Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:3216 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 130 of 2024
Reserved on: 24.05.2024 .
Date of decision: 11.06.2024 Secretary, HPPWD, Shimla, H.P. & others .P
....Appellants Versus H
Chaman Lal & others
o f ....Respondents Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kai r nth t la, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No For the Appellants u : Mr. H.S. Rawat, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent o s : Mr. Devender K. Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kai nt C hla,Judge h The present appeal is directed against the judgment
iag nd decree dated 31.08.2022, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned First
H
Appellate Court), vide which the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Court No.1, Sunderngar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) was partly modified. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
_________________________
1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
1
2
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction and .
mandatory injunction. It was asserted that the su . it P land described in para 1 of the judgment of the learn ed Trial Court is owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. The defendHants have no right, title or interest over the same. f The defendants
constructed a road from Jarol to Beh nao without the consent of
the plaintiffs through the suit r lantd. The plaintiffs repeatedly
asked the defendants to a u cquire the suit land. They even served
a legal notice upon the defendants but in vain. Hence, the suit
was filed to se C ek theo relief mentioned above. 3. h The suit was opposed by the defendants by filing a w g ritten statement taking preliminary objections, regarding lack i of maintainability, plaintiffs being estopped from filing the suit H
by their acts and conduct and the suit being barred by limitation. It was asserted that the portion of the road, namely, Jarol-Salwana-Behna was completed before 1989. The road was declared fit for plying of vehicular traffic on 19.05.1989.
The portion of the road from Jarol to Behna was made fit for
3
vehicular traffic on 05.03.2005. Peoplehave been using the road for more than 20 years. The road could not have been constructed without the express consent of the land ow P ners. .The plaintiffs did not raise any objection to the construc . tion of the road. The plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation after
20 years. All the landowners had given their ve rbHal consent to
the construction of the road. Meha r o Chan
fd, predecessor-in- interest, was the Nambardar of t the area. He requested the HPPWD department and othe r r government representatives to construct the road from h u is land. The plaintiffs have no right to
challenge the const o ruction of the road. Hence, it was prayed that the suit b C e dismissed. 4. h No replication was filed. 5 g . The learned Trial Court framed the following issues i on 15.11.2019: -
H
1. Whether the defendants have constructed a road over the suit land owned and possessed by the plaintiffs without their consent and without acquiring the same through process of law, as alleged? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to
4
acquire the suit land through process of law, as prayed? OPP.
3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form, as alleged? OPD. .
4. Whether there lies no cause of action and locus standi in favour of the plaintiffs to f . ileP the present suit, as alleged? OPD.
5. Whether the suit is bad for the n H on-joiner of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD .
6. Whether the suit is barred by fstatutory period of limitation, as alleged? OP o D.
7. Relief.
6. The parties were c r alletd to produce their evidence and plaintiffs examined u Ajay Kumar (PW-1), Rajinder Kumar (PW-2), Lata Devi ( o PW-3), Jai Prakash (PW-4), Shiv Ram (PW-5) and Plainti C ff No.3Hans Raj (PW-6). The defendants examined Bhim Singh (DW-1) and Hitesh Kumar (DW-2). 7 g . h The learned Trial Court held that the defendants i had not disputed that the road was constructed over the suit H
land. They claimed that the road was constructed with the consent of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. However, they failed to lead any evidence to prove this fact. Compensation was paid to Jai Prakash (PW-4), whose land was
also acquired for constructing the road. A person cannot be
5
deprived of his property except as per the law. The suit was not barred by limitation. Hence, issues N0. 1 and 2 were answered in affirmative, rest of the issues were answered in negative and .
the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed. .P
8. Being aggrieved from the judgmen H t and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the de f fe ndants filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Sudnernagar, (learned Fir t st A popellate Court). Learned First Appellate Court held that r no oral consent was proved. The witnesses of the defenda u nts were not posted in the area at the
time of construction o of the road and their testimonies regarding
the consen t w C ere not acceptable. Compensation was awarded to some h of the landowners and there is no justification for denying t g he same to the plaintiffs. The State cannot appropriate the i land of the citizen without payment of the compensation. The H
suit is within limitation as the cause of action is continuing; therefore, judgment and decree were upheld with a slight modification that the defendants were directed to restore the suit land in its original position or to initiate the process for
acquisition of the suit land.
