ANURAG VIJAYKUMAR GOEL v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises out of prolonged matrimonial disputes between the appellant-husband, Anurag Vijaykumar Goel, and the second respondent-wife (referred to as the respondent). Both parties had been divorced once earlier and entered into a second marriage with each other on 25.07.2015. Their conjugal life lasted approximately one year and nine months, after which serious discord set in.

The appellant has an autistic minor child from his first marriage. In the earlier matrimonial settlement, the jointly owned apartment with his first wife was released fully in his favour, expressly in the best interest of the minor child. This apartment, bearing No. A-52, Kalpataru Habitat, Dr. S.S. Rao Road, Mumbai, along with two car-parking spaces, later became a central point of dispute between the appellant and the respondent.

According to the appellant, due to irreconcilable disputes and constant harassment by the respondent, he left the Mumbai apartment, resigned from a lucrative job in a private bank, and moved to Faridabad to live with his parents and his differently abled son. The respondent, conversely, alleged that she was subjected to continued intimidation and domestic violence by the appellant, and that he abandoned her without any financial support. She claims to have brought her parents to reside with her in what she describes as her matrimonial home—the appellant’s apartment.

On 30.03.2017, the respondent lodged a written complaint (Annexure P-2) with the jurisdictional police, inter alia under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The statement on the basis of which a First Information Report was eventually registered is Annexure P-3, dated 19.04.2018. In that statement, the respondent alleged that the appellant left Mumbai for Faridabad on 06.04.2017, ostensibly to attend to his ailing father and son. She also referred to emails requesting him to return and alleged that the appellant accused her of being schizophrenic, of beating his son, and of possibly poisoning him. The FIR resulted in a criminal prosecution against the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and allied provisions.

Seeking to quash this criminal case, the appellant invoked the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). The High Court of Bombay declined to quash the proceedings, holding that the respondent’s withdrawal of consent at the second motion for divorce was within her statutory rights and that the veracity of allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet should be tested at trial. This refusal led to the present criminal appeal before the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, in May 2017, the respondent initiated separate proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against the appellant and his parents. In the same month, the appellant filed a petition for divorce in the jurisdictional court at Delhi. The Family Court, Saket, New Delhi, to which the divorce petition was assigned, referred the parties to mediation with the Principal Counsellor. This resulted in a comprehensive settlement agreement dated 01.09.2022 (Annexure P-10), signed by both parties.

Pursuant to the settlement, the parties moved a first motion petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 03.09.2022. The Family Court recorded the settlement and the first motion order on 14.09.2022. However, before the second motion could be taken up, the respondent resiled from the settlement and declined to proceed with the mutual consent divorce.

After the respondent backed out of the settlement, the appellant:

• Approached the High Court of Bombay to seek quashing of the criminal proceedings arising out of CR No. 63 of 2018 dated 19.04.2018, primarily on the ground that the respondent had withdrawn from the agreed mutual consent divorce.
• Filed contempt proceedings in the High Court of Delhi, alleging that the respondent had violated the settlement by not proceeding with the second motion for divorce.

A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court punished the respondent for contempt. On appeal, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court set aside that order, holding that the attempt to initiate contempt was essentially a means to coerce the respondent into participating in the second motion for divorce, and clarifying that an undertaking recorded at the first motion crystallizes only if both parties affirm their consent at the second motion. An SLP against that Division Bench order was stated to be pending, though the Supreme Court noted that, if all matrimonial disputes were closed under Article 142 in the present appeal, the appellant would not proceed with that SLP.

