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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 INSC 75
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Corresponding Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
  • Criminal Procedure Act (no specific section or article title mentioned)
  • Section governing cancellation of bail (no specific section or article title mentioned)
  • Sections 352 and 353(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Corresponding Sections 504 and 505 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860]
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 INSC 75
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Corresponding Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
  • Criminal Procedure Act (no specific section or article title mentioned)
  • Section governing cancellation of bail (no specific section or article title mentioned)
  • Sections 352 and 353(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Corresponding Sections 504 and 505 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860]
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

An FIR No. 527 of 2025 was registered on 10 March 2025 at the Cyber Crimes Police Station, Hyderabad against unknown persons under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Sections 352 and 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Sections 504 and 505(2) IPC), based on a complaint by Mr. S. Kailash.

The appellants (accused) Pogadadabnda Revathi and Bandi Sandhya were arrested, produced before the XII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hyderabad on 12 March 2025, and remanded to judicial custody till 26 March 2025.

On 13 March 2025, the investigating officer sought five days’ police custody. The Magistrate rejected the request by order dated 17 March 2025, noting that extensive investigation had already been carried out and incriminating devices (including laptops, hard disks, router, and CPUs) had been seized; the Magistrate found no tenable grounds for police custody. On the same day (17 March 2025), the Magistrate granted the accused regular bail.

The State filed a revision before the Sessions Judge at Nampally, Hyderabad. By order dated 26 September 2025, the Sessions Judge allowed the revision and directed police custody for a short period (initially 6–8 October 2025), later modified to 13–15 October 2025, without addressing that the accused were already on bail.

The accused challenged the Sessions Court’s order before the High Court of Telangana in a criminal petition; the High Court dismissed the petition on 13 October 2025. The Supreme Court granted leave and heard the resulting criminal appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revisional court and the High Court were justified in directing police custody remand after the Magistrate had rejected police custody with reasons and after the accused had been granted (and continued to enjoy) regular bail.
  2. Whether granting police custody while a bail order remains operative amounts to an impermissible indirect cancellation of bail without following the settled parameters for cancellation.
  3. What is the permissible scope of revisional interference with a Magistrate’s reasoned order declining police custody remand under the applicable remand provisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused-Appellants' Arguments

  • The Magistrate had rejected police custody on 17 March 2025 by detailed, cogent reasons, and granted regular bail on the same day.
  • The Sessions Court and the High Court failed to properly consider the Magistrate’s reasons and the fact of continuing bail.
  • Directing police custody nearly seven months after release on bail, without due appreciation of the Magistrate’s order, was a gross abuse of process.
  • So long as the bail order remained in force, police custody could not lawfully be granted.

Respondent-State's Arguments

  • The State supported the impugned order, contending it was passed strictly in accordance with law and warranted no interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satyajit Ballubhai Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 14 SCC 434 Police remand should not be granted mechanically; where an accused is already on bail, remand affecting liberty requires valid, weighty reasons; if remand is sought on grounds like interference with investigation, the appropriate course may be cancellation of bail; police custody cannot be granted so long as bail operates as it would effectively nullify bail. The Court relied on the principle to hold that, since the appellants were on unchallenged bail, directing police custody would amount to indirect cancellation of bail and was therefore legally impermissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the High Court’s reliance on Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 167 CrPC), which contemplates police custody up to fifteen days (in whole or in parts) within the initial statutory window. As the offences in question were not punishable with death, life imprisonment, or ten years or more, the Court noted that the applicable statutory window for police custody would be forty days.

The Court emphasized that the decision to grant or refuse police custody is a matter of discretion vested in the Magistrate. Where the Magistrate has exercised that discretion with reasons, revisional interference should ordinarily not occur unless the Magistrate’s order is shown to be grossly perverse.

On the facts, the Magistrate had declined police custody after recording that extensive investigation was already conducted and multiple incriminating devices had been seized (including specific listed devices), and that the accused’s presence in police custody was not required for further progress. The Supreme Court found that the Sessions Judge, while allowing revision, effectively overlooked this reasoned order and justified custody on the grounds of further recoveries and recording of detailed confessional statements.

