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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 INSC 267
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 482 of the Code
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Sections 63, 65, 65A of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act)
  • Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 63 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 INSC 267
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 482 of the Code
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Sections 63, 65, 65A of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act)
  • Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 63 of the Act
Smart Summary

Sujoy Ghosh v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr.

Supreme Court of India; 2026 INSC 267; judgment dated March 20, 2026. [1][2][3][4][5]

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a film director and screenwriter, directed Kahaani, released on March 9, 2012. He registered the first half of the script for Kahaani-2: Durga Rani Singh with the Screen Writers Association (SWA) on October 10, 2013. [6][7]

The complainant alleged that he met the appellant and Prabhat Kumar Thakur in Mumbai on June 29, 2015, sought a recommendation letter for registering a script, and left his script, Sabak, with the appellant. He claimed to have registered it with SWA on July 31, 2015. Following the release of Kahaani-2 on December 2, 2016, he complained to SWA that the film infringed his copyright. [8][9]

While the SWA dispute was pending, the complainant initiated proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Hazaribagh, alleging offences under Sections 63, 65 and 65A of the Copyright Act, 1957, and Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code. On February 24, 2018, before the criminal court took cognizance, SWA’s expert Dispute Settlement Committee rejected his complaint after finding no similarity between the film and his script. [10][11][12]

On June 7, 2018, after recording statements from the complainant’s brother and cousin, the CJM found a prima facie case under Section 63 of the Copyright Act and summoned the appellant and Thakur. The appellant sought quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [13][14]

The Jharkhand High Court dismissed that petition on April 22, 2025. It considered the allegations sufficiently specific to proceed, held that their truth should be tested at trial, and declined to use inherent powers to stifle what it regarded as a legitimate prosecution. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. [15][16][17]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the complaint and witness statements supplied sufficient material to establish a prima facie copyright offence and whether the summoning order reflected the required judicial application of mind. [18][19][20][21]
  2. Whether the surrounding circumstances—including the SWA expert finding, its concealment, and the earlier registration of the appellant’s work—established that the prosecution was frivolous and vexatious and warranted quashing under Section 482. [18][22][23][24][25][26][27][28]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The summoning order showed non-application of mind because neither the complaint nor the witness statements identified any part of Sabak allegedly copied in Kahaani-2; consequently, there was no prima facie material showing similarity. [18]
  • The complainant deliberately suppressed SWA’s February 24, 2018 communication recording its experts’ finding that the works were not similar. [18]
  • The appellant’s script had been registered substantially earlier than the complainant’s, demonstrating that the prosecution was malicious and an abuse of process. [18][22]

Complainant’s Arguments

  • The CJM had examined the complaint, supporting documents and witness statements and found sufficient grounds to proceed under Section 63 of the Copyright Act. [19]
  • At the cognizance and process stage, the Magistrate need only ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, without undertaking a detailed evidentiary evaluation or determining the truth of the allegations. The impugned orders therefore required no interference. [19]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Birla Corporation Limited v. Adventz Investments and Holdings Limited & Ors., (2019) 16 SCC 610 Cited by the appellant in support of his challenge to the summoning order and prosecution; no individual proposition is specified. The judgment records the reliance but does not separately discuss or apply this decision. [18][22][29]
Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219 When proceedings are challenged as frivolous, vexatious or malicious, courts must examine surrounding circumstances rather than confining scrutiny to the complaint’s allegations. Also cited by the appellant, this decision supports the Court’s examination of the wider record when considering quashing under Section 482 or Article 226. [29][30][23][31]
Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., (2025) SCC Online SC 641 Cited in support of the appellant’s submissions; no separate proposition is identified. The Court records the citation without an individual discussion of its application. [18][22][29]
Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1947 Cited in support of the appellant’s submissions; no separate proposition is identified. The Court records the citation without an individual discussion of its application. [18][22][29]
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335 Cited by the complainant in support of his submissions opposing interference; no individual proposition is specified. The Court records the reliance but does not separately analyse this precedent. [19][32]
Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 1032 Cited by the complainant in support of his submissions opposing interference; no individual proposition is specified. The Court records the reliance but does not separately analyse this precedent. [19][32]
Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors.; (1998) 5 SCC 749 Summoning an accused is a serious judicial act requiring scrutiny of the material and application of mind to the facts and applicable law. Supports the standard against which the Court found the CJM’s summoning order mechanical and unsupported by sufficient material. [20][33][21]
Vikas Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1534 A Magistrate must scrutinise the evidence and determine whether an offence is prima facie disclosed before issuing summons. Cited with Pepsi Foods for the summoning standard applied in finding non-application of mind by the CJM. [20][33][21]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

  1. Summoning requires substantive judicial scrutiny. The Court emphasised that criminal proceedings cannot begin as a matter of course merely because a complainant produces two supporting witnesses. The Magistrate must scrutinise the evidence, apply the relevant law and determine whether a prima facie offence exists; questioning the complainant and witnesses may assist that inquiry. [20]

