Ganga Sagar And 2 Others v. Vinod Yadav And Another

no. 2 in violation of the agreement to sell, and permanent injunction. It was pleaded that defendant no. 1 had executed a registered agreement to sell the disputed property in favour of the plaintiffs and had undertaken to execute the sale deed after the pending litigation came to an end. According to the plaintiffs, despite repeated requests, defendant no. 1 neither informed them about the conclusion of the litigation nor executed the sale deed. Subsequently, when the plaintiffs approached defendant no. 1 for execution of the sale deed, they came to know that the property had already been sold in favour of defendant no. 2. It was alleged that the subsequent sale deed is illegal and void as the agreement to sell executed in favour of the plaintiffs had never been cancelled. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs also sought a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from creating any third-party interest or raising any construction over the disputed property.

5. The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case, observing that mere execution of an agreement to sell does not create any right or interest in the property. It further found that the plaintiffs had admitted the ownership of defendant no. 1 as well as the execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant no. 2. The Trial Court also observed that the plaintiffs had not sought the relief of specific performance in the proper form and that an injunction could not be granted when an equally efficacious alternative remedy was available. Holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable injury, it rejected the application for temporary injunction.

6. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants submitted that the Trial Court erred in law in rejecting the application for temporary injunction by failing to appreciate the settled legal position governing suits for specific performance. Placing reliance upon FGP Limited vs. Saleh Hooseni Doctor and another, (2009) 10 SCC 223, it was contended that where the existence of an agreement to sell is not seriously disputed, grant of temporary injunction to preserve the subject matter of the suit is of paramount importance. It was further submitted, relying upon Food Corporation of India vs. Mahavir Prasad and others, AIR 1988 All 160, that a conjoint reading of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and Order VII Rule 7 C.P.C. makes it clear that the Court is not precluded from granting an appropriate relief merely because it has not been specifically worded in the plaint. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in observing that the absence of a specific prayer in a particular form disentitled the plaintiffs from interim protection.

7. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the record, this Court finds that the observation of the Trial Court that the plaintiffs had not sought the relief of specific performance is factually incorrect. A perusal of FAFO No. 1298 of 2026

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the plaint shows that the plaintiffs have sought a direction against defendant no. 1 to execute the sale deed in their favour on receipt of the balance sale consideration. Thus, in substance, the relief of enforcement of the agreement to sell has been claimed.

8. However, the aforesaid erroneous observation, by itself, is not sufficient to vitiate the impugned order. It is well settled that an agreement to sell, by itself, does not create any right, title or interest in the immovable property. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act expressly provides that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on the property. Admittedly, defendant no. 1 has already executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant no. 2. Whether such transfer is ultimately liable to be set aside or whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for specific performance are matters to be adjudicated after the parties lead evidence and cannot be conclusively determined at the interlocutory stage.

9. The reliance placed by the plaintiffs upon Food Corporation of India v. Mahavir Prasad, AIR 1988 All 160 : (1988) 1 AWC 594. is also of no assistance. The observations made therein regarding the scope of Order VII Rule 7 C.P.C. were rendered while deciding the rights of the parties after conclusion of the trial. Order VII Rule 7 is an enabling provision which empowers the Court, in an appropriate case, to mould the final relief to which a party may be found entitled on the basis of the pleadings and evidence. It cannot be construed as a general principle requiring the Court to ignore the nature of the relief claimed or to extend its application while examining an interlocutory application for temporary injunction.

10. The Trial Court has, apart from the aforesaid incorrect observation, considered the application on the touchstone of the settled principles governing grant of temporary injunction, namely, existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The discretion exercised by the Trial Court cannot be said to be arbitrary, perverse or contrary to any settled principle of law so as to warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction. The error regarding the nature of the relief claimed does not go to the root of the matter nor does it affect the ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court.

11. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no illegality, perversity or material irregularity in the impugned order dated 6.4.2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kanpur Nagar rejecting the applications for temporary injunction. No case for interference in appellate jurisdiction is made out.

FAFO No. 1298 of 2026

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12. Consequently, both the appeals, namely, F.A.F.O. No.1298 of 2025 and F.A.F.O. No.1319 of 2025, are dismissed. The impugned order dated 6.4.2026 is affirmed.

July 16, 2026

Mukesh FAFO No. 1298 of 2026

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(Anil Kumar-X,J.)

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