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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition arises from acquisition proceedings concerning land in Village Chhalera Bangar, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The land was acquired in two phases: initially in 1979-1980 for parts of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427, and subsequently in 2005 for remaining portions of the same khasras. The petitioner, along with others, purchased the land in 1997, and their ownership was recorded in revenue records. Despite this, the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) attempted possession, leading to a civil suit in 1998 which resulted in an injunction restraining NOIDA from taking possession of certain land not subject to the earlier acquisition.

Despite the injunction, NOIDA allotted part of the land to M/s. DLF Universal Limited in 2004 and physically handed it over in early 2005. Subsequent notifications under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act of 1894) were issued in 2005 to formalize acquisition. The petitioner challenged these notifications in a writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005), which was disposed of in 2009 with directions to determine compensation according to law and specific judicial precedent. NOIDA filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against this judgment, and an interim order was granted by the Supreme Court in 2011. During this interim period, an award determining compensation was passed in January 2011 without informing the petitioner. The SLP was eventually dismissed in 2015.

The petitioner made a representation for compensation determination in line with the 2009 judgment, which was rejected by order dated 08.01.2018. Consequently, the present writ petition challenges both the award dated 31.01.2011 and the rejection order dated 08.01.2018.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the acquisition proceedings initiated in 2005 have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013), due to delay in passing the award and non-payment of compensation.
  2. Whether the award dated 31.01.2011 determining compensation is illegal, invalid, or non-est, given that it was passed without compliance with the High Court’s directions in the petitioner’s earlier writ petition and without considering the market value of the land.
  3. Whether the writ petition filed solely by the petitioner is maintainable despite objections regarding co-ownership and alleged suppression of facts.
  4. Whether the compensation for the acquired land should be determined based on the circle rate applicable to agricultural land or commercial/industrial land, considering the land’s declared status under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 (Act of 1976).
  5. Whether the remedy under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 bars the maintainability of the writ petition seeking compensation determination.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner acquired ownership of the land in 1997, recorded in revenue records, making him the absolute owner.
  • Despite ownership and injunction orders, NOIDA allotted and took possession of the land without proper acquisition.
  • The petitioner challenged the acquisition notifications and sought compensation determination as per the High Court’s judgment in Bhopendra Singh v. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (2005), which was not complied with due to interim Supreme Court orders.
  • The award dated 31.01.2011 was passed without following the High Court’s directions and without determining compensation on the market value or circle rate of the land.
  • The petitioner’s writ petition is maintainable despite objections about co-ownership and alleged suppression of facts because subsequent orders and revenue records show sole ownership in his name.
  • Compensation should be calculated based on the circle rate applicable to commercial/industrial land, as the land was declared under industrial development area by notification under the Act of 1976.
  • The acquisition proceedings initiated in 2005 have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 due to delay in passing the award and non-payment of compensation, rendering the award nullity.
  • The remedy under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 does not bar the writ petition because this petition seeks compliance with a prior court order, and the petitioner was granted liberty by the Supreme Court to approach the High Court.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The writ petition filed solely by the petitioner is not maintainable as the land was purchased by three persons; the petitioner suppressed material facts regarding a compromise order rejected by the Civil Court.
  • The writ petition is barred by Section 18 of the Act of 1894, as the petitioner should have invoked the reference remedy for compensation disputes.
  • The land was agricultural at the time of notification in 2005; thus, compensation based on commercial/industrial rates or circle rates is not tenable.
  • Reference to the Supreme Court judgment in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer was made to show that market value must consider nature, location, and other factors, and deductions for development costs are permissible.
  • The land was allotted to respondent no. 7 (DLF Universal Limited) in 2004 and developed with a mall; therefore, acquisition has not lapsed, and Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not apply.
  • Compensation was offered and deposited in court in 2017 after rejection by the petitioner, negating lapse claims.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhopendra Singh v. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295) Compensation determination must be as per law and judicial precedent; circle rate is minimum statutory market value. Directed respondents to determine compensation according to this precedent; award ignoring it was set aside.
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129 Once possession is taken under Section 17(1), land vests absolutely in Government; provisions of Section 11-A do not apply; acquisition does not lapse due to delay in award. Held that acquisition did not lapse despite delay in passing award; possession taken in 2005 vested land in Government.
Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 3 SCC 751 Market value determination considers nature, location, size, and other factors; deductions for development costs allowed. Applied to reject meagre compensation rate; compensation to be redetermined considering circle rate and deductions.
Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (dead) by LRs v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 4 SCC 789 Principles for market value and compensation; allowance for deductions between 20%-50% for development charges. Supported the direction to deduct 50% from circle rate for development costs in compensation calculation.
Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board v. K.S. Gangadharappa, (2009) 11 SCC 164 Market value to be determined by reference to comparable sales with necessary adjustments. Reinforced approach to compensation calculation; circle rate is relevant benchmark.
Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 Vesting of land upon possession under Section 17(1) is absolute; acquisition cannot be withdrawn; Section 11-A provisions not attracted. Supported rejection of lapse argument based on delay in award; possession vests title in Government.
Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1 Possession under Section 17(1) vests land in Government; acquisition does not lapse due to failure to make award within two years. Applied to hold acquisition proceedings valid despite delay; compensation non-payment does not invalidate acquisition.
Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 Section 11-A not attracted where possession taken under Section 17(1); acquisition proceedings do not lapse. Confirmed acquisition validity despite delay in award; acquisition cannot be withdrawn post-possession.
May George v. Tahsildar, (2010) 13 SCC 98 Test for mandatory provisions is whether non-compliance invalidates entire proceedings; non-compliance with procedural provisions may not be fatal. Held that non-compliance with certain provisions does not invalidate acquisition; lapsing not automatic.
CST v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., (1961) 2 SCR 189 Legal fictions must be limited to their legitimate purpose and not extended beyond. Applied to reject expansive interpretation of lapse provisions that would divest vested titles.
Braithwaite & Co. (India) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., (1968) 1 SCR 771 Legal fictions adopted for limited purposes; extension beyond legislated intent is unjustified. Supported limitation of lapse provisions to cases where possession and compensation are absent.
G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 Disputes over compensation withdrawal must be pursued through prescribed procedures or suits. Referenced in context of proper remedy for compensation disputes under the Land Acquisition Act.
Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divl. Officer, AIR 1939 PC 98 Compensation must be based on price a willing vendor might reasonably expect from a willing purchaser. Applied to emphasize fair market value basis for compensation calculation.
Special Land Acquisition Officer v. T. Adinarayan Setty, AIR 1959 SC 429 Criteria for comparable sales in market value determination. Used to guide principles for assessing market value for compensation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the factual matrix and legal submissions, focusing on the acquisition proceedings initiated in 2005. It noted that the petitioner’s earlier writ petition was disposed of with directions to determine compensation as per the legal precedent set by the High Court of Uttranchal in Bhopendra Singh, which was not complied with due to an interim Supreme Court order. The award dated 31.01.2011 was passed during the pendency of this interim order and did not follow the High Court’s directions, nor did it consider the circle rate of the land as the minimum market value.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the award was a nullity warranting lapse under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, reasoning that possession had been taken under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894, vesting title in the Government, and thus the acquisition could not lapse for delay in award as per authoritative Supreme Court precedents (Indore Development Authority, Satendra Prasad Jain, Pratap, Awadh Bihari Yadav). The Court also rejected the contention that the writ petition was barred by Section 18 of the Act of 1894, holding that the petition sought compliance with a prior judicial direction and was filed with liberty granted by the Supreme Court.

