1. Sri S.N. Dubey, learned counsel for the caveaetor is not present though the case has been taken up in the revised list.
2. Heard Sri V.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri N.K. Verma, learned AGA for the State and perused the impugned F.I.R. as well as material brought on record.
3. The relief sought in this petition is for quashing of the F.I.R. dated 11.5.2018, registered as case crime No. 87 of 2018, under Sections 324, 307 I.P.C, Police Station Chandawak, District Jaunpur.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per the FIR, petitioner has not been assigned the role of causing injuries to the injured as the same has been assigned to the co-accused Nilesh Yadav. He further submitted that the petitioner was only found to be present at the place of occurrence and general allegation has been levelled against the petitioner.No offence is made out against the petitioner, hence, FIR is liable to be quashed.
5. The Full Bench of this court in Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P. (2006 (56) ACC 433) reiterated the view taken by the earlier Full Bench in Satya Pal v. State of U.P. (2000 Cr.L.J. 569) that there can be no interference with the investigation or order staying arrest unless cognizable offence is not ex-facie discernible from the allegations contained in the F.I.R. or there is any statutory restriction operating on the power of the Police to investigate a case as laid down by the Apex Court in various decisions including State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604) attended with further elaboration that observations and directions contained in Joginder Kumar's case (Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 contradict extension to the power of the High Court to stay arrest or to quash an F.I.R. under article 226 and the same are intended to be observed in compliance by the Police, the breach whereof, it has been further elaborated, may entail action by way of departmental proceeding or action under the contempt of Court Act. The Full Bench has further held that it is not permissible to appropriate the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution as an alternative to anticipatory bail which is not invocable in the State of U.P. attended with further observation that what is not permissible to do directly cannot be done indirectly.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not brought forth anything cogent or convincing to manifest that no cognizable offence is disclosed prima facie on the allegations contained in the F.I.R. or that there was any statutory restriction operating on the police to investigate the case.
7. Taking into account the nature of allegation levelled against the petitioner in the FIR as well as injuries sustained by the injured, i.e., incised wound, the Court is of the view that the allegations in the F.I.R. do disclose commission of cognizable offence and, therefore, no ground is made out warranting interference by this Court. The prayer for quashing the same is refused.
8. The petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed.
Comments