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Case Number

C.M.W.P No. 30115 of 2006

Attorney(S)

M.A.Haseen

Judges

Dr. B.S Chauhan
Dilip Gupta, JJ.

Acts

Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called C.P.C.).
provisions of Order XXI, Rule 32 and of Order XXXIX, Rule 2 (iii), C.P.C.
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971
provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C.,
provisions of Order, XXI, Rule 32, C.P.C.
Order XXXIX, Rule 2 (iii), C.P.C.
Rule 2A of Order XXXIX, C.P.C.
Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C.
Order XXXIX, Rule 1, C.P.C.,
provisions of Act, 1971.
Order XXI, Rule 32

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: B.S. Chauhan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner initiated Suit No. 477 of 2003 and sought an interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. The trial court rejected the injunction application by order dated 15.7.2003. The petitioner preferred Revision No. 12 of 2003; the revisional court granted an injunction by order dated 18.11.2004 restraining the respondents from interfering with the petitioner's peaceful possession and occupation of the disputed premises. That revisional order was not complied with. The petitioner then applied under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. before the trial court; that application was rejected on 2.7.2005 on the ground that enforcement of the civil court's order was for the police administration. A revision against that rejection was dismissed on 28.7.2005. A writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution (Writ No. 319 of 2006) was dismissed as withdrawn on 4.1.2006 with liberty to approach the appropriate forum. The petitioner alleges continued harassment by respondents despite the interim injunction and seeks enforcement.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. empowers the civil court to enforce an interim injunction and to impose detention or attachment for disobedience of the injunction.
Whether proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A are analogous to contempt proceedings and prevail over the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether a civil court (or the High Court in appropriate circumstances) can direct the police administration to ensure compliance of its interim orders when those orders are being wilfully disobeyed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Despite the interim injunction granted by the revisional court in her favour, the respondents continued to harass and interfere with her peaceful possession.
The courts below declined to enforce the injunction, stating that enforcement was the duty of the police administration, thereby leaving the petitioner without effective relief.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj	That any action taken in contravention of a Court order is a nullity as done in disobedience of the interim order.	Used to support the proposition that disobedience of court orders produces nullities and must be addressed by enforcement mechanisms.
Surjit Singh and Ors. v. Harbans Singh and Ors.; Government of A.P. v. Gudepu Sailoo and Ors.	Reiteration of the same view regarding enforcement/disobedience of injunctions.	Referenced as corroborative authorities reaffirming the settled position on enforcement of injunctions.
State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari (Constitution Bench)	Held that the provisions deal with wilful defiance of orders passed by the civil court; proceedings are for enforcement/effectuation of an order of execution.	Employed to characterize proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A as enforcement-oriented and analogous to execution proceedings.
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Ors. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd.	Held that disobedience of an injunction may be punished even if the court that granted the injunction ultimately lacked jurisdiction; as long as the order is in force it must be obeyed.	Applied to reject the contention that lack of jurisdiction of the injunction-granting court absolves a respondent from punishment for disobedience.
Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan (AIR 1998 SC 2765)	Held that under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, the civil court can order detention or attach property, and both may be resorted to; attachment is coercive to enforce compliance while detention is punitive/coercive.	Quoted and relied upon to explain the dual remedial/punitive aspects of Rule 2A and the purposes of attachment and detention.
Ram Rup Pandey v. R.K. Bhargava and Ors.; Smt. Indu Tewari v. Ram Bahadur Chaudhari and Ors.; Rudraiah Company v. State of Karnataka and Ors.; Papanna v. Nagachari; Smt. Savitri Devi v. Civil Judge (S.D.) Gorakhpur	Support for the proposition that the special provision (Order XXXIX, Rule 2A) shall prevail over the general law of contempt contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; and that High Court should not entertain petitions under the Act, 1971 in such cases.	Used to show that proceedings under Rule 2A are the appropriate route and that the Contempt Act is not the parallel mechanism for these cases.
Md. Jamal Paramanik and Ors. v. Md. Amanullah Munshi (Gauhati High Court)	Held that it is not permissible for a court to impose a fine or compensation as punishment under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A because the rule does not provide for it.	Invoked to note limits on the kinds of punishment that can be imposed under Rule 2A.
Thakorlal Parshottamdas v. Chandulal Chunnilal (AIR 1967 Guj 124)	Held that punishment for breach of interim injunction could not be set aside merely because the injunction was ultimately vacated by the appellate court.	Referred to support the proposition that disobedience consequences survive subsequent vacatur of injunction.
Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh	Held that if an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A is filed but the suit is withdrawn during its pendency, the Court may not be justified in passing punishment at that stage.	Noted as a distinguishing authority that provides a caveat where the suit itself is withdrawn during pendency of enforcement proceedings.
Sitaram v. Ganesh Das	Explained that Rule 2A's purpose is to enforce injunction orders; it parallels Order XXI, Rule 32 (execution of decrees for injunction) and the modes (attachment/detention) are similar and are intended to effect compliance rather than merely punish.	Used to explain the curative and coercive function of Rule 2A and the rationale for lifting imprisonment when compliance occurs.
Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza	Held that violation of an injunction or an undertaking is punishable under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A even if the substantive matter has been disposed of; the focus is on disobedience while the injunction was in force.	Relied upon to reinforce that punishment may be imposed based solely on the fact of disobedience while the injunction subsisted.
Eastern Trust Co. v. Makenzie Mann and Co. Ltd. (Privy Council, AIR 1915 PC 106)	Authority for the proposition that "An injunction, although subsequently discharged because the plaintiff's case failed, must be obeyed while it lasts."	Quoted to support the proposition that an injunction must be obeyed during its operative life irrespective of later discharge.
K.L. Viramani v. IIIrd A.D.J. and Ors. (AIR 1992 All 326)	Held that once a Court is satisfied that an interim order has been disobeyed, there is no justification for the Court not to initiate enforcement proceedings.	Applied to emphasize the duty of courts to proceed with enforcement when disobedience is established.
Rameshwar Lal v. Municipal Council, Tonk and Ors.	Expresses the settled proposition that a party cannot be left remedyless.	Invoked to underline the obligation of courts to provide effective relief and not leave litigants without remedy.
K.S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and Ors.; A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Anr.; Tilokchand Motichand and Ors. v. H.B. Munshi; Jai Singh v. Union of India and Ors.; Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority v. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. and Ors.	Authorities cited for the principle that ordinarily a writ court should not interfere where a suit or appropriate forum is pending.	Referred to as examples where interference by the writ court would not be appropriate; used to show the general rule against intervention in pending suits.
Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors.	Held that in extraordinary circumstances a writ court may exercise discretionary jurisdiction even if the party has approached another forum; courts cannot be silent spectators where orders are sought to be violated with impunity.	Relied upon to justify exceptional intervention by the writ court or High Court when orders of a Court are being wilfully violated and extraordinary circumstances exist.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recording the factual matrix: the revisional court had granted an injunction which was not complied with, and lower civil courts had taken the position that the police administration must enforce the order. The Court then analyzed the statutory framework and existing authorities concerning Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C.

