SOMYA SAXENA D/O ALOK SAXENA v. NATIONAL MEDICAL COMMISSION

2. Facts of the case:

2.1 Quint essential facts relevant for adjudication of the controversy involved in this appeal are that the appellant appeared in NEET UG 2016 Examination and having secured requisite merit and rank, was admitted in Sri Devaraj Urs Medical College, Kolar, Karnataka. Thereafter, the appellant, having completed her final year of MBBS course, was required to undergo one year compulsory rotating internship. The appellant ever since her admission in the medical college at Kolar, Karnataka was suffering from disease known as "Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura" and was undergoing treatment in the same medical college where she was pursuing her MBBS course. Later on, as is pleaded, appellant's medical condition deteriorated resulting in complications and increase in bleeding tendency. Finding it difficult to receive treatment and at the same time pursue her internship at the medical college from where the appellant had completed her MBBS course, the appellant requested for allowing her to undergo compulsory rotating internship from any medical college at Jaipur where her family was residing so that she may receive proper treatment. However, request of the appellant was turned down vide order dated 11.01.2022 which led to filing of writ petition by the appellant.

2.2 The action of the respondents in rejecting appellant's prayer to allow her to complete her internship in a medical college at Jaipur was challenged mainly on the ground that at the time of coming into force the National Medical Commission Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 2019'), the appellant was undertaking her medical course and at that time, a different

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provision as provided under the Graduate Medical Regulations, 1997 with regard to internship was in force which allowed the students to complete their compulsory rotating internship of one year at any recognised medical college and hospital in India. Therefore, even though, subsequently after coming into force the Act of 2019 and new regulations providing for compulsory rotating internship in the same college where the student had undergone MBBS course, the same had no application in view of saving clause as provided under Section 49 of the Act of 2019. Otherwise also, the appellant was not keeping good health and, therefore, nothing prevented Respondent No. 1-National Medical Commission to provide appropriate relaxation to the appellant to undergo her compulsory internship in any medical college at Jaipur.

2.3 Respondent No.1-National Medical Commission opposed the prayer of the appellant by taking stand that the applicable provision contained in the regulations in force on the day when the appellant had completed her MBBS course mandated that the student would be required to undertake his/her compulsory internship only in the college where he/she studied and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to any relief.

The learned Single Judge was of the view that on the face of the provisions contained in the relevant regulations, the appellant was bound under the law to complete her internship only in the medical college where she had undertaken MBBS course and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant vide impugned order dated 18.10.2022.

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3. Submissions on behalf of the appellant:

3.1 Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that the provisions contained in Section 49 of the Act of 2019 clearly provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, any student who was studying for a degree, diploma/certificate in any medical institution immediately before the commencement of the Act of 2019, shall continue to so study and complete his course for such degree, diploma or certificate, and such institution shall continue to provide instructions and examination for such student in accordance with the syllabus and studies as existed before such commencement. Therefore, it is contended, in the matter of compulsory rotating internship, the appellant would be governed and regulated by the erstwhile rules and regulations and not by the new regulations. According to him, studies and the course for MBBS degree includes compulsory rotating internship as well and, therefore, the new regulation mandating that compulsory internship will have to be undertaken only in the institution/medical college where the student studied MBBS course, will not be applicable and the earlier provisions, which allowed internship in any other medical college in India, are applicable in the case of the appellant and this aspect has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge.

3.2 Further submission of learned Senior Counsel is that Respondent No. 1-National Medical Commission did not appreciate that the appellant was suffering from serious ailment and it had become impossible for her to complete her internship while undergoing treatment at a distant place away from her family. Therefore, in these circumstances, the appellant was entitled to

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appropriate relief by directing the respondents to allow the appellant to undertake her compulsory internship in any medical college at Jaipur where she would get proper treatment and care by her family.

4. Submissions on behalf of the respondents:

4.1 Learned counsel for the respondents, at the outset, raised an issue with regard to territorial jurisdiction of this Court by submitting that no cause of action or part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He would submit that the appellant had completed her MBBS course at Sri Devaraj Urs Medical College, Kolar, Karnataka and her application for allowing internship in any medical college at Jaipur was rejected by the authorities at New Delhi. Merely because the appellant was claiming that she should be allowed internship at Jaipur, would not result in any cause of action, much less part of cause of action arising at Jaipur. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India Vs. A. Shainamol, IAS AIR Online 2021 SC 918; State of Goa Vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited & Others (2023) 7 SCC 791 and decision dated 17.11.2022 rendered by Delhi High Court in the case of Sachin & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (W.P. (C) 13180/2022 & CM APPL.

