Robinson, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Factual and Procedural Background

On 19 October 2005, the appellant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for robbery committed on 7 December 2004. The appellant was released after serving two-thirds of the sentence but was recalled on 6 August 2008. Due to being unlawfully at large, the appellant did not return to prison until arrested on 4 September 2008. Section 50A was inserted into the Criminal Justice Act 1991 on 14 July 2008 before the recall, changing the release provisions so that the appellant was not entitled to automatic release after serving three-quarters of the sentence but could only be released on the recommendation of the Parole Board or by the Secretary of State. The appellant was eventually released on 26 February 2010. The appellant challenged the retrospective effect of this legislative change on his sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the removal of the appellant's entitlement to automatic release after three-quarters of his sentence constituted a retrospective change to the sentence originally imposed, contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. Whether the provisions relating to release and recall relate to the administration or execution of the sentence rather than to the sentence itself passed by the Crown Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The appellant contended that the removal of his entitlement to automatic release after three-quarters of the sentence amounted to a retrospective interference with the sentence imposed by the sentencing court, violating Article 6 of the Convention.
• The appellant's counsel argued that sentencing judges consider the legislative framework on early release when determining the appropriate sentence, and thus changes to that framework after sentencing interfere with the sentence itself.
• He relied on the principle that the legislative framework informs the sentencing level, so altering it retrospectively changes the sentence imposed.
• The appellant also relied on Strasbourg jurisprudence to support the contention that such legislative changes interfere with the sentence.

Respondent's Arguments

• This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed whether the legislative change removing automatic release after three-quarters of the sentence altered the sentence imposed or merely affected its execution. It relied on established jurisprudence distinguishing the sentence passed by the court from the administration of that sentence, such as release and recall provisions. The court cited domestic authorities including the Practice Statement (Crime: Sentencing) 1992, which instructs that sentencing judges should not consider early release regimes when determining sentence length. The court also referred to Strasbourg case law affirming that conditional release and parole decisions are administrative matters outside Article 6 scope.

The court acknowledged the appellant's argument that legislative changes to release provisions interfere with the sentence, but rejected it, emphasizing that the sentence of five years remained unchanged. The legislative changes only affected the administration of the sentence. The court distinguished this case from M v Germany, where retrospective extension of detention broke the link between sentence and custody, imposing a heavier penalty. Here, no such retrospective penalty was imposed.

Consequently, the court agreed with the earlier judgment that section 50A provisions relate to the execution of the sentence and do not alter the sentence imposed by the Crown Court.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court held that the appellant's sentence of five years remained unchanged by the legislative amendments affecting release provisions. The removal of automatic release after three-quarters of the sentence was a matter of sentence administration, not the sentence itself. The appeal was dismissed accordingly. This decision directly affects the parties by upholding the validity of the legislative scheme but does not establish new legal precedent beyond reaffirming established principles distinguishing sentencing from its execution.