Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.8. Order 33
  • Order 33 Rule 5(a) of the Code.
  • Clause (a) of Order 33 Rule 5
  • Order 33 Rule 1 of the CPC,
  • person.22. Order 33 Rule 2
  • Rules 2 and 3. Sub rule (b)
  • IOP.21. Order 33 Rule 5
  • Order 33 Rule 1 CPC
  • Rule 1 Order 33,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.8. Order 33
  • Order 33 Rule 5(a) of the Code.
  • Clause (a) of Order 33 Rule 5
  • Order 33 Rule 1 of the CPC,
  • person.22. Order 33 Rule 2
  • Rules 2 and 3. Sub rule (b)
  • IOP.21. Order 33 Rule 5
  • Order 33 Rule 1 CPC
  • Rule 1 Order 33,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Annie John, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the order dated 18.3.2016 in I.O.P.1/2015 on the file of the Sub Court, Ernakulam. The appellant in this appeal is the plaintiff in that I.O.P. The appellant filed a suit seeking declaration of title over certain suit properties and a declaration that Document Nos.1378/2013 and 2925/2013 of the SRO, Thrikkakara, executed in the names of respondents 2 and 3, are nominal documents given as security for loans advanced to the appellant by the first respondent.

The plaint was valued at Rs.75,00,000/- and the court fee was calculated at Rs.7,78,192/-. The appellant claimed she had insufficient means to pay the court fee and invoked Order 33 Rule 1 CPC to sue as an indigent person (in forma pauperis). At the trial the appellant was examined as PW1 and the respondent as RW1; Exts.B1 to B4 were marked. The appellant admitted in evidence that she had received Rs.42,00,000/- as sale consideration from the respondents and sought reliefs including a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining eviction and a decree fixing a liability (the plaint also mentions a figure of Rs.17,67,397/- with interest).

The Sub Court rejected the appellant's petition to proceed as an indigent person under Order 33 Rule 1 CPC. The present appeal challenges that rejection. The final disposition in this opinion is dismissal of the appeal and closure of pending interlocutory applications.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant is "not possessed of sufficient means" — i.e., whether she lacked sufficient means to pay the court fee of Rs.7,78,192/— so as to be permitted to sue under Order 33 Rule 1 CPC.
  2. Whether the appellant complied with the disclosure requirements under Order 33 (in particular Rule 2) and whether non‑disclosure of assets or sale proceeds justified rejection of the application under Order 33 Rule 5.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted she had no job or independent income and that her only property was the suit property and movables listed in the I.O.P.
  • Counsel argued that the first respondent was merely a money‑lender and that the impugned documents were securities executed in favour of respondents 2 and 3; reconveyance had been demanded when respondents asserted title.
  • The appellant maintained she had insufficient means to pay the calculated court fee and relied on her oral evidence about expenditures (for example, amounts spent for a daughter's marriage and repayment of loans) to explain the sale consideration she admitted receiving.
  • The appellant disputed that she was currently employed by or held shares in "Carmel Kuries", asserting resignation and prior transfer of shares (though documentary proof was limited).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended the I.O.P. was not maintainable on facts or law because the appellant had sufficient assets and funds.
  • They pointed to earlier transactions: the appellant originally owned about 21.79 cents in Vazhakkala; portions had been sold in 2006 and 2013; an agreement for sale dated 13.5.2013 and a sale deed for a total consideration of Rs.40,00,000/- were produced.
  • The respondents argued the appellant had received and retained sale consideration (admitted by the appellant as Rs.42,00,000/-) and also received rent from a tenant; she continued occupying the ground floor on a rental arrangement and had not vacated despite expiry of tenancy, leading respondents 2 and 3 to file O.S.282/2015 for recovery of possession.
  • The respondents emphasized evidence that the appellant held shares in "Carmel Kuries" (approximately 2,147 remaining shares according to respondents' counsel) and that her husband is a practising lawyer — factors relevant to assessing her means.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sebastian Karukapkarambil v. J.M.J. Silverstar and others (2017 (1) KHC 684) That it must be proved the plaintiff has no independent income or properties from which he can derive income to pay the requisite court fee and has not disposed of any property within two months of filing the petition to claim the benefit; also that there was a cause of action to file the suit. The court applied this standard to require the appellant to show absence of independent income or property and to consider recent dispositions of property; the court found the appellant had not met that requirement.
Mathai M. Paikeday v. C.K. Antony [(2011) 13 SCC 174] Definition of 'indigent': payment of fees would deprive one of basic living expenses or substantially impair pursuit of a court remedy; factors to consider include employment, income, unencumbered assets, indebtedness, financial help from others and combined household assets where parties function as a single economic unit. The court relied on this definition and the enumerated factors (including the appellant's employment history, assets, bank deposits and her husband being a practising lawyer) in assessing whether the appellant was indigent.
Manjulata v. Sidhkaran (2005 KHC 5996) Reiteration that "not possessed of sufficient means" in Explanation 1 to Order 33 Rule 1 CPC refers to capacity to raise money to pay the prescribed court fee, not mere possession of property. The court used this principle to focus on the appellant's capacity to raise the court fee (including sale proceeds and other assets) rather than only formal ownership of property.
Mathew v. State of Kerala (1996 (2) KLT 363) Where an applicant does not disclose an asset in the application, the application is liable to be rejected under Rule 1 of Order 33 and Order 33 Rule 5(a). The court applied this principle to the appellant's failure to disclose receipt and possession of sale consideration and bank account details, treating nondisclosure as a ground for rejection under Order 33 Rule 5.
Dr. D. Hemachandra Sagar and another v. D. Prithviraj and another (2004 KHC 3808) Applicants must make a full and true disclosure of all assets and resources in applications to sue as an indigent person; if disclosures are untrue or unreliable the application must be dismissed. The court found that the appellant had suppressed material facts and made unreliable disclosures; this failure to make full and true disclosure was treated as fatal to her claim to proceed as an indigent person.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by identifying Order 33 CPC as an enabling provision that allows an indigent person to file a suit without paying court fee initially, with the intention of assisting poor litigants. The central legal benchmark is whether the petitioner is truly "not possessed of sufficient means" — which the court interpreted in line with the cited precedents as the plaintiff's capacity to raise money to pay the prescribed court fee, not merely formal ownership of assets.