Regarding ownership objections, the Court found that subsequent orders and revenue records established the petitioner as sole owner, negating allegations of suppression of facts and maintainability objections. On compensation, the Court held that the land was declared under industrial development area prior to acquisition notification, and thus compensation should be based on the circle rate applicable to commercial/industrial land rather than agricultural land. It relied on the principles from cited Supreme Court judgments (Chimanlal Hargovinddas, Viluben Jhalejar Contractor, Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board) to direct compensation determination at 50% of the circle rate after deductions for development charges, with solatium and interest as applicable.

The Court found that the respondents acted in sheer adamancy by rejecting the petitioner’s representation without redetermining compensation post-dismissal of the SLP. The order dated 08.01.2018 rejecting the representation and the award dated 31.01.2011 were set aside to the extent of compensation calculation, and directions were issued for fresh determination in compliance with the law and judicial precedents.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is disposed of with the following directions:

  • The award dated 31.01.2011 and the order dated 08.01.2018 rejecting the petitioner’s representation are set aside to the extent of compensation determination.
  • The respondents are directed to redetermine compensation based on the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000 per square meter prevailing since 16.04.2004 for Sector-18, after making a 50% deduction towards development charges, effectively fixing compensation at Rs. 55,000 per square meter for 2.18 bighas of land.
  • Solatium of 30% shall be added to the compensation amount.
  • Interest shall be paid at 9% per annum for one year from possession date (February 2005), followed by 15% per annum as per the proviso to Section 34 of the Act of 1894.
  • Compensation amount deposited in Court in 2017 shall earn interest at 15% up to the date of deposit and shall be paid to the petitioner along with accrued interest.
  • All payments and compliance shall be completed within three months from receipt of the order copy.

Implications: This decision enforces strict compliance with judicial directions for compensation determination, clarifies that acquisition proceedings do not lapse once possession is taken under Section 17(1) despite delays in award, and confirms that compensation must reflect the true market value considering the land’s declared status and circle rates. It upholds the principle that legal fictions of lapse cannot divest vested titles and that writ petitions seeking compliance with court directions are maintainable notwithstanding statutory remedies. No new precedent is set; rather, existing Supreme Court jurisprudence is applied and reinforced.

    Reddy Veeranna v. State Of U.p. And Others

    Munishwar Nath Bhandari, J.:— The writ petition was filed with the following prayers which are quoted herein for ready reference:

    “(i) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 08.01.2018 passed by the respondent no. 3 (Annexure No. 15 to the writ petition);

    (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction declaring that the acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1979-1980 in respect of 01-00-00 Bigha in Khasra No. 422 and 01-15-00 Bigha in Khasra No. 427 of Village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. have lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and direct the respondents to return the said land to the petitioner;

    (iii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing the award stated to have been passed on 31.1.2011 and further declaring that the same is illegal, invalid and non-est;

    (iv) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction declaring that the acquisition proceedings initiated in terms of Notification No. 4535/77-4-2005-78 N. 2005 Lucknow dated 2/9/2005 and Notification No. 5914/77-2005-7 No. 2005 Lucknow dated 22.11.2005 in respect of 02-09-00 bigha in Khasra No. 422 and 00-09-10 Bigha in Khasra No. 427 both situated at Village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana & Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh have lapsed and consequently direct the respondents to return the said land to the petitioner; and/or alternatively, direct the respondents to issue fresh acquisition notification and to pass fresh award in accordance with the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and the decision in W.P. No. 75152/2005 and the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.A. Nos. 731-732/2013 and C.A. No. 1107/2009 based on the prevailing market value and pay the same to the petitioner in a time bound manner.”

    2. The prayers quoted above shows reference of the acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1979-1980 for a land measuring 1.00 bigha of Khasra No. 422 and 01.15.00 bigha of Khasra No. 427 of Village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana & Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. It has further reference of subsequent acquisition proceedings for land measuring 02.09 bighas of Khasra No. 422 and 00.09.10 bighas of Khasra No. 427 of the same village and pargana for which notification under sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1894’) was issued on 02.09.2005. The acquisition of land of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 was thus made in two parts. One in the year 1979-1980 and thereafter in the year 2005. The case has chequered history thus, it would be appropriate to give brief facts of the case which are as follows:

    Brief facts of the case

    3. The petitioner along with two others purchased land of Khasra No. 422 measuring 3.09.00 bighas and Khasra No. 427 measuring 2.04.10 bighas of Village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana & Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar by a registered sale deed dated 20.04.1997. The part of land of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 was acquired by the respondents in the year 1979-1980.

    4. The petitioner has sought lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1979-1980 but during the course of argument, relief in reference to the first acquisition proceeding of year 1979-1980 was not pressed and accordingly, we would not be referring to the facts pertaining to acquisition of the part of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 in the year 1979-1980. The facts regarding acquisition of part of land in the year 1979-1980 has been mentioned in view of prayer No. (ii) of the writ petition quoted above.

    5. The facts which are relevant for the remaining prayers and needs to be dealt pertain to the acquisition of land measuring 02.09.00 bighas of Khasra No. 422 and land measuring 00.09.10 bigha of Khasra No. 427. A notification under section 4(1) read with section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 was issued on 02.09.2005. It was to propose acquisition of remaining part of land of both the khasras as only part of it was earlier acquired in the year 1979-1980. It was also for Khasra No. 424 of one Hari Singh. The proposed acquisition was initiated after an order passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghaziabad on a suit bearing No. 416 of 1998 preferred by the petitioner and others for permanent injunction. The suit was partly decreed by the order dated 16.02.2002 restraining New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) to take possession of land of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 measuring 02.18.00 bighas (02.09.00 bighas of Khasra No. 422 and 00.09.10 bighas of Khasra No. 427 totalling 02.18.00 bighas) which was not subject matter of the acquisition initiated in the year 1979-1980. It was while refusing to grant injunction in regard to the part of the land acquired in the year 1979-1980. The civil suit was filed by the petitioner and others when NOIDA intended to take possession of the land without its acquisition. The NOIDA preferred an appeal against the injunction order dated 16.02.2002 but was dismissed.

    6. Despite injunction order dated 16.02.2002, the respondents-NOIDA floated a tender in the year 2003 followed by allotment of land in favour of respondent No. 7 M/s. DLF Universal Limited on 12.04.2004. The possession of the land was given on 25.02.2005. It was after allotment of the land to respondent no. 7 that a notification under section 4(1) read with section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 was issued on 02.09.2005. It was followed by a notification under section 6 of the Act of 1894 on 22.11.2005. The facts given above shows allotment of land of respondent no. 7 without acquisition. It was despite an injunction order of Civil Judge (Senior Division) in favour of the petitioner and others.