Key points of the Court's reasoning as stated in the opinion:

Order XXXIX, Rule 2A provides power to enforce orders of injunction and to impose punishment for disobedience; actions taken in contravention of a court order are nullities (para 4).
Precedents (including a Constitution Bench and various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts) establish that proceedings under Rule 2A deal with wilful defiance and are analogous to contempt proceedings but are taken under the special provisions of the Code (paras 6–11).
The Court referred to authorities which explain that under Rule 2A attachment of property is a means to compel obedience and detention in civil prison is a mode of punishment/coercion; both measures may be employed where facts justify them (paras 8–9, 11).
The special statutory scheme in Rule 2A prevails over the general Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the High Court should not entertain a petition under that Act where Rule 2A is the applicable remedy (para 9).
There are limits: some authorities indicate that fine/compensation are not permissible under Rule 2A; other decisions offer distinctions where proceedings may be inappropriate (e.g., if a suit is withdrawn during pendency) (para 11).
The Court emphasized the duty of civil courts to enforce their orders and not to remain silent spectators, and that the statute confers the necessary powers to enable enforcement, including attachment and detention for up to three months (paras 16–17).
Given the factual situation where the interim order was being disobeyed and the civil courts had failed to secure compliance, the Court found that extraordinary steps were warranted to prevent erosion of judicial authority (paras 16, 20–21).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court directed the civil court to issue necessary orders to the Superintendent of Police, Kaushambi, to take all measures to ensure compliance with the interim orders passed by the civil court, and directed the Superintendent of Police to ensure compliance forthwith and to file a personal affidavit within three weeks explaining why the interim order could not be complied with.

