Sharif v The London Borough of Camden

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent, who had been accepted as homeless, was owed the full housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 by the Appellant local authority. The Appellant initially housed the Respondent, her father (in his sixties and in poor health) and her teenage sister in a three-bedroom house obtained under a private sector leasing scheme. In November 2009 the Appellant sought to discharge its duty by offering two separate, self-contained studio flats on the same hostel floor—one for the Respondent and her sister and one for their father, a few yards away.

The Respondent refused the offer as unsuitable, arguing that her father’s health required the family to live within a single unit. The Appellant treated the refusal as bringing its obligation to an end. After an internal review upheld that stance, the Respondent appealed to The Court under section 204 of the 1996 Act. The trial judge (Judge Mitchell) dismissed the appeal, but the Court of Appeal (Judges Etherton, Jacob and Wilson) allowed it, holding that section 176 requires a single unit of accommodation. The Appellant obtained permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, on the proper construction of section 176 of the Housing Act 1996, a housing authority can discharge its duty by offering two separate self-contained units that are close together, or whether the statute mandates provision of a single unit so the family can “live together.”

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The purpose of Part VII is to keep families together, but that purpose can be achieved where separate units are “sufficiently proximate”; the focus should be on practical togetherness, not a single unit.
• The statutory language is neutral: “accommodation” is not synonymous with “unit,” and Parliament did not impose a communal-space requirement.
• Requiring one unit with communal living space would impose an unwarranted burden on housing authorities with limited stock.
• Analogous authorities (e.g., Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins) show that neither “accommodation” nor “living together” imports facility-based limitations such as cooking areas.

Respondent's Arguments

• The ordinary meaning of “available for occupation … together with” implies that all family members must reside in the same unit; separate self-contained flats, however close, do not satisfy that requirement.
• The test is objective: the accommodation must permit normal family life within it; split units without shared space fail that test.
• Allowing multi-unit provision risks undermining Parliament’s policy of keeping families together.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The majority (Judges Carnwath, Walker, Hope and Hale) held that the statutory phrase “available for occupation … together with” does not compel provision of a single housing unit. They reasoned as follows:

• “Accommodation” is a neutral word; Parliament did not equate it with “unit of accommodation.”
• The obligation is satisfied if the family can, in practical terms, live together; that may be in one or in multiple adjacent units, depending on factual judgment by the authority.
• The Review Officer’s factual conclusion—that the two flats, only yards apart, allowed caregiving and family interaction comparable to a house with two floors—was neither irrational nor ultra vires.
• Imposing a communal-space requirement would constitute judicial amendment of clear statutory language and could produce anomalies: a seriously overcrowded single flat might count, while two adjacent flats would not.
• Precedents such as Puhlhofer, Surdonja and Langford support a proximity-based, not unit-based, approach.
• The statute already provides separate safeguards (e.g., “suitability,” “reasonableness”) for quality; those were not in dispute on this appeal.

Judge Kerr dissented, concluding that the language and purpose of section 176 require one physical unit so the family can reside as a single entity.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED; the trial judge’s order dismissing the Respondent’s section 204 appeal is restored.

Consequently, a housing authority may, in appropriate circumstances, discharge its Part VII duty by offering more than one self-contained unit, provided the units are sufficiently proximate to enable the family to live “together.” The decision clarifies that the statute does not impose a mandatory communal-space or single-unit requirement; suitability remains a separate, fact-sensitive inquiry. No new broad precedent was set beyond this interpretative clarification of section 176.