6
9. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court the defendants filed the present appeal with the following proposed substantial .
questions of law: - .P
i) Whether the learned Appellate Court H has felled in error of law in entertaining the suit beyond the period of limitation?
ii) Whether without specific pleadifngs and evidence, the relief of permanen t t p ro o hibitory and mandatory injunction i.e. either r to restore the suit to its original or to initiate the process for acquisition of the land of respondents/plaintiffs can be granted?
iii) Whether the findings of the learned Appellate Court are liable o to beu set aside in view of judgments passed by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Dig C amber and a full bench of the Hon'ble High Court of H.P., in CWP No.1966/2020 (Shankar Dass Vs. State)?
i h v) Whether the judgment passed by the learned g
Appellate Court is barred upon mis-appreciation of i
facts and evidence on record? 10. I have heard Mr H.S. Rawat, learned Additional
H
Advocate General for the defendants/appellants and Mr Devender K. Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents.
11. Mr. H.S. Rawat, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellants-defendants submitted that the learned First
7
Appellate Court erred in decreeing the suit. The suit was filed after the lapse of 20 years and the same is barred by delay and latches. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme .
Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar 1995 (4) SCC 6 . 83 P and judgement passed by this Court inShankar Dass Vs State of HP, 2013(2) Him L.R.698(FB), Rattan Lal vs. State o f HH.P. & Others, passed in CWP No. 1433 of 2019, decid ed o on 16
f.07.2019 in support of his submission. He prayed t that the present appeal be admitted on the proposed subs r tan ial questions of law.
12. Mr. Devender u K Sharma learned counsel for the plaintiffs/responden o ts supported the judgments and decrees passed by th C e learned courts below and submitted that no substantial question of law arises in the present case. He prayed t g hat th h e present appeal be dismissed. i 13. I have given considerable thought to the
H
submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. The defendants have not disputed the construction of the road through the suit land. Their plea is that the road was
constructed through the suit land with the consent of Mehar
8
Chand, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. It was also asserted that in para (e) of the grounds of appeal that Mehar Chand, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, had given his .
suit land willingly for the construction of the road b . ei P ng a Namberdar of the area. He requested the HPPWD department and other government officials to construct f th e rHoad from his land because his house was not con ne o cted to the road at that time. Hence, the only question is whether the road was constructed with the consent o r f thte predecessor-in-interest of
the plaintiffs or not. u
15. Bhim S o ingh (DW-1) admitted in his cross- examinatio n C that no document exists regarding the plaintiffs' conse h nt for the construction of the road. He also admitted that h g e had not talked to the general public in the years 2004-2005. i 16. Hitesh Kumar (DW-2) also stated in his cross-
H
examination that he had not talked to the people of the area in the year 2004-2005 when the road was constructed. These testimonies mean that people had not consented to the construction of the road on their land in the presence of these
witnesses. Further, Bhim Singh (DW-1) was posted as J.E. in
9
Sub-Division Dehar in the year 2018, whereas Hitesh Kumar (DW-2) was posted as Assistant Engineer, in the year 2017. This shows that they were not even posted in the area at the time of .
the construction of the road and they were not compe . te P nt to testify about the consent of the landowners at the time of the construction of the road. f H
17. In Nokhia & Others vs. Sta te o of HP ILR 1984 HP 906, the State Government had used the land for the construction of the link road without acquirin r g thte same. A writ petition was
filed before this Court. S u tate Government had taken a defence
of the consent. Thi o s Court held that the State has to bring the
material on re C cord to show that free and informed consent was given h and consent based upon the representation that payment o g f the compensation would be made, is no consent at all. This i Court issued the following directions: -
H
"8. On this occasion, once again, the Court draws the attention of the State Government to the state of affairs which have come to light in this and similar cases and directs that: (a) instructions be issued to all limbs and subordinates that no citizen should be deprived of
his property save in accordance with law, that is,
the law relating to the acquisition and
requisitioning of property and that in rare and
10
exceptional cases of emergent public utility projects, the execution whereof cannot brook any delay in the public interest and where the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be resorted for reasons such as the nature .
