ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(referred to as „Cr.P.C." hereinafter) is filed for quashing the FIR registered at Crime No. 608/2013 at P.S. Pardeshipura for offence punishable under Section 420 read with 34 of IPC alongwith subsequent proceedings pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore.
2. The exposition of facts, in brief, giving rise to the present petition are as under:
Brajesh S/o Pradeep Gupta R/o 276-B, Veenanagar, Indore submitted a written complaint dated 07.04.2023 to the SHO, P.S. Pardeshipura Indore, inter-alia stating that M/s Snehal D/o Sharad Shabnis and Shreepad Shabnis S/o Sharad Shabnis proposed to sell their house No. 1464/23 for consideration of Rs. 25,51,000/-. Accordingly, an agreement was executed
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on 04.01.2013 in his favour. He paid advance consideration of Rs. 9,51,000/- and published a Public Notice dated 10.01.2013. Ms. Snehal, on pretext of ailment of her brother Shreepad deferred execution of sale deed. Accordingly, second agreement was executed on 25.03.2013 by Ms. Snehal. Despite execution of second agreement, sale deed was not executed by Ms. Snehal and her brother Shreepad in furtherance of the agreement to sell. The accused are trying to sale the property to some other person. On such allegations, P.S. Pardeshipura registered FIR at Crime No. 608/2013 for offence punishable u/S 420 r/W 34 of IPC against Snehal and Shreepad. Relevant seizures were made. The statements of witnesses were recorded. Petitioner Snehal and Shreepad were arrested. On completion of investigation, final report was submitted. The trial is underway.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners stated that only one prosecution witness namely Sunil Gupta (PW-1) has been examined till date.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners in addition to the grounds mentioned in the petition submits that no offence, as alleged, is committed by the petitioners. Dispute between the parties is essentially civil in nature, which is given colour of criminal prosecution. Continuation of the proceedings would cause severe prejudice to the petitioners
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposes the petition and submits that the petitioners have not executed the sale deed despite receiving the advance consideration. It goes to show the dishonest intention on their part. During pendency of the petition, the SHO, P.S. Pardeshipura, Indore informed that respondent no. 2 - Brajesh Gupta had expired on 30.05.2017 and his relatives have been given intimation with regard to pendency of this petition.
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6. Heard, learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The section 420 IPC deals with the cheating by dishonestly inducing delivery of property. The petitioner"s failure to execute the sale deed and to return the advanced money has led to charges of cheating. Mere non- performance of the contract or inaction or deferment in complying with the terms of contract may provide cause of action for specific performance of the contract but dishonest intention to cheat or fraudulent intention to misappropriate the advance amount cannot be inferred from these actions.
8. In the case of International Advance Research Centre for P.M. & N.M. Vs. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P)Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2016) 1 SCC 348 , the Supreme Court held as under:
15. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are : (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security; and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section
420 IPC. In order to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but, it is further necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order to deceive the complainant.
16. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the cheating would depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. If it is established that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the very time when he made a promise and entered into a transaction with the complainant to part with his property or money, then the liability is criminal and the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating. On the other hand, if all that is established is that a representation made by the accused has subsequently not been kept, criminal liability cannot be foisted on the accused and the only right which the complainant acquires is the remedy for breach of contract in a civil court. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction. In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 250, para
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21)
"21. … In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating."
The above view in Palanitkar case [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] was referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain v. State of U.P. [(2014) 13 SCC 553 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 751]
9. In the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Vs. State of U.P. reported in
(2024) 10 SCC 690, the Supreme Court has held as under:
36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients.
In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC): -
1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the property, and
2) The person entrusted: -
a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or
b) dishonestly used or disposed of the property or willfully suffers any other person so to do in violation of:
i. any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is discharged; or
ii. legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see: S.W.P. Palanitkar (supra).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC, the essential ingredients are: -
1) deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or by omission;
2) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or
3) the consent that any persons shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit (see: Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC))
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from the very beginning or inception.
