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Court No. - 3 Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 230 of 2021 Appellant :- Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar Trust Lucknow Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Appellant :- Arvind Srivastava,Syed Safdar Ali Kazmi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.
Hon'ble Brij Raj Singh,J.
1. Heard Shri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner- appellant, and Shri Ajit Kumar Singh, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Shri Sudhanshu Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State.
2. The present intra-Court appeal is directed against the order of learned single-Judge dated 6.9.2021, passed in Writ - C No. 4340 of 2021. Thereby the writ petition has been dismissed and the order dated 16.1.2021 passed by SDM, Rampur (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order), upheld. In the impugned order, relying on the earlier reports dated 16.3.2020 and 6.1.2021, land admeasuring 70.005 hectares in village Seegankheda has been declared vested in the State Government, free of all encumbrances for the reason of violation Section 89(2) read with Sections 104 & 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Code).
3. In view of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General as to the maintainability of the present intra-Court appeal, we do not propose to go into the other facts giving rise to the merit dispute dealt with in the order dated 16.1.2021.
4. First, it has been submitted, the order dated 16.1.2021 had been passed by the 'Revenue Court' (as defined under Section 4(16) of the Code) under Section 104 read with Section 105(2) of the Code with Neutral Citation No. - 2022:AHC:3708-DB
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respect to a matter clearly enumerated in List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Petitioner having challenged that order before this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the present intra-Court appeal is not maintainable by virtue of the exclusionary clause contained in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Second, in any case, the order dated 16.1.2021 was amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the Board or the Commissioner, under Section 210 of the Code. Third, the order dated 16.1.2021 is a consequential order, upon an earlier order of the Board of Revenue dated 14.1.2020. That order has attained finality upon dismissal of the petitioner's earlier writ petition - Writ-B No. 437 of 2020 on 21.10.2020. The recall application there against was also dismissed on 0.10.2021.
5. The above preliminary objection has been met by learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant who would submit, in the first place, the Additional Collector was not a 'Court' within the meaning of that term used in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules. He is only an administrative authority who acted in the exercise of his administrative function only. Relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1 and Indian National Congress (I) Vs. Institute of Social Welfare and Others, (2002)
5 SCC 685, it has been submitted, in passing the impugned order, the Additional Collector did not act as a court. He neither had any power to summon any witness nor he had been vested with any statutory function to adjudicate rights between parties nor he acted in discharge of sovereign function. Merely because the Additional Collector issued a notice to the petitioner-appellant; entertained its reply and; passed an order to vest the property in dispute in the State, it did not qualify that function of the Additional Collector as a court. Alternatively, it has been submitted, that action may at best be described as a quasi-judicial function performed by an administrative authority. Since the Additional Collector did not pass the impugned order in his capacity as a court, the
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exclusionary clause contained in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules would not apply to the present case. Accordingly, the intra-Court appeal would be maintainable. Second, the learned single-Judge has decided the writ petition on merits and not on the preliminary objection. Therefore, merely because the impugned order dated 16.1.2021 may have been revisable under Section 210 of the Code, the present intra-court appeal may not be dismissed on that preliminary objection. The Writ Court has dealt with the issue on merits, the intra-Court appeal would have to be considered on merits. Last, the impugned order dated 16.1.2021 is not a consequential order. In any case, a declaration under Section 143 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, was made prior to the sale deeds being executed in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, there was no occasion to pass the order vesting any part of the land in favour of the State. Even otherwise, violations alleged are only with respect to part of the land purchased by the petitioner. A recall application is also stated to be pending in the earlier writ petition.
6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, insofar as the second limb of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General is concerned, we are not impressed. It is true, once the learned single-Judge has dealt with the grounds of attack raised in the writ petition, on merits, it is too late in the day to relegate such a petitioner to the forum of the alternative remedy. If at all, that course may become open only after the order of the learned single-Judge is first set-aside, on merits. In face of the first limb of the preliminary objection raised, that stage has yet not arrived. In so far as the third limb of the preliminary objection is concerned, its result would hinge on our opinion on the first limb of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General. If that preliminary objection is to be sustained, no discussion would be required as to that (third limb). Accordingly, we chose to consider the first limb of the preliminary objection, first.
