H.R. Department of Infosys company v. State of Telangana

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3. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.2 and Accused No.2 were employees of the petitioner-Company and pursuant to a complaint of sexual harassment made by Accused No.2 against respondent No.2, the petitioner-Company conducted an enquiry through its Grievance Redressal Board, which recommended termination of the services of respondent No.2, pursuant to which his services were terminated vide letter dated 30.01.2013; aggrieved thereby, respondent No.2 filed S.E.No.4 of 2013 before the Authority under Section 48(1) of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, which was dismissed on 27.01.2015; that respondent No.2 thereafter filed W.P.No.4801 of 2015 before this Court challenging the said order; subsequently, respondent No.2 filed a private complaint against the petitioner-Company and Accused No.2 under Section 190 r/w 200 Cr.P.C. before the XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, L.B. Nagar, Ranga Reddy District, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 211, 182, 193, 204, 420 and 120-B read with Section 34 IPC, and the said Magistrate, vide order dated 27.02.2015, referred the complaint to the SHO, Ghatkesar Police Station, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., pursuant to which FIR No.124 of 2015 was registered. Seeking to quash the said FIR, the present Criminal Petition is filed.

4. Learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that pursuant to the complaint made by Accused No.2, the petitioner had constituted an investigating team in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

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Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan¹; that the Grievance Redressal Board had conducted meetings with the petitioner and respondent No.2; that during the meeting held on 21.11.2012, respondent No.2 admitted that he had approached Accused No.2 and continued such conduct despite counselling; that, on account of the repeated conduct, the Grievance Redressal Board recommended removal of respondent No.2 from the services of the company; and that, pursuant to the said recommendation, the services of respondent No.2 were terminated vide letter dated 30.01.2013.

4.1. He further submitted that the learned Magistrate referred the private complaint made by respondent No.2 to the Police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., mechanically without recording reasons; that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa², has held that the application of mind by the Magistrate while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must be reflected in the order; and that the said principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State Of Gujarat. of Gujarat³; that the order passed by the learned Magistrate does not satisfy the aforesaid requirement.

4.2. He further submitted that the allegations relating to offences under Sections 182, 193 and 211 IPC are subject to the statutory bar contained in

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Section 195 Cr.P.C.; that, insofar as Section 182 IPC is concerned, cognizance can be taken only upon a complaint in writing by the concerned public servant or the competent superior public servant; and that, in respect of offences covered by Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C., the requisite complaint has to emanate from the concerned Court or an authorised officer thereof.

4.3. He further submitted that the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 204 and 420 IPC are not made out; that, insofar as Section 204 IPC is concerned, the allegation of respondent No.2 is that the petitioner obtained his signatures on blank papers and the said documents were subsequently forged and produced before the Labour Court, whereas there is no allegation of the petitioner secreting or destroying or obliterating any document which was legally required to be produced before a Court or public servant; and that, insofar as Section 420 IPC is concerned, there is no allegation of any fraudulent or dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property or making, altering or destroying any valuable security, and therefore, the essential ingredients of the aforesaid offences are not satisfied and Sections 204 and 420 IPC are not attracted to the present case.

4.4. He further submitted that the allegations in the complaint do not disclose any cognizable offence and that there was no sufficient material before the learned Magistrate to warrant an order of investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; that the present case falls within the principles laid down by the

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others⁴, particularly where the allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence, where the allegations are inherently improbable, where there is a legal bar to the proceedings, and where the criminal proceeding is instituted with an ulterior motive; and that the continuation of the criminal proceedings would consequently amount to an abuse of the process of law.