38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 of IPC, punishable under Section 406 of IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415 of the IPC, punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
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39. Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the person may seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but, any breach of trust with a mens rea, gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. It has been held in Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha & Ors., reported in (1973) 2 SCC 823 as under:
"4. We have heard Mr. Maheshwari on behalf of the appellant and are of the opinion that no case has been made out against the respondents under Section 420 Penal Code, 1860. For the purpose of the present appeal, we would assume that the various allegations of fact which have been made in the complaint by the appellant are correct. Even after making that allowance, we find that the complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence on the part of the respondents under Section
420 Penal Code, 1860. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs. 35.000/- There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay them Rs. 35,000/- by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability on the respondents for the offence of cheating."
40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, a person who comes into possession of the movable property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against the terms of the contract, then the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of each case.
41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.
10. Recently, in the case of Radheyshyam & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (Order dated 22.07.2024 passed in Cr.A. No. 3020 of 2024),
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reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2311 the Supreme Court has held as under:
8. Thus, cheating forms an essential ingredient to constitute and offence under Section 420, IPC. Further, to constitute cheating as defined under Section 415, IPC, it is necessary that a fraudulent or dishonest inducement is done and the deceived person is made to deliver any property owing to the fraud. Section 415, IPC, defines „cheating", as:
"Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat"."
9. From the bare perusal of the FIR, it is evident that there was no act of cheating, that is, the complainant was nowhere fraudulently induced or dishonestly deceived by the appellants. A commercial transaction took place between the parties during which the parties consensually agreed for the sale of the property of the appellants and respondent no. 2 paid the part consideration. The default in payment of their loan dues on part of the appellants is not reflective of their deceitful intention towards the complainant. Mere non-registration of the sale or its refusal cannot amount to cheating. The delivery of the advance payment towards consideration was made in furtherance of an Agreement to Sale and it is not the case of the respondent that he was in anyway deceived or duped to make such payments to the appellants. It is a civil dispute and gives rise to the complainant"s right to resort to the remedies provided under civil law by filing a suit for specific performance.
10. Additionally, the appellants have also been accused of committing the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406, IPC. This offence is defined under Section 405, IPC as follows:
"Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes off that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust"."
11. For an offence punishable under Section 406, IPC, the following ingredients must exist:
i. The accused was entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;
ii. The accused had dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of that property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so; and
iii. Such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust
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is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.
12. In the present case, the appellants were not entrusted with any property by respondent no. 2 - complainant. The only delivery made was of part payment towards an Agreement to Sale between the parties. The amount paid towards consideration cannot be said to have been entrusted with the appellants by respondent no. 2. Additionally, merely because the appellants are refusing to register the sale, it does not amount to misappropriation of the advance payment. Since there was no entrustment of property, the offence of misappropriation of such property and thereby criminal breach of trust cannot be said to be made out.
11. Therefore, in view of aforestated dictum of law laid down in the case of International Advance Research Centre for P.M. & N.M., Delhi Race Club and Radheyshyam (supra), the offence punishable u/S 420 and 34 of IPC is prima-facie not made out against the petitioner from the contents of impugned FIR and the material on record. Apparently, both the parties consensually agreed for the sale of the property of the petitioners and complainant Brajesh Gupta paid the part consideration. Mere non- registration of the sale in furtherance of agreement or its refusal cannot amount to cheating. The payment of the advance consideration was made in furtherance of agreement to sale and it is not the case of the complainant that he was in anyway fraudulently induced, deceived or duped to make such payments to the petitioners. The impugned FIR, based on written complaint, is an attempt to clock the civil dispute of specific performance of contract with criminal prosecution for cheating. Hence, the exercise of inherent jurisdiction u/Sec. 482 of Cr.P.C. is needed to prevent abuse of the process of Court.
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12. Consequently, this petition u/S 482 of Cr.P.C. is allowed. The FIR registered at Crime No. 608/2013 dated 13.09.2013 at P.S. Pardeshipura, Distt. Indore as well as the further proceeding in RCT No. 2582 of 2017(RCT 3802582 of 2017) before by the JMFC, Indore is quashed. The Petitioners stands discharged.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
sh/-