The Supreme Court held these reasons to be unacceptable and perverse in view of the Magistrate’s findings about recoveries and interrogation already completed. It further noted that the Sessions Court’s order came more than six months after police custody was refused and after the accused had been released on bail.

Critically, the Court reasoned that granting three days of police custody while the accused were already on bail would require taking them back into custody, thereby curtailing liberty and operating as an indirect cancellation of bail without satisfying the settled parameters for cancellation. The Court held that the legally permissible course, where police custody is sought of an accused already on bail, is to first seek cancellation of bail and only thereafter seek police custody; criminal procedure does not countenance police remand of a person who continues to enjoy bail protection.

Applying Satyajit Ballubhai Desai, the Court concluded that so long as the bail order dated 17 March 2025 (which had not been challenged) continued to operate, police custody could not be granted, and any such direction would amount to indirect cancellation of bail.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order dated 13 October 2025 and the Sessions Judge’s order dated 26 September 2025 granting police custody.

The direct effect is that the direction to remand the accused-appellants to police custody (during the specified three-day period) stood nullified, and the accused’s existing bail order remained undisturbed. The Court’s decision reiterates that police custody cannot be ordered while a bail order continues to operate, and that the proper course is to seek cancellation of bail first; the opinion applies existing principles (including the cited precedent) rather than stating that it lays down a new rule.

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    POGADADABNDA REVATHI v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA

    2026 INSC 75

    1

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

    (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s).16536 of 2025)

    POGADADABNDA REVATHI & ANR. …. APPELLANT(S)

    VERSUS

    THE STATE OF TELANGANA ….RESPONDENT(S)

    J U D G M E N T

    Mehta, J.

    1. Heard.

    2. Leave granted.

    3. The instant appeal by special leave is directed against the order dated 13thOctober, 2025 passed by the High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad1in Criminal Petition No.13071 of 2025.

    4. Brief facts relevant and essential for disposal of the appeal are noted hereinbelow.

    4.1 An FIR bearing No. 527 of 2025 was registered on 10thMarch, 2025 at Cyber Crimes Police Station,

    1 Hereinafter referred to as 'High Court'.

    1

    2

    Hyderabad against unknown persons under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Sections 352 and 353(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Corresponding Sections 504 and 505

    (2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] on the basis of a complaint filed by one Mr. S. Kailash.

    4.2 The appellants2herein, namely, Pogadadabnda Revathi and Bandi Sandhya were arrested in connection with the aforesaid FIR and were presented before the learned XII Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hyderabad3on 12thMarch, 2025 and were remanded to judicial custody till 26thMarch, 2025 by an order of even date.

    4.3 On 13thMarch, 2025, the Inspector of Police, Cyber Crimes Police Station, Hyderabad moved an application before the learned Magistrate seeking police custody of the accused-appellants for a period of five days. The said application was rejected vide order dated 17thMarch, 2025 and the following reasons were assigned for declining police custody: -

    "6. It is well settled law that the magistrate will have to satisfy himself that the presence of the accused in

    2 Hereinafter, being referred to as 'accused-appellants'.

    3 Hereinafter, being referred to as 'learned Magistrate.

    3

    police custody is whether absolutely necessary. The Court shall look into the evidence and material collected by the investigating agency. Remand to police custody should not be granted to collect the material and evidence. In case, where it is impossible for the police authorities to go further in the investigation and in those cases only remand to the police custody Is justified by law.

    7. In the present case, admittedly the present investigating officer examined the material witnesses and recorded the confession panchanama of the A1 & A2 and also seized incriminating material i.e. One Dell Laptop, Asus Laptop, Two Segate Hard Disk, One-Pulse Media Logo, TP Link Wifi Router and 7 CPU's under cover of seizure panchanama. In addition to it the laptop, mobile phone of husband of A1 are also seized by police. Under these facts and circumstances, this court does not find any tenable grounds to grant police custody of the accused herein for the reasons assigned in the requisition and it appears that the presence of the respondents is not required for police custody to proceed with further. The petition is devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed."