Specific operative directions contained in the opinion:

Learned standing counsel was directed to take notice for respondent Nos. 1 to 7; notice was issued to respondent Nos. 8 to 12 returnable in four weeks (para 21).
The civil court was directed to issue necessary orders to the Superintendent of Police, Kaushambi, to ensure compliance of its interim orders "at the earliest" and "forthwith" (para 22).
The Superintendent of Police, Kaushambi, was directed to file a personal affidavit within three weeks detailing the circumstances under which the interim order could not be complied with (para 22).
The matter was listed for hearing on 6.7.2006 (para 23).

Implications:

Direct effect on parties: the Court has compelled administrative involvement (the Superintendent of Police) to secure compliance with the revisional court's interim injunction and required an affidavit explaining non-compliance; the matter was listed for further hearing.
Broader implications: the opinion reiterates established principles concerning Order XXXIX, Rule 2A (that it empowers enforcement including attachment and detention, and that it operates in a manner analogous to contempt proceedings but under the special statutory scheme). The opinion does not state that it is creating a new legal precedent beyond applying and synthesizing existing authority; its immediate effect is to secure enforcement in the present matter.

This summary is strictly confined to the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what is explicitly present in the text.

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Smt. Jagannathiya v. State Of U.P Through Secretary Home, U.P Lucknow And Others

JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.

1. This writ petition reveals a very sorry state of affair, wherein the learned civil court and the revisional court expressed their inability to enforce the order passed by them, leaving the hapless litigant on the mercy of the so called police administration.

2. The present petitioner filed a Suit No. 477 of 2003 along with an application for injunction, under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called C.P.C.). The said application was rejected by the trial court vide order dated 15.7.2003. Being aggrieved. Revision No. 12 of 2003 was preferred and the revisional court granted the injunction vide order dated 18.11.2004, to the effect that the respondents were restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession and occupation of the petitioner in respect of the premises in dispute. The order passed by the revisional court was not complied with. Therefore, petitioner filed an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. before the trial court, which stood rejected vide order dated 2nd July, 2005, observing that once the order is passed by the civil court, it is for the police administration to ensure its compliance. Therefore, the party may approach the police authorities. Unfortunately, revision preferred against the said order also stood dismissed vide order dated 28.7.2005, and Writ No. 319 of 2006 under Article 227 of the Constitution also stood dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 4.1.2006, with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum. Hence this petition.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in spite of the interim injunction in her favour, the respondents are harassing and interfering with her peaceful possession, with all impunity, and the courts below have expressed their inability observing that it is the duty of the police administration to enforce the orders passed by the Courts.

4. Order XXXIX, Rule 2A deals with the power to enforce the order passed by the Court and impose the punishment. It is settled legal proposition that any action taken in contravention of the order of the Court is a nullity as having been done in disobedience of the interim order of the Court. Vide Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj .

5. Similar view has been reiterated in Surjit Singh and Ors. v. Harbans Singh and Ors. and Government of A.P. v. Gudepu Sailoo and Ors. .

6. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari , has categorically held that the said provisions deal with the wilful defiance of the order passed by the civil court.