In the Supreme Court, apart from seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings, the appellant moved an application under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, relying on the decision in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan. The Supreme Court heard the appellant (through senior counsel) and the respondent who appeared in person.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant under Section 498-A, 406 read with Section 34 IPC, arising from CR No. 63 of 2018 and pending as CC No. 136/PW/2018 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 15th Court at Sewree, Mumbai, should be quashed in exercise of inherent powers analogous to Section 482 Cr.P.C., having regard to the nature and timing of the allegations in the respondent’s complaint.
2. Whether, in the facts of this case, the Supreme Court should exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage between the appellant and the respondent on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, and if so, on what terms, particularly in relation to transfer of the Mumbai apartment, clearance of maintenance dues, and any claim for permanent alimony.
3. Whether the respondent’s withdrawal of consent before the second motion for divorce by mutual consent could, by itself, justify quashing the criminal proceedings, and to what extent the High Court erred in confining itself to that aspect without examining the sufficiency of the allegations under Section 498-A IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The respondent initially acted in accordance with the mediated settlement (Annexure P-10), but then unjustifiably resiled from it before the second motion for divorce, with the apparent intention of coercing the appellant into agreeing to a more favourable settlement for her.
• Owing to the marital discord, the appellant resigned from his well-paid employment in a private bank to join his aged parents, who were unable to care for his autistic child. As a result, he no longer possesses the same financial capacity he had when employed.
• Despite his changed financial status, the appellant remains willing to fully honour the settlement terms: he is prepared either to convey the Mumbai apartment (A-52, Kalpataru Habitat) and the two parking spaces to the respondent, or, in the alternative, to pay Rs. 4 crores if the respondent prefers to vacate the premises and accept the monetary value instead. The two car parking spaces are said to have income-generating potential.
• The appellant has also agreed to relinquish his claims over two cars registered in his name that are currently in the respondent’s custody.
• Under Article 142 of the Constitution, and relying on this Court’s decision in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, the appellant contends that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and cannot be revived. It is therefore in the best interest of both parties that the marriage be dissolved and they be allowed to move on with their lives.
• He maintains that he is willing to comply with the settlement terms recorded in Annexure P-10, including the gift of the apartment to the respondent, and urges that the pending criminal proceedings be quashed and the marriage dissolved accordingly.

Respondent’s Arguments

• The respondent vehemently opposes the appellant’s contentions and does not agree to the settlement offer as described by him.
• She asserts that she is currently unemployed, whereas the appellant is still lucratively employed. She relies on a LinkedIn profile, which she claims shows that the appellant continues in his earlier position with Citi Bank, and on income-tax returns to substantiate that he has substantial income.
• The respondent contends that the appellant owns immovable properties worth crores of rupees and runs two businesses that generate sufficient income, while she is in a state of penury and unable to fund her basic daily needs.
• She relies upon various observations by Division Benches of the High Court of Bombay and the High Court of Delhi, which, according to her, illustrate attempts by the appellant to coerce her into pursuing the second motion for divorce by mutual consent.
• The respondent alleges that the mediated settlement agreement (Annexure P-10) was procured by coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud perpetrated by the appellant.
• She further states that there are substantial arrears of maintenance payable to the housing society in respect of the apartment where she resides with her parents, exposing her to the risk of eviction.
• She is not willing to abide by the original settlement in Annexure P-10 and instead prays for permanent alimony of Rs. 12 crores in addition to the transfer of the apartment to her in an encumbrance-free manner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of both the factual matrix and the legal standards governing quashing of criminal proceedings and exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

1. Nature and Timing of Allegations under Section 498-A IPC

The Court first scrutinized the respondent’s written complaint dated 30.03.2017 (Annexure P-2) and the subsequent statement dated 19.04.2018 (Annexure P-3) on the basis of which the FIR was registered under Section 498-A IPC. The Court noted that:

• The marriage took place on 25.07.2015, and the first written complaint (Annexure P-2) was made on 30.03.2017, while the FIR was registered only on 19.04.2018, about a year after the parties’ admitted separation.
• In Annexure P-3, the respondent alleged that the appellant had left Mumbai for Faridabad on 06.04.2017 to look after his father and son and that she made repeated pleas for him to return. Yet, the written complaint (Annexure P-2) predated his departure and was founded on similar allegations.
• The allegations focused on abuse, threats, accusations and counter-accusations characteristic of strained marital relations, but did not provide specific instances or details that would clearly constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC.
• The respondent’s additional reply in the Article 142 proceedings admitted that frequent quarrels began in 2016 and referenced a fight on 28.03.2017, after which she claimed to have been abandoned on 06.04.2017. She also acknowledged that she had been informed of the appellant’s travel to Faridabad while she was at work, indicating that she was gainfully employed at the time of separation.