and character of land, possession of the land or any specified portion thereof may be taken withP the consent, as explained above of the p.erson(s) interested in the land after the execution of an agreement, in writing, between the sai H d person(s) and the competent authority, in acco rdance with law, incorporating the conditions, in f ter alia, that the land acquisition proceedin gs o shall be initiated and completed and the c t ompensation will be paid within a reasonable time to be specified in the agreement and that interest will be paid from the date of taking over of possession; an r d
(b) in ord u er to avoid proliferation of litigation and to a o lleviate genuine hardship of persons similarly situate, all cases like the present, where there has C been a deviation from law and persons have been deprived of the possession of their property save in accordance with law, be taken up for regularisation h
by initiating/ completing acquisition proceedings in accordance with law with the utmost expedition g
and within a time-limit which may be set up by the i
State Government bearing in mind the need of striking a just balance between the inevitable lapse H
of time which is reasonably likely to occur even if urgent action is taken in that direction and the duty of providing quick relief by emergent remedial measures to the aggrieved persons and, in all such cases, equitable compensation, on the basis on which the Court has so far awarded the same in such and similar cases and proposes to
award herein, be paid to such persons from the
date of taking over of possession till the date of
actual payment, in addition to the compensation,
11
solatium and interest at the statutory rate which becomes payable under the law. The Court has so far viewed cases where such unauthorized actions were taken in the past leniently but any future lapse will have to be strictly viewed if it is brought .
to its notice." (Emphasis supplied) P
18. Therefore, in view of the directions issued . by this Court, it is impermissible to use the land of the pe H rson without his consent and if consent has to be taken it f has to be through an agreement in writing between o that person and the
competent authority. These d r ire t ctio ns are binding upon the State and it is not permi u ssible for the State to say that it had taken the oral consent of the owner.
19. This judg o ment was followed in Lata vs. State of H.P. 2009 (1) Sh im C . L.C. 107 and it was held that mere bald assertion that t h he landowners had orally consented to the taking of p g ossession of the land on a verbal assurance is not sufficient. i The State has to give the details of when the consent was
H
obtained, who was the authority that obtained the consent and in what manner. It was observed: "12. The respondent state has only made a bald assertion that the landowners had orally consented to the taking of
possession of the land on a verbal assurance. The
respondents have not given details when the consent was
obtained who was the authority that obtained the
12
consent and in what manner. The plea set up by the State that the owners have given consent and voluntarily handed over the land cannot be accepted."
20. This question was also considered by the Ho P n'ble .Supreme Court in Vidya Devi Versus State of H.P. 2020(2) SCC 569and it was observed: - .
"12.8. The contention of the State that thHe Appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is completely b ase o less.
fWe find a complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant o t f her property by the State." 21. Similar is the judg r ment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra & another Vs. State of H.P & others 2022
(7) SCC 508 wherein o it wasu observed: "2 C 1. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The State h has merely averred to the appellants' alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection but has not placed any g
material on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the i
State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken over or H
acquired in the manner known to the law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the State's position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the other writ proceedings.
22. This court is also not moved by the State's contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining
13
(which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same reason - construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were illegally .
dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of Article 31 and warrantinPg the High Court's intervention under Article 226 juris.diction. In the absence of written consent to volu H ntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written f co nsent in matters of land acquisition proceedings has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass
{supra) itself, which is re lie o d upon in the impugned judgment.
23. This court, in V r idyat Devi {supra) facing an almost identical set of u facts and circumstances - rejected the contention of 'oral' consent to be baseless and outlined the respo o nsibility of the State: "12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule C of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in h
Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] g
wherein it was held that the State must comply i
with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State H
being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now considered to
be not only a constitutional or statutory right
but also a human right. Human rights have
been considered in the realm of individual
14
rights such as the right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension. "
.
22. In the present case, the defendants have failed to prove any writing or even the plea of the predecessor . oPf the plaintiffs' oral consent by leading satisfacto H ry evidence. Therefore, both the learned Courts below ha f d r ightly held that the oral consent was not proved. o
23. The Hon'ble Suprem r e t Cou rt highlighted the right of a person to possess t u he property and the international framework for compulsory acquisition in Urban Improvement Trust v. Gordhan Das o s, (2024) 3 SCC 250: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1368
and observed: C
h (ii) International legal framework on compulsory land g
acquisition i
18. Before proceeding to deal with the issue of the legitimacy of the land acquisition proceeding, it would be H
appropriate to set out the international legal framework on compulsory land acquisition. The right to self- determination is enshrined within the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), amongst other instruments which is defined
as the right of all people to freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources, and that no person may be
deprived of its means of subsistence. Article 17 of the
15
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that,
"Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Self- determination also includes an obligation for States to .
