Rohit B. Deo, J. - The issue involved in both the civil revision applications is common, and the civil revision applications are finally heard at the admission stage with the consent of the parties and are decided by this common judgment.

2. Civil Revision Application 60/2018 emanates from Regular Civil Suit 70/2016 instituted by the legal heirs of deceased Bala Gore seeking decree of declaration and permanent injunction. The declaration sought is that the sale deed dated 01.12.2009 executed by deceased Bala Gore in favour of defendant 1 Sandeep Dakhare and defendant 2 Subhash Chimnaji Gore is illegal, sham, bogus and vitiated by fraud and that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit property. Consequential reliefs are sought, to which a reference shall be made at a later stage. The defendant 1 Sandeep Dakhare preferred an application for rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) contending that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in view of the provisions of section 26 of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). This application is rejected by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Rajura by order dated 31.01.2018.

3. Civil Revision Application 61/2018 assails the order dated 31.01.2018 rendered by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Rajura in Regular Civil Suit 80/2016 in which suit the defendants 15, 16, 17 and 18 preferred an application for rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code on the ground that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in view of the provisions of section 26 of the Act. Regular Civil Suit 80/2016 is instituted by Smt. Manda Arjun Pode, the daughter of deceased Chimanji Gore seeking decree of partition and cancellation of the sale deed, gift deed, partition deed and will executed qua the suit property.

4. The short submission of Shri A.P. Satpute, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant is that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in view of the provisions of section 26 of the Act.

5. Section 26 of the Act reads thus:

26. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Central Government or the competent authority or any other person is empowered by or under this Act to determine.

6. The statutory scheme would indicate that the ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not absolute. The ouster is restricted to a matter which the Central Government or the competent authority or any other person is empowered by or under the Act to determine.

7. In Ramesh Gobindram vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf reported in, (2010) 8 SCC 726 the Apex Court observes:

12. The well settled rule in this regard is that the civil courts have the jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those entertainment whereof is expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of civil courts to try suits of civil nature is very expansive. Any statue which excludes such jurisdiction is, therefore, an exception to the general rule that all disputes shall be triable by a civil court. Any such exception cannot be readily inferred by the courts. The court would lean in favour of a construction that would uphold the retention of jurisdiction of the civil courts and shift the onus of proof to the party that asserts that civil court's jurisdiction is ousted.

13. Even in cases where the statute accords finality to the orders passed by the Tribunals, the court will have to see whether the Tribunal has the power to grant the reliefs which the civil courts would normally grant in suits filed before them. If the answer is in negative, exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction would not be ordinarily inferred. In Rajasthan SRTC vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa, a three Judge Bench of this Court observed:"

There is a presumption that a civil court has jurisdiction. Ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where the jurisdiction of a civil court is sought to be barred under a statute, the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction in respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or tribunal acts without jurisdiction."

8. In the light of the observations in Ramesh Gobindram vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf it would be necessary to consider the pleadings in Regular Civil Suit 70/2016 and Regular Civil Suit 80/2016.

In Regular Civil Suit 70/2016 the legal heirs of deceased Bala Gore have inter alia sought the following reliefs:

i) Declare that sale deed dated 01.12.2009 executed by Late Shri Bala Gore in favour of defendant nos. 1 & 2 is illegal, false, sham, bogus and obtained by fraud;

ii) Declare that the plaintiff's are the owner of suit field and direct the defendant no.1 & 2 to handover actual physical possession of the suit property to the plaintiff's;

iii) Permanently restrain the defendant nos. 3 & 4 from giving the job / employment to the defendant no. 1 on the basis of fraudulent sale deed or compensation of defendant no. 2;

iv) Hon'ble Court may direct the defendant nos. 3 & 4 to take disciplinary action and also start the departmental enquiry and may pass any appropriate order against defendant no. 2 for playing fraud upon WCL Authorities as the defendant no. 2 is in service of WCL;

v) Permanently restrain defendant nos. 1 & 2 from transferring, alienating, mortgaging, creating charge, lien etc., creating any third party interest over the suit property by any other person by any other means;

vi) By appropriate orders, direct the defendant no. 3 & 4 to pay the compensation along with interest to the plaintiffs only being the legal heirs of Late Shri Bala Gore, original owner of the suit property which is particularly mentioned in the schedule which is part and parcel of this plaint;

vii) Saddle the cost of the suit upon the defendant nos. 1 & 2;

viii) Grant any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances and also in the interest of justice.