  2. Quashing scrutiny extends beyond the complaint’s wording. Where proceedings are alleged to be manifestly frivolous, vexatious or malicious, courts must carefully consider the attending circumstances and overall record, rather than merely checking whether the complaint formally alleges the ingredients of an offence. [30][23]

  3. The allegations lacked identifiable copying. The complaint asserted that the film used the complainant’s script and that most scenes were based on it. The Court found these allegations bald and unsubstantiated: they did not disclose even prima facie similarity between the works. Neither the complainant’s statement nor those of his brother and cousin identified any feature allegedly copied. [34][35][36][24]

  4. The adverse expert finding had been concealed. SWA’s expert committee had found no similarity before the witness statements were recorded and before summons were issued. The complainant and witnesses nevertheless concealed that material fact from the criminal court. [24][25]

  5. The summoning order was mechanical. There was no material establishing prima facie similarity, and the CJM had not even recorded satisfaction on that question. The Court held that the order suffered from non-application of mind and that the High Court failed to appreciate both that defect and the absence of sufficient supporting material. [21]

  6. The registration chronology contradicted the infringement allegation. The appellant registered the synopsis on December 10, 2012, the partial script on October 10, 2013, and the full script on December 2, 2013. These preceded the complainant’s June 2015 visit and July 2015 registration. The Court concluded that the appellant’s work preceded the complainant’s script and that infringement did not arise because the latter script did not exist when the appellant registered his screenplay. [26][27]

  7. The prosecution warranted termination. Taken together, these circumstances led the Court to conclude that the proceedings against the appellant were manifestly frivolous and vexatious. [28]

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court ALLOWED THE APPEAL, quashed the CJM’s summoning order dated June 7, 2018, and set aside the High Court’s order dated April 22, 2025. It also quashed the proceedings in Complaint Case No.1267 of 2017 pending before the CJM, Hazaribagh. [37][38]

The direct consequence was termination of the identified criminal complaint proceedings. The judgment applied expressly settled principles governing summoning and quashing rather than announcing a new legal test. [20][30][23][37]

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    SUJOY GHOSH v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND

    2026 INSC 267

    1

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

    (@ SLP (Crl.) NO. 9452 OF 2025)

    SUJOY GHOSH ... APPELLANT

    VERSUS

    THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

    J U D G M E N T

    ALOK ARADHE, J.

    1. Leave granted.

    2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 22.04.2025 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand (High Court), whereby petition preferred by the appellant under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) has been dismissed.

    3. Facts leading to filing of this appeal briefly stated are that the appellant is a film Director and screenwriter. He directed the film titled 'Kahaani', which was released on 09.03.2012. The film received wide acclaim, and the appellant was granted National Award for Best Screenplay in 2013. Thereafter on 10.10.2013, the appellant created and registered first half of

    1

    2

    the script, for the film titled 'Kahaani-2: Durga Rani Singh' (Kahaani-2) with Screen Writers Association (SWA).

    4. According to the complainant, he travelled to Mumbai and met the appellant and one Prabhat Kumar Thakur (alleged owner of Western India Film Producers Association) on 29.06.2015. The complainant sought a recommendation letter required for registering a film script and allegedly left a copy of his script titled 'Sabak' with the appellant. The complainant claims that he registered the script 'Sabak' with SWA on 31.07.2015. The film directed by the appellant titled 'Kahaani-2', was released on 02.12.2016.

    5. The complainant filed a complaint on 23.12.2016 before the SWA alleging that the film 'Kahaani-2' infringed the copyright of his script 'Sabak'. The dispute was referred to SWA Dispute Settlement Committee.

    6. During the pendency of the proceeding before the said Committee, the complainant filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh (CJM), alleging that he had authored the script titled 'Sabak' and shared the same with the appellant, and that the appellant produced the film 'Kahaani-

    3

    2' using his script without permission. Accordingly, it was alleged that the appellant had committed offences punishable under Sections 63, 65, 65A of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act) and Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

    7. However, during the pendency of the proceedings before the CJM, and before order of cognizance could be passed, the Dispute Settlement Committee of SWA consisting of experts, by an order dated 24.02.2018, held that there was no similarity between the appellant's film and the complainant's script, consequently rejected the complaint.

    8. The CJM, after recording the statements of complainant's real brother and cousin, by an order dated 07.06.2018 (summoning order) held that there was sufficient material to proceed with the complaint against the appellant and co-accused Prabhat Kumar Thakur, and that a prima facie case under Section 63 of the Act was made out. The summons were accordingly issued.