refrain from any forcible actions that deprive people of enjoying such rights. .P
19. The concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent ("FPIC") within international development law is most clearly stated in the United Nations D eclHaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Articles 10, 11, 19, 28 and 29 which prescribe situations in wfhich FPIC must be
obtained before granting c o ompensation, taking of indigenous property, e t tc. Development experts have recognised that FP r IC is not only important for Indigenous people but can also be used as a positive approach to involve local communities in decision- making about u any proposed development. Engaging them in o such processes fosters a greater sense of ownership and engagement and helps safeguard their rig C ht to development as a basic human rights principle [ Sambhav Shrivastava et al., "Subversion of Due Process for Seeking the Consent of Communities in Land h Acquisition and Resultant Land Conflicts" (Oxfam 2020)
practice.oxfam.org/resources/subversion-of-due- i
process-for-seeking-the-consent-of-communities-in-land-acquis-621109/> accessed on 19-9-2023.]. These H
principles are not to be found under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 but the concept of acquiring land through consent and Social Impact Assessment (SIA) on whether a project serves a "public purpose" has been added in the 2013 avatar of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is
found to be more attuned to the notion of fairness and is
progressive to this extent.
16
20. While there are many instances of the authorities failing to adhere to the acquisition regime, this Court has the benefit of a study conducted by the Lands Rights Initiative of the Centre for Policy Research [ Namita Wahi, Ankit Bhatia et al., "Land Acquisition in India: A .
Review of Supreme Court Cases 1950-2016" (Centre for Policy Research 2017).]. The outcome of the extePnsive study of around 1269 judgments of the Supreme .Court of India between 1950 to 2016 on the legal tra H jectory of land acquisition cases in India leads to the following comments:
"The process of land acquisition inf India has been the source of increasing politic al o and legal contestation for almost two hundred t years. This stems from the inherently coercive n r ature of the process, which creates a severe imbalance in power between the State and land losers. Our revi u ew of the Supreme Court litigation since the time India became a constitutional republic in 1950 shows th o at while much of this imbalance was created within the very text of the Land Acquisition Act, a con C siderable part of it could also be attributed to executive non-compliance with the rule of law. The result was a situation of great inequity for the land losers." h
(emphasis supplied) g
21. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment had the i
occasion to look at the process of compulsory land acquisition where the landowners had practically no means to oppose the proposed acquisition. A two-judge
H
Bench in Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569: (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799] speaking through Indu Malhotra, J. made the following significant observation : (SCC pp. 572-73, para 12) "12. … 12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-
Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ)
17
491] in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except .
in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, . thPough not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T . H Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (201 f 1) 9 SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414] 12.3. To forcibly dispo ss o ess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative t of a human right, as also the constitutional r right under Article 300-A of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied)
24. It was la o id do u wn by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi (s C upra) that a person cannot be deprived of his property w ithout any legal sanction of law. It was held: - h "12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have been g
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal i
sanction, without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession
H
in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find a complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed
18
on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &Ors, 2013 1 SCC 353wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare state .
governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitutio . n. P
12.10. This Court in State of H ary H ana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human r f ight. Human rights have been considered in th e r o ealm of individual rights such as the right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Huma t n rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension."
25. This question u was r also considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in o Hari Krishna Mandir Trust vs. State of Maharashtra 2020(9) SCC 356 and it was held that the Municipal Corporation i C s under obligation to acquire the land used for constr h ucting the road. It was observed: - g
"93. On perusal of the documents, there can be no doubt i
at all that the road in question measuring 444.14 sqm. never belonged to the Pune Municipal Corporation. In H
the property records, there was no private road. There were three plots 473 B1, B2, B3 and 473B4 shown as vacant land held by the owners of all the three adjacent plots. 94. The Municipal Corporation was never shown as the owner of the vacant plot or any private road. Even assuming that there was any policy decision to have an
approach road to every plot, it was incumbent upon the
authorities concerned to acquire the land. On the other
hand, the scheme clearly records that the same was
19
based on entries in property records and the award of the arbitrator."
26. It was further observed that the right of property is a .
statutory right and no person can be deprived of the righ . t t P o his property. It was observed: -
"96. The right to property may not be a fundamental right any longer, but it is still a constHitutional right under Article 300A and a human right a s observed by this Court in VimlabenAjitbhai Pa o tel vs.
f VatslabenAshokbhai
Patel and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 649 (para 42). In view of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, no person is to be d r eprived of his property save by the authority of law. The aptpellant trust cannot be deprived of its property s u ave in accordance with the law. 97. Articl o e 300A of the Constitution of India embodies the doctrine of eminent domain which comprises two parts, (i) possession of the property in the public int C erest; and (ii) payment of reasonable compensation. As held by this Court in a plethora of decisions, including State of Bihar and Others vs. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak h
Sangh and Others, (2006) 2 SCC 545, 574 (para 69); JelubhaiNanbhai Khachar and Others vs. State of g
Gujarat and Anr. (1995) Suppl. 1 SCC 596; Bishambhar i
Dayal Chandra Mohan and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1982) 1 SCC 39 the State possesses the power H
to take or control the property of the owner for the benefit of the public. When, however, a State so acts it is obliged to compensate the injury by making just compensation as held by this Court in Girnar Traders vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2007) 7 SCC 555 (paras 55 and 56)."