    4.4 It is pertinent to mention here that the learned Magistrate vide a separate order of even date i.e. 17th March, 2025 enlarged the accused-appellants on bail.

    4.5 Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate rejecting the request for grant of police custody, the respondent, the State of Telangana

    4

    through the Inspector of Police, preferred a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge at Nampally, Hyderabad, who vide order dated 26th September, 2025 allowed the same and directed that the accused-appellants be remanded to police custody from 6thOctober, 2025 to 8thOctober, 2025. However, the said order was subsequently modified, altering the period of custody from 13thOctober, 2025 to 15thOctober, 2025.

    4.6 It is imperative to state here that in the order granting police custody of the accused-appellants, the learned Sessions Judge has completely glossed over the fact that the accused-appellants had already been granted regular bail by the learned Magistrate vide a separate order dated 17thMarch, 2025.

    4.7 Be that as it may, aggrieved by the order of learned Sessions Judge, the accused-appellants assailed the same before the High Court by way of a criminal petition. The High Court, vide order dated 13thOctober, 2025, dismissed the said petition. The aforesaid order of the High Court rejecting the criminal petition forms the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal by special leave.

    5

    5. Learned Counsel representing the accused- appellants urged that the learned Magistrate rejected the application filed by the investigating officer on 17thMarch, 2025, seeking police custody of the accused-appellants by assigning detailed reasons and the accused-appellants were granted regular bail on the very same day. He urged that neither the Sessions Court nor the High Court, applied mind to the fact that the police custody remand had been denied by the learned Magistrate by assigning cogent reasons and the accused-appellants had also been released on bail. Thus, directing police custody of the accused-appellants nearly 7 months after they had been released on bail and that too, without due appreciation of the reasons assigned in the order dated 17thMarch, 2025 passed by the learned Magistrate declining police custody, is nothing but a gross abuse of the process of law. It was submitted that so long as the order granting bail remains in force, no direction granting police custody could have been lawfully issued.

    6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State vehemently and fervently supported the impugned order and submitted that

    6

    the same was passed strictly in accordance with law and does not warrant interference.

    7. We have heard and considered the submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the impugned order.

    8. Learned Single Judge of the High Court while rejecting the Criminal Petition filed by the appellant took note of the provisions of Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [Corresponding Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] which provides that police custody for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole or in parts, may be granted by the Magistrate during the initial forty days or sixty days, as the case may be, out of the total detention period of sixty days or ninety days.

    9. In the present case, since none of the offences are punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, the statutory period applicable for grant of police custody would be forty days.

    10. Learned Magistrate, while declining the application for police custody, took note of the factum of extensive investigation already having been carried

    7

    out and the consequential recoveries of incriminating materials viz. One Dell Laptop, Asus Laptop, Two Segate Hard Disk, One Pulse Media Logo, TP Link Wifi Router and 7 CPUs from the accused-appellants. In addition to the aforesaid recoveries, laptop and mobile phone of appellant No. 1's husband were also seized.

    11. Needless to say, the discretion whether or not to grant police custody remand is vested exclusively with the Magistrate and once the Magistrate exercises such discretion accepting or declining the prayer for police custody, by assigning reasons, such order should ordinarily not be interfered with by the revisional forum unless gross perversity is shown in the order of the Magistrate.

    12. We are afraid that the learned Sessions Judge, while accepting the revision, has completely overlooked the order passed by the learned Magistrate and went on to record that further recoveries were to be made from the accused- appellants and their detailed confessional statements had to be recorded and for the said reasons, police custody remand was essential.

    8

    13. We find both the reasons to be unacceptable and perverse on the face of record in view of the fact that the order of the learned Magistrate specifically refers to the recoveries of the subject devices used for posting the offensive messages having been effected and extensive interrogation having been carried out from the accused-appellants.