39902/2022 and other connected matter).

5. Rejoinder on behalf of the appellant:

5.1 In reply to respondents' objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction of this Court, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in the present case, apart from the fact that the appellant is

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permanent resident of Jaipur, she was medically examined at Jaipur and the appellant has placed heavy reliance upon her ailment coupled with the fact the medical college at Jaipur had given its consent to accommodate the appellant and further that the impugned order rejecting appellant's representation was communicated to her at Jaipur, part of cause of action has certainly arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his submission, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India & Others (2014) 9 SCC 329; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Others Vs. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) 3 SCC 456; Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. Union of India & Another AIR 1961 SC 532; Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Others (1994) 4 SCC 711; Union of India & Others Vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Another (2002) 1 SCC 567; National Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Others Vs. Haribox Swalram & Others (2004)

9 SCC 786 and order dated 10.06.2022 passed by High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in the case of Nihal Habeeb & Others Vs. National Medical Commission & Others (WP (C) No. 18790 of 2022).

6. Analysis, reasoning & conclusion:

6.1 While replying to the relief sought by the appellant before the learned Single Judge, Respondent No. 1-National Medical Commission, in its reply, had raised specific objection to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as below:

"14. It is submitted that the present petition as filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed by this Hon'ble Court on the ground of Forum Non Conveniens. It is humbly submitted with utmost

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respect that this Hon'ble Court does not exercise the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the present petition as none of the proper and necessary parties to the present petition are presently located or residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that the petitioner has miserably failed to disclose any material event so as to even remotely establish the locus of the respondent no. 2 - SMS Medical College to be considered as a proper and / or necessary party in the present case, without which the present writ petition cannot be adjudicated. On the contrary, the respondent no. 2 - SMS Medical College has been impleaded as a party to the present petition by the petitioner without there being any sufficient cause or reason, with sole motive somehow maintain the present writ petition before this Hon'ble Court."

6.2 As the objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction of this Court was specifically raised by Respondent No.1 in its reply before the learned Single Judge that no cause of action or part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the case on merits, we are inclined to examine the issue of territorial jurisdiction before adverting to the merits of the case.

6.3 It is also well settled that while dealing with an objection as to lack of territorial jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a writ petition on the ground that the cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction, the Court essentially has to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of the averments made in the writ petition treating the same as true and correct. This has been observed as the fundamental principle in plethora of decisions by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including a recent pronouncement in the case of

State of Goa Vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited & Others (supra). Therefore, in order to appreciate the submissions and decide the issue of territorial jurisdiction, we shall

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first look into the averments made in the writ petition as they stand, without going into the correctness or otherwise of those factual statements.

6.4 The appellant filed writ petition aggrieved by rejection of her prayer to allow her to undertake compulsory rotating internship from a medical institution at Jaipur. The pleadings made in the writ petition are that the appellant had appeared in NEET UG 2016 Examination and after having remained successful, she was admitted in MBBS course in Sri Devaraj Urs Medical College, Kolar situated in State of Karnataka. The appellant completed her final year of MBBS course. After completing MBBS course, the appellant was required to undertake one year compulsory rotating internship and she started her internship in medical college at Kolar wherefrom she completed her MBBS course. In the meantime, the appellant had developed certain ailment and, therefore, it became difficult for her to continue her internship at Kolar. In the writ petition, it has been pleaded by the appellant that while staying at Kolar, she had to frequently receive prolonged immunosuppressive therapy and had to remain hospitalised several times. The appellant has also given details of the treatment of her ailment taken in the medical college where she was studying, coming back to her parental house at Jaipur and receiving treatment as also consultation with doctor at Jaipur. The appellant has given chronological details of her frequent movement from Kolar (Karnataka) to Jaipur (Rajasthan) and then from Jaipur (Rajasthan) to Kolar (Karnataka) time and again and also the details of receiving treatment at both the places. According to the pleadings in the writ petition, the appellant