    9. The appellant, thereafter, filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. The High Court by an order dated 22.04.2025, held that Magistrate's role at summoning stage is limited to ascertain

    4

    whether sufficient ground exists to proceed. It was further held that the complaint contained direct and specific allegations of copyright infringement, the veracity of which has to be tested during trial. The High Court observed that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

    10. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the summoning order discloses complete non-application of mind as there is no material on record, even prima facie, to conclude that there was any similarity between the appellant's film 'Kahaani-2' and complainant's script 'Sabak'. It is contended that neither the complaint nor statements of witnesses contain any assertion identifying any portion of the complainant's script that was allegedly copied. It is urged that the complainant deliberately suppressed a crucial document, namely, letter dated 24.02.2018 sent by SWA to the complainant, observing that the expert panel of SWA on comparison had found no similarity between rival works. It is also pointed out that script of appellant's film 'Kahaani-2' was registered much prior to complainant's script and, therefore,

    5

    the complaint is malicious in nature and constitutes abuse of process of law. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court1.

    11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant submitted that CJM on examination of the complaint, supporting documents and statements of the witnesses, found sufficient ground to proceed against the appellant for offence under Section 63 of the Act. It is contended that at the stage of cognizance and issuance of process, the Magistrate is only required to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists and is not expected to undertake a detailed evaluation of evidence or determine the veracity of the allegations. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned orders, do not call for any interference in this appeal. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court2.

    12. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and have traversed the record.

    1 Birla Corporation Limited v. Adventz Investments and Holdings Limited & Ors., (2019) 16 SCC 610, Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219, Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., (2025) SCC Online SC 641 and Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1947.

    2 State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335 and Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 1032.

    6

    13. The principles governing summoning of an accused in a criminal case as well as parameters for quashing criminal proceedings are well-settled. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect application of mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Magistrate must carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and determine whether any offence is prima facie made out. The Magistrate may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise, and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused3.

    14. When an accused seeks quashing of either the FIR or criminal proceedings on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous, vexatious or malicious, the Court is duty bound to examine the matter with greater care. It will not be

    3 Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors.; (1998) 5 SCC 749 and Vikas Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1534.

    7

    just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case, over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, and try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation4.

    15. In the backdrop of the aforementioned legal principles, we may advert to the facts of the case in hand. We have carefully perused the complaint. The allegations with regard to copyright infringement are contained in Paras 9 and 10 of the complaint, which read as under:

    4 Mohd. Wajid & Anr. (supra)

    8

    "9. That the complainant saw a film produced by accused no.1 'Kahanni-2' at Laxmi Chitramandir Hazaribagh on 03.12.2016 and after seeing the said film, the Complainant was surprised because the said film was made on the script written by the complainant, and most scenes were based on complainant's script.

    10. That after seeing the said film the complainant understood that the accused had stolen his script and made the film by violating copyright provisions."

    Thus, it is evident that the complaint only contains a bald and unsubstantiated allegations and do not even prima facie disclose the similarity between the film and the script.

    16. Likewise, the statement of the complainant and witnesses namely, Ajay Kumar Mehta (brother of the complainant) and Jai Kishore Mehta, (cousin of the complainant), do not identify any feature of the script allegedly copied. It is pertinent to note that Dispute Settlement Committee of SWA comprising experts in its order dated 24.02.2018, found no similarity between the film and the script and dismissed the complaint. The aforesaid order was passed before recording the statements of the witnesses and before a summoning order was passed. However, the complainant and his witnesses concealed the aforesaid

    9

    material fact and did not bring the same to the notice of the Court.

    17. On the basis of aforesaid material on record, there is no material on record to prima facie conclude that there was any similarity between appellant's film and complainant's script. In the summoning order, the CJM has even failed to record the satisfaction that there is any similarity between the appellant's film and the complainant's script. The summoning order, therefore, has been passed in mechanical manner and suffers from vice of non-application of mind. The High Court has also failed to appreciate that the summoning order has been passed without any application of mind and in the absence of sufficient material on record.

    18. The material on record reveals that 'Kahaani-2' is a sequel to the earlier film of the appellant, namely 'Kahaani'. The appellant registered the synopsis of the film on 10.12.2012

    under the title 'Kolkata'. The partial script of the said film, then titled 'Durga Rani Singh', was registered on 10.10.2013. The full script of the said film, then titled 'Karaar', was registered on 02.12.2013. Admittedly, the complainant went to Mumbai on 29.06.2015 and registered his script on

    10

    31.07.2015. Thus, the appellant's work clearly preceded the complainant's script in point of time and the question of copyright infringement does not arise as the complainant's script was not even in existence when the appellant registered his screenplay.

    19. For the reasons stated above, the inevitable conclusion is that the proceedings instituted against the appellant are manifestly frivolous and vexatious.

    20. In the result, the summoning order dated 07.06.2018 passed by the CJM, and order dated 22.04.2025 passed by the High Court, are quashed and set aside. The proceeding in Complaint Case No.1267 of 2017, pending before CJM, Hazaribagh, is quashed and set aside.

    21. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

    …..…….……………….………….……….J.

    [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

    …..…….……………….………….……….J.

    [ALOK ARADHE]

    NEW DELHI;

    MARCH 20, 2026.

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    SUJOY GHOSH v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND
    (Mar 20, 2026)