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7. The intra-court appeal jurisdiction arises under Clause 10 of The Letters Patent. Yet, at present, that limited right of appeal is circumscribed by the Rules, relevant Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules. It reads: -
"5. Special appeal. - An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of Superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction [or in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of Appellate or Revisional Jurisdiction under any such Act] of one Judge."
8. The meaning to be given to the exclusionary clause contained in Rule 5 above is no longer res integra. A Full Bench of this Court in Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR (2010) All 46 (FB) had the occasion to consider that precise issue. In paragraphs 15 & 16 of that report, it was concluded as below:
"15. Having given our anxious consideration to the various plea raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we find that from the perusal of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules a special appeal shall lie before this Court from the judgment passed by one Judge of the Court. However, such special appeal will not lie in the following circumstances:
"1. The judgment passed by one Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court;
2. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction;
3. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of the power of Superintendence of the High Court;
4. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction;
5. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award by
(i) the tribunal,
(ii) Court or
(iii) statutory arbitrator
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made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India;
6. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award of
(i) the Government or
(ii) any officer or
(iii) authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act, i.e. under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.
16. The exercise of original jurisdiction by any tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator or exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction by the Government or any officer or authority is to be under any U.P. Act or any Central Act with respect to the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The powers have to be exercised under the Act and not given by the Act. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Indramani Pyarlal Gupta (supra) the words 'powers exercised under the Act' would comprehensively embrace in its power conferred by any bye laws or delegated legislation. If the appellate or revisional powers has been conferred by the Government trough an order issued under the delegated provisions of the Act then it is definitely a power exercised under the Act and in that event no special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules would lie against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge. In the present case, we find that the Commissioner had exercised powers conferred under Clause 28 of the Distribution Order, 2004, which order has been passed under the provisions of the Act, therefore, the appellate power has been exercised under the Act and, thus, no special appeal would lie. It may be mentioned here that right of an appeal is a statutory right and not a vested right and can be hedged by conditions as held by the Apex Court in the cases of Smt. Ganga Bai(supra) and Vijay Prakash & Jawahar (supra). The Division Bench of this Court while deciding the case of Ram Dhyan Singh(supra), has incorrectly taken the view that the order should be passed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction conferred by some Act whereas under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, a special appeal would not lie if the appellate or revisional jurisdiction have been conferred on an authority under any U.P. Act or Central Act relating to any of the entries enumerated in the State List or Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India."
9. That view was applied and followed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Kalyanpur (M/s) & Ors. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, U.P., Kanpur & Anr., (2003) 1 UPLBEC 496.
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After taking note of the Full-bench decision in Sheet Gupta (supra), the co-ordinate bench concluded: -
"64. From the above discussions and looking into the provisions of U.P. Act No. 14 of 1962 as amended by Amendment Act of 1981 and Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court, 1952, special appeal is excluded from a judgment of one Judge of this Court in following categories :-
(i) Judgment of one Judge passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court.
(ii) Judgment of one Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
(iii) Judgment of one Judge made in the exercise of its power of Superintendence.
(iv) Judgment of one Judge made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
(v) Judgment of order of one Judge made in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 orArticle 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award of a Tribunal, Court or Statutory Arbitrator made or purported to be more in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in State List or Concurrent List.
(vi) Judgment or order of one Judge made in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award by the Court or any officer or authority made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act."
10. Applying that well-established rule, it is to be seen whether the impugned order was an order passed by a Tribunal or a Court or a statutory arbitrator, in the exercise of jurisdiction vested under a state enactment, with respect to a matter enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List. If the answer to the aforesaid query is found to be in the affirmative, clearly, the instant intra-court appeal would not be maintainable.