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successfully cleared her final year of MBBS course in medical college at Kolar. She has also pleaded that she was undertaking compulsory rotating internship at Kolar, but could not continue due to frequent lapses and associated health issues whereafter she came back to her home town Jaipur for her rehabilitation. It has also been pleaded that the appellant and her father requested Respondent No. 1-National Medical Commission to allow her to complete her internship from any medical college at Jaipur, but she received communication dated 11.01.2022 rejecting her request. The letter of rejection was addressed to the appellant on her mail address. Representation was sent by the petitioner on 05.01.2022 through mail. In para 7 of the writ petition, it has been stated that due to exceptional medical condition, the appellant and her father requested Respondent No. 1 to allow her to complete her internship at Jaipur from any medical college and in support thereof, the representation sent through mail on 05.01.2022 has also been annexed with the writ petition. The appellant filed rejoinder, wherein also, she reiterated her medical condition and various medical reports were also filed therewith collectively.

6.5 In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Others (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the meaning of expression, "cause of action", taking into consideration the provisions contained in Article 226, sub-article

(2) of the Constitution of India. It was held that the expression,

"cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Their Lordships in the Hon'ble Supreme Court

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clearly held that in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction, the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In the aforesaid decision, reliance was also placed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on an earlier decision in the case of

Chand Kour Vs. Partab Singh, ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98 wherein it was held that the cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. On facts, Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Others (supra) was a case where the writ petition was filed before the High Court at Calcutta on the plea that a part of cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction on the basis that the petitioner therein became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading an advertisement which appeared in Times of India newspaper in Calcutta edition. In response thereto, the petitioner therein submitted its bid or tender from its registered office at Calcutta and revised the bids subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible, it sent representation including fax messages to the office of ONGC at New Delhi demanding justice. Finally, offer of the petitioner therein was rejected and contract was awarded to another party. Thus, the petitioner therein claimed that a part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court

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because it became aware of the advertisement at Calcutta, it submitted its bids and tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about rejection of its offer. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that the advertisement itself mentioned that the tender should be submitted at New Delhi and would be scrutinised at New Delhi and further that a final decision whether or not to award contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. It was also noted that the execution of the contract work was to be carried in the State of Gujarat. On such factual premises, it was held that none of part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court by observing thus:

"8. ……………....Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court."

6.6 In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Others (supra), another fact situation considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Swaika Properties (1985) 3 SCC 217 and the principles laid down therein were also relied upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as below:

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"11. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the State of Rajasthan case by the learned counsel for ONGC. The facts of that case reveal that the respondent-company having its registered office at Calcutta owned a large chunk of land on the outskirts of Jaipur. The Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur, at the instance of the Improvement Trust, Jaipur issued a notice intimating that the State Government proposed to acquire a large part of the said parcel of land for a public purpose, namely, implementation of a development scheme. The said notice was duly served on the respondents at their Calcutta office. The respondents thereafter participated in the inquiry and contended that they proposed to use the land for constructing a three star hotel. The Special Officer, however, felt that the alleged need of the respondents was just a pretence and the land was not needed bona fide by them, but the real object was to get the land released from acquisition. Consequently, the requisite final notification for the acquisition of the land was issued. Thereafter an attempt was made to seek exemption in regard to the notified land under Section 20 of the Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, but in vain. Having failed to get the land released from acquisition, the respondents filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the acquisition wherein rule nisi was issued and an ad interim ex parte prohibitory order was granted restraining taking of possession of the acquired land, etc. The question which arose for consideration in the backdrop of the said facts was whether the High Court of Calcutta had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant ex parte ad interim relief. This Court observed that upon the said facts, the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to issue rule nisi or to grant the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order. After extracting the definition of the expression "cause of action" from Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 223, para 8)

"The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1)

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of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench."

Applying the principles as quoted hereinabove, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court.