7. In Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Ors. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with a case of disobedience of an injunction passed under Order XXXIX, Rule 1, C.P.C., wherein the contention was raised that the proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A cannot be initiated and no punishment can be imposed for disobedience of the order because the civil court, which granted the Injunction, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Apex Court rejected the contention holding that a party aggrieved of the order has a right to ask the Court to vacate the injunction pointing out to it that it had no jurisdiction or approach the higher court for setting aside that order, but so long the order remains in force, the party cannot be permitted to disobey it or avoid punishment for disobedience on any ground, including that the Court had no jurisdiction, even if ultimately the Court comes to the conclusion that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The party, who willingly disobeys the order and acts in violation of such an injunction, runs the risk for facing the consequence of punishment.

8. In Samee Khan v. Bindu. Khan 1999 (1) AWC 18 (SC) : AIR 1998 SC 2765, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the power under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C., the civil court has a power either to order detention for disobedience of the disobeying party or attaching his property and if the circumstances and facts of the case so demand, both steps can also be resorted to. The Apex Court held as under:

But the position under rule 2a of order xxxix is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside the disobedience does not get erased. It may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside. For what purpose the property is to be attached in the case of disobedience of the order of injunction? Sub-rule (2) provides that if the disobedience or breach continues beyond one year from the date of attachment the Court is empowered to sell the property under attachment and compensate the affected party from such sale proceeds. In other words, attachment will continue only till the breach continues or the disobedience persists subject to a limit of one year period. If the disobedience ceases to continue in the meanwhile the attachment also would cease. Thus, even under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A the attachment is a mode to compel the opposite party to obey the order of injunction. But detaining the disobedient party in civil prison is a mode of punishment for his being guilty of such disobedience.

9. Thus, in view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that the proceedings are analogous to the contempt of court proceedings but they are taken under the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. for the reason that the special provision inserted in the Code shall prevail over the general law of contempt contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, "the Act, 1971"). Even the High Court, in such a case, shall not entertain the petition under the provisions of Act, 1971. (Vide Ram Rup Pandey v. R.K. Bhargava and Ors. ; Smt. Indu Tewari v. Ram Bahadur Chaudhari and Ors. ; Rudraiah Company v. State of Kamataka and Ors. ; Papanna v. Nagachari AIR 1996 Kant 256 and Smt. Savitrt Devi v. Civil Judge (S.D.) Gorakhpur 2003 (3) AWC 1718 : (2003) 6 AIC 749 (All).

10. In Md. Jamal Paramanik and Ors. v. Md. Amanullah Munshi AIR 1989 (NOC) 50 (Gau), the Gauhati High Court held that it is not permissible for a court to impose a fine or compensation as one of the punishments, for the reason that the provisions of order xxxix, rule 2a do not provide for it. In Thakorlal Parshottamdas v. Chandulal Chunnilal AIR 1967 Guj 124, Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) held that the punishment for breach of interim injunction could not be set aside even on the ground that the injunction was ultimately vacated by the appellate court. In Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh , a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that if an interim injunction had been passed and is alleged to have been violated and application for initiating contempt proceeding under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A has been filed but during its pendency the suit itself is withdrawn, the Court may not be justified to pass order of punishment at that stage. Thus, it made a distinction from the above referred Gujarat High Court's decision in Thakorlal Parshottamdas (supra) that contempt proceedings should be initiated when the interim injunction is in operation.

11. In Sitaram v. Ganesh Das , the Court held as under:

The purpose of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. is to enforce the order of injunction. It is a provision which permits the Court to execute the injunction order. Its provisions are similar to the provisions of Order, XXI, Rule 32, C.P.C. which provide for the execution of a decree for injunction. The mode of execution given in Order XXI, Rule 32 is the same as provided in rule 2a of order xxxix. In either case, for the execution of the order or decree of injunction, attachment of property is to be made and the person who is to be compelled to obey the injunction can be detained in civil prison. The purpose is not to punish the man but to see that the decree or order is obeyed and the wrong done by disobedience of the order is remedied and the status quo ante is brought into effect. This view finds support from the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari ; while dealing with Order XXXIX, Rule 2 (iii), C.P.C. (without the U.P. Amendment) the Court held that the proceedings are in substance designed to effect enforcement of or to execute the order, and a parallel was drawn between the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 32 and of Order XXXIX, Rule 2 (iii), C.P.C. which is similar to Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. This curative function and purpose of Rule 2A of Order XXXIX, C.P.C. is also evident from the provision in rule 2a for the lifting of imprisonment, which normally would be when the order has been complied with and the coercion of imprisonment no longer remains necessary.

