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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2021 INSC 91
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 105, Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 105 of the Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 106 of the Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 106, Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2021 INSC 91
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 105, Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 105 of the Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 106 of the Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 106, Constitution Bench judgment
  • Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Anju, whose husband had died due to alcoholism, was living with her two minor children—Vijay Kumar alias Bittu (4 years) and Muskan (2 years). The appellant-accused, her neighbour, enticed her to move with him to Punjab. He frequently expressed dislike toward the children, beat them, and once fractured Vijay’s arm. On 18-3-2013, while Anju was at a temple, the appellant administered celphos (aluminium phosphide insecticide) to the sleeping children. Upon Anju’s return, the appellant stated he had poisoned them and left. The children were rushed to the Civil Hospital, Mandi Gobindgarh, where they were declared dead.

An FIR was registered and, after investigation, the appellant was charged under Section 302 IPC. Initially pleading guilty, he later retracted. The Trial Court (1-7-2013) convicted him and imposed “imprisonment for life, meaning the remainder of natural life” plus a fine of Rs 5,000. The Punjab & Haryana High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on 13-12-2018 (2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6942). The present appeal challenges both findings in the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant was deprived of a fair opportunity to cross-examine key prosecution witnesses (PWs 1 and 2) in violation of Section 230 CrPC.
  2. Whether a Trial Court is competent to impose a sentence of life imprisonment “for the remainder of natural life,” or whether such a modified sentence can be pronounced only by a High Court or the Supreme Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • PWs 1 and 2 were examined on the very day charges were framed (29-4-2013) without giving the appellant a reasonable chance to cross-examine them, rendering the trial unfair.
  • The Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence of life imprisonment till the end of natural life; under Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1, only High Courts or the Supreme Court may impose such a special category sentence.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The record (Annexures P-2 and P-3) shows the appellant’s counsel did cross-examine PWs 1 and 2 on 29-4-2013; the fairness objection is therefore baseless and raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.
  • Even if the Trial Court’s power to specify “remainder of natural life” is questioned, the Supreme Court itself can affirm or impose that sentence given the brutality of the crime.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1 Only High Courts and the Supreme Court may impose a modified life sentence that extends to the convict’s natural life. Appellant relied on it to challenge the Trial Court’s sentence; the Supreme Court used its own power to confirm the same sentence.
Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008) 13 SCC 767 Recognised a “special category” sentence: life imprisonment beyond 14 years without remission as an alternative to the death penalty. Cited within Sriharan to reaffirm the validity of such special category sentences.
Sangeet v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452 Earlier view questioning the legality of sentences that deprive remission. Explicitly overruled in Sriharan; referenced to support the prevailing position allowing special category life sentences.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the counter-affidavit and record extracts. It noted that after pleading guilty, the appellant’s counsel had cross-examined PWs 1 and 2 on 29-4-2013. The appellant later opted for a full trial on 14-5-2013 but never moved to recall the witnesses; hence, the alleged denial of cross-examination lacked factual basis.

Regarding sentencing, the Court acknowledged that, under Sriharan, the power to impose a “remainder of natural life” sentence resides in constitutional courts. Although the Trial Court technically exceeded its authority, the Supreme Court found the crime—poisoning two defenceless toddlers for personal convenience—exceptionally heinous. Exercising its own jurisdiction, it chose to confirm the same sentence rather than remit for re-sentencing, thereby curing the procedural irregularity.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The conviction under Section 302 IPC is affirmed, and the sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant’s natural life is confirmed.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that while subordinate courts may not craft special-category life sentences, the Supreme Court can step in to validate and confirm such punishment when the facts justify it. No new legal principle is announced, but the judgment underscores the Court’s willingness to uphold exceptionally severe sentences for brutal crimes involving vulnerable victims.

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    Gauri Shankar v. State Of Punjab .

    Ajay Rastogi, J.— Leave granted. The sole appellant-accused faced trial for committing the murder of two minor children aged 4 years and 2 years in brutal manner by administering celphos to them. After being convicted by the learned trial Judge for the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 by judgment dated 1-7-2013 and confirmed by the High Court on appeal preferred at his instance being dismissed by judgment impugned dated 13-12-2018 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6942, the appellant has preferred this appeal.

    2. The case of the prosecution was that complainant Anju was married with Ajay Kumar, s/o Sajjan Singh and from this wedlock, she had two children, namely, Vijay Kumar alias Bittu aged 4 years and Muskan aged 2 years. Ajay Kumar was addicted to liquor and because of intoxicants, he died. The appellant-accused was residing on rent in the neighbourhood of complainant Anju. The appellant-accused allegedly enticed Anju and brought her with her two children to Punjab where the fateful incident took place. The appellant used to quarrel with Anju and frequently beat the children and used to proclaim that he did not like the children as they were not his own and that some day he would kill both of them. About a month and half before the incident, he had fractured the arm of Vijay alias Bittu, deceased son of Anju.