6.7 In the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Another (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that nature of case which gives rise to part of cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court are only those having a nexus or relevance with the lis involved in the case and none else. On facts, that was a case where claim of the benefit of the Passbook Scheme contained in Import Export Policy in relation to certain credits to be given on export of shrimps was involved. The respondents therein claimed benefit on the basis of export of prawns and import of the inputs. It was an admitted fact that the benefits, which the respondents therein were seeking, were to be extended through the port situated at Chennai. As those benefits were not admitted for various reasons, the respondents therein filed special civil applications before the High Court at Ahmedabad. In support of the case that a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Ahmedabad, the facts regarding the place where the parties were carrying on their business of export and import, places wherefrom order of export and import was placed, documents and payments for export and import sent/made, credit of duty claimed in respect of exports which were handled, payments received, non-grant and denial of utilisation of the credit

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affecting the business and execution of bank guarantee through their bankers at the place, were relied upon to contend that a part of cause of action had arisen at the place where the aforesaid facts and transactions had taken place. Having noted the factual premise of the case as stated and the contentions in support of the arguments that part of cause of action had arisen at Ahmedabad, their Lordships in the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as below:

"14. Though it is also contended in para 16 of the application that the appellants have their office at Ahmedabad, that contention has not been pressed since it is clear from the records that none of these appellants have their office at Ahmedabad. Dehors this fact, if we take into consideration the other facts enumerated hereinabove in support of the cause of action pleaded by the respondents, it is seen that none of these facts is in any way connected with the relief sought for by the respondents in their civil applications so as to constitute the cause of action at Ahmedabad.

15. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India which speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court reads:

"226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."

16. It is clear from the above constitutional provision that a High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for consideration in a number of cases before this Court. In this regard, it would suffice for us to refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 (SCC at p. 713) wherein it was held:

"Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any

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other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression 'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial."

17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.

18. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents are carrying on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents from Ahmedabad have also no connection

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whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The non-granting and denial of credit in the passbook having an ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a court at Ahmedabad to adjudicate on the actions complained against the appellants."

In the aforesaid case, it was held that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Gujarat High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that the facts, which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do no give rise to a cause of action so as to confer jurisdiction on the Court concerned.

6.8 The nexus theory as propounded earlier was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Others Vs. Haribox Swalram & Others (supra). That was a case where textile mills were situated in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex- factory at Bombay. The money was to be paid to the mills at Bombay. Objection to territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court was sustained, but in intra-court appeal, it was held that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently, the question of revocation of contract at Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. Respondents No. 2 and 3 in that case had filed a petition before Calcutta High Court pleading inter alia that they had entered into contract and made advance payment. The mills concerned supplied and delivered the goods to them from time to time, but a substantial part of the contract remained unexecuted. The mills were requested to take necessary steps for immediate delivery of goods. The mills

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intimated that delivery could not be effected as the banking transaction and accounts of the mills had been frozen, but assured that arrangements were being made to deliver the goods as early as possible. However, as the goods were not supplied due to subsequent events wherein the management of the mills was taken over by the Central Government, Respondents No. 2 and 3 therein approached the authorities for release of goods. The goods were released only in part. Later on, in stead of meeting the demand regarding supply of balance quantity of goods, outstanding contracts were cancelled. In this back ground, writ petition was filed before Calcutta High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying upon earlier decisions in the cases of State of Rajasthan Vs. Swaika Properties (supra) and Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Others (supra), held thus:

"12. In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently, the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. In our opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law. It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract. In fact, it is stated in para 18 of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in para 73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under:

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"73. Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all accounts at the aforesaid place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences referred to hereinabove addressed to your petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your petitioner's place of business within the jurisdiction. In the circumstances, this Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present application."

12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed……..."

6.9 In the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Others Vs. Kalyan Banerjee (supra), the issue of territorial jurisdiction again came up for consideration in the factual premises that services of the respondent-employee therein were terminated at Mugma and he filed writ petition before Calcutta High Court. As the respondent-employee was serving in Mugma area and the office of the General Manager was situated at Mugma which is situated in the State of Jharkhand, a preliminary objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction was raised before Calcutta High Court. Explaining the meaning of expression, "cause of action"

and placing reliance upon the dictum in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254 and other decisions, it was held that Calcutta High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction. Contention that the head office of the company was situated in the State of West Bengal was rejected on

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the ground that only because head office was situated in West Bengal, this by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon Calcutta High Court particularly when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent- employee therein.