27. This position was reiterated in Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 932 wherein it was observed:
20
18. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides .
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a c . itizPen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to p ay H compensation, though not expressly included in A f rticle 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) o 9 SCC 1] 19. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627, t this Court held that: "6. … Having rega r rd to the provisions contained in Article 300- u A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the rig o ht of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid."
C
(Emphasis supplied) 20. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 h
SCC 517, this Court held that: "21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
ig
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such rights. The provisions H
of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed." (Emphasis supplied) 21. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court recognised the right to property as a
basic human right in the following words:
"30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is
21
an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John .
Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seedbed which must be conserved if other constituPtional values are to flourish, is the consensus among .political thinkers and jurists."
(Em pHhasis supplied)
22. In JilubhaiNanbhai Khachar v. Sta f te of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596, this Court held as follows:
"48. … In other word t s, A rt o icle 300-A only limits the powers of the Stat r e that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivatio u n without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there i o s no deprivation." (Emphasis supplied)
23. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353, this CoCurt held that the State must comply with the h
procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare
ig
State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. H
24. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as the right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
28. Dealing with the remedy available to a person in case of forcible dispossession, it was held that a person can file a
22
writ of mandamus for payment of compensation. It was observed in Vidya Devi (supra):-
"99. In case of dispossession except under the authority .
of law, the owner might obtain restoration of possession by a proceeding for Mandamus against the GovernPment as held by this Court in Wazir Chand vs. State of H.imachal Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC415. Admittedly, no H compensation has been offered or paid to the appellant Trust. As observed by this Court in K.T. Plant f atio n Private Limited and Anr. vs. State of Karnataka, o (2011) 9 SCC 1 even though the right to claim compensa tion or the obligation of the State to pay compensatio t n to a person who is deprived of his property is not ex r pressly provided in Article 300A of the Constitution, it is inbuilt in the Article. The State seeking to acquire private property for a public purpose cannot say that no compensation shall be paid. The
Regional and u Town Planning Act also does not
contemplate deprivation of a landholder of his land,
wi C thout c o ompensation. Statutory authorities are bound to pay adequate compensation. 100. The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under h Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of g
Mandamus, but are duty-bound to exercise such power, i
where the Government or public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred H
upon it by a Statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide, or on irrelevant consideration." 29. Similarly, it was held in Syed Maqbool Ali vs. State of Utter Pradesh 2011(15) SCC 383 that the remedy of a person whose land is taken without acquisition is to file a civil suit for
23
recovery of possession or payment of compensation. It was observed:-
"9. The remedy of a landholder whose land is taken .
without acquisition is either to file a civil suit for recovery of possession and/or for compensatioPn or approach the High Court by filing a writ H petitio.n if the action can be shown to be arbi trary, irrational, unreasonable, biased, mala fide or w f ithout the authority of law, and seek a direction that the land should be acquired in a manner known to law."
30. Thus, a person deprived of h o is property unlawfully is entitled to the restoration of the t pos session or the payment of compensation. r
31. It was su o bmituted that no objection was raised at the time of construction of the road and the suit was filed after the lapse of 20 y C ears which is impermissible. A similar situation
arose h before the this Court in Jai Ram Vs State of H.P. 2011 (3)
ig Shim. L.C. 91 and it was held that non-raising of objection by a landowner when his land is being encroached upon either by
H
the State or its Agencies or even by a private person does not disentitle him to seek his legal remedy. It was observed:- "5. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had offered his land for being utilized for
the construction of a road, under the aforesaid
PGSMY Scheme. Their plea is that the petitioner did
24
not object to the construction of the road on the site. Non-raising of objection by a landowner, when his land is being encroached upon, either by the State or its Agencies or even by a private person, does not .