The court applied the following analytical steps, based on the evidence and legal principles stated in the opinion:

  1. Clarified the burden on the appellant: the appellant must establish inability to pay the court fee and make full, true disclosure of assets and resources in the I.O.P. (Order 33 Rule 2 and the jurisprudence cited).
  2. Examined the appellant's own evidence: PW1 admitted receipt of Rs.42,00,000/- as sale consideration but failed to provide a cogent, documentary explanation for how those funds were spent. Bank passbooks were not produced to satisfactorily account for the money; late production showed acceptance of Rs.30 lakhs but did not resolve the discrepancy.
  3. Considered respondents' evidence and assertions: respondents pointed to previous property sales, that the appellant continued to derive economic benefit (rent) and possibly held shares in "Carmel Kuries", and that her husband is a practising advocate — factors relevant to the appellant's capacity to raise funds.
  4. Applied the disclosure requirements of Order 33 Rule 2 and the rejection provision in Order 33 Rule 5: the appellant failed to schedule and disclose material facts (sale consideration, shareholdings, employment history/dates of resignation) in the petition and in evidence; nondisclosure was treated as material and fatal under the authorities cited (Mathew and Dr. D. Hemachandra Sagar).
  5. Concluded that the lower court correctly evaluated the evidence and found that the appellant had sufficient means to pay the court fee or at least had not established inability to do so; nondisclosure rendered the I.O.P. unsustainable.

The court emphasized that although payment of court fee is a matter between the appellant and the State (and not directly between parties), the appellant's failure to disclose sale proceeds and other assets deprived the court of the basis to treat her as indigent. The court found no grounds to interfere with the lower court's factual and legal conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The appeal is dismissed. (The opinion states: "The appeal is hence dismissed.")

