Factual and Procedural Background
On 10 September 2002, the stewards of Company A ("the appellants") found the Appellee in breach of Company A's rules of racing, directing a reprimand and a fine. After a hearing lasting approximately ten days, Judge A declared on 8 December 2004 that the stewards' decision was reached in breach of Company A's implied obligation of fairness under the contract between the Appellee and Company A, rendering the decision of no effect. The present appeal was brought with permission of Judge A.
Company A is a company limited by guarantee responsible for regulating greyhound racing in the United Kingdom, overseeing numerous racecourses including Racecourse A, which is central to this case. Company A's functions include licensing racecourses, trainers, and officials; issuing rules of racing; and disciplining conduct within the sport.
Stewards appointed by Company A conduct inquiries into breaches of the rules. The Appellee was a licensed trainer and owner of a greyhound ("the greyhound") who competed at Racecourse A. The greyhound tested positive for the drug hexamine following a race on 11 May 2002. The Appellee denied administering the drug, suggesting it was given by a third party or due to contamination.
An inquiry was held on 10 September 2002 by six stewards, including a veterinary steward with prior professional connections to Racecourse A. The inquiry lasted between one and two hours, after which the stewards found the Appellee in breach of the rules. The Appellee challenged the fairness of the inquiry, alleging procedural unfairness and apparent bias, leading to the subsequent judicial review proceedings and appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the veterinary steward exhibited apparent bias in the inquiry process.
- Whether the presence of the chief executive of Company A during the stewards' deliberations constituted procedural unfairness or apparent bias.
- Whether the overall disciplinary process complied with the implied obligation of fairness under the contract between the parties.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellee's Arguments
- The veterinary steward demonstrated actual and apparent bias through an aggressive attitude and preconceived views, undermining the fairness of the inquiry.
- The security arrangements at Racecourse A were insufficient, allowing for the possibility that a third party administered hexamine to the greyhound.
- The presence of the chief executive of Company A during the stewards' private deliberations was a breach of natural justice and procedural fairness.
- The Appellee did not waive the right to object to the veterinary steward's participation due to lack of knowledge about his connections.
Appellants' Arguments
- The veterinary steward's prior professional relationship with Racecourse A and its officials was purely professional, ceased months before the inquiry, and did not give rise to bias.
- The veterinary steward's robust questioning was appropriate in inquisitorial proceedings and did not amount to bias.
- The chief executive's presence during deliberations was customary, he did not participate in decision-making, and did not affect the fairness of the inquiry.
- The Appellee failed to challenge the decisions not to reopen the inquiry and did not demonstrate procedural unfairness affecting the outcome.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Law v Company A [1983] 1 WLR 1302 |
Stewards as domestic tribunal exercising contractual powers. |
Confirmed the contractual basis of stewards' jurisdiction and the domestic tribunal status. |
| Modahl v British Athletic Federation Limited [2002] 1 WLR 1192 |
Courts' approach to fairness in sporting disciplinary processes. |
Emphasised courts should allow sporting bodies latitude consistent with fairness. |
| Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 |
Test for apparent bias: real possibility of bias from the viewpoint of a fair-minded observer. |
Applied to assess alleged bias of the veterinary steward and presence of chief executive. |
| R v Gough [1993] AC 646 |
Previous test for apparent bias. |
Referenced in relation to the development of the bias test harmonised with European Convention on Human Rights. |
| Re Medicaments and Related Classes Goods (No. 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 |
Two-stage test for apparent bias and principles of natural justice. |
Guided the court's analysis of bias allegations in the domestic tribunal context. |
| Locabail (UK) Limited v Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] 2 QB 451 |
Consideration of circumstances relevant to apparent bias. |
Supported the contextual approach to bias allegations. |
| R v Inner West London Coroner ex parte Dallaglio [1994] 4 All ER 139 |
Definition of bias as unfair predisposition unconnected with merits. |
Clarified meaning of bias in the context of tribunal conduct. |
| Nwabueze v General Medical Council [2000] 1 WLR 1760 |
Qualifications and impartiality of tribunal members with relevant expertise. |
Supported the appropriateness of the veterinary steward’s expertise despite prior connections. |
| Man O'War Station Limited v Oakland City Council [2002] UKPC 28 |
Effect of prior professional associations on impartiality. |
Held prior professional contacts do not necessarily raise bias concerns. |
| Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574 |
Use of experience and opinion by domestic sporting tribunals. |
Endorsed stewards’ reliance on expertise and experience in sporting disciplinary proceedings. |
| Cooper v Wilson [1937] KB 309 |
Rule against non-members participating in tribunal deliberations. |
Considered in relation to chief executive’s presence during deliberations; court found no unfairness as no improper participation occurred. |
| R v Chelsea and Westminster Health Care NHS Trust ex parte L (1997, unreported) |
“Brooding presence” doctrine in bias cases. |
Discussed as part of categorising outsider influence on tribunals. |
| Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemical Limited v Davy McKee (UK) London Limited [2002] EWCA Civ 1396 |
Evidence and cross-examination principles. |
Applied to reject challenge to un-cross-examined evidence from stewards about deliberations. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed examination of the allegations of apparent bias against the veterinary steward. It acknowledged his prior professional relationship with Racecourse A and its officials but found that relationship to be professional, ceased before the inquiry, and did not compromise his impartiality. The court emphasized the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings, where robust questioning by stewards with expertise is appropriate and necessary to test evidence.
Applying the legal test from Porter v Magill, the court concluded that no fair-minded and informed observer would perceive a real possibility of bias arising from the steward’s conduct or relationships. The court rejected the judge below’s contrary conclusion as an erroneous application of the test.
Regarding the presence of the chief executive during the stewards' deliberations, the court found that although best practice would have been for him to leave, the uncontradicted evidence showed he did not participate in decision-making. The chief executive’s role was administrative and advisory only, without voting rights or influence on the outcome. The court held that the appearance of unfairness was not sufficient to invalidate the proceedings where no actual unfairness occurred.
The court further reflected on the overall fairness of the process and the outcome, noting the undisputed positive drug test and the improbability of the Appellee’s explanation that a third party administered the drug. The court stressed the importance of allowing sporting regulatory bodies latitude to manage disciplinary matters, provided fundamental fairness is observed.
In sum, the court found no procedural unfairness or bias sufficient to overturn the stewards’ decision and concluded that the tribunal’s finding was just.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed.
The court overturned the lower court’s finding of apparent bias against the veterinary steward and procedural unfairness related to the chief executive’s presence at deliberations. The stewards’ decision that the Appellee breached the rules by administering hexamine to the greyhound stands as a fair and lawful determination. The ruling reinforces the principle that sporting disciplinary bodies should be afforded broad discretion to regulate their sports, subject to fundamental fairness, and that courts should not lightly interfere with domestic tribunal decisions absent clear unfairness or illegality. No new precedent was established beyond the application of established principles of apparent bias and procedural fairness in the context of sporting regulatory proceedings.