disentitle him from seeking his legal remedy. Neither the scheme of PGMSY authorizes the P State nor its Agencies to utilize private la H nds, w . ithout payment of compensation to the landowners nor could have a provision like that f been made in the scheme as the same would have been contrary to the mandate of Article 300-A o of the Constitution of India." 32. Similarly, it was held i t n J eet Ram Versus State of H.P. Latest HLJ 2016 HP 615 that th r ere can be no waiver or estoppel regarding constitutional r u ights. It was observed:
"4. No pe o rson can be deprived of his property without fol C lowing due process of law. Respondents have utilised the land of the petitioner without paying him any compensation. There is no contemporaneous record h
placed on record by the respondent-State to show that the petitioner had consented to the construction of the g
road through his land. It is evident from the contents of i
Annexure P-1 that the nature of land in Khasra no. 279, as per Jamabandi for the year 2001-02, is Bagicha. A H
valuable piece of land of the petitioner has been utilised in an arbitrary manner by the respondent-State, for the purpose of construction/widening of the Shillaru-Reog road. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 6. The legitimate right of a citizen, that too pertaining to valuable property, cannot be defeated merely on the
technical objections. There ought to be a difference in the
approach of a private litigant vis-a-vis the State. The
25
State stands on a higher pedestal. It is the duty of the functionaries of the State to maintain the Rule of Law. There cannot be any estoppel/waiver against the constitutional/ fundamental/ legal rights." .
33. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held in Raj Kumar Versus State of H.P. in Civil Appeal no. 9105 . of P2015, decided on 29.10.2015 that where the land was H utilized for construction of the road without the f pa yment of the compensation and there was no proof o of the consent, State is liable to pay compensation. r Si t nce in the present case the consent was not establish u ed, therefore, the plaintiff are entitled to the relief sought by them and the learned First Appellate Court had rightly gr o anted the relief of mandatory injunction.
34. Th C is position was reiterated in Sukh Dutt Ratra & anoth h er vs. State of H.P & others 2022 (7) SCC 508, wherein it was o g bserved:- i
"13. While the right to property is no longer a H
fundamental right [Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.], It is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A.
14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without
26
due process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King's Bench in Entick v. Carrington, [1765] EWHC (KB) 198 and by this court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1955 (1) SCR 408. Further, in several judgments, .
this court has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a hPigher responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted. within the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law. H
15. When it comes to the subject of priv ate property, this court has upheld the high th re o shold
fof legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab, 1962 (2) SCR 69 this court rejected the contention that th r e ptetitioners in the case were trespassers and u could be removed by an executive order, and instead concluded that the executive action taken by the State o and its officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in another case - Sta C te of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors, 1989 (1) SCR 176, held: "A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to h
resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier g
termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. i
The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to H
resume possession. Under the law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better
position. On the contrary, it is under an additional
inhibition stemming from the requirement that all
27
actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'".
16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied .
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remain . s -P Can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriate d? HIn these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting inftervention on the
grounds of equity and fairness o .
17. When seen holistically, i t is apparent that the State's actions, or lack ther r eof t , have in fact compounded the injustice meted u out to the appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation o of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to on C ly extend the benefit of the court's directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State's lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of h
initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had g
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not i
other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in H
CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law. 18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either way - as contended by both sides
in the present dispute - however, the specific factual
matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the
appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself
28
behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a 'limitation' to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1969 (1) SCR 808 ', held: .
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. W . hPere it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded a s eHquivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waivfing that remedy, yet
put the other party in a s o ituation in which it would not be reasonable t to place him if the remedy were afterwards to b r e asserted in either of these cases, the lapse of time and delay are most material. But in ev u ery case, if an argument against relief, whi o ch otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of C that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the h
delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause g
a balance of justice or injustice in taking one i
course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy. "
H
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants'
prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of the cause of
action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and
intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226
29
jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the name of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading to his dispossession from the land without payment of compensation - held: .
"Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the appellants is . uPtterly untenable and not worthy of em ana H ting from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State. When we pointe f d out to the learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious enough to o accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State has tak t en an intractable attitude and persisted in op r posing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent. Ours is a u constitutional democracy and the rights ava o ilable to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(l)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the C Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows: h
"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person g
shall be deprived of his property save by i
authority of law." This is a case where we find an utter lack of legal H
authority for the deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution... "
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi {supra)While dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held as follows:
30
"There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grants of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory .
dues, claims for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, i . t isP true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citiz en from seeking remedy, even if his fundame f ntal r H ight has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case o at hand deals with a different scenario alto gether. The functionaries of the State took t over possession of the land belonging to th r e appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for a grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must eith u er comply with the procedure laid down for o acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. " C xxxx 25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due h
process of law, was violative [Relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 2005 g
Supp (3) SCR 388; N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy i
(2008) 15 SCC 517; Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors. 2011 (12) SCR 191; and H
JilubhaiNanbhaiKahchar v. State of Gujarat 1994 Supp (1) SCR 807.] of both their human right and constitutional right under Article 3 00-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case."
