1. Rule.
2. Heard Mr. Ravi Kadam, learned senior counsel on behalf of the Petitioner and Mr. Shyam Mehta, learned senior counsel on behalf of Respondent No. 1 on the question of grant of interim relief.
3. The Petitioner has approached this Court being aggrieved with initiation of the enforcement case under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short “PML Act”).
4. The Petitioner is a society duly registered under Section 33 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Perusal of Chapter VII of the Copyright Act, 1957 as well as Chapter XI of the Copyright Rules, 2013 would reveal that a complete code is provided for the functioning of the copyright society. It could further be seen that Central Government, if finds that the society is being managed in a manner detrimental to the interest of the authors and other owners of the right concerned, it is also empowered to cancel the registration of the said society.
5. Perusal of the impugned notice issued under the provisions of the PML Act would reveal that the very basis for proceeding against the present Petitioner is FIR No. 321 of 2014 registered for offences punishable under Section 420, 471 r/w 120(B) of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”). The said FIR is placed on record. The said FIR is lodged by one Surendra Sathi against one Hasan Kamaal and Omprakash Sonik stating therein that the said persons had not paid royalty, which was due to the said complainant.
6. For the offences under Section 420, 471 as well as 120(B), mens rea is a necessary ingredient. As held by the this Court in Natural Sugar and Allied Industries Ltd. v. Razzak s/o Hazi Gaffar 2006 All M.R. (Cri.) 2822 and Motorola Incorporated v. Union of India 2004 Cri.L.JJ. 1576 juristic person cannot be prosecuted for offences which require mens rea.
7. Apart from that, it would reveal that in so far as the FIR lodged at Agra by said Surendra Sathi is concerned, the same is already quashed with consent of the parties by the judgment and order dated 7 November 2017, passed by the Allahabad High Court.
8. In any event, we find that on the basis of solitary complaint by one of the members of the Petitioner society against the erstwhile office bearers of the society, a drastic step of initiation of proceedings under the PML Act, is at least, prima-facie, an abuse of process of law.
9. In that view of the matter, by way of ad-interim order, there shall be stay to all the further proceedings qua the present Petitioner. Stand over to 1 March 2018.