It is inter alia pleaded that the suit property bearing survey 443 admeasuring 0.81 HR is an ancestral property which could not have been alienated by deceased Bala Chimnaji Gore. The sale deed dated 01.12.2009 is executed by plaintiff 2 Ms. Pratiksha Gore who was then a minor through her natural guardian deceased Bala Gore. The averment in the plaint is that plaintiff 2 Pratiksha Gore, plaintiff 3 Nandini Gore and plaintiff 4 Sagar Gore are minors as on the date of the institution of the suit. The sale deed is challenged on several grounds, one of which is that the share of the minor in the ancestral property could not have been alienated by Bala Gore in the absence of legal necessity. It is further contended that in the absence of permission of the District Judge under section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority Guardianship Act, 1956 the sale deed is void and is at any rate voidable at the option of the minor children. It is further averred that the sale deed is a nominal document. It would not be necessary to make elaborate reference to the plaint averments and suffice it to say that the issues involved touch important civil and property rights of the parties.

9. Regular Civil Suit 80/2016 is instituted by Smt. Manda Arjun Pode, who appears to be the sister of Bala Gore whose legal heirs are the plaintiffs in Regular Civil Suit 70/2016 Smt. Manda Arjun Pode is seeking partition of the properties which according to her were owned by deceased Chimna Gore. The plaintiff Smt. Manda Arjun Pode is further seeking declaration that certain documents executed in respect of the suit property are illegal and indeed void.

10. It does not appear to be in dispute that the suit property in Regular Civil Suit 70/2016, which property appears to be one of the property which is the subject matter of Regular Civil Suit 80/2016 is acquired and therefore, one of the reliefs claimed touches the compensation payable under the Act. The seminal issue is whether, in view of the fact that a relief as regards the compensation for acquisition of land is claimed in the suit, whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is necessarily ousted. The answer must be an emphatic no.

11. The object of the Act is to establish in the economic interest of India greater public control over the coal mining industry and its development by providing for the acquisition by the State of un-worked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of rights in or over such land, for the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith.

12. Section 2(a) defines competent authority to mean any person appointed to be a competent authority under section 3. Subsection (f) defines Tribunal to mean the Tribunal constituted under section 14. Section 4 provides for preliminary notification giving notice of the intention of the Central Government to prospect for coal. Section 5 provides for the effect of notification on prospecting licences and mining leases. Section 6 provides that whenever any action of the nature described in subsection (3) of section 4 is to be taken, the competent authority shall, before or at the time such action is taken, pay or tender payment for all necessary damage which is likely to be caused, and in case of dispute as to the sufficiency of the amount so paid or tendered or as to the person to whom it should be paid or tendered, the dispute may be referred to the decision of the Central Government which decision shall be final. Section 7 deals with power to acquire land or rights in or over land notified under section 4, section 8 provides for objections to the acquisition and section 9 provides for declaration of acquisition. Section 10 provides for vesting of land or rights in the Central Government. The power to take possession of land acquired is conferred on the competent authority by virtue of the provisions of section 12.

In the context of the controversy section 14 is relevant and is therefore, reproduced verbatim:

14. (1) Where the amount of any compensation payable under this Act can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.

(2) Where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government shall constitute a Tribunal consisting of a person who is or has been or is qualified to be a judge of a High Court for the purpose of determining the amount.

(3) The Central Government may in any particular case nominate a person having expert knowledge in mining to assist the Tribunal, and where such nomination is made, the person or persons interested may also nominate any other person for the same purpose.

(4) At the commencement of the proceedings before the Tribunal the Central Government and the person interested shall state what in their respective opinions is a fair amount of compensation.