    7. Petitioner and others preferred a writ petition bearing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005 to challenge the notification under section 4(1) read with sections 17(1), 17(4) and section 6 of the Act of 1894. It was mainly on the ground that without any urgency, section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 was invoked for allotment of land to a builder for construction of a mall. It was also on the ground that despite a notification under section 17(4), the petitioner and others were not paid any compensation. Thus, possession of the land was unauthorised and illegal. It is, however, a fact that challenge to the notification under section 4(1) read with section 17 and section 6 of the Act of 1894 was not pressed by the petitioner and others rather prayed for determination of compensation in accordance with the law laid down by the High Court of Uttaranchal in the case of ‘Bhopendra Singh v. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad’ reported in 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295; First Appeal No. 33 of 2004, order dated 8-4-2005 (Utt). It is after keeping in mind the Commissioner's report that land cannot be demarcated and the petitioner cannot get the land back. The writ petition was disposed of by the order dated 10.12.2009 with a direction to the Special Land Acquisition Officer for determination of compensation according to the law laid down by the High Court of Uttaranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra) with payment of compensation within a period of one month. A further direction for rehabilitation was also given if the policy of NOIDA permits for it. The petitioner was expecting compliance of the judgment dated 10.12.2009 within the time period. It was, however, not complied by New Okhla Industrial Development Authority rather they preferred an Special Leave to Appeal before the Apex Court where an interim order was passed on 11.01.2011.

    8. The facts on record further shows that owner of neighbouring Khasra No. 424 Shri Hari Singh filed S.L.P. bearing No. 16841 of 2014 to challenge the acquisition proceeding pursuant to same notification. The said appeal is still pending for the reason that despite the direction of the Apex Court to DLF Universal Limited to settle the matter with the land owners, it was not settled. The judgment of the High Court in the case of the petitioner dated 10.12.2009 was not complied in view of the interim order passed by the Apex Court on 10.01.2011. It is, however, a fact that during the pendency of the S.L.P. of NOIDA and interim order by the Apex Court, the respondents passed an award on 31.1.2011 to determine the amount of compensation. It is alleged to be without notice and information to the petitioner. It was not informed even when the S.L.P. preferred by the NOIDA was heard by the Apex Court finally. The S.L.P. therein was dismissed by the judgment dated 04.11.2015. The knowledge of the award dated 31.01.2011 came when a letter was sent by NOIDA to the petitioner's advocate vide its letter dated 10.05.2016. No notice alleged to have been served under sections 9 and 10 of the Act of 1894. The petitioner thus made a representation to the District Magistrate and Land Acquisition Officer for determination of compensation in the light of the judgment in his own writ petition. The representation was, however, rejected by order dated 08.01.2018. Thus, the present writ petition has been filed to challenge the order dated 08.01.2018 and also the award.

    Arguments on behalf of the petitioner

    9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that land of Khasra No. 422 and 427 was purchased by a registered sale deed on 20.04.1997 by the petitioner along with two others. Their names were mutated in the revenue record and thereby they became absolute owner of the land. Despite that, NOIDA tried to take forceful possession, thus, a civil suit bearing No. 416 of 1998 was filed by the petitioner and others. The civil suit was decreed for the land measuring 02.09.00 bighas of Khasra No. 477 and 00.09.00 bigha of Khasra No. 429 which was not subject matter of acquisition in the year 1979-1980. Despite injunction order in favour of the petitioner, the land belonging to the petitioner was allotted to respondent no. 7 by the allotment letter dated 12.04.2004. It is thereafter only respondents issued notification under section 4(1) and section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 on 02.09.2005 followed by notification under section 6 of the Act of 1894 on 22.11.2005. The petitioner challenged the notification by maintaining Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005 which was disposed of by the order dated 10.12.2009. It was with a direction to the respondents to determine the compensation as per law and the judgment of the High Court of Uttaranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra) and pay the amount of compensation within a period of one month. The official respondents preferred SLP against the said judgment where an interim order was passed by the Apex Court on 10.01.2011. It is during the pendency of the interim order that award was made on 31.01.2011 and is being challenged having not passed as per the direction given by this Court in the petitioner's own Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005 disposed of by the order dated 10.12.2009.

    10. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner became sole owner of the land in question pursuant to the order passed by the Civil Court so as the revenue authorities. The name of the petitioner was entered in the revenue record as sole owner of the land and accordingly present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner being the title holder of the land. The respondents have yet raised objections about the maintainability of the writ petition with an allegation of suppression of fact regarding order on the compromise deed on a suit preferred by the co-owners. The objection of suppression of facts and the maintainability of the writ petition is in ignorance of the order passed by the Civil Court and mutation of land in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner preferred a representation against the award immediately when it came in his knowledge through a letter sent by NOIDA to his lawyer on 10.05.2016.

    11. The representation of the petitioner for determination of compensation in the light of the judgment dated 10.12.2009 was not accepted. It is despite the fact that in the award dated 31.1.2011, a reference of interim order on 10.01.2011 by the Apex Court against the judgment dated 10.12.2009 was given. The compensation was thus not determined as per judgment of High Court of Uttaranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra). The award was otherwise made subject to the outcome of the SLP before the Apex Court. The SLP preferred by the NOIDA having been dismissed, the respondents were expected to determine the compensation as per law and judgment of High Court of Uttaranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra). The representation of the petitioner for determination of compensation was arbitrarily rejected by the order dated 08.01.2018. Thus, petitioner was left with no option but to prefer this writ petition. It was when a liberty for it was given by the Apex Court on a contempt petition preferred by the petitioner.

    12. The determination of compensation has not been made on the circle rate prevalent on the date of issuance on the notification under sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act of 1894. It was Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter in the year 2005. Thus, respondents had not determined the compensation taking into consideration the market value of the land on the date of issuance of the notification under section 4 of the Act of 1894. Accordingly, prayer has been made not only to set aside the order dated 08.01.2018 but also the award dated 10.01.2011 with a direction for determination of compensation on the market value.

    13. The respondents have contested the writ petition mainly on the ground that compensation has been determined taking into consideration the nature of the land which according to them was an agricultural land ignoring the notification dated 17.04.1976 under U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1976’). The land in question became part of industrial development area, on issuance of notification under section 2 of the Act of 1976. Section 17, the Act of 1976 provides for overriding effect on all the other Acts of the State of U.P. The nature of land should have been taken under Industrial Development Plan for the purpose of determination of compensation. The respondents could not have considered the nature of land in ignorance to the aforesaid thereby the determination of compensation was based on wrong assumption on the nature of land and ignoring the circle rate.

    14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further referred to the pleading in the written statement of the respondents to the suit for permanent injunction. The respondents pleaded that land in question is commercial and is very valuable land. The respondents could not have taken U-turn to make a statement contrary to what was pleaded in the civil suit. It is only to justify determination of compensation in violation of the law. Learned counsel for the petitioner has given reference of section 23 of the Act of 1894 for the aforesaid purposes to show how the compensation has to be determined.

    15. It is with the further statement that even the acquisition proceeding lapsed because award under section 11 was passed much subsequent to the period given under section 11A of the Act of 1894. The prayer was to cover this case by section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It is also on the pretext that the award dated 31.01.2011 is nullity because compensation was not determined as per law and the judgment in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra), thus Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 became applicable. The compensation should thus be determined under the Act of 2013.

    16. The objection of the respondents to the maintainability of the writ petition in reference to section 18 of the Act of 1894 has been contested. The counsel for the petitioner submits that when the writ petition preferred by the petitioner was disposed of by the judgment dated 10.12.2009 with the direction to determine the compensation as per law and judgment in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra), the respondents were under an obligation to comply the judgment aforesaid. It was not complied due to interim order of the Apex Court as the award was passed during the pendency of the interim order, thus was not in compliance of the judgment of this Court dated 10.12.2009. The petitioner preferred a contempt petition before the Apex Court where liberty was given to approach the High Court. The petitioner accordingly preferred this writ petition as per the liberty given by the Apex Court. The writ petition is basically to seek compliance of the judgment dated 10.12.2009 thus Section 18 of the Act of 1894 would not effect maintainability of the writ petition.