11. Indisputably, the impugned order dated 16.1.2021 has been passed with reference to powers and proceedings under the Code. It is state legislation. Also, the Code has been enacted with respect to subject matters enumerated, primarily under Entries 18 and 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Therefore, the latter stipulation of the exclusionary clause contained in Rule 5 of Chapter
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VIII of the Rules is satisfied. The only real issue is - whether the Additional Collector acted as a Tribunal, or a Court or a Statutory Arbitrator while passing the impugned order dated 16.1.2021. In the preliminary objection raised, the learned Additional Advocate General has claimed the Additional Collector to be a Court, only.
12. Here, we may first take note of the provisions of the Code itself. The Additional Collector has been defined as a Revenue Court under Section 4(16) of the Code. It reads:
"4. Definitions. - In this Code, -
(16) "Revenue Court" means all or any of the following authorities (that is to same) the Board and all members thereof, Commissioners, Additional Commissioners, Collectors, Additional Collectors, [Chief Reveue Officers, Assistant Collectors, Settlement Officerss, Assistant Settlement Officers, Record Officers, Assistant Record Officers, Tahsildars, Tahsildar (Judicial) and Naib Tahsildars;]
13. Section 104 of the Code is in the following terms:-
104. Every Lease or transfer of interest in any holding or part thereof made by a bhumidhar or any asami in contravention of the provisions of this Code shall be void.
Then, section 105(2) of the Code reads as under: -
"105. Consequences of transfer by bhumidhar in contravention of the Code. - (1) …..
(2) Where any land or other property has vested in the State Government under sub- section (1) it shall be lawful for the Collector to take over possession of such land and other property, and to direct that any person occupying such land or property be evicted therefrom, and for that purpose, the Collector may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and the provisions of Section 59 mutatis mutandis shall apply to such property."
14. Also, section 206(1) of the Code reads as under: -
"206. Jurisdiction of Civil court and Revenue Courts. - (1). Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of this Code, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit, application or proceeding to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, any revenue court or revenue officer is, by or under this Code empowered to determine, decide or dispose of".
15. The Code is a complete enactment. The jurisdiction and procedure of the Revenue Court are governed by the provisions made under Chapter XIII of the Code. That procedure would govern the proceedings conducted by the Additional Collector - also a Revenue Court. Then,
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under section 206 of the Code, notwithstanding any other law, a Revenue Court has jurisdiction to entertain amongst others any suit, application, or other proceedings under the Code. Thus, for the purpose of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, in the first place, the Additional Collector is a Revenue Court. Insofar as that authority has passed an order in a 'proceeding' referable to powers vested in him under Section 105(2) read with Section 104 of the Code, the distinction sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner also is too fine and artificial to merit acceptance.
16. Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules excludes from the purview of intra-Court appeal, judgments of learned single-Judge of the Court, that arise from orders passed by any 'Court'. So long as the order is found to have been passed by the Revenue Court, duly constituted under the Code, having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter dealt with in the statutory 'proceeding' (under section 105(2) read with section 104 of the Code) before it, the exclusionary clause would remain ever applicable. In fact, the Rule in question chooses to use the words - "in respect of", to describe the subject matter of the writ petition decided by the learned single-Judge. Those words are expansive. These have been employed to include within the sweep and cover of the exclusionary clause, incidental, ancillary, and consequential proceedings arising from the order of nature first considered by the Rule, to create the exclusion. Consequently, even if the original order itself may remain not challenged in writ jurisdiction, no intra-Court appeal may lie against an order passed in that jurisdiction, arising from a proceeding "in respect thereof".
However, no definite opinion is being expressed as to that as plainly that issue is not directly involved at present.
17. The petitioner-appellant had challenged the impugned order in writ proceedings. That writ petition was directed against and not merely "in respect of" an order of a "Revenue Court" passed with reference to sections 104 & 105 (2) of the Code. No further scrutiny is required to be made. We find, besides the fact that there is no reason to not consider the Additional Collector a
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"Revenue Court" (in view of specific definition clause contained in Section 4(16) of the Code) we are also unable to accept the distinction being sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant that the intra- Court appeal is maintainable because the function exercised by the Additional Collector is that of a quasi-judicial or administrative in texture.
