Madhya Pradesh Rural... v. L.G. Chaudhary Engin..., Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Factual and Procedural Background

The batch of matters arose out of disputes relating to public works contracts executed for various State authorities. A recurring question was whether applications for appointment of arbitrators under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”) were maintainable when a special State enactment – the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (“M.P. Act”) – provided its own arbitral mechanism. Earlier, in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB (2011) 13 SCC 261, this Court had treated the State Act as impliedly repealed, leading several High Courts to entertain Section 11 petitions. On 24-1-2012, a two-judge Bench delivered separate but conflicting opinions in M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers & Contractors (2012) 3 SCC 495, prompting a reference to a larger Bench. The present three-judge Bench was constituted to resolve that divergence, decide the reference and dispose of numerous connected civil appeals and special leave petitions that turned on the same point.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 is impliedly repealed or displaced by the 1996 Act in respect of disputes arising from State “works contracts”.

Whether disputes that survive or arise after termination of a works contract fall within the expression “subject-matter of arbitration” under Section 2(d) of the 1996 Act and, correspondingly, within the ambit of the State Act.

Whether High Courts could validly appoint arbitrators under Section 11 of the 1996 Act in the face of the special jurisdiction conferred on the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal by the State Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants/State Authorities

Invoked Section 2(4) of the 1996 Act to contend that where another enactment provides for arbitration, that enactment prevails to the extent of inconsistency; therefore proceedings must lie under the M.P. Act.

Relied on the interpretation of the analogous Section 46 of the 1940 Act in Dhanrajamal Gobindram to argue that statutory arbitration schemes are preserved.

Submitted that VA Tech was decided per incuriam and should not govern.

Respondents/Contractors

Maintained that, by virtue of VA Tech, the 1996 Act had supplanted the State Act, giving the High Courts power to appoint arbitrators.

Contended that, once a statement of defence had been filed before an arbitrator appointed under the 1996 Act, Section 16(2) barred any belated jurisdictional objection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers & Contractors (2012) 3 SCC 495	Prior conflicting views on coexistence of the State Act with the 1996 Act.	Larger Bench endorsed the view of Ganguly, J., holding State Act continues to apply.
VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB (2011) 13 SCC 261	Held State Act stood impliedly repealed.	Declared per incuriam and overruled.
Maharshi Dayanand University v. Anand Coop. L/C Society Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 295	Arbitrator’s power to decide disputes post-termination.	Cited (in dissenting opinion) to show such power under 1996 Act; majority accepted the principle via Section 2(d).
Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. 1942 AC 356 (HL)	Continuation of arbitration clause after contract termination.	Referenced in dissent; majority noted but relied instead on the statutory definition.
Dhanrajamal Gobindram v. Shamji Kalidas & Co. (1961) 3 SCR 1020	Section 46 of 1940 Act preserves special statutory arbitrations.	Used to interpret Section 2(4) of the 1996 Act as preserving the State Act.
Punjab SEB v. Guru Nanak Cold Storage & Ice Factory (1996) 5 SCC 411	Reiterated precedence of special statutes over the general Arbitration Act when inconsistent.	Relied on to bolster the primacy of the State Act.
Mahesh Chandra Garg v. State of M.P. (Civil Revision 353/2004)	High Court decision following VA Tech.	Set aside because its foundation (VA Tech) was overruled.
Viva Highways Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation Ltd. (2017) 2 MP LJ 681	Larger Bench of High Court overruling earlier contrary view.	Followed to allow appeal in C.A. No. 4018/2018.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers & Contractors (2012) 3 SCC 495

Prior conflicting views on coexistence of the State Act with the 1996 Act.

Larger Bench endorsed the view of Ganguly, J., holding State Act continues to apply.

VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB (2011) 13 SCC 261

Held State Act stood impliedly repealed.

Declared per incuriam and overruled.

Maharshi Dayanand University v. Anand Coop. L/C Society Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 295

Arbitrator’s power to decide disputes post-termination.

Cited (in dissenting opinion) to show such power under 1996 Act; majority accepted the principle via Section 2(d).

Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. 1942 AC 356 (HL)

Continuation of arbitration clause after contract termination.

Referenced in dissent; majority noted but relied instead on the statutory definition.

Dhanrajamal Gobindram v. Shamji Kalidas & Co. (1961) 3 SCR 1020

Section 46 of 1940 Act preserves special statutory arbitrations.

Used to interpret Section 2(4) of the 1996 Act as preserving the State Act.