(5) The Tribunal shall after hearing the dispute, make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just, and specify the person or persons to whom the compensation shall be paid; and in making the award the Tribunal shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and to the foregoing provisions of this Act with respect to the manner in which the amount of compensation shall be determined in so far as the said provisions or any of them may be applicable.

(6) Where there is a dispute as to the person or persons entitled to compensation and the Tribunal finds that more persons than one are entitled to compensation, it shall apportion the amount thereof among such persons and in such manner as it thinks fit.

 

(7) Nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940, shall apply to any proceedings under this section.

[(8) The Tribunal, in the proceedings before it, shall have all the powers which a civil court has while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely:-

(i) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(ii) requiring the discovery and production of any document;

(iii) reception of evidence on affidavits;

(iv) requisitioning any public record from any court or office; and

(v) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses.]

Section 17 deals with payment of compensation and reads thus:

17. (1) Any compensation payable under this Act may be tendered or paid to the persons interested entitled thereto, and the Central Government shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in subsection (2).

(2) If the persons interested entitled thereto shall not consent to receive it or if there be any dispute as to the sufficiency of the amount of compensation or the title to receive it or the apportionment thereof, the Central Government shall deposit the amount of compensation with the Tribunal:

Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:

[Provided further that every person who claims to be an interested person (whether such person has been admitted to be interested or not) including the person referred to in the preceding proviso shall be entitled to prefer a claim for compensation before the Tribunal:

Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to prefer any such claim before the Tribunal.]

(3) When the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited as required by this section, the Central Government shall be liable to pay interest thereon at the rate of five per centum per annum from the time the compensation became due until it shall have been so paid or deposited.

Section 20 provides for appeal and section 26, which is reproduced supra is the ouster clause.

13. The scheme of section 14 is that if the amount of compensation payable is fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with the agreement and only if such agreement is not reached then the Central Government shall constitute a Tribunal for the purpose of determining the amount. Section 17(1) refers to the compensation payable under the Act. The reference is to the compensation agreed or to the compensation determined by the Tribunal. It is difficult to accept the submission that conjoint reading of sections 14 and 17 of the Act, manifests the legislative intent that the Tribunal is empowered to decide the title disputes.

14. The competing claims to compensation or disputes touching the apportionment of the compensation may be prima facie considered by the Tribunal and the compensation may be apportioned between persons known or believed to be interested in the land. However, the final determination of the rights of persons interested, where the rights are dependent on the validity or otherwise of the document of title or where the determination involves decision on important civil and property rights, must necessarily be that of the civil court.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the following observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. G.H. Grant vs. The State of Bihar reported in, AIR 1966 SC 237.

"In determining the amount of compensation, which may be offered, he has, it is true, to apportion the amount of compensation between the persons known or believed to be interested in the land of whom or of whose claims, he has information whether or not they have appeared before him. But the scheme of apportionment by the Collector does not finally determine the rights of the persons interested in the amount of compensation; the award is only conclusive between the Collector and the persons interested and not among the persons interested. The Collector has no power to finally adjudicate upon the title to compensation, that dispute has to be decided either in a reference under Section 18 or under Section 30 or in a separate suit. Payment of compensation, therefore, under Section 31, to the person declared by the award to be entitled thereto discharges the State or its liability to pay compensation (subject to any modification by the Court), leaving it open to the claimant to compensation to agitate his right in a reference under Section 30 or by a separate suit." (emphasis supplied)

16. It is well settled that a provision ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed. The jurisdiction of the civil court under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is expansive and takes within its sweep every suit of a civil nature except a suit of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A provision which purports to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court must be strictly construed. Section 26 of the Act, construed thus, would bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance only of those matters which are necessarily to be decided by the authorities or the Tribunal under the Act.

17. In the case at hand, the civil suits seek to establish title. The civil suits do not question the acquisition nor do they question the quantum of compensation. The entitlement to the compensation would follow the decision on title. However, this Court has no hesitation in holding that dispute touching the title to the property acquired cannot be finally determined by the Tribunal constituted under section 14 of the Act. The jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the issues of title to the property acquired is not ousted. The orders impugned do not suffer from any infirmity. The civil revisions applications are dismissed with no order as to costs.