From these circumstances, the Court concluded that the allegations in Annexure P-3 were “common-place, banal and vague,” amounting principally to marital squabbles and bickering, rather than to conduct that could reasonably be said to attract Section 498-A IPC. The complaint was lodged a year after the separation, and the narrative did not disclose specific acts of cruelty targeted at the respondent that crossed the threshold of a criminal offence.

Referring to the principle in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Court reiterated that where the allegations in the FIR, even taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute an offence, criminal proceedings can be quashed. Applying this, the Court held that the material disclosed did not support an offence under Section 498-A IPC.

2. Error in the High Court’s Approach under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The High Court of Bombay had refused to quash the criminal proceedings, mainly on the basis that the respondent was entitled, as a matter of statutory right, to withdraw consent at the second motion for divorce by mutual consent, and that the allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet should be tested at trial.

The Supreme Court agreed that the respondent’s withdrawal of consent at the second motion was within her statutory rights, and thus the appellant could not rely solely on her resiling from consent as a ground for quashing. However, it found fault with the High Court’s failure to meaningfully consider the other grounds raised in the quashing petition, especially the sufficiency of the allegations under Section 498-A IPC.

The High Court had, in a perfunctory manner, stated that the contradictions in witness statements and the veracity of the FIR allegations must be tested at trial, without analyzing whether those allegations, on their face, even constituted an offence under Section 498-A. The Supreme Court held that such an approach was inconsistent with the principles in Bhajan Lal, particularly when the complaint and FIR lacked specific and grave allegations and were lodged long after the separation.

3. Assessment of the Mediated Settlement and Respondent’s Conduct

The Court then examined in detail the mediated settlement (Annexure P-10) reached on 01.09.2022 before the Family Court, Saket, New Delhi:

• Annexure P-10 expressly contemplated a legal divorce by mutual consent and provided that all pending civil and criminal proceedings between the parties would be withdrawn upon the final decree of divorce.
• The parties further agreed not to institute any additional civil or criminal cases against each other related to the matrimonial relationship.
• A key part of the settlement required the appellant to execute and register a gift deed transferring the Mumbai apartment (A-52, Kalpataru Habitat) to the respondent. Before execution of the gift, the respondent undertook to clear the outstanding loan with the bank to which the apartment had been mortgaged.
• In compliance with this, the respondent handed over a demand draft of Rs. 9,91,408.41 to the appellant on 14.09.2022, the date on which the first motion for divorce by mutual consent was recorded by the Family Court. The appellant, in turn, settled the loan and released the mortgage.
• The respondent also agreed to pay the pending maintenance charges for the flat, where she continued to reside with her parents. A deed was to be mutually drafted and registered gifting the flat to the respondent once these obligations were met.

In her additional reply, the respondent admitted that maintenance charges due to the housing society had not been paid, attributing this to her parents’ illness and the appellant’s alleged failure to provide scanned documents relating to the apartment. She claimed to have asked the appellant by email to deposit the maintenance dues, assuring that she would reimburse him at the time of registration. Although the email was not produced, the appellant showed that his father underwent surgery and was discharged on 13.01.2023 (Annexure A33), which the Court viewed as corroborating that the parties were still engaged in implementing the settlement around that time.

Subsequently, the respondent repudiated the settlement on the ground that, although it provided for residence, it made no provision for future maintenance, either monthly or by way of lump-sum permanent alimony. The Court inferred that this change of stance revealed her intention to seek a more advantageous financial arrangement than what she had originally agreed to.

The Court found that the respondent’s allegations of coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud in relation to the settlement were unsubstantiated and “blandly raised.” Her conduct in paying nearly Rs. 10 lakhs to clear the mortgage, and her continuing steps towards settlement even into early 2023, were inconsistent with her later claim of having been coerced or misled at the time of executing the settlement.

4. Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage and Article 142

Taking note of the parties’ protracted acrimonious relations over eight years, the Court observed that:

• The parties have been embroiled in multiple legal proceedings with no sign of reconciliation.
• Their relationship has become “totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation,” squarely fitting the parameters outlined in Shilpa Sailesh for invoking Article 142 to dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.

The Court therefore held that the invocation of Article 142 was imperative to do complete justice between the parties, and that the only remaining question was the appropriate terms upon which they should separate—principally in relation to property and any claim for alimony.

5. Financial Circumstances, Property, and Alimony

The Court emphasized that while the alimony received by the respondent from her first divorce was irrelevant to the present dispute, the appellant’s responsibilities towards his autistic minor child and his current financial status were relevant considerations in shaping an equitable exit arrangement.

Key aspects of the Court’s financial assessment included:

• The Mumbai apartment (A-52, Kalpataru Habitat) along with two car-parking spaces is described as a “very valuable asset.” Its transfer to the respondent would be sufficient to reasonably secure her post-divorce life.
• The respondent is a graduate engineer with a postgraduate qualification in management and was admittedly working at the time of the parties’ estrangement. This demonstrated her capacity and potential to maintain herself, especially given her experience in the information technology field.
• Income tax returns of the appellant, placed on record by the respondent as Annexure A10, showed very high incomes (Rs. 2,54,60,137/- in assessment year 2013–14 and Rs. 2,46,28,969/- in 2015–16) when he was employed with Citi Bank. However, by 2018–19 his income had dropped to Rs. 50,34,120/-, and by 2021–22 it had declined further to Rs. 17,73,630/-. These figures supported the appellant’s assertion that he was no longer employed by Citi Bank.
• The Court expressly refused to rely on the LinkedIn profile (Annexure A11) produced by the respondent as proof of continued employment at Citi Bank, thereby accepting the appellant’s contention that his employment position had changed.

On this basis, the Court rejected the respondent’s demand for Rs. 12 crores as permanent alimony in addition to the apartment. It noted that she had made no such claim at the time of entering into the settlement, and her later demand, coupled with unsubstantiated allegations of coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud, could not be sustained.

The Court regarded the gift of the encumbrance-free apartment, along with two car-parking spaces, as sufficient compensation and security for the respondent in the context of the dissolution of marriage. It also took into account the interest of the appellant’s autistic minor child: the child’s mother (the appellant’s first wife) had previously released her half share in the apartment in favour of the appellant for the child’s benefit. Nonetheless, the Court was convinced that, even in light of the child’s welfare, it was consistent with the minor’s best interests that the appellant gift the property to the respondent to finally and conclusively resolve the marital dispute through divorce by mutual consent under Article 142.

6. Maintenance Dues to the Housing Society

The Court noted from the Delhi High Court’s order that, as on 25.01.2025, the maintenance charges due to the housing society in respect of the apartment totaled Rs. 25,90,701/-. Although the respondent had earlier taken responsibility for these charges—since she and her parents were in occupation of the flat—she later emphasized these arrears as grounds of hardship and risk of eviction.

In the Supreme Court, the appellant, who was present in person, agreed to pay the entire maintenance due as on the date of judgment. The Court took this undertaking into account in fashioning the final directions: it required the appellant to deposit all maintenance arrears up to 01.09.2025 with the society, as a precondition for the society to issue an updated no-encumbrance certificate and ownership certificate in his name, thereby regularizing the title before the gift to the respondent.

7. Contempt Proceedings and Related Litigation

The respondent relied on the Division Bench order of the Delhi High Court setting aside the contempt order previously passed by the Single Judge, stressing its observation that initiating contempt proceedings was an attempt to coerce her into participating in the second motion for divorce. The Division Bench had also held that an undertaking recorded at the time of the first motion crystallizes only if both parties reaffirm their consent at the second motion.