    3. On the fateful day of 18-3-2013, at about 7.30 a.m., Anju went to the temple for prayers. At that time, the children were sleeping in the house and the appellant-accused was present. When Anju returned from the temple, she saw both her children lying on the cot struggling for life. The appellant-accused went away telling the complainant Anju that he had given poison to both the children. The complainant Anju raised alarm and with the assistance of Jagdev Singh, PW 2, the landlord and his nephew Kamaldeep Singh, PW 3, both the children were taken to Civil Hospital, Mandi, Gobindgarh, where they were declared dead. On intimation to the police, statement of the complainant Anju was recorded and FIR was registered. The bodies were sent for post-mortem examination. The viscera was sent for chemical examination. After completion of investigation, challan was presented in the Court.

    4. Initially, the appellant pleaded guilty and did not claim trial. He admitted that he administered poison to the children as a result of which the children died within 15-20 minutes. However, after the examination of the complainant Anju (PW 1) and the landlord Jagdev Singh (PW 2), he moved an application dated 14-5-2013 stating that he had no concern with the crime and that he had been misled by the government counsel to make a wrong statement admitting his guilt.

    5. The prosecution examined number of witnesses including Anju PW 1, the complainant, whose both children were murdered by the appellant-accused. The statement of PW 1 Anju was duly supported by PW 2 Jagdev Singh and PW 3 Kamaldeep Singh who are the landlord and his nephew where the complainant Anju along with the appellant-accused were residing at the time of the incident.

    6. Apart from other prosecution witnesses duly supported by the Histopathology Reports, Exts. P-8 and P-9, the cause of death in case of both the children was found to be aluminium phosphide insecticide ingestion. The statement of the appellant-accused was recorded under Section 313 CrPC where he denied having committed the crime, but did not lead any evidence in defence.

    7. The learned trial Judge finally held the appellant guilty of an offence under Section 302 IPC and punished him with imprisonment for life which would mean remainder of natural life and fine of Rs 5000 by judgment dated 1-7-2013.

    8. On the appeal being preferred by the appellant, the High Court revisited the record in totality and confirmed the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial Judge by judgment dated 13-12-2018 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6942 which is impugned before us in the instant appeal.

    9. At the motion stage when the matter came up before this Court on 20-2-2020 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1120, the plea which was raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that on the date of framing of charges i.e. 29-4-2013, the statement of material prosecution witnesses PW 1 and PW 2 was recorded without affording reasonable opportunity to the appellant-accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses as mandated under Section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. After the notice was served, counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent and the fact noticed by us in our order dated 20-2-2020 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1120 has been explained in Para 13 of the counter-affidavit that after framing of charges, the appellant pleaded guilty, however following the rule of prudence, the trial court decided to examine four witnesses before recording the conviction, and accordingly PW 1 and PW 2 were examined first and perusal of their statements i.e. Annexure P-2 and Annexure P-3 would show that the opportunity was granted to the appellant-accused to cross-examine the witnesses on 29-4-2013 and in fact cross-examination was done by the counsel for the appellant-accused. However, after cross-examination of these two witnesses, the appellant pleaded to claim trial on 14-5-2013 and thereafter the evidence of other prosecution witnesses was recorded. At no stage, the appellant moved any application for recalling the witnesses and to be more specific, of PW 1 and PW 2 and this issue has been raised for the first time before this Court.

    10. After taking note of the statement of fact which has been stated by the respondent in the counter-affidavit and Para 13 in particular, of which the reference has been made and with assistance of the learned counsel, we have gone through the material available on record and find no error in the finding of guilt being recorded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court in the impugned judgment 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6942 which calls for our interference.

    11. The learned counsel for the appellant at this stage submitted that while convicting the appellant-accused for offence under Section 302 IPC, he has been sentenced with imprisonment for life which would mean a remainder of natural life which was not in the domain of the trial court, and this could have been exercised only by the High Court or by this Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on paras 105 and 106 of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1, which is extracted hereunder:

    “105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court.
    106. Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008) 13 SCC 767 that a special category of sentence; instead of death; for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452 that the deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law and we specifically overrule the same.”

    12. Taking assistance thereof, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that at least judgment of the trial court in imposing punishment of life imprisonment to the remainder of natural life needs to be interfered by this Court.

    13. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that imprisonment for life could indeed be imposed by the learned trial Judge and since this question was not raised by the appellant before the High Court and has been raised for the first time before this Court, it can be considered as to whether for such a heinous crime which the appellant has committed, at least this Court may exercise its power and approve the sentence which has been imposed taking note of what has been observed by this Court in the judgment referred to supra.

    14. We find substance in what is being urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, and after the accused has been held guilty for offence under Section 302 IPC, and sentenced to imprisonment for life could indeed be imposed by the learned trial Judge under its judgment dated 1-7-2013.

    15. On the legal principles, the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be correct, but we have taken note of the prosecution case in totality with motive of the crime that he was living in a relationship with the complainant Anju who had two children from the previous marriage, and had taken away the life of two minor innocent children at the very threshold of their life and murdered in a brutal manner by administering celphos to them has been established. It is true that the punishment of remainder of natural life could not have been imposed by the learned trial Judge but after looking into the entire case, we consider it appropriate to confirm the sentence of imprisonment for life to mean the remainder of natural life while upholding the conviction under Section 302 IPC.

    16. Consequently, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

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    Comments

    Gauri Shankar v. State Of Punjab .
    (Feb 16, 2021)