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  • Article 163 of the Civil Services Regulations
  • Section 124 of the Constitution of Jammu
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Article 163 of the Civil Services Regulations
  • Section 124 of the Constitution of Jammu
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Ali Mohammad Magrey, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Constable (belt No. 1046) in the respondent Department. He was discharged from service by an order dated 18 June 1998 for having been absent from duty (a continuous absence of 68 days). The petitioner challenged that discharge by filing SWP No. 858/1999 before this Court. By judgment dated 12 February 2009 this Court quashed the discharge order, allowed the writ petition, and gave liberty to the respondents to conduct a fresh inquiry in accordance with rules, keeping the absence from 18 June 1998 to 12 February 2009 subject to the outcome of that inquiry.

A departmental inquiry was thereafter conducted. Subsequently the respondent No. 4 issued order No. 487 of 2010 dated 29 May 2010 which (i) imposed the penalty of stopping one annual increment and (ii) treated the period of the petitioner’s discharge w.e.f. 18 June 1998 till 4 August 2009 as “Dies-non” (on the principle of “No Work No Pay”). The petitioner filed a review petition which was rejected by order No. 722 of 2010 dated 14 September 2010, and the petitioner made further representations which did not elicit relief. The petitioner filed the instant writ petition seeking quashing of order No. 487 of 2010 insofar as it treated the discharge period as “Dies-non” and seeking a writ of mandamus directing respondents to treat the period as on duty and pay consequential benefits.

The respondents filed a counter affidavit asserting that the petitioner remained unauthorisedly absent for 68 days and was rightly discharged; they relied on the departmental inquiry disposition (order dated 29 May 2010) that forfeited one annual increment for one year and treated various absence periods, including the period 18 June 1998 to 4 August 2009, as “Dies-non”; they contended the petitioner is not entitled to pay or perks for the period he remained off the rolls, and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether order No. 487 of 2010 dated 29 May 2010 insofar as it treats the petitioner’s discharge period w.e.f. 18 June 1998 to 4 August 2009 as “Dies-non” is legally valid.
  2. Whether the respondents could lawfully treat the discharge period as “Dies-non” when the discharge order had been quashed by this Court and the petitioner was later reinstated pending inquiry.
  3. Whether the principle of “No Work No Pay” justifies treating the period of discharge as “Dies-non” and thereby invoking all consequences attached to “Dies-non.”
  4. Whether treating the petitioner’s absence period as “Dies-non” in the circumstances violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (as alleged by the petitioner).
  5. Whether “Dies-non” is a recognised penalty under the J&K Police Manual such that it could be imposed as part of departmental punishment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted he was originally discharged for absence but this discharge order was quashed by this Court in SWP No. 858/1999 (judgment dated 12 February 2009), with liberty for a fresh inquiry and the absence kept subject to the outcome.
  • The petitioner contended that after being subjected to inquiry he was exonerated of charges of carelessness and negligence and reinstated in service, yet the respondents issued order No. 487 of 2010 treating the discharge period as “Dies-non” and stopping one annual increment.
  • The petitioner sought quashing of the portion of the order treating the period 18 June 1998 to 4 August 2009 as “Dies-non” and alternatively a mandamus to treat the period as on duty with consequential benefits; he challenged the legality of treating that period as “Dies-non.”
  • The petitioner also pursued a review petition and multiple representations which were rejected or ignored, prompting the present writ petition.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents stated that the petitioner was absent without authorization after a period of leave and remained away for 68 days, resulting in discharge by order dated 18 June 1998.
  • They relied on the judgment of this Court (12 February 2009) that quashed the discharge and allowed a fresh inquiry; in compliance the respondents conducted a departmental inquiry and issued order dated 29 May 2010 forfeiting one annual increment for one year and treating specified absence periods (including 18 June 1998 to 4 August 2009) as “Dies-non.”
  • The respondents contended that since the petitioner remained off the rolls w.e.f. 18 June 1998 to 4 August 2009, he is not entitled to pay or other ancillary perks for that period for which he had not worked; they invoked the “No Work No Pay” principle.
  • The respondents prayed for dismissal of the petitioner’s writ petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
SWP No. 858/1999 — Judgment dated 12 February 2009 (this Court) The Court quashed the petitioner’s earlier discharge order and granted liberty to the respondents to conduct a fresh inquiry; kept the absence from 18 June 1998 to 12 February 2009 subject to the outcome of that inquiry. The opinion relied on this prior judgment as part of the factual and procedural background: the discharge had been quashed and the petitioner’s absence was to be considered in light of a fresh inquiry. The Court treated that earlier judgment as central background to assessing the legality of treating the absence as “Dies-non.”
Nazir Ahmad Baba v. State of J&K — SWP No. 2008/2015 (Coordinate Bench) — decision dated 1 September 2017 Referenced as a decision taking a similar view on the matter of treating periods as “Dies-non.” The Court observed that a coordinate Bench had taken a similar view and cited that decision to support the conclusion that treating the period as “Dies-non” in the present circumstances was not justified.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by reproducing SRO 514 dated 22 November 1999, which recasts the explanation to Article 163 of the Civil Services Regulations (Volume I) and defines “Dies-non” (dies-non juridicus). The reproduced explanation lists explicit consequences of treating any period as “Dies-non,” including: no remuneration, no pension entitlement for the period, no counting of the period for experience, promotion or seniority, and other attendant service consequences.