    14. In this background, we are of the firm view that the learned Sessions Judge, while exercising revisional jurisdiction ought not to have interfered in the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Magistrate. Rather, we find that the learned Sessions Judge did not even advert to the order of the learned Magistrate in the correct perspective while deciding the revision.

    15. The order granting police custody was passed by the revisional Court after more than 6 months from the date on which police custody was declined by the learned Magistrate and the accused- appellants were released on bail. Thus, the revisional Court as well as the High Court clearly seem to have fallen into error while directing the grant of police custody of the accused-appellants for investigation in connection with the aforesaid FIR.

    9

    16. It is pertinent to mention that the accused- appellants had already been enlarged on bail. Granting police custody for a period of three days would necessarily require the accused-appellants to be taken back into custody and curtailing their liberty for that period of 3 days, which would, in effect, tantamount to cancellation of bail in an indirect manner, without adherence to the settled legal parameters governing cancellation of bail.

    17. It is a settled position of law that where the investigating agency seeks police remand of an accused who has already been enlarged on bail, the proper and legally permissible course is to first seek cancellation of bail in accordance with law and only thereafter apply for police custody. The scheme of criminal procedure does not countenance the grant of police remand of an accused who continues to enjoy the protection of bail, as such a course would effectively defeat and nullify the order granting bail.

    18. In this regard we may refer to Satyajit Ballubhai Desai v. State of Gujarat reported in

    (2014) 14 SCC 434 wherein this Court observed as follows: -

    10

    "19. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the learned Magistrate as also the High Court appear to have adopted a casual or a mechanical approach permitting police remand of the appellants without scrutinising the reasons, ignoring the fact that the appellants had already been enlarged on bail by the High Court and the dispute with the complainant Surjaben who had lodged the complaint had already been settled. Thus, the existing facts and circumstance prima facie were clearly not so grave or extraordinary justifying police remand which could have been overlooked by the High Court even though it was for three days only as it was bound to have ramifications not only affecting the liberty of the person who was already granted bail but also the Magistrate nullifying the order of the High Court granting bail, even if it was for a period of three days only.

    20. In fact, when the accused had been enlarged on bail by the High Court, it was all the more essential initially for the police authorities and thereafter by the Magistrate to disclose and assign convincing reasons why investigation could not proceed further without seeking police remand of the accused and in case police remand was sought on any ground of interference with the investigation in any manner alleging influencing the witnesses or tampering with the evidence in any manner, straightaway it could have been a case for cancellation of bail of the accused and the Magistrate could have directed the police authorities to approach the High Court seeking cancellation or any other appropriate direction.

    21. What is sought to be emphasised is that the disclosure of reasons by the Magistrate allowing

    11

    police remand especially in a matter when the accused has been enlarged on bail by the High Court is all the more essential and cannot be permitted in the absence of a valid and sufficiently weighty reason seeking such custody, as it clearly affects the liberty of an individual who has been enlarged on bail by a court of competent jurisdiction."

    (Emphasis supplied)

    19. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid decision makes it abundantly clear that when an accused is enlarged on bail, police custody cannot be granted so long as the order of bail continues to operate. In the present case, the accused-appellants stand enlarged on bail by effect of the order dated 17th March, 2025 passed by the learned Magistrate, which has not been challenged before any forum and consequently the grant of police custody in the face of an existing bail order would amount to indirect cancellation of bail.

    20. In view of the above discussion, the impugned orders dated 13thOctober, 2025 passed by the High Court and 26thSeptember, 2025, passed by learned Sessions Judge do not stand to scrutiny and are hereby set aside.

    21. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

    12

    22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

    ….……………………J.

    (VIKRAM NATH)

    ...…………………….J.

    (SANDEEP MEHTA)

    NEW DELHI;

    JANUARY 09, 2026.

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    POGADADABNDA REVATHI v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA
    (Jan 9, 2026)