18. The Additional Collector is a "Revenue Court" entrusted with judicial function to, amongst others, pass an order under the Code to adjudge the civil rights of the petitioner in a "proceeding" and pass an order to declare that the land purchased by the petitioner vested in favour of the State. A further microscopic examination of each order passed by him to determine whether it is truly an order that qualifies as an order of a Court (by adopting an independent external test), is unnecessary. In fact, that test is misconceived. The Code is a complete code. It not only vests the judicial powers and jurisdiction in specified authorities, but it also excludes and ousts the plenary jurisdiction of all other Civil Courts with respect to matters falling under the Code.
19. The decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant is of no help. In Indian National Congress (supra), a question had arisen whether the Election Commission acted as an administrative or as a quasi-judicial authority while dealing with registration of a political party. It is in that context that observations were made in paragraph 24 of the report as have been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant. Those observations cannot be read out of context or in isolation. Relying on the statutory duty to act judicially i.e. after making due enquiry before reaching its decision and in accordance with rules, it was inferred, the function performed by the Election Commission while dealing with a registration application of a political party was a quasi-judicial function.
20. In R. Gandhi, President Madras Bar Association (supra), the Supreme Court considered the difference between courts and tribunals. While drawing that distinction, the Supreme Court took note of its
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earlier decisions. Some part of that discussion has been referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant. However, upon consideration, the Supreme Court concluded as below:
"45. Though both courts and tribunals exercise judicial power and discharge similar functions, there are certain well-recognised differences between courts and tribunals. They are:
(i) Courts are established by the State and are entrusted with the State's inherent judicial power for administration of justice in general. Tribunals are established under a statute to adjudicate upon disputes arising under the said statute, or disputes of a specified nature. Therefore, all courts are tribunals. But all tribunals are not courts.
(ii) Courts are exclusively manned by Judges. Tribunals can have a Judge as the sole member, or can have a combination of a judicial member and a technical member who is an "expert" in the field to which the tribunal relates. Some highly specialised fact-finding tribunals may have only technical members, but they are rare and are exceptions.
(iii) While courts are governed by detailed statutory procedural rules, in particular the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act, requiring an elaborate procedure in decision making, tribunals generally regulate their own procedure applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only where it is required, and without being restricted by the strict rules of the Evidence Act."
21. Examined in that light, we are unable to appreciate the submission raised by learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant. In so far as the Additional Commissioner i.e. "Revenue Court" constituted under the Code is concerned undoubtedly it is a judicial authority constituted under the Code to adjudicate upon disputes arising under that enactment. At present, that "Revenue Court" has adjudicated a dispute between the State and the petitioner-appellant viz a viz the civil rights over the land in dispute. In any case, the declaration of rights of the nature contemplated under Section 105(2) read with Section 104 of the Code leaves no doubt as to the nature of the jurisdiction or power exercised by the Additional Collector as a "Revenue Court".
22. In the context of objection raised before us, the exact procedure prescribed to receive evidence, the conduct of proceedings, etc. would remain non-decisive in the context of the clear intent of the Code to clothe the Additional Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to act as the "Revenue Court", to adjudge valuable civil rights, at its core. What may arise for
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consideration is whether the "Revenue Court" under the Code is a 'court' or a 'tribunal'. In the context of the language used in Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules, that issue is purely academic. In either case, the intra-Court appeal would remain excluded against an order passed in writ jurisdiction to test the correctness of the impugned order.
23. Accordingly, the first preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General is sustained. In that view of the matter, we do not propose the examine the third aspect of the objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General as it may lead us to the merit issues involved in the appeal, which we cannot touch in view of our firm conclusion reached first.
24. The present special appeal is found to be not maintainable, and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 5.1.2022
Prakhar/Faraz