    17. The petitioner thus pressed all the prayers other than prayer no. (ii), i.e., acquisition of the part of the land of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 in the year 1979-1980. Thus, this Court would be dealing with all the relevant facts pertaining to acquisition proceedings of year 2005 for the remaining land of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427.

    Arguments of the respondents

    18. The official respondents and respondent no. 7 have contested the writ petition. The objection about maintainability of the writ petition has also been raised.

    19. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that writ petition by the sole petitioner is not maintainable as the land was purchased by three persons including the petitioner. The writ petition has been filed by one person. A reference of the order of the Civil Court dated 12.09.2002 has been given whereby Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gautam Buddha Nagar denied to record the compromise. The fact aforesaid was suppressed by the petitioner, thus even allegation of suppression of fact has been made. It was submitted that the writ petition by the petitioner alone to claim compensation for the land of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 is not maintainable and otherwise the petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands rather suppressed the material fact. The prayer is accordingly to dismiss the writ petition on the aforesaid ground itself.

    20. The other objection is in reference to Section 18 of the Act, 1894. It is submitted that if one is not satisfied with the determination of the compensation, should have invoked Section 18 of the Act, 1894. A writ petition for it is not maintainable, thus maintainability of the writ petition has been questioned in reference to the aforesaid also.

    21. The contest of the writ petition has been made on the nature of the land for determination of compensation. It is submitted that land in question was an agricultural land at the time of issuance of the notification on 02.09.2005 while the petitioner is claiming compensation of land by taking market value of the commercial/industrial land. The aforesaid is not tenable. A reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona reported in (1988) 3 SCC 751 : AIR 1988 SC 1652 has been given. It is to show how the market value of the land is to be determined. As per the judgment of the Apex Court in the case supra, the market value of the land is to be determined not only taking into consideration the nature of the land but its location and other aspects. The Apex Court has permitted certain deductions while determining the market value of the land. The balance-sheet of plus and minus factors has to be drawn while determining the compensation. In view of the above, the claim of the petitioner for determination of the compensation either on the rate on which land was allotted to respondent no. 7 or on a circle rate of the commercial land has been questioned.

    22. Learned counsel for respondent no. 7 submitted that the land in question was allotted to them by the letter dated 12.04.2004 and has been used by them. A mall has been constructed over it, thus question of lapse of the acquisition or to revert back the land to the petitioner does not arise. A serious contest on the prayer for lapse of the acquisition has been made. It was submitted that Section 24 of the Act, 2013 has no application on the facts of this case. An award was passed on 11.01.2011 after notification under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Act, 1894. The possession of the land was given to them in the month of February, 2005 itself. The land vested in the Government on issuance of the notification under Section 17 of the Act, 1894 and thereby, even if there was a delay in passing the award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894, the acquisition would not lapse in the light of the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ‘Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal’ reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129. The prayer is to dismiss the writ petition.

    23. The official respondents have also contested the prayer for lapse of the acquisition and application of Section 24 of the Act, 2013. It is submitted that after the notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 on 22.11.2005, the award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 was passed on 31.01.2011. Since prior to it, Section 17 of the Act, 1894 was invoked with possession of the land, the period of award given under Section 11A of the Act, 1894 was not to apply. It is further submitted that the amount of compensation was offered to the petitioner but when it was not accepted then deposited with the Court in the year 2017 itself. Thus, Section 24 of the Act, 2013 would not apply. The prayer is, accordingly, to dismiss the writ petition.

    Discussion and Finding of the Court

    24. We have considered rival arguments of the parties and scanned the record carefully.

    25. A notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Act, 1894 was issued on 02.09.2005 for acquisition of the land of Khasra No. 422 measuring 02-09-00 Bighas and Khasra No. 427 measuring 00-09-10 Bighas. It was followed by a notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 published on 22.11.2005. Challenge to aforesaid notifications were made by the petitioner through Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005 which was disposed of by the judgment dated 10.12.2009. The petitioner therein did not press the writ petition for challenge to the notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Act, 1894 rather prayed for determination of compensation as per the provisions of law and the judgment of the High Court of Uttranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra). The prayer aforesaid was accepted by the Court in its judgment dated 10.12.2019 with a direction for payment of compensation within a month. The respondents preferred a S.L.P. before the Apex Court wherein an interim order was passed on 10.01.2011. Operation of the judgment of this Court dated 10.12.2009 was stayed and it is during the pendency of the appeal before the Apex Court and the interim order that the respondents had passed an award dated 31.01.2011 which is under challenge along with the order dated 08.01.2018.

    26. The challenge to the award dated 31.01.2011 has been made. It is stated that award was passed ignoring the judgment of the High Court of Uttranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra) despite a direction in petitioner's own writ petition decided by the judgment dated 10.12.2009. The compensation has not been determined on the market value of the land.

    27. The lapse of the acquisition proceeding has been claimed in reference to Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “The Act of 2013”). It is on the ground that after the notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 on 22.11.2005, the award was not passed within a period specified under Section 11A of the Act, 1894 rather the award was notified on 31.01.2011 thereby the acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 2005 be treated as lapsed. It is also on the ground that despite the award dated 31.01.2011, amount of compensation was not deposited immediately thereupon rather it was deposited in the Court in the year 2017 without any information to the petitioner. Therefore, the proceedings for acquisition of land should be treated to have lapsed on that ground also and thereby, prayer is made for restoration of the land in favour of the petitioner or determination of compensation under the Act of 2013.

    28. Reference of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 has been given on the ground that award dated 31.01.2011 cannot said to be an award in the eye of law having been passed in ignorance of the judgment of this Court dated 10.12.2009 in the writ petition preferred by the petitioner. When the award was not passed after determining the compensation, as was directed by this Court in its judgment dated 10.12.2009, it should be treated to be nullity and accordingly Section 24 of the Act, 2013 to be applied for passing of the award afresh after determining the compensation under the Act, 2013. The alternative prayer of the petitioner is for determination of the compensation as per the direction of this Court in the earlier writ petition preferred by the petitioner himself and decided by the judgment dated 10.12.2009.

    29. According to the petitioner, the compensation has not been determined on the market value of the land. It is despite a ratio propounded by the High Court of Uttranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra) where circle rate of the land was not taken to be a guiding factor. The market value of the land can be considered on the circle rate determined under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Specific reference to Section 3 in Schedule I-B has been given. The petitioner has calculated the compensation based on the circle rate of the land in question and accordingly produced a valuation sheet to seek compensation of the land based on the calculation given therein.

    30. It is also submitted that while a suit was preferred by the petitioner for permanent injunction, the official respondents filed a written statement therein showing the land to be of commercial use and otherwise is a valuable land, however, while passing the award, it was ignored. The prayer is to determine the compensation at the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mt. which has been seriously disputed by the respondents alleging nature of the land to be agricultural at the time of acquisition. It is, thus, submitted that Land Acquisition Officer has rightly determined the amount of compensation taking circle rate of the agricultural land of the village in which it was existing. Accordingly, we need to determine the issue after referring to the documents on record. However, before that, we would be dealing with the objections raised by the respondents on maintainability of the writ petition. The respondents have made allegation of suppression of facts by the petitioner and at the same time raised objection on the locus of the petitioner to claim compensation of the entire land without there being a compromise decree in his favour.