6.10 The aforesaid principles applicable in the matter of determining territorial jurisdiction as to whether a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court have been restated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judicial pronouncement in the case of State of Goa Vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited & Others (supra). In the aforesaid decision, it has been held thus:

"15. This is a case where clause (2) of Article 226 has been invoked by the High Court to clothe it with the jurisdiction to entertain and try the writ petitions. The constitutional mandate of clause (2) is that the "cause of action", referred to therein, must at least arise in part within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction when writ powers conferred by clause (1) are proposed to be exercised,

notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person is not within those territories.

16. The expression "cause of action" has not been defined in the Constitution. However, the classic definition of "cause of action" given by Lord Brett in Cooke vs. Gill (1873) LR 8 CP 107 that "cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court", has been accepted by this Court in a couple of decisions. It is axiomatic that without a cause, there cannot be any action. However, in the context of a writ petition, what would constitute such "cause of action" is the material facts which are imperative for the writ petitioner to plead and prove to obtain relief as claimed.

17. Determination of the question as to whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily involve an exercise by

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the High Court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These are the guiding tests.

18. Here, tax has been levied by the Government of Goa in respect of a business that the petitioning company is carrying on within the territory of Goa. Such tax is payable by the petitioning company not in respect of carrying on of any business in the territory of Sikkim. Hence, merely because the petitioning company has its office in Gangtok, Sikkim, the same by itself does not form an integral part of the cause of action authorising the petitioning company to move the High Court. We hold so in view of the decision of this Court in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram. The immediate civil or evil consequence, if at all, arising from the impugned notification is that the petitioning company has to pay tax @ 14% to the Government of Goa. The liability arises for the specific nature of business carried on by the petitioning company within the territory of Goa. The pleadings do not reflect that any adverse consequence of the impugned notification has been felt within the jurisdiction of the High Court. At this stage, we are not concerned with the differential duty as envisaged in Schedule II (@ 6%) vis-à-vis Schedule IV (@ 14%) of the impugned notification. That is a matter having a bearing on the merits of the litigation.

19. The long and short of the matter is that the petitioning company has to bear the liability of paying tax @ 14% levied by the Government of Goa for selling lottery tickets in the State of Goa under Schedule IV of the impugned notification. It does not bear out from the petition memo how the impugned notification levying tax for carrying on business in the State of Goa subjects the petitioning company to a legal wrong within the territory of Sikkim for the writ petition to be entertained by the High Court.

20. In our opinion, the High Court ought not to have dismissed the applications of the appellant without

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considering the petition memo which has no semblance of a case having been made out as to how part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the High Court or without any pleading as to how any right has been affected within the territory of Sikkim."

Taking into consideration that the tax was levied by the Government of Goa in respect of the business which the respondent-company therein was carrying on within the territorial jurisdiction of Goa and the tax is payable not in respect of carrying on any business in the territory of Sikkim, it was held that merely because the respondent-company therein has its office at Gangtok, it does not form an integral part of cause of action authorising the respondent-company therein to move to the High Court at Sikkim.

6.11 In the present case, the appellant was admitted to MBBS course in a medical college at Kolar, Karnataka. The appellant completed her MBBS course and when an occasion arose for undergoing compulsory rotating internship, she started her internship at the college from where she completed her MBBS course. However, later on, the appellant expressed difficulty in continuing her internship in the college wherefrom she had completed her MBBS course. Her representation requesting to undergo compulsory internship from any medical college at Jaipur was sent to Respondent No.1-National Medical Commission and the order rejecting appellant's representation was passed on 11.01.2022. The appellant approached this Court by filing writ petition seeking relief against the order of rejection of her request on the pleadings that she is permanent resident of Jaipur. Plethora of decisions, which have been referred to hereinabove, clearly lay down the principle that merely because a person

