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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No. 281 of 2015
Bela Bai W/o Dhanush Mahipal, Aged about 41 years, R/o Adarshnagar, Bavapara, UTAI, Police Station UTAI, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
--Appellant Versus
State of Chhattisgarh through Police Station UTAI, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
---Respondent
For Appellant :- Mr. B.P. Singh, Advocate For State :- Mr. Soumya Rai, P.L.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Singh Chandel Judgment on Board
15/06/2023
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of CrPC against the impugned judgment dated 23/01/2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Durg in Sessions Trial No. 307/2013 whereby he has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 100/- in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month.
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2. Case of the prosecution is that marriage of deceased Hiroundi Bai was solemnized with Pawan Kumar in the year 2013 and thereafter, she started residing with her husband and her in-laws at village Utai, however, her husband Pawan Kumar used to commit maarpeet with her and her mother-in-law Bela Bai (appellant herein) used to quarrel with her, which she had also told her father Milap Patil (P.W.-1), who had taken her to back to his house but after some days, he again left her at her in-laws house on 25/09/2013. On 27/09/2013, Milap Patil (P.W.-1) received the information that her daughter Hiroundi Bai had been burnt in fire and she is admitted in the Hospital. When he reached the Hospital, he found that Hiroundi Bai was badly burnt and when he asked her about the incident, she told him that her husband Pawan Kumar committed maarpeet with her in the morning and thereafter, appellant poured kerosene oil over her and set her ablaze.
3. Father of the deceased, Milap Patil (P.W.-1) then registered dehati nalishi (Ex. P/1) on the basis of which offence punishable under Section 307/34 of IPC was registered against the appellant Bela Bai and co- accused Pawan Kumar and thereafter, first information report was registered at Police Station Utai vide Ex. P/18. On the same day itself, Head Constable Prakashdas (P.W.-10) sought opinion from the Doctor
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vide Ex. P/20 whether Hiroundi Bai was in a fit condition to give her dying declaration and wrote a letter to the Executive Magistrate vide Ex. P/19 to record dying declaration of the deceased. After finding that Hiroundi Bai was in a fit state of mind to give her dying declaration, Naib Tahsildar Ghanshyam Prasad Sharma (P.W.-14) recorded dying declaration of the deceased vide Ex. P/27 wherein Hiroundi Bai admitted that in the morning, her husband Pawan Kumar committed maar peet with her and thereafter, her mother-in-law Bela Bai (appellant herein) poured kerosene oil over her and set her ablaze. Thereafter, Hiroundi Bai was admitted to Bheemrao Ambedkar Hospital, Raipur, however, while undergoing treatment, she died, which was informed at Police Station Moudhapara, Raipur wherein merg intimation was registered vide Ex. P/15 pursuant to which inquest was conducted vide Ex. P/31 and her dead body was subjected to postmortem which was conducted by Dr. S.K. Bagh (P.W.-13) and as per the postmortem report (Ex. P/26), cause of death is said to be due to cardiorespiratory failure as a result of burn injuries to the body. From the spot, broken pieces of bangles, one mangalsutra, burnt clothes, plastic bucket and matchsticks were seized vide Ex. P/11. Memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ex. P/12 and at her instance, a 5 litre plastic
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container and matchbox were seized vide Ex. P/13. The seized articles were sent for forensic examination and as per the FSL report (Ex. P/28), kerosene oil was found on the burnt clothes, plastic container and burnt matchsticks. After due investigation, appellant Bela Bai and co-accused Pawan Kumar were charge-sheeted for offence punishable under Section 302/34 of IPC which was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence.
4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and brought on record 31 documents. Statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein she denied guilt and she examined two witnesses and brought on record 3 documents in her defence.
5. Learned trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, finding the death of deceased Hiroundi Bai to be homicidal in nature, proceeded to convict the appellant Bela Bai for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and co-accused Pawan Kumar for offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC against which appellant Bela Bai has preferred the instant appeal.
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6. Mr. B.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the oral dying declaration given by the deceased to her father Milap Patil (P.W.-1) is not at all trustworthy as Dr. R.K. Nayak (P.W.-11) has clearly stated in his testimony before the Court that deceased Hiroundi Bai told him that she herself poured kersene oil over her body and lit fire which has duly been recorded in her case history (Ex. P/23). Moreover, though the written dying declaration (Ex. P/27) has been proved by the Executive Magistrate Ghanshyam Prasad Sharma (P.W.-14), however, there is no certificate by the Doctor which shows that Hiroundi Bai was in a fit state of mind to give her dying declaration and the Executive Magistrate also did not record his satisfaction prior to recording dying declaration that Hiroundi Bai was physically and mentally fit to give her dying declaration though he has given statement before the Court in this regard but it cannot be accepted as it could be an afterthought. As such, neither the oral dying declaration nor the written dying declaration is acceptable and the appellant deserves to be acquitted.
7. Per contra, Mr. Soumya Rai, learned State counsel would principally submit that though certificate of the Doctor has not been placed on record but the Executive Magistrate Ghanshyam Prasad Sharma (P.W.-14), who has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, has
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clearly stated before the Court that he recorded the dying declaration of the deceased pursuant to taking certificate of the Doctor clearly stating that Hiroundi Bai was physically and mentally fit to give her dying declaration and he has further stated that he himself ascertained from the deceased whether she was fit to make her dying declaration and only after being satisfied, he proceeded to record the dying declaration (Ex. P/27). As such, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC relying upon the dying declaration (Ex. P/23) given by the deceased and therefore, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.
9. The first question for the consideration would be whether the death of deceased Hiroundi Bai was homicidal in nature ?