    31. We would first be dealing with the issue as to whether the writ petition filed by the sole petitioner to claim compensation of land measuring 2.18.00 bighas of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 is maintainable. The respondents have produced a copy of the order dated 12.09.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gautam Buddha Nagar to deny acceptance of compromise and accordingly, allegations have been made about suppression of aforesaid fact. It is also that no compromise deed or decree has been issued by the competent Court and for that reason, one co-owner of the land, namely, Vishnu Pradhan contested the case separately to challenge the acquisition of the land. We, however, find that petitioner has produced a copy of the Khatauni of Fasli Year 1407-1412 when the land was recorded solely in the name of the petitioner. It was pursuant to the order dated 01.09.2010 in Suit No. 2441 of 2010 under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act, 1996 and the judgment of Civil Judge (Senior Division) dated 17.06.2010 to record entire land of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 in the name of the present petitioner. A copy of the Khatauni was submitted alongwith the supplementary affidavit, thereby the objection on maintainability of the writ petition in the hands of the petitioner is not tenable rather the petitioner became sole owner of the property in dispute after an order under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act and the judgment of the Civil Court dated 17.06.2010. His name was accordingly entered in the khatauni. The respondents have ignored the subsequent orders by which land was entered in the name of the petitioner alone.

    32. In view of the finding recorded above, it cannot be taken to be a case of suppression of facts to maintain this writ petition to question the award dated 31.01.2011 and order dated 08.01.2018 and to claim determination of compensation as per law.

    33. It is true that on 12.09.2002, the compromise submitted by the parties was not accepted by the Court but subsequent to it, the name of the petitioner alone was recorded in the Khatauni in pursuance of the order of Revenue Authority and Civil Court in the year 2010. Thus, we are unable to accept the objections of the respondents on maintainability of the writ petition on the aforesaid ground.

    34. The issue now remains about maintainability of the writ petition in the light of Section 18 of the Act, 1894. It is submitted that after an award dated 31.01.2011, if the petitioner was not satisfied with the determine of compensation, remedy of reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 was available and thereby, the writ petition is not maintainable.

    35. To deal with the issue, it would be necessary to refer to the judgment in the case of the petitioner himself when a writ petition was filed to challenge the notification under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Act, 1894. The judgment therein was passed on 10.12.2009 and last two paras of the said judgment are relevant, thus quoted hereunder for ready reference:—

    “Mr. S.D. Kautilya, learned counsel for the petitioners made a statement at bar that the petitioners do not press the relief claimed in the instant writ petitions and only pray that their compensation be determined and be paid to them in accordance with law and also keeping in mind the Judgment of High Court of Uttaranchal rendered in Bhopendra Singh v. Awas Vikas Parishad, reported in 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295. According to him this statement is being made keeping in mind the Commissioner's report that the land cannot be demarcated and the petitioners cannot get back the land.

    Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, but without prejudice to the merits of the case, the writ petition is disposed of with the direction to the SLAO to determine the compensation according to law as laid down in the judgment rendered in Bhopendra Singh (Supra). The payment of the compensation shall be made preferably within a period of one month. However, it is further provided that if as per policy of NOIDA any land is to be given to the petitioners, same shall be expedited for rehabilitation of the petitioner. Writ petition is disposed of.”

    36. As per the judgment referred above, the respondents were under the obligation to determine the compensation not only as per law but the judgment of High Court of Uttranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra).

    37. It is not in dispute that the judgment aforesaid was challenged by New Okhla Industrial Development Authority by maintaining a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court wherein an interim order was passed on 11.01.2011. In view of the interim order of the Apex Court, respondents have not calculated the compensation in the light of the judgment dated 11.01.2011 while passing the award on 31.01.2011. It comes out from the award itself and for ready reference, relevant para of it is quoted hereunder:—

    38. The part of the award quoted above shows knowledge about interim order of the Apex Court to the Land Acquisition Officer and thereby, award was made subject to final outcome of the appeal. The determination of the compensation was not made as per the direction of this Court in the judgment dated 10.11.2009 but on meagre rate of Rs. 181.87 per square meter ignoring the circle rate and taking market value of the land. The petitioner thus filed a contempt petition before the Apex Court bearing Nos. 1841-1842 of 2018. The said contempt petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail the appropriate remedy before the High Court. The order of the Apex Court in the contempt petition is quoted hereunder for ready reference:

    “Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks leave to withdraw these petitions, with liberty to approach the High Court.

    The Contempt petitions are dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail the appropriate remedy before the High Court. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.”

    39. In view of the liberty given by the Apex Court to take remedy before the High Court, the present writ petition was filed to seek determination of compensation in compliance of the judgment dated 10.12.2009. In the circumstances, the objection of the respondents in reference to Section 18 of the Act, 1894 would not be tenable. It is not a case where determination of the compensation has been claimed by maintaining the writ petition for the first time rather the first writ petition preferred by the petitioner was disposed of with a direction to the Special Land Acquisition Officer to determine the compensation according to law laid down in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra). When compliance of the said judgment was not made, a contempt petition was filed. It is only when in the contempt petition, the Apex Court gave liberty to avail the remedy before the High Court, the writ petition was filed. It is basically to seek compliance of the judgment dated 10.12.2009 in the case of the petitioner himself and that too when the law on the issue was settled by the High Court of Uttranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra), as upheld by the Apex Court. It was held that circle rate is minimum statutory market value.

    40. In view of the above, the writ petition cannot be dismissed, which is basically to seek compliance of the judgment dated 10.12.2009. Thus, the objections of the respondents against the maintainability of the writ petition is rejected.

    41. The question for our consideration now remains in regard to the determination of compensation and other reliefs prayed by the petitioner, which includes prayer for lapsing of the acquisition proceeding.

    42. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that compensation was not determined as per the direction of the High Court in petitioner's own writ petition, thus, award be treated as nullity so as to apply Section 24 of the Act, 2013. In our opinion, award cannot be treated nullity only for the reason that compensation has not been determined as per law rather in that case, the Court can appropriately determined the compensation, therefore, we are unable to accept the first argument for lapse of acquisition on that ground. For ready reference, Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is quoted hereunder:—

    “Section 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894-

    (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

    (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

    Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

    43. The provision aforesaid would not apply to the facts of this case when award was passed on 31.01.2011 and amount of compensation was deposited in the Court in the year 2017. The possession of the land was taken in the year 2005 itself. It is in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra).

    44. The lapse of the acquisition has been claimed even on the ground that award was passed beyond the period given under Section 11A of the Act, 1894. The argument aforesaid has been seriously contested by the respondents on the ground that after a notification under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Act, 1894, possession of the land was taken by the Government. The aforesaid has not been disputed by the petitioner also rather according to them, the possession of the land was taken on 25.02.2005 itself.

    45. In view of the notification under Section 17 and possession of the land, argument for lapsing of the acquisition for an award passed beyond a period prescribed under Section 11A cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra). The relevant para of the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) is quoted hereunder:—

    “136. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369, the concept of vesting under the 1894 Act had been taken into consideration. The Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48, once it has taken the possession. This Court has observed that once possession has been taken under Section 17(1), prior to the making of the award, the owner is divested of the title to the land, which is vested in the Government and there is no provision by which land can be reverted to the owner. This Court has observed thus : (SCC pp. 373-74, paras 14-15)

    “14. There are two judgments of this Court, which we must note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84 it was held that the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, (1970) 2 SCC 149 it was held that : (SCC p. 152, para 8)

    ‘8. … after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.’