Implications:

  • The order of the Sub Court dated 18.03.2016 rejecting the appellant's petition to sue as an indigent person under Order 33 Rule 1 CPC stands affirmed.
  • All pending interlocutory applications are ordered closed, as recorded in the opinion.
  • No broader or novel precedent was announced by the court beyond applying established principles: the court applied and reiterated existing standards on the meaning of "indigent", the burden of disclosure, and the consequences of nondisclosure under Order 33 CPC.

    Mini James v. T.I. Goerge & Others

    Annie John, J.

    1. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 18.3.2016 in I.O.P.1/2015 on the file of the Sub Court, Ernakulam. The appellant herein is the plaintiff in the above I.O.P. The parties are referred to as in the IOP.

    2. The appellant filed a suit for declaring her title over the suit properties and for declaring that the document Nos.1378/2013 and 2925/2013 of SRO, Thrikkakara, executed in the name of respondents 2 and 3, are nominal documents, which were given as security for the loans advanced to the appellant by the first respondent. The suit was valued at Rs.75,00,000/- and the court fee fixed was Rs.7,78,192/-. It is the case of the appellant that she has insufficient means to pay the court fee, as her only asset is the suit property and the movables listed in I.O.P.

    3. The appellant was examined as PW1 and the respondent as RW1. Exts.B1 to B4 were marked. Appellant has deposed that she has no job or income of her own and her only property is the suit property. While appellant was in the box she has admitted that she has received Rs.42,00,000/-, as the sale consideration from the respondents. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the first respondent is only a money lender and the documents were executed as securities in favour of respondents 2 and 3, for which she has filed a suit for recovery of the properties covered by those documents on repayment of the loan amount. When respondents 1 to 3 started asserting title over the suit properties, on 14.12.2014, she has demanded the respondents to reconvey the properties. The respondents demanded payment of Rs.42,00,000/- with interest from the appellant for reconveying the property. Hence, appellant/plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents from forcefully evicting her from the plaint schedule properties and for passing a decree fixing the liability of the appellant at Rs.17,67,397/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

    4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the IOP is not maintainable, either in law or on facts. According to the respondents, the appellant was having property to an extent of 21.79 cents in Vazhakkala village. The third respondent purchased about six cents of property from the appellant in the year 2006. In the year 2013, the third respondent purchased 3.647 cents of property and the remaining extent of the property owned by the appellant was 10 cents with a double storied building. In the year 2013, the appellant again approached the respondents 2 and 3 and agreed to sell the balance 10 cents of land and an agreement for sale was executed on 13.5.2013. Thereafter the appellant executed a sale deed in favour of respondents 2 and 3 for a total consideration of Rs.40,00,000/-. The respondents had availed a loan of Rs.30,00,000/- from State Bank of India to mobilize the sale consideration.

    5. Now the respondents contend that the appellant is in possession of the aforesaid sale consideration and also receives rent from the fourth respondent/tenant. She occupies the ground floor of the building on a rental arrangement. But, even after the expiry of 11 months, the appellant has not vacated the ground floor, for which respondents 2 and 3 filed a suit as O.S.282/2015 before Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam for recovery of possession.

    6. Heard Smt.Ranju A.T., the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Martin K.Jose, the learned counsel for the respondents.

    7.The only question to be considered is, whether the appellant is having sufficient means to pay the court fee of Rs.7,78,192/-. The suit has been filed as IOP by invoking Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    8. Order 33 is an enabling provision which allows filing of a suit by an indigent person without paying the court fee at the initial stage. If the plaintiff ultimately succeeds in the suit, the court would calculate the amount of court fee, which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been permitted to sue as an indigent person and that amount would be recoverable by the State from any party ordered by the decree to pay the same. The main intention of Order 33 CPC is to help the poor litigants, who are unable to pay the requisite court fee, to file a suit because of poverty.

    9. 'Indigency' also means the right to sue in 'forma pauper' is restricted to 'indigent persons'. A person may proceed as poor person only after a court is satisfied that he or she is unable to prosecute the suit and pay the costs and expenses. A person is indigent, if the payment of fee would deprive one of basic living expenses, or if the person is in a state of impoverishment that substantially and effectively impairs or prevents the pursuit of a court remedy.