The Supreme Court agreed with this legal position concerning the second motion and did not disturb that finding. However, in relation to the maintainability of the contempt proceedings, and given that an SLP against that order was stated to be pending, the Court refrained from further comment, noting that the appellant would not pursue the SLP if all matrimonial proceedings were brought to an end under Article 142 through the present judgment.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court allowed the criminal appeal and the application under Article 142, granting comprehensive relief to finally resolve all matrimonial disputes between the parties, subject to specific conditions.

Core Holdings

• Quashing of Criminal Proceedings: The Court quashed the criminal proceedings in CC No. 136/PW/2018 pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 15th Court at Sewree, Mumbai, for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 read with Section 34 IPC. This was based on the finding that the allegations in Annexures P-2 and P-3 were vague, general, and did not prima facie constitute an offence under Section 498-A IPC, within the meaning of the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal.
• Dissolution of Marriage under Article 142: Exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and following the principles in Shilpa Sailesh, the Court dissolved the marriage between the appellant and the respondent on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, holding that the relationship was totally unworkable and emotionally dead. This dissolution is, however, expressly made subject to compliance with specified terms.

Terms and Conditions Imposed

1. Payment of Maintenance Dues and Regularization of Title:
   The appellant must deposit the entire arrears of maintenance to the housing society in respect of apartment No. A-52, Kalpataru Habitat, Dr. S.S. Rao Road, Mumbai, along with its two car parking spaces, as outstanding “as on today” and up to 1 September 2025. Upon such payment, the society shall issue:
   • a no-encumbrance certificate in favour of the appellant, and
   • an ownership certificate recording the property in his name.
2. Execution of Gift Deed:
   With the above documents in hand, the appellant must execute a gift deed in favour of the respondent in respect of the said apartment and car parking spaces on or before 30.08.2025, on any date communicated to the respondent by written notice with due acknowledgment.
3. Presence before Registrar:
   The draft of the gift deed has already been exchanged between the parties. Both the appellant and respondent No. 2 are required to be present before the jurisdictional Registrar on the notified date for execution and registration of the deed.
4. Consequence of Respondent’s Non-Appearance:
   If respondent No. 2 does not appear on the notified date, the Registrar must record the appellant’s presence. In that event, both parties shall be present before the Registrar on 15.09.2025 for execution of the deed.
5. Effect of Non-Compliance:
   
   • If the appellant fails to comply with the above directions (particularly regarding payment of maintenance dues and execution of the gift deed), the order of divorce shall not take effect.
   • If the respondent fails to appear both on the date notified by the appellant and again on 15.09.2025, notwithstanding the appellant’s compliance, the divorce shall nevertheless come into effect.
6. Closure of All Litigation:
   All civil and criminal proceedings initiated by either party, in relation to or arising out of the marriage, shall stand closed. Further, no new civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted by either party in relation to any aspect arising out of or connected with the marriage that has now been dissolved.

Direct Implications for the Parties

• The criminal prosecution under Sections 498-A, 406/34 IPC against the appellant comes to an end.
• The marriage between the parties stands dissolved upon compliance with the specified conditions, bringing an end to their marital status and related disputes.
• The respondent is to receive the valuable Mumbai apartment and its two car parking spaces by way of gift from the appellant, once maintenance dues are cleared and title regularized, thereby securing her residence and providing substantial property in lieu of monetary alimony.
• The appellant, while relinquishing the apartment, achieves finality in all matrimonial disputes and is relieved from further litigation connected to this marriage.

Broader Legal Significance

The judgment applies existing legal principles rather than setting out new doctrinal rules. It reaffirms:

• the parameters for quashing criminal proceedings under the framework laid down in Bhajan Lal, particularly the requirement that the FIR must, on its face, disclose the ingredients of a cognizable offence; and
• the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142, as articulated in Shilpa Sailesh, to dissolve marriages that have irretrievably broken down, while tailoring equitable conditions to do complete justice between the parties.

The primary effect of this judgment is thus confined to the parties before the Court, resolving their long-standing disputes and closing all related litigation, while reaffirming and applying settled principles on quashing criminal proceedings and granting divorce under Article 142.