    15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when the Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, the Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.”

    This Court further observed in Satendra Prasad Jain that even if compensation was not paid to the appellant under Section 17(3-A), it could not be said that possession was taken illegally. Vesting is absolute. This Court has observed thus : (SCC p. 375, para 17)

    “17. In the instant case, even that 80% of the estimated compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 27-6-1990 shows, failed to make the necessary monies available and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its possession was taken, to urge that the possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is under no obligation to make an award.”

    137. In Tika Ram v. State of U.P., (2009) 10 SCC 689 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 328, the question considered was in case possession is taken, and compensation is not paid, what is the effect? This Court has held that there is no lapse of acquisition and observed thus : (SCC pp. 736-37, paras 91-93 & 95)

    “91. However, the question is as to what happens when such payment is not made and the possession is taken. Can the whole acquisition be set at naught?

    92. In our opinion, this contention on the part of the appellants is also incorrect. If we find fault with the whole acquisition process on account of the non-payment of 80% of the compensation, then the further question would be as to whether the estimation of 80% of compensation is correct or not. A further controversy can then be raised by the landlords that what was paid was not 80% and was short of 80% and therefore, the acquisition should be set at naught. Such extreme interpretation cannot be afforded because indeed under Section 17 itself, the basic idea of avoiding the enquiry under Section 5-A is in view of the urgent need on the part of the State Government for the land to be acquired for any eventuality discovered by either sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act.

    93. The only question that would remain is that of the estimation of the compensation. In our considered view, even if the compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition would not suffer. One could imagine the unreasonableness of the situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would entail serious consequences.

    95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, a similar view was reported. That was a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The Court took the view that once the possession was taken under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdraw from that position under Section 18 and even the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted. That was of course a case where the award was not passed under Section 11-A after taking of the possession. A clear-cut observation came to be made in that behalf in para 12, to the effect that the non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. was approved. The Court also relied on the decision in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 where similar view was taken regarding the land acquisition proceedings not getting lapsed. The only result that may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest, as contemplated in Section 34 and the proviso added thereto by the 1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish to further refer the matter, as suggested by Shri Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel and Shri Qamar Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore, even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of any reference.”

    It has further been observed that the only result that may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest as contemplated in Section 34 of the 1894 Act.

    138. In Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1, this Court held that when the possession of land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A of passing the award within two years were not attracted. The proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed under Section 11-A, once possession had been taken. The part-payment of compensation would also not render the possession illegal. This Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 8-9, para 12)

    “12. The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 are somewhat similar to Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Just as publication of a notification under Section 52(1) vests the land in the State, free from all encumbrances, as provided by Section 52(4), similarly when possession of land is taken under Section 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. A question arose before this Court that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A and an award is not made in respect to the land so acquired, would the acquisition proceedings lapse. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. this Court held that once possession had been taken under Section 17(1) and the land vested in the Government then the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance with Section 17(3-A), regarding part payment of compensation before taking possession, would also not render the possession illegal and entitle the Government to withdraw from acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P. and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar. In view of the aforesaid ratio it follows that the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted in the present case and even if it be assumed that the award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the acquisition of land does not come to an end.”

    139. In Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, question was raised with respect to the lapse of acquisition proceedings in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A as award had not been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. Possession had been taken by the Government under Section 17(1). It was held that it was not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition. Provisions of Section 11-A was not attracted. Following is the relevant portion of the observations made by this Court : (SCC p. 37, para 8)

    “8. … It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the Act the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award under Section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. We are of the view that the above plea has no force. In this case, the Government had taken possession of the land in question under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a case, Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act.”

    141. In May George v. Tahsildar, (2010) 13 SCC 98 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 774, this Court considered the question to declare a provision mandatory, test is to be applied as to whether non-compliance of the provision could render entire proceedings invalid or not. This Court referred to various decisions (which are referred to in the footnote [Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 181 : 1952 Cri LJ 955; State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 773; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, AIR 1965 SC 895; State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, (1976) 2 SCC 895 : AIR 1975 SC 2190; Sharif-Ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone ., (1980) 1 SCC 403; Balwant Singh v. Anand Kumar Sharma, (2003) 3 SCC 433; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111; Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2004) 6 SCC 331 : AIR 2004 SC 2036; Rubber House v. Excelsior Needle Industries (P) Ltd. ., (1989) 2 SCC 413; B.S. Khurana v. MCD, (2000) 7 SCC 679; State of Haryana v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133; and Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 326] and summarised the position thus : (SCC pp. 105-06, paras 24-25 & 27)

    “24. In Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani, this Court while dealing with a similar issue held as under (SCC p. 719, para 17)

    ‘17. … The expression “may” used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnised according to the ceremonies indicated therein.’

    25. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be applied is as to whether non-compliance with the provision could render the entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. The issue is to be examined having regard to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provisions in question. The Court may find out as to what would be the consequence which would flow from construing it in one way or the other and as to whether the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions and as to whether the non-compliance is visited by small penalty or serious consequence would flow therefrom and as to whether a particular interpretation would defeat or frustrate the legislation and if the provision is mandatory, the act done in breach thereof will be invalid.

    27. In G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237, this Court has held that if a “person interested” is aggrieved by the fact that some other person has withdrawn the compensation of his land, he may resort to the procedure prescribed under the Act or agitate the dispute in suit for making the recovery of the award amount from such person.”

    142. This Court in May George opined, therefore, that once the land vests in the State, it cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. There is nothing in the 1894 Act to show that non-compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to any penalty.

    143. Now, coming back to the main issue, the legal fiction of lapsing [under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act] cannot be extended to denude title which has already vested in the beneficiaries of the acquisition corporation/local bodies, etc. and who, in turn, have also conveyed title and transferred the land to some other persons after development. In CST v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., (1961) 2 SCR 189 : AIR 1961 SC 1047 the Court has held that “a legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it has been created and cannot be extended beyond its legitimate field.” Similarly, in Braithwaite & Co. (India) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., (1968) 1 SCR 771 : AIR 1968 SC 413, this Court held that a legal fiction is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose only and there is no justification for extending it beyond the purpose for which the legislature has adopted. Lapsing is provided only where possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid, divesting of vested land is not intended nor specifically provided.”

    46. The question now remains in reference to the challenge of the award and prayer for determination of compensation as per law. The facts on record show that the writ petition preferred by the petitioner to challenge the notification under Sections 4, 6 and 17 was disposed of this Court by the judgment dated 10.12.2009. A direction was given to the Special Land Acquisition Officer to determine the compensation as per law laid down in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra). The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority preferred S.L.P. against the judgment dated 10.12.2009 wherein an interim order was passed by the Apex Court on 11.01.2011. In view of the interim order, Land Acquisition Officer did not determined the compensation as per the direction of this Court dated 10.12.2009 or the judgment in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra). The Land Acquisition Officer while passing the award was aware about the interim order and thereby, ignoring the direction in the writ petition of the petitioner himself, the compensation was determined. It is without referring to the circle rate under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 which is otherwise taken to be the minimum market value of the land. Thereby, the award determining the compensation cannot be accepted being not in compliance to the judgment dated 10.12.2009. It is more so when after the award, a special leave petition preferred by the NOIDA was dismissed by the Apex Court on 04.11.2015 and thereby, the judgment dated 10.12.2009 passed by this Court in the writ petition preferred by the petitioner became final.