5. He finally submitted that respondent No.2, having failed to obtain relief before the Authority under the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, and having already challenged the said order before this Court in W.P. No.4801 of 2015, has initiated the present criminal proceedings with an ulterior motive to harass the petitioner and Accused No.2; and that, in the circumstances, the FIR in Cr.No.124 of 2015 is liable to be quashed by this Court in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

6. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on following judgments:-

a) Priyanka Srivastava and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others⁵, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation

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of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations."

b) Tilak Nagar Industries Limited and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh⁶, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"However, power under Section 156(3) can be exercised by the Magistrate even before he takes cognizance provided the complaint discloses the commission of cognizable offence. Since in the instant case, the complaint does not do so, the order of the Magistrate stated above cannot be sustained in law and is accordingly quashed."

c) Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar and Others⁷, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"It was held that: "5. Chapter XI IPC deals with 'false evidence and offences against public justice' and Section 193 occurring therein provides for punishment for giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding. Section 195 to an offence against public justice such as giving false evidence under Section

193 IPC, etc. or to an offence relating to documents actually used in a court, private prosecutions are barred absolutely and only the court in relation to which the offence was committed may initiate proceedings. Provisions of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing as required under that section. It is settled law that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent upon the court to

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order prosecution, but to exercise judicial discretion to order prosecution only in the larger interest of the administration of justice."

d) C.P. Kotwal v. Ali Ashad⁸, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"The learned Magistrate has committed the error of law in giving directions to the officers of concerned Police station to do the investigation in view of provisions of Sections 156(3) of the Code, without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of section 195 of the Code. As he did not take the note of these provisions and the facts disclosed to him vide the complaint which was made by the respondent No. 1. Had that adverted his due notice to the matter in question, he would not have landed in error of giving directions to the police officer of the concerned police station to make the necessary investigation. The said error which happens to be against the provisions of law, will have to be quashed by exercising inherent powers by this Court".

e) Vishnu Kumar v. State of A.P.⁹, wherein, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held as under:

"A plain reading of this section would show that for offences mentioned in Clause (b) (i) and (ii) of Sec. 195, 1), Cr.P.C. the court can take cognizance of these offenses only when the complaint is in witing filed by the Court or some other court to which that court is subordinate, before which the document in question is found to be a forged one and the accused before that court are found to have committed any offence. In the instant case, on the basis of the alleged forged document, the accused

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have filed a suit in the civil court. Therefore, it would be the civil court which would be the proper complainant in this case and not a private individual or the police."

f) Commissioner of Police and Others v. Devender Anand and Others, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"The criminal proceedings have been initiated by the original complainant to settle the civil dispute. Thereafter, on thorough investigation/inquiry and considering the facts and circumstances of the case narrated hereinabove, when it was opined that the dispute between the parties is of a civil nature, the High Court ought not to have issued further directions.

10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and as observed hereinabove, initiation of the criminal proceedings by the original complainant is nothing but an abuse of the process of law."

g) Thermax Limited and Others v. K.M. Johny and Others, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"The principles enunciated from the above quoted decisions clearly show that for proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code, the complaint must disclose relevant material ingredients of Sections 405, 406, 420 read with Section 34 IPC. If there is a flavour of civil nature, the same cannot be agitated in the form of criminal proceeding."

h) Jitendra Rao Veeramalla v. Public Prosecutor, Telangana¹⁰, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"While exercising power under Section 156(3), the Court must record its satisfaction as to what weighed the Magistrate to pass

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such an order which reflects the application of mind to the facts of the case in its entirety so as to enable the Higher Court to form an opinion."

7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1- State submitted that the learned Magistrate, on due verification of the contents of the private complaint made by respondent No.2, and on being satisfied that the same make out prima facie offences alleged therein, has referred the same to the Police for registration and investigation into the same. He fairly submitted that though the complaint made by respondent No.2 was not accompanied by an affidavit, which is mandatory, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava's case (cited supra), the learned Magistrate has referred the complaint to the Police for registration. He further submitted that in obedience of the directions given by the learned Magistrate concerned, the SHO of Ghatkesar Police Station has registered a case in Crime No.124 of 2015 against the petitioner and accused No.2. Therefore, there is no abuse of process of Court and prayed to dismiss the Criminal Petition.

8. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1-State.

9. The undisputed facts of the case are that respondent No.2, who was removed from the services of the petitioner-Company, on the complaint made

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against him by accused No.2 herein, pursuant to the recommendation of the Grievance Redressal Board, has made a private complaint against the petitioner and one Neha Dangwal alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 211, 182, 193, 204, 420 and 120-B read with Section 34 IPC. The learned Magistrate referred the complaint to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., pursuant to which a case in Crime No.124 of 2015 came to be registered.

10. Perusal of the material discloses that the complaint filed by respondent No.2 before the learned Magistrate was not accompanied by a sworn affidavit as contemplated in Priyanka Srivastava's case (cited supra). Along with the private complaint, copies of the address proof of respondent No.2, educational qualifications and termination order are filed. The complainant i.e., respondent No.2 did not bring to the notice of the learned Magistrate the pendency of the proceedings initiated by him against the petitioner challenging his termination, the order passed therein by the Authority, the enquiry conducted by the Grievance Redressal Board pursuant to the complaint made by Accused No.2. Further, in Jitendra Rao Veeramalla's case (cited supra), it has been reiterated that the order directing investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must reflect application of mind of the learned Magistrate to the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, the order of the learned Magistrate does not

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disclose consideration of the aforesaid relevant circumstances or demonstrate due application of mind to the allegations.

11. It is also pertinent to note that the allegations made in the complaint do not prima facie attract the ingredients of the relevant Sections of Indian Penal Code. The allegations relating to Sections 193 and 211 IPC, particularly in the context of the proceedings before the Authority, are subject to the statutory requirements contemplated under Section 195 Cr.P.C. and cannot be set in motion by way of a private complaint in the manner adopted by respondent No.2. Likewise, the allegation that the signatures of respondent No.2 were obtained on blank papers and that the documents were subsequently fabricated upon by the petitioner-Company does not, by itself, constitute an offence under Section 204 IPC, particularly when there is no allegation of the petitioner secreting or destroying or obliterating any document which was legally required to be produced before a Court or public servant Similarly, the private complaint does not disclose any act of inducement or deception so as to attract the essential ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC.

12. The allegation concerning the signatures of respondent No.2 on the documents relied upon by the petitioner-Company also requires to be considered in the context in which the said allegation was raised. It is not in dispute that the issue concerning the disputed signatures had already arisen in the proceedings before the Authority and that the petitioner-Company itself had

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sought forensic examination of the documents. Thus, mere assertion of respondent No.2 that his signatures were obtained on blank papers, in the absence of material prima facie disclosing the ingredients of the relevant Sections of law, cannot by itself constitute a basis for continuation of the criminal proceedings.

13. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ch.Bhajan Lal's case (cited supra), make it clear that the inherent powers under Section

482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court where the allegations made in the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence; or where the allegations are such that they do not disclose a cognizable offence warranting investigation; or where continuation of the proceedings would otherwise amount to an abuse of the process of law. The present case falls within the aforesaid parameters. The allegations contained in the complaint, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences invoked against the petitioner and Accused No.2. Therefore, permitting the criminal proceedings to continue would not advance the administration of criminal justice and would amount to permitting a prosecution on allegations which do not attract the ingredients of the Sections of law mentioned therein.

14. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the allegations and the material available on record, this Court is of the considered

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opinion that the allegations contained in the complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not attract the essential ingredients of the Sections of law mentioned in the private complaint against the petitioner and Accused No.2. Hence, continuation of the criminal proceedings, in the circumstances of the case, would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the proceedings arising out of FIR No.124 of 2015 of Ghatkesar Police Station, Cyberabad, Ranga Reddy District, therefore, are liable to be quashed.

15. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed and FIR No.124 of 2015 of Ghatkesar Police Station, Cyberabad, Ranga Reddy District is hereby quashed against the petitioner.

16. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No costs. ___________________________________

LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J

Date:12.10.2026

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