From these provisions the Court reasoned that “Dies-non” has serious consequences on a government servant’s career and therefore cannot be invoked casually. The Court observed the following facts from the record: (a) the petitioner was discharged from service and that discharge was quashed by this Court; (b) the petitioner remained out of service w.e.f. 18 June 1998 till 4 August 2009, but this absence was due to the discharge order which was subsequently declared null and void by this Court; (c) following the quashing, the petitioner was reinstated on 5 May 2011 pending inquiry, and a departmental inquiry culminated in an order which (among other penalties) treated the discharge period as “Dies-non.”

The Court considered whether the respondents were justified in treating the period as “Dies-non.” It noted that respondents could legitimately justify non-payment of salary for the period on the narrow principle of “No Work No Pay” (i.e., not disbursing salary for a period the employee did not work). However, the Court found that treating the period as “Dies-non” — with its far-reaching consequences for pension, promotion, seniority and other service benefits — was not justified in the circumstances. The Court observed that it was not clearly shown on record whether charges of carelessness and negligence were proved in the inquiry, and emphasised that the period in question was the result of an earlier discharge order which this Court had set aside.

The Court additionally noted that “Dies-non” is not one of the penalties prescribed under the J&K Police Manual. The combination of the serious consequences attached to “Dies-non,” the absence of its prescription as a penalty in the Police Manual, the background of the quashed discharge order, and the existence of a coordinate Bench decision taking a similar view collectively informed the Court’s conclusion that treating the period as “Dies-non” in the present case was illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (as held by the Court).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed; the impugned order (order No. 487 of 2010 dated 29 May 2010) is quashed insofar as it treats the petitioner’s period of discharge from 18 June 1998 till 4 August 2009 as “Dies-non.”

Implications:

  • The direct effect for the parties is that the portion of the impugned order treating the relevant period as “Dies-non” is set aside, thereby removing the attendant consequences of “Dies-non” (such as impact on pension, seniority, promotion and experience) as applied in that order.
  • However, the Court expressly held that the petitioner is not entitled to any salary for that period — the respondents remain justified in withholding salary for the period on the principle of “No Work No Pay.”
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, broad precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Court; it relied on statutory/regulatory provisions (SRO 514 / Article 163 explanation) and a coordinate Bench decision for support. No broader legal rule beyond the decision’s effect on the present parties is articulated by the Court in the opinion.

Disposition: Writ petition disposed of as above, along with the connected interlocutory application (IA).

    Mohammad Iqbal Lone Petitioner(S) v. State Of J.K. And Others (S).

    Ali Mohammad Magrey, J.:— By this petition, the petitioner is seeking a ‘Writ of Certiorari’ for quashing the order bearing No. 487 of 2010 dated 29 of May, 2010 issued by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Anantnag/respondent No. 4 insofar as it relates to treating the period of his discharge w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 to 4 of August, 2009 as ‘Dies-non’. A ‘Writ of Mandamus’ is also sought by the petitioner in the name of the respondents commanding them to treat the period of his discharge w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 to 4 of April, 2009 as on duty and pay him all the consequential benefits.