    10. We have heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the impugned order dated 18.03.2016.

    11. According to the respondents, the appellant is not an indigent person or pauper as she is holding sufficient funds; movable as well as immovable properties.

    12. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that the appellant has no sufficient means to pay the court fee, which was calculated at Rs.7,78,192/-. It has also come out in evidence of PW1 that certain part of the property has been sold out by the appellant and at last she has sold ten cents of property to the respondents on receipt of Rs.42 lakhs as admitted in her deposition. When a question was asked by the learned counsel for the respondents, she was unable to establish how Rs.42 lakhs had been spent by her. In addition to that, admittedly, she was working in 'Carmel Kuries' as brought out by the evidence of the respondents. But, this fact has been denied by the appellant by deposing that, about four years back she has resigned from the said 'Carmel Kuries' and at present she is having no job and residing along with her husband, who is an advocate and she is fully depending upon him. Over and above, the respondents' counsel brought out that appellant is a shareholder of the kuri company. But, this fact also has been denied by the counsel for the appellant by stating that the shares were already transferred before filing of the IOP. The respondents' counsel has pointed out that the appellant was holding the shares of the 'Carmel Kuries' and subsequently she has sold some shares. Even after that the balance share in her possession is about 2147. 13. In order to contradict the argument of the respondents' counsel, the appellant's counsel argued that the appellant has no 'sufficient means' to pay the court fee. The burden is upon the appellant to establish this fact. At the time of argument, the learned counsel for the appellant was not able to substantiate the fact as to how the appellant had spent Rs.42 lakhs which she received after executing sale deed with respect to the property. Appellant has argued that she has spent Rs.10 lakhs for her daughter's marriage, Rs.10 lakhs for getting a loan. There was no cogent explanation about the balance amount in her hand. Apart from her oral evidence that she has a bank account evidencing her dealings, no pass book was produced to substantiate the said contention. At the fag end she has produced some records of the bank account. But, it would only show that she has accepted Rs.30 lakhs. No satisfactory explanation was brought out by the appellant to establish that she has insufficient income to pay the court fee.

    14. In Sebastian Karukapkarambil v. J.M.J. Silverstar and others (2017 (1) KHC 684), it was held that what is required to be proved is that, the plaintiff has no independent income or properties from which he can derive income to pay the requisite court fee and he had not disposed of any property within two months of filing of the petition, so as to claim the benefit; and that there was cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit against the defendants.

    15. It was held in Mathai M. Paikeday v. C.K Antony . [(2011) 13 SCC 174] that a person is 'indigent' if the payment of fees would deprive one of basic living expenses, or if the person is in a state of impoverishment that substantially and effectively impairs or prevents the pursuit of a court remedy. At the same time, a person need not be a destitute. Factors considered when determining if a litigant is 'indigent' are similar to those considered in criminal cases and include the party's employment status and income, including income from government sources, such as social security and unemployment benefits, the ownership of unencumbered assets, including real or personal property and money on deposit, the party's total indebtedness and any financial assistance received from family or close friends. It was also held that where two persons are living together and functioning as a single economic unit, whether married, related, or otherwise, consideration of their combined financial assets may be warranted for the purposes of determining a party's indigency status in a civil proceedings.

    16. Here, the respondents' counsel pointed out that the appellant's husband is also a practising lawyer and this fact has not been denied by the appellant. When the appellant pleads that she has no sufficient means, the burden is heavy on the appellant to prove that she is incapable of paying the court fee. The expression "not possessed of sufficient means" mentioned in explanation 1 to Order 33 Rule 1 CPC while defining the word 'pauper' refers to the plaintiff's capacity to pay the court fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such a suit. What is contemplated is not the possession of the property but the sufficient means with capacity to raise money to pay the court fee. This has been reiterated in Manjulata v. Sidhkaran (2005 KHC 5996). The expression “not possessed of sufficient means” mentioned in Explanation 1 to Order 33 Rule 1 CPC that while defining the word “pauper” refers to plaintiff's capacity to pay the court fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such a suit – What is contemplated is not possession of the property but sufficient means with capacity to raise money to pay the court fee.

