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEALS DISMISSED.
Both Company A and Company B failed. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Tier 4 Sponsor Guidance notwithstanding its not having been laid before Parliament, and confirmed that the Defendant acted lawfully in revoking Company A’s licence and refusing Company B’s HTS status.
Implications: The decision secures the legal foundation of the sponsor-licensing regime critical to Tier 4 immigration control. Educational institutions must continue to comply with the Guidance; migrants remain unaffected provided they obtain a CAS from a licensed sponsor. No new precedent was set on parliamentary procedure, but the Court clarified the boundary between migrant-facing “rules” and sponsor-facing administrative measures.
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