    2. The case of the petitioner is that he came to be appointed as a Constable in the respondent Department and was, subsequently, allotted belt No. 1046. It is stated that the petitioner has been discharging his duties in the respondent Department to the best satisfaction of his superiors, however, in the year 1998, the petitioner came to be discharged from service for the reason of absenting himself from duty for 68 days with effect from 29 of September, 1997 till 6 of December, 1997. Thereafter, as stated, the petitioner resumed his duties on 6 of December, 1997, wherafter an enquiry was conducted against the petitioner in ex parte culminating in the issuance of order of discharge of the petitioner. Being aggrieved, the petitioner assailed the order of discharge issued by the respondents through the medium of writ petition bearing SWP No. 858/1999 before this Court. In the said writ petition, this Court, in terms of judgment dated 12 of February, 2009, while allowing the same, not only quashed the order of discharge of the petitioner, but also gave liberty to the respondents to conduct a fresh enquiry in the matter in accordance with the rules governing the field and kept the absence from 18 of June, 1998 to 12 of February, 2009 subject to outcome of the said enquiry. The petitioner has proceeded to state that he was, thereafter, subjected to enquiry by the respondents and on competition of the said enquiry, the petitioner, while being exonerated from all the charges of carelessness and negligence, was reinstated in service. Thereafter, as stated, in terms of the order No. 487 of 2010 dated 29 of May, 2010 issued by the respondent No. 4, a major punishment was inflicted upon the petitioner by stopping one annual increment and treating the period of his discharge w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009 as ‘Dies-non’ on the principle of ‘No Work No Pay’. Faced with this situation, the petitioner contends that he filed a review petition before the respondents with respect to the issue of treating his period of discharge as ‘Dies-non’, however, the respondents, in terms of order bearing No. 722 of 2010 dated 14 of September, 2010 rejected the same as being devoid of any merit. It is pleaded in the petition that the petitioner did not stop there and filed a series of representations before the respondents thereby requesting them to set aside the portion of the order impugned declaring the period of his discharge w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009 as ‘Dies-non’, however, since all the requests of the petitioner fell in deaf ears and did not entail any response from the respondents, the petitioner, as stated, was constrained to file the instant writ petition.

    3. Counter stands filed on behalf of the respondents resisting and controverting the averments made by the petitioner in his petition. It is stated that the petitioner proceeded on 03 days leave, but after expiry of the said leave period, the petitioner did not report back for duties and, instead, remained unauthorizedly absent from duty for 68 days for which a departmental enquiry was initiated resulting in issuance of order dated 18 of June, 1998 whereby the petitioner was discharged from service. It is further stated that the petitioner, thereafter, approached this Court through the medium of SWP No. 858/1999, wherein this Court quashed the order of discharge of the petitioner vide judgment dated 12 of February, 2009 and also gave liberty to the respondents to conduct fresh inquiry in accordance with the rules governing the field. The respondents have proceeded to state that in compliance of the aforesaid judgment of this Court, the petitioner was reinstated in service vide order dated 5 of May, 2011 and a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner which came to be disposed of vide order dated 29 of May, 2010 whereby the annual increment of the petitioner was forfeited for a period of one year and the period of absence of the petitioner viz., from 29 of September, 1997 till 6 of December, 1997; from 28 of April, 1998 till 17 of June, 1998 and also the period of his discharge w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009 was treated as ‘Dies-non’ on the principle of ‘No Work No Pay’. The respondents contend that since the petitioner remained away from the rolls of the Department w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009, as such, he is not entitled to any pay or other perks ancillary to such a period for which he has never worked. In the end, the respondents have prayed that the petition of the petitioner be dismissed.

    4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings on record and considered the matter.