    47. The last para of the award made it subject to the outcome of the appeal. Since the appeal preferred by the NOIDA was dismissed, the award should have been passed afresh by the respondents in compliance to the judgment dated 10.12.2009. A representation made by the petitioner for the aforesaid was yet rejected without application of mind. When award dated 31.01.2011 was made subject to final outcome of the appeal then it was obligatory on the part of the respondents to redetermine the compensation so as to make it as per the judgment of this Court dated 10.12.2009 in writ petition of the petitioner himself. The respondent No. 5 has produced circle rate of Sector 18 since 16.06.2004 at Annexure SCA-7 along with supplementary affidavit. It shows circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter. The allotment of land to the respondent No. 7 was prior to 16.04.2004. It was pursuant to lender notice issued in the year 2003. Learned counsel for the respondents however submits that aforesaid cannot be taken to be a rate for determination of the compensation for the reason that Corporation had incurred heavy amount for development which amount is required to be deducted.

    48. Learned counsel for the respondents have given reference of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas (supra) to substantiate their argument. It is submitted that if the determination of compensation by Land Acquisition Officer was without taking proper value of the land, let it be determined at the rate of Rs. 600/- per square meters which was the circle rate for the agricultural land.

    49. We find the argument aforesaid to be in contradiction to the written statement of the official respondents in the suit for permanent injunction.

    50. Respondents while contesting the suit preferred by the petitioner for permanent injunction raised a plea that land in dispute is situated in the centre of the developed land of the authority and to be used for commercial purpose thus, land is very valuable. It is also that the area in question was declared to be under industrial plan area by invoking Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. The relevant part of the written statement to the civil suit bearing No. 416 of 1998 is quoted hereunder:—

    51. The pleading of the respondent themselves not only shows that land in dispute would be used for the commercial purpose but it was otherwise declared to be industrial development plan area under Section 2 of the Act, 1976. Once the land is declared under industrial development plan area by invoking Section 2 of the Act, 1976, it cannot continue to be agricultural land. Accordingly, the compensation should have been determined by the respondents taking note of its use at the time of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1894. It is when the area in dispute was declared to be industrial development plan area and was otherwise used for commercial purpose. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that compensation is to be redetermined keeping in mind the facts given above.

    52. Learned counsel for the respondents have referred to the circle rate of the agricultural land in ignorance of the fact that by a notification dated 17.04.1976 issued under the Act, 1976, the area in question was declared under industrial development area. The notification was issued under Section 2 of the Act, 1976 much prior to the notification for acquisition of the land.

    53. Learned counsel for the petitioner, thus, made a reference of Section 17 of the Act, 1976 to show overriding effect of the Act. For ready reference, Section 17 of the Act, 1976 is quoted hereunder:—

    “17. Overriding effect of the Act. - Upon any area being declared an industrial development area under the provisions of this Act, such area, if included in the master plan or the zonal development plan under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, or any other development plan under any other Uttar Pradesh Act, with effect from the date of such declaration, be deemed to be excluded from any such plan.”

    54. As per Section 17 of the Act, 1976 on declaring any land under industrial development area, if included in the master plan or the zonal development plan under Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 or any development plan under any other Uttar Pradesh Act is deemed to be excluded from such plan. Since Section 17 is having overriding effect, thus on issuance of the notification, land came under industrial development plan. It is otherwise a fact that the market value of the land is to be determined keeping in mind Section 23 of the Act, 1894 and the judgment of the Apex Court referred by both the counsel for the parties.

    55. We find failure of the official respondents in determination of the amount of compensation despite specific direction of this Court in its judgment dated 10.12.2009. The perusal of the award dated 31.01.2011 shows it to be during the pendency of the SLP before the Apex Court and while interim order dated 11.01.2011 was operating against the judgment dated 10.12.2009 and thereby, the calculation of the compensation was not made in reference to the said judgment due to the interim order. A clear indication of it exists in the impugned award which was made subject to final outcome of the appeal. It was, thus, rightly urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that respondents should have determined the compensation afresh after dismissal of the SLP by the Apex Court upholding the judgment of this Court dated 10.12.2009 in the writ petition of the petitioner himself.

    56. It is to surprise that despite a detailed representation to pray determination of the compensation in the light of the judgment of the High Court of Uttranchal in the case of Bhopendra Singh (supra), respondents passed impugned order dated 18.01.2018 rejecting the representation of the petitioner.

    57. We find that the order dated 18.01.2018 has been passed in ignorance of the facts discussed above apart from the award dated 31.01.2011 which was made subject to final outcome of the SLP preferred by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA). The rejection of the representation of the petitioner shows sheer adamancy of the respondents, otherwise respondents should have redetermined the compensation in compliance of the judgment dated 10.12.2009. Accordingly, we find reason to set aside the order dated 18.01.2018 so as the computation of the compensation in the award dated 31.01.2011.

    58. At this stage, we would like to refer the judgment cited by both the parties in regard to the determination of the compensation.

    59. Learned counsel for the respondents have relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas (supra) as to show how market value of the land is to be determined. The market value of the land is to be determined after taking into consideration various factors given therein. It is not only proximity from the time angle but situation angle also. The balance sheet of plus and minus factor has to be drawn for that purpose. The size of the plot is also taken to be a relevant factor for determination of market value. If the proposition of law laid down in the case supra is applied, then circle rate of the area would be relevant. The deduction of the amount towards development can be made to get the market value of the land. The circle rate of the land was Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter since 16.04.2004. On deduction to the extent of 50% could have been made towards development to find out the market value of the land. The judgment referred by the respondents does not justify determination of compensation on a meagre rate of Rs. 181.87 per square meter which was not the circle rate of the land.

    60. The reference of the judgment in the case of Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (dead) by LRs v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 4 SCC 789 is given where same principles were laid down by the Apex Court for determination of the market value of land and for determination of compensation, as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas (supra). In that case, the land was submerged under water, thus, it was having no potential value and thereby the development was stopped but on the other hand, development began on the other side of River “Suki”. The sale of the land was found at the rate of Rs. 46.30/- per square meters. The Apex Court, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, determined the compensation at the rate of Rs. 160/- per square meter for larger plots and Rs. 175/- per square meter for smaller plots. Para 18 to 21 of the judgment in the case of Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (supra) are quoted herein:—

    “18. One of the principles for determination of the amount of compensation for acquisition of land would be the willingness of an informed buyer to offer the price therefor. It is beyond any cavil that the price of the land which a willing and informed buyer would offer would be different in the cases where the owner is in possession and enjoyment of the property and in the cases where he is not.

    19. Market value is ordinarily the price the property may fetch in the open market if sold by a willing seller unaffected by the special needs of a particular purchase. Where definite material is not forthcoming either in the shape of sales of similar lands in the neighbourhood at or about the date of notification under Section 4(1) or otherwise, other sale instances as well as other evidences have to be considered.