10.Learned trial Court has recorded an affirmative finding in this regard and held the death of deceased Hiroundi Bai to be homicidal in nature relying upon the expert medical opinion of Dr. S.K. Bagh (P.W.-13) who has proved the postmortem report (Ex. P/26) in which cause
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of death is said to be cardiorespiratory failure as a result of burn injuries and relying upon the dying declaration (Ex. P/27). Considering the statement of Dr. S.K. Bagh (P.W.-13) as well as the postmortem report (Ex. P/26) and the injuries suffered by the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held the death of deceased Hiroundi Bai to be homicidal in nature, particularly when it has not been seriously questioned by learned counsel for the appellant. We hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court.
11. This brings us to the next question for consideration, which is, whether the appellant poured kerosene oil over the body of the deceased and set her ablaze due to which she suffered severe burn injuries and died ?
12. At this stage, it is appropriate to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus:
"32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.—Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:—
(1) when it relates to cause of death.—When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted
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in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.
xxx xxx xxx"
13. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and cross-examination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of
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Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that "a dying man seldom lies" or in other words "truth sits upon the lips of a dying man". The relevance or this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. 14.Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the "dying declaration" section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to "circumstances of the transaction", which are as under: -
"21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:-
(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature
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and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and- dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.
(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.
(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.
(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the
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said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant."
15. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)2, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: -
"21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:-
21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court.
21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement.
21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not
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absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration.
21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement.
21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration."
16. Where several dying declarations are made the test is whether the version of the deceased is proved to be false in respect of the integral part of the case. A dying declaration should satisfy all the necessary tests and one such important test is that if there are more than one dying declarations they should be consistent particularly in material particulars [See: Kamla v. State of Punjab3.]
17. In the matter of Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State Of Maharashtra . 4, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration made by the accused, one first in time must be preferred.
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18. In a recent judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana5while considering the issue of multiple dying declarations, their Lordships have held as under:
"9. It could thus be seen that the Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/ duress/prompting. The dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required. In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon. However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.
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20. We therefore find that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one (Ex. PE). In any case, the benefit of doubt which has been given to the other accused by the trial court, ought to have been equally given to the present appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused."
19. In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v. State of
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Maharashtra 6has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. Their Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as under: -
"5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab7wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.8(at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that
"in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration"
has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.8 must be held to be not correctly decided and we
6(2002) 6 SCC 710
7(1999) 6 SCC 545
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affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat9.
20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh (S) v. State (Nct Of Delhi) (S).)10following the principle of law laid down in Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration, however, the requirement remains that the person who records dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration.
21. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Laxman (supra) followed in Jagbir Singh (supra), it is quite vivid that the dying declaration (Ex. P/27) was recorded by the Executive Magistrate Ghanshyam Prasad Sharma (P.W.-14) and before recording the dying declaration, the Station House Officer of the concerned Police Station requested the Doctor who was attending the deceased to give his opinion as to whether she was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give her dying declaration, but unfortunately, no such opinion given by the Doctor has been brought on record to show that deceased Hiroundi Bai was in a fit state of mind to give her dying declaration to the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14).
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Moreover, a careful perusal of the dying declaration (Ex. P/27) would show that even the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14) did not record his satisfaction prior to recording the dying declaration that deceased was fit to give her dying declaration and in light of the principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jagbir Singh (supra), though absence of certificate by the Doctor is not fatal to the prosecution but the person who records dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration. Though the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14) has clearly stated in his testimony before the Court that he had ascertained and found the deceased to be mentally and physically fit to give her dying declaration and thereafter, he proceeded to record her dying declaration, but we are not impressed at all with such statement made by the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14) firstly, for the reason that he has stated before the Court that the Doctor issued a certificate stating that deceased was mentally and physically fit to give her declaration but unfortunately no such Doctor's certificate has been brought on record and there is no such reason available on record as to why the Doctor's certificate could not be brought on record and secondly, because the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14) himself could have recorded his satisfaction in a few words that
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the deceased was physically and mentally fit to give her dying declaration which could have satisfied this Court but that is also not available on record. Furthermore, the dying declaration was recorded on 27/09/2013, however, the statement of the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14) was recorded before the Court on 27/05/2014 i.e. after 8 months and the statement made by the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14) could be result of afterthought at this point of time. As such, prosecution has miserably failed to establish that the deceased was in a fit condition, both physically and mentally, to give her dying declaration (Ex. P/27) as neither the Doctor's certificate has been brought on record nor the satisfaction of the Executive Magistrate (P.W.-14) has anywhere been recorded in writing that the deceased was mentally and physically fit to give her dying declaration. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept the finding recorded by the trial Court that the dying declaration (Ex. P/27) given by the deceased to the Executive Magistrate Ghanshyam Prasad Sharma (P.W.-14) was true and voluntary. We
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P/23), however, a careful reading of the case history (Ex. P/23) and the statement of Dr. R.K. Nayak (P.W.-
11) would show that he has stated as well as recorded that deceased Hiroundi Bai told him that she herself poured kerosene oil over her body and lit fire and thereby, suffered burn injuries. As such, the oral dying declaration allegedly given by the deceased to Dr. R.K. Nayak (P.W.-11) also nowhere establishes that it was the appellant who poured kerosene oil over the body of the deceased and set her on fire.
23. In view of the aforesaid legal discussion, we are of the considered opinion that appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of principle of benefit of doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment so far as it relates to the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant Bela Bai is hereby set aside. She be released forthwith, if her detention is not required in any other case.
24. Accordingly, this criminal appeal stands allowed.
25. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Arvind Singh Chandel) Judge Judge
Harneet