    5. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the matter in its right and correct perspective, it shall be advantageous to reproduce the provisions of SRO 514 dated 22 of November, 1999, in terms whereof the Government, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 124 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, re-casted the explanation to Article 163 of the Civil Services Regulations Volume 1 as under:

    “The word ‘Dies-non’ is an abbreviated for of ‘Dies-non Juriducus’ means a day on which no legal business is transacted or which is not reckoned for some particular purpose. The period which is directed to be treated as ‘Dies-non’ cannot therefore be counted for service benefits otherwise available for that period. In fact, the period required or ordered to be treated as ‘Dies-non’ is by way of concession for permitting the beneficiary proceeded on un-unauthorized absence for a particular period. Literal ……. Meaning of ‘Dies-non’ would boll down to mean that this period is not capable of being counted at all for purposes of possible benefits to the beneficiary. Rights which have accrued to him till the date of his proceeding on un-authorized leave or rights which may accrue to him after he is allowed to join service as a result of direction that the period of absence be treated as ‘Dies-non’ remain quite intact, but no benefit whatsoever can accrue to him as a result of call it concession or legal fiction of construing the period of un-authorized absence as ‘Dies-non’ under any circumstance. This period cannot count for any purpose, whatsoever. Accordingly, the import of the term ‘Dies-non’ is that:—

    i. It does not qualify for any remuneration (pay and allowances);

    ii. It does not count for pension;

    iii. It does not cause any interruption for leave earned up to the date proceeding that on which the period of Dies-non has commenced;

    iv. It does not cause any interruption for the past service qualifying for pension;

    v. It shall not count for experience;

    vi. During ‘Dies-non’ the concerned Government servant shall not be entitled to promotion;

    vii. The concerned shall lose seniority in his cadre/category by the period which is treated as ‘Dies-non’.”

    6. From an appreciation of Article 163 and the explanation appended thereto in terms of SRO supra, it becomes axiomatic that the term ‘Dies-non’ entails several consequences insofar as the service career of a Government employee is concerned. Besides, it does not qualify for any remuneration and affects pension, increment, experience, seniority and promotion, etc. of the concerned official. The provision of ‘Dies-non’ has serious consequences on the service prospects of an employee and, therefore, cannot be invoked in a casual manner.

    7. From the perusal of the pleadings on record, it is not clearly forthcoming as to whether the charges of carelessness and negligence were proved against the petitioner even in the enquiry proceedings conducted by the respondents. The fact that the petitioner was serving as a Police Constable and that he was discharged from service for continuous absence from duty is not in controversy. Likewise, the factum of the petitioner having assailed the order of his discharge from service before this Court and this Court having set aside the order of his discharge from service is also not in controversy. Indisputably, too, the petitioner remained out of service w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009, but this cannot be treated as an unauthorized absence. The petitioner remained out of duty for the said period because of an order of discharge issued by the respondents, which order was, ultimately, declared as null and void by this Court. The petitioner was then reinstated in service on 5 of May, 2011 pending an enquiry into his conduct. However, upon culmination of the Departmental enquiry proceedings, the penalty of stoppage of annual increment for one year was ordered against the petitioner, coupled with treating the period of his discharge w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009 as ‘Dies-non’ by the respondent No. 4. In this backdrop, the order impugned insofar as it pertains to treating the period of discharge of the petitioner as ‘Dies-non’ is apparently illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The respondent No. 4 could well justify not to disburse the salary for the period w.e.f. 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009 on the principle of ‘No Work No Pay’, but was not justified to treat the aforesaid period as ‘Dies-non’ which has serious consequences on the service career of the petitioner. In any case, ‘Dies-non’ is not one of the penalties prescribed under the J&K Police Manual. Similar view was taken by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in its decision dated 1 of September, 2017 passed in SWP No. 2008/2015 titled ‘Nazir Ahmad Baba v. State of JK’

    8. In view of the preceding analysis, the petition of the petitioner is allowed, as a sequel thereto, the order impugned insofar as it pertains to treating the period of discharge of the petitioner from 18 of June, 1998 till 4 of August, 2009 as ‘Dies-non’, is quashed. However, the petitioner shall not be entitled to any salary for the aforesaid period only on the principle of ‘No Work No Pay’.

    9. Writ petition disposed of as above, alongwith the connected IA.

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    Comments

    Mohammad Iqbal Lone Petitioner(S) v. State Of J.K. And Others (S).
    (Sep 24, 2019)