35. It was submitted that the State has been in possession for more than 20 years and the plaintiffs are not
31
entitled to possession. This cannot be accepted. The defendants are the State and its instrumentalities. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, .
(2011) 10 SCC 404: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769: 2011 SCC On . Lin P e SC 1341that the State cannot take the plea of adverse possession to grab the property of its citizens. If the protec f tor s Hof the law will become grabbers of the property, th en o the people will be left with no protection and there will be total anarchy in the entire country. It was observed at pag r e 41t9
45. If the prote u ctors of law become the grabbers of the property o (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the C entire country. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public h
interest. No government department, public undertaking, and much less the Police Department g
should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or i
building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grabbing the property of its own citizens H
in the manner that has been done in this case. 36. This position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi Versus State of H.P. 2020(2) SCC 569 wherein it was held: -
"10.6. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it
32
would be tantamount to "adverse" possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State .
cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to graPb the property of its own citizens, as has been done. in the present case."
37. It was laid down by this Court in f Tila k HRaj vs. Bhagat Ram & Another 1997 (1) Sim. LC 281 th at a suit based on the title, where no plea of adverse possessi t on haod been raised, could not be barred by limitation on th r e ground that it was filed after more than 12 years from u the date of dispossession. It was observed: -
"10C o
. The present suit is for possession on the basis of title. Article 63, Limitation Act, 1963, governs the
h
present case. It provides that for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on the g
title, the limitation of twelve years begins to run from i
the date of the defendant's interest becomes adverse to the plaintiffs H
11. It is well settled that adverse possession means a hostile assertion, that is, a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. 12. It is also well settled that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must plead and prove by clear and unequivocal evidence, that is, possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the
property claimed. In deciding whether the acts of the
defendant constitute adverse possession, regard has to
be had to the animus of such defendant which has to be
33
ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case.
13. It is equally well settled that mere possession for however long a period is not enough to claim title .
inasmuch as the possession has to be adverse.
14. In Liaq Mohammad v D. D. A. and others, AI . R P 1994 NOC (Delhi) 35, it has been held that a suit for possession based on title, where a plea of adverse possession has
been raised, would not be barred b f y lim H itation on the ground that it has been filed after the expiry of twelve years from the date of dispossession.
15. Equally, it can be said tha o t once the defendant has failed to establish his t adverse possession for the statutory period, a r suit for possession based on title cannot be dismissed as being time-barred on the ground that the same was filed after the expiry of twelve years from the date of dispossession."
38. Similarly, it uwas held in Indira vs. Arumugam & Another (1998 C ) 1 SCC o 614 that in a suit based on the title, when the title has been established, the plaintiffs cannot be dispos h sessed on the ground of limitation unless the plea of
iag dverse possession is established. It was observed:- H
"4. The aforesaid reasoning of the learned Judge, with respect, cannot be sustained as it proceeds on the assumption as if old Article 142 of the earlier Limitation Act was in force wherein the plaintiffs who based his case on the title had to prove not only the title but also possession within 12 years of the date of the suit. The said provision of law has undergone a metamorphic sea
change as we find under the Limitation Act, 1963 Article
65 which reads as under:
34
| Description of the suit:- For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on the title | Period of limitation:- Twelve years | Time from which period begins to run: - When the possession of the . defendant b.ecPomes adverse to the plaintiffs. |
| the sui |
possession of Twelve years run: - When the
immovable possession of the
property or any .
interest therein defendant becomes based on the title adverse t . o P the plaintiffs.
5. It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based on the title for possession, once the title is H established on the basis of relevant documents and other evidence unless the defendant proves a o dvers f e possession for the prescriptive period, the pla intiffs cannot be non-suited. Unfortunately, this aspe t ct of the matter was missed by the learned Judge and r , therefore, the entire reasoning for disposing of the Second Appeal has been vitiated. Only on that short grou u nd and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the question of law framed by the learned Judge for disposing of the Second Appeal, this appeal is allowed."