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resides at a particular place or carries on business would not mean that the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territory in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction. It is borne out from the facts pleaded that representation was made by the appellant and her father both through e-mail to Respondent No.1-National Medical Commission and copy of the representation sent through e-mail has also been annexed with the writ petition. However, in the pleadings, as contained in para no. 7 of the writ petition, do not state as to the place wherefrom such representation was made through e-mail. The pleadings with regard to rejection of the representation made in para no. 8 of the writ petition are that communication was received from National Medical Commission (Under Graduate Medical Education Board) on 11.01.2022 and copy of that communication has also been filed along with the writ petition. It is again a letter received through e-mail. Another set of pleadings as contained in para no. 9 of the writ petition are that the appellant sent e-mail stating regarding her medical condition and allowing her to complete internship from any medical college at Jaipur, copy of which has also been annexed with the writ petition. Other pleadings are that the Vice Chancellor of Respondent No.3-college replied to the appellant's e- mail on 28.08.2022 ensuring to put up the case before the academic council. In para no. 10 of the writ petition, it has been stated that when the appellant went to her college for the purpose of internship on 26.08.2022, her health again deteriorated. Lastly, in para no. 11 of the writ petition, it has been stated that the

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respondents are not allowing the appellant to complete her internship from any medical college at Jaipur. In the present case, all the communications have been made through e-mails. Averments contained in para nos. 7 to 10 of the writ petition do not state regarding the place wherefrom communications were made or the place where communications were received.

6.12 From the aforesaid facts as pleaded in the writ petition, it is vividly clear that no part of cause of action arose within the territories in relation to which this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

6.13 Submission of learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that as the appellant received treatment at Jaipur, a part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. In our considered opinion, the principles, which have been laid down and discussed hereinabove, lead to conclusion that the fact that the appellant received treatment at her permanent place of residence, is not a fact integral to cause of action. The appellant had studied MBBS course at Kolar, Karnataka, she started pursuing her internship there and then made a request for allowing her to continue her internship from any medical college at Jaipur, which application was rejected by the authorities at New Delhi. These facts did constitute an integral part of cause of action, but none of them arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Moreover, merely because the medical college at Jaipur is aggreable to allow the appellant to undergo internship, in our

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considered opinion, would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action.

6.14 Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has placed heavy reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India & Others (supra). On facts, that was a case where the appellant therein was found medically fit in the medical test for sea service. However, the appellant therein suffered illness while working at the port whereafter he was medically examined and advised for admission in the hospital. Upon examination, he was considered permanently unfit for sea service. The Shipping Department of the Government of India at Mumbai cancelled the registration of the employee as seaman. Thereafter, the appellant therein settled at his native place Gaya, Bihar and from there, he sent several letters/representations for his financial claims as per the statutory provisions and terms of contract. The said claims were rejected vide communication dated 07.10.2011. Referring to various earlier decisions explaining the principles for determination as to when cause of action, wholly or in part, would arise within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as below:

"16. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction."

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It is, thus, clear that the fact whether or not cause of action, wholly or in part for filing writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of a High Court has to be decided in the light of nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has also been held that the aggrieved party has to establish that a legal right claimed by it has been infringed by the other side within the territorial limits of that Court. Having considered the legal position, on facts, it was found in the aforesaid case that the letter of rejection was sent to the home town of the appellant therein at his native place where he was staying after having been found medically unfit and it was also found that from that place, representations were sent claiming disability compensation. The representations were replied by the authorities at the home address of the appellant therein, rejecting the claim for disability compensation. In that case, it was further found that on having been declared medically unfit, the appellant therein returned back to his native place and all claims/representations were being made from that place only; letters/representations were being entertained and replied by the respondents therein and decision on those representations was communicated at appellant's address in Bihar.

6.15 The facts of the case, as pleaded in the writ petition, nowhere states regarding the place wherefrom representation was sent or the place where the rejection order was received. According to the appellant, sending of representation and receipt of letter of rejection of representation both were through e-mails.

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There is no pleading as to the place wherefrom e-mails were sent or the place where such e-mail were received. In the case of

Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), all the bundle of facts taken together led to the conclusion that a fraction of cause of action had arisen in the home town of the appellant therein, who was permanently discharged from service and staying there.

As the law is well settled that the issue as to whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction or not, has to be decided on the pleadings of the case as it is.

6.16 In view of above conclusion, we have to hold that though the learned Single has dismissed the writ petition, but the learned Single Judge lacked the territorial jurisdiction to decide the writ petition on merits and, therefore, writ petition is dismissed leaving the appellant to work out her remedy before appropriate forum. The order passed by the learned Single Judge would be of no consequence in law and it will be open for the appellant to approach the appropriate forum for redressal of her grievances.

6.17 Appeal is, accordingly, disposed off.

(ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J (MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA),J

MANOJ NARWANI /

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