    20. The amount of compensation cannot be ascertained with mathematical accuracy. A comparable instance has to be identified having regard to the proximity from time angle as well as proximity from situation angle. For determining the market value of the land under acquisition, suitable adjustment has to be made having regard to various positive and negative factors vis-à-vis the land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. The positive and negative factors are as under:

    Positive factors (i) smallness of size (ii) proximity to a road (iii) frontage on a road (iv) nearness to developed area (v) regular shape (vi) level vis-à-vis land under (vii) special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage” Negative factors (i) largeness of area (ii) situation in the interior at a distance from the road (iii) narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth (iv) lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up (v) remoteness from developed locality (vi) some special acquisition disadvantageous factors which would deter a purchaser

    21. Whereas a smaller plot may be within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed preparing a layout plan, carving out roads, leaving open spaces, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers and the hazards of an entrepreneur. Such development charges may range between 20% and 50% of the total price.

    61. In the said judgment, the deduction towards development of the area ranging 20% to 50% was permitted with variation of the rate between larger and smaller plots between 25% to 33%.

    62. A further reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board v. K.S. Gangadharappa, (2009) 11 SCC 164 would be relevant. The Apex Court after taking into consideration Sections 23 to 25 of the Repeal Act of 1894 lay down the principle for determination of market value of land. Para 8 of the judgment is quoted herein for ready reference:—

    8. “16. ‘6. Where [a] large area is the subject-matter of acquisition, rate at which small plots are sold cannot be said to be a safe criterion. Reference in this context may be made to three decisions of this Court in Collector of Lakhimpur v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta [(1972) 4 SCC 236 : AIR 1971 SC 2015], Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of M.P. [(1977) 1 SCC 684 : AIR 1977 SC 1560] and Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer [(1984) 2 SCC 324 : AIR 1984 SC 892].

    7. It cannot, however, be laid down as an absolute proposition that the rates fixed for the small plots cannot be the basis for fixation of the rate. For example, where there is no other material it may in appropriate cases be open to the adjudicating court to make comparison of the prices paid for small plots of land. However, in such cases necessary deductions/adjustments have to be made while determining the prices.

    8. In Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust, Bhopal . [(1989) 2 SCC 329 : (1989) 1 SVLR (C) 399], in a case under the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trusts Act, 1960 this Court held that the rates paid for small parcels of land do not provide a useful guide for determining the market value of the land acquired. While determining the market value of the land acquired, it has to be correctly determined and paid so that there is neither unjust enrichment on the part of the acquirer nor undue deprivation on the part of the owner. It is an accepted principle as laid down in Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divl. Officer [AIR 1939 PC 98] that the compensation must be determined by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from the willing purchaser. While considering the market value disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy it must alike be disregarded; neither must be considered as acting under any compulsion. The value of the land is not to be estimated as its value to the purchaser. But similarly this does not mean that the fact that some particular purchaser might desire the land more than others is to be disregarded. The wish of a particular purchaser, though not his compulsion may always be taken into consideration for what it is worth. Section 23 of the Act enumerates the matters to be considered in determining compensation. The first criterion to be taken into consideration is the market value of the land on the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Similarly, Section 24 of the Act enumerates the matters which the court shall not take into consideration in determining the compensation. A safeguard is provided in Section 25 of the Act that the amount of compensation to be awarded by the court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. Value of the potentiality is to be determined on such materials as are available and without indulgence in any fits of imagination. Impracticability of determining the potential value is writ large in almost all cases. There is bound to be some amount of guesswork involved while determining the potentiality.

    9. It can be broadly stated that the element of speculation is reduced to minimum if the underlying principles of fixation of market value with reference to comparable sales are made:

    (i) when sale is within a reasonable time of the date of notification under Section 4(1);

    (ii) it should be a bona fide transaction;

    (iii) it should be of the land acquired or of the land adjacent to the land acquired; and

    (iv) it should possess similar advantages.

    10. It is only when these factors are present, it can merit a consideration as a comparable case. (see Special Land Acquisition Officer v. T. Adinarayan Setty [AIR 1959 SC 429]).’

    These aspects have been highlighted in Ravinder Narain v. Union of India [(2003) 4 SCC 481], SCC pp. 483-84, paras 6-10.

    17. The deduction to be made towards development charges cannot be proved in any straitjacket formula. It would depend upon the facts of each case.” [Ed. : As observed in Lucknow Development Authority v. Krishna Gopal Lahoti, (2008) 1 SCC 554, pp. 557-58, paras 16-17.]”

    63. A perusal of para 8 shows reference of judgment of Apex Court reported in AIR 1939 PC 98 wherein market value was taken at the price on which willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from the willing purchaser. A reference to Section 23 to 25 of the Repeal Act of 1894 has been given and if the principle laid down by the Apex Court therein is applied, the market value of the land should have been determined taking note of the circle rate for the land in question. A perusal of the letter of allotment in favour of respondent No. 7 dated 12.04.2004 shows it to be in Sector-18 of District Ghaziabad. The circle rate for each sector was determined prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. The respondents were expected to take into account the circle rate of the land in question and thereupon to make reasonable deductions towards the development which may be between 20% and 50% as per the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (supra).

    64. If the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment cited above is applied, then determination of compensation should have been made after taking the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter of the land in question and thereupon to make deduction towards the development. The development charges can be maximum to the extent of 50% of it and accordingly respondents should have taken Rs. 55,000/- per square meter to be the market value of the land.

    65. The official respondents while doing it could have noticed that the land was allotted to respondent No. 7 one and half years back prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. It was by the allotment letter dated 12.04.2004. The circle rate was determined thereupon on 16.04.2004. The allotment of land to the respondent No. 7 was 8 times bigger than the land of the petitioner and it was one and half years back. While applying the judgment of the Apex Court, the market value should have been taken @ Rs. 55,000/- per square meter. However, due to the interim order of the Apex Court dated 11.01.2011 against the judgment dated 10.12.2009, the respondents did not determine the compensation as per the direction given by this Court.

    66. It is also that despite the award made subject to final outcome of the S.L.P., the amount of compensation was not re-determined even after dismissal of the S.L.P. filed by the NOIDA. The compensation determined on the meagre price was endorsed on 08.01.2018.

    67. The challenge to the acquisition and determination of compensation is otherwise pending consideration before the Apex Court in a petition filed by Hari Singh of neighbouring Khasra No. 424 acquired pursuant to the same notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. A direction was given by the Apex Court to D.L.F. Universal Limited to settle the matter, however, no settlement could arrive and the matter is pending consideration before the Apex Cour.

    68. The fact aforesaid has been narrated to show pendency of the litigation in regard to the same acquisition even before the Apex Court.

    69. Accordingly, we find reasons to cause interference in the award dated 31.01.2011 and direct the respondents to determine the compensation as under:—

    (1) The respondents are directed to take into consideration the circle rate of Sector-18 since 16.04.2004 given in Annexure-7 of supplementary counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 5. It was Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter for Sector-18.

    (2) After making 50% deduction towards the development charges, it would come to Rs. 55,000/- per square meter and accordingly the compensation would be determined on the aforesaid rate for the land measuring 2.18 bighas.

    (3) The addition of solacium of 30% would be made thereupon. The amount arrived as per the direction in paras (1) and (2) would be payable with interest @ 9% per annum for one year from the date of possession i.e. February, 2005 and thereupon 15% per annum as per the Proviso to Section 34 of the Act of 1894.

    (4) The amount deposited in the year 2017 would earn interest @ 15% only till it was deposited. The amount so deposited would be paid to the petitioner with the interest earned on it.

    (5) The amount of compensation would be paid thereupon to the petitioner.

    70. The order dated 08.01.2018 is set aside. The respondents are directed to carry out the directions given above within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

    71. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid.

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