39. Sim C ilar ios the judgment of this Court in Shishi Ram Vs. Megh Ch and AIR 2013 HP 65, wherein it was held: - h "12. It is settled law that mere possession however long g
does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true i
owner. Adverse possession really means hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of H
the title of the true owner, and in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession/ roved must be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner must be peaceful, open and continuous. The
possession must be open and hostile enough to be
capable of being known by the parties interested in the
property, though it is not necessary that there should be
35
evidence of the adverse possession actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action. …………………..
14. The learned first Appellate Court thus ri P ghtly .conclude that when the plaintiffs had filed a suit for possession based upon the title and the defendant had taken plea of adverse possession to defend his . title, in
that eventuality of the defendant's failure to prove his
adverse possession, the suit filed by th e p H laintiffs could not have been dismissed on the ground that the
defendant failed to prove the possession within a period
of 12 years prior to the filin g o of the
f suit as held by the Apex Court in Indira v. Ar t umgam [AIR 1999 SC 1549]." 40. In the present case, r the State cannot take the plea of adverse possession and u the limitation will not start running against the State. Hence, the suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation. o
41. It C was submitted that plaintiffs have acquiesced and were h not entitled to the possession. This is not acceptable. It w g as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamakshi i Builders vs. Ambedkar Educational Society 2007 (12) SCC 27 that
H
acquiescence does not confer any title. It was observed: - "23. Acquiescence on the part of Respondent No. 1, as has been noticed by the High Court, did not confer any title on Respondent No. 1. Conduct may be a relevant fact, so as to apply the procedural law like estoppel, waiver or
acquiescence, but thereby no title can be conferred.
24. It is now well-settled that time creates a title.
36
25. Acquisition of a title is an inference of law arising out of a certain set of facts. If in law, a person does not acquire title, the same cannot be vested only by reason of acquiescence or estoppel on the part of other. .
26. It may be true that Respondent No. 1 had constructed some buildings, but it did so at its own risk. If it . tho P ught that despite its status as a tenant, it would raise certain constructions, it must have taken a grave risk. There is
nothing on record to show that such permission was
granted. Although Respondent No. 1 f claimHed its right, it did not produce any document on that behalf. No application for seeking su ch o permission having been filed, an adverse inference in that behalf must be drawn."
42. Therefore, the princip t le of acquiescence will not help the defendants in an u y manrner whatsoever.
43. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supr C eme Coourt in State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar (supra)Ratt an Lal (supra) and Shankar Dass (supra), however, these h judgments were delivered in the exercise of the writ
ig jurisdiction which is based upon the principle of delay and H
latches. A civil suit is governed by the Limitation Act and when the suit has been held to be within limitation, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.
44. In Dharnidhar Mishra (supra) the writ petition filed by the landowner seeking compensation for the land was
37
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and observed: .
25. We regret to state that the learned Single Judge oPf the High Court did not deem fit even to en H quire w.ith the State whether just and fair compensatio n was paid to the appellant or not. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition only on the ground of delay. As held by this court in Vidya Devi v. The Sta f te of Himachal
Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 569, delay and laches cannot be
raised in a case of a continu in o g cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court.
The condition of dela r y is t a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in
the facts and circumstances of the case. As held by this
Court, it o would u depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay aro C se. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. h
26. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its g
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not i
defeat it. [See: P.S Sadasivaswamy v. State Of Tamil Nadu ., (1975) 1 SCC 152] H
27. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: "11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence,
grant of compensation for a wrong done to them
decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claims for
educational facilities and other categories of similar
38
cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand .
deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of theP land belonging to the appellants without any sanction. of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for a grant of the benefit of compensation. The Sta f te mus H t either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other perm o issible statutory mode." (Emphasis supplied)
28. In such circumst r anc t es referred to above, we are of the view that we should set aside the impugned order passed by the H u igh Court and remit the matter for fresh consideration. 45. Thus, no advantage can be derived by the defendants from the prin C ciple o o f delay and laches. 46. Hence, the suit was within limitation. The
defen h dants had unauthorisedly used the suit land and they were
ig rightly directed to restore the suit land to its original condition or to initiate the process of acquisition of the land. The
H
judgments of Digambar (supra), Rattan Lal (supra) and Shankar Lal(supra) do not apply to the present case and there is no misappreciation of the evidence. Hence, no substantial question of law arises in the present case.
47. No other point was urged.
39
48. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs throughout. The record of the learned courts below be returned forthwith. .
49. Pending application(s), if any, also s . tanPd(s) disposed of. H
(Rake f sh Kainthla) Judge 11thJune, 2024.
(Ravinder)
rt o
ou h
C
ig
H
Comments