12. In Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza , it has been held that violation of injunction or even undertaking given before the Court, is punishable under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. The punishment can be imposed even if the matter stood disposed of, for the reason that the Court is concerned only with the question whether there was a disobedience of the order of injunction or violation of an undertaking given before the Court, and not with the ultimate decision in the matter. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Eastern Trust Co. v. Makenzie Mann and Co. Ltd. AIR 1915 PC 106, wherein it had been observed as under:

An injunction, although subsequently discharged because the plaintiffs case failed, must be obeyed while it lasts....

13. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari , observed that the purpose of such proceedings is for the enforcement or effectuation of an order of execution.

14. Thus, it is evident from the above discussion that the proceedings are analogous to the proceedings under the Act, 1971. The only distinction is that as the Legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted a special provision, enacting the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C., it would prevail over the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act.

15. In K.L. Viramani v. IIIrd A.D.J. and Ors. 1992 (3) AWC 1470 : AIR 1992 All 326, this Court held that once the Court is satisfied that interim order passed by it is disobeyed, there could be no justification for the Court not to initiate proceedings for enforcement of its order.

16. However, the Court cannot merely be a silent spectator while the order passed by the competent Court is being violated with impunity and the party is left on the mercy of the so called administration. There is not only an obligation but a solemn duty of the Court to enforce its order by all means. The Statute itself has conferred all powers upon the Court to enable it to enforce its order. The provision itself empowers the civil court to attach the property of the person guilty of disobedience or to detain him in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. The provision was inserted as it was felt to be necessary in order to maintain the dignity of the Court in the eyes of the people so that the supremacy of law may prevail and to deter the people of mustering the courage to disobey the interim injunction passed by the Court.

17. In such a fact-situation the civil court must ensure by all means that interim order passed by it is complied with and for that purpose, it should issue necessary instructions to the police if the facts so warrant, our conscious is shocked and it is beyond our imagination as how the trial court and appellate court could take such a casual and indifferent attitude.

18. It is settled legal proposition that a party cannot be rendered remedy less. (Vide Rameshwar Lal v. Municipal Council, Tonk and Ors. , The petitioner had been running from pillar to post for enforcement of the interim order passed by the revisional court but in vain. Undoubtedly, the writ court should not interfere in the matter where suit is pending. (Vide K.S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and Ors. ; A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Anr. ; Tilokchand Motichand and Ors. v. H.B. Munshi ; Jai Singh v. Union of India and Ors. and Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Bombay v. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. and Ors. .

19. However, in Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in extraordinary circumstances, writ court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction even if the party has approached the other forum. The Court held as under:

There must be extraordinary situation or circumstances, which may warrant a different approach, where the orders passed by a Court are sought to be violated or thwarted with impunity. The Court cannot be a silent spectator in such extraordinary situation.

(Emphasis added)

20. If such a course is not resorted to, the very existence of the Courts, i.e., judicial system will come in the jeopardy.

21. Learned standing counsel takes notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 7. Issue notice to respondent Nos. 8 to 12 returnable in four weeks.

22. In the fact-situation we have no option but to direct the civil court to issue necessary orders to the Superintendent of Police, Kaushambi, to take all measures to ensure the compliance of the interim orders passed by it at the earliest, and we direct the said authority to ensure its compliance forthwith. We further direct the Superintendent of Police, Kaushambi, to file his personal affidavit within a period of three weeks from today as under what circumstances the interim order passed by the trial court could not be complied with.

23. List the matter on 6.7.2006.

Smt. Jagannathiya v. State Of U.P Through Secretary Home, U.P Lucknow And Others

Judgment Summary: B.S. Chauhan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Smt. Jagannathiya v. State Of U.P Through Secretary Home, U.P Lucknow And Others

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