    17. It was held in Mathew v. State of Kerala (1996 (2) KLT 363) that when an applicant does not disclose an asset held by him in his application, whatever be the reason on the wording of Rule 1 Order 33, it is clear that the application is liable to be rejected in terms of Order 33 Rule 5(a) of the Code. It was held in Dr. D. Hemachandra Sagar and another v. D. Prithviraj and another (2004 KHC 3808), that in an application to sue as an indigent person, in cases where the defendants have evidence, they can certainly produce it; but it is not their duty to disprove the case of the applicants. It is very necessary to record that the scheme of law is to the effect that two basic ingredients are predominant, the first being that it is a condition precedent for the plaintiff-applicant to make a full and true disclosure of all their assets and resources. Where this is not done or where it is evident to the court that the disclosures are untrue or unreliable or incorrect which boils down to the inference that they are half truths or totally false, the application will have to be dismissed on this ground alone.

    18. If the appellant is in possession of the property or money sufficient enough to raise cash for the payment of the court fee, she or he can be deemed to have sufficient means to pay the court fee and she would not be considered to be a 'pauper'. It is true that no injustice is likely to be caused to the respondents, if the appellant is allowed to contest the suit without payment of court fee. The sum total of the averments in the petition is up to the position that the court fee is massive and that the plaintiff do not have either the assets or the resources to meet that requirement.

    19. It must be borne in mind that the payment of court fee is a matter between the appellant and the State and not between the contesting parties. Thus, if the appellant is allowed to file an appeal as forma pauperis, no injustice would be caused to the respondents, except that the appellant will be allowed to contest the legality and the validity of the decree passed by the trial court against her.

    20. Here, the appellant did not disclose the fact that she was having the sale consideration with her and she has not produced the documents before the court below at the time of filing of IOP.

    21. Order 33 Rule 5 deals with the rejection of application for permission to sue as an indigent person. Clause (a) of Order 33 Rule 5 thereof says that the application shall be rejected where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rules 2 and 3. Sub rule (b) calls for rejection where the applicant is not an indigent person.

    22. Order 33 Rule 2 clearly provides that every application for permission to sue as an indigent person shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits, a schedule of movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof shall be annexed thereto and it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings. In other words, what Rule 2 contemplates is a scheduling of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof.

    23. In this case, the appellant has failed to incorporate all these facts in her petition and during evidence she has not given any proper explanation how she has expended the entire amount which she had at the time of filing of the petition. Over and above, there is no evidence to prove as to on which month and date she has resigned from the Carmel Kuries and in which date she has transferred the shares etc.

    24. We have already held that she is still holding the shares with her. There is no evidence on the part of the appellant that she has omitted to mention all these facts in the petition as well as in evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued to establish the fact that the appellant has no sufficient means to pay the court fee. It is true that in certain circumstances the court can take a liberal view to allow the parties to pay the court fee. But, here, the appellant has suppressed the real material facts before the court below. So, the court below has evaluated the evidence adduced by either side and ultimately came to a conclusion that the appellant had sufficient means to pay the court fee. Accordingly, the prayer to permit the appellant, to file a suit, by invoking Order 33 Rule 1 of the CPC, was rejected by lower court. We do not find any materials in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. What is required to be proved is that the appellant has no independent income or property and that she is incapable of deriving the income to pay the court fee. The appellant has failed to establish this fact. It is true that the Village Officer has given a certificate stating that the appellant is a permanent resident of Vazhakkala village and that she was the owner of 6.39 ares together with a two storied building and she has alienated her properties in the year 2013 and she was residing in the building even after alienation. So under such circumstances, the court below was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that nondisclosure of the account details of the appellant is fatal. Hence, we find that the court below is perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that non-disclosure of assets in the hands of the appellant is fatal to her to continue to sue as an indigent person. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the parties and having perused the record, we are of the opinion that the order of the lower court is consistent. We do not find any reason to interfere with the findings of the court below.

    25. The appeal is hence dismissed. All the pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mini James v. T.I. Goerge & Others
    (Jul 19, 2018)