Punjab SEB v. Guru Nanak Cold Storage & Ice Factory (1996) 5 SCC 411

Reiterated precedence of special statutes over the general Arbitration Act when inconsistent.

Relied on to bolster the primacy of the State Act.

Mahesh Chandra Garg v. State of M.P. (Civil Revision 353/2004)

High Court decision following VA Tech.

Set aside because its foundation (VA Tech) was overruled.

Viva Highways Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation Ltd. (2017) 2 MP LJ 681

Larger Bench of High Court overruling earlier contrary view.

Followed to allow appeal in C.A. No. 4018/2018.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Bench examined Section 2(d) of the 1996 Act which keeps the “subject-matter of arbitration” alive even after a contract is terminated. This provision, overlooked in the dissenting opinion of Mishra, J., supported the conclusion that post-termination disputes still fall within the State Act.
2. Section 2(4) of the 1996 Act explicitly gives primacy to any “other enactment” providing for arbitration in case of inconsistency. Reading it with the ratio of Dhanrajamal and Punjab SEB, the Court held that the M.P. Act continues to govern works-contract disputes and is not impliedly repealed.
3. Because VA Tech failed to consider Section 2(4) and mis-applied the doctrine of implied repeal, it was declared per incuriam and overruled.
4. Consequently, High Court orders appointing arbitrators under Section 11 of the 1996 Act—passed in reliance on VA Tech—were without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.
5. The Bench clarified that ongoing arbitrations commenced under the 1996 Act pursuant to such orders would be transferred to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal, and awards already made would not be annulled solely on jurisdictional grounds if no timely objection had been raised.
6. Analogous State statutes, such as the Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992, were held to operate in the same manner, leading to dismissal of the SLP pertaining to Gujarat.

Holding and Implications

Reference answered in favour of the continued applicability of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983; numerous related appeals allowed, High Court orders under Section 11 of the 1996 Act set aside, and proceedings redirected to the State Arbitration Tribunal.

Immediate consequences include transfer or restoration of pending disputes to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal, revival of earlier statutory references, and validation of awards already rendered where jurisdictional objections were untimely. The ruling reinforces the supremacy of special State arbitration statutes over the general 1996 Act in cases of inconsistency but does not create new substantive rights beyond that clarification.

Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority And Another v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers And Contractors .

(2018) 10 SCC 833

Order dated 8-3-2018

(Before Adarsh Kumar Goel and Rohinton Fali Nariman and Uday U. Lalit, JJ.)

Civil Appeals No. 974 of 2012 with Nos. 2615-16, 2751-62 of 2018, 11383 of 2017, SLPs (C) Nos. 15059 of 2011, 12478 of 2016, 5076, 7407, 7416, 17070, 18212, 19637, 20744, 21017, 21037, 21434, 23107, 25319, 25321, 30773 of 2017, 1631-33, 1635-37 of 2018, Diaries Nos. 23682 and 23685 of 2017

CA No. 974 of 2012

1. The matter has been placed before this Bench of three Judges pursuant to the order dated 24-1-2012 (2012) 3 SCC 495, which is as follows:

“60. In view of some divergence of views expressed in the two judgments delivered today by us, the matter may be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench to resolve the divergence.”

2. Appointment of an arbitrator in a dispute arising out of execution of a “works contract” was the subject-matter for consideration before the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

3. The appellants raised objection that the matter being covered by a special State Act, namely, M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (“the M.P. Act”, in short), the application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could not be entertained. The High Court, however, overruled the said objection relying upon the judgment of this Court in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB (2011) 13 SCC 261.

4. When the matter was considered by a Bench of this Court on 24-1-2012 (order in M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors (2012) 3 SCC 495), this Court held that the judgment in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. (2011) 13 SCC 261 was per incuriam insofar as it held that the M.P. Act stands impliedly repealed by the Central Act. While Hon'ble Ganguly, J., held that the State Act will cover a dispute even after termination of the “works contract”, Hon'ble Gyan Sudha Mishra, J. took a different view as follows: (M.P. Rural Road Development case (2012) 3 SCC 495)

“51

. It is no doubt true that if the matter were before an arbitrator appointed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for adjudication of any dispute including the question regarding the justification and legality as to whether the cancellation of works contract was legal or illegal, then the said arbitrator in view of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharshi Dayanand University v. Anand Coop. L/C Society Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 295, as also in view of the persuasive reasoning assigned in the judgment and order in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. 1942 AC 356, (1942) 1 All ER 337 (HL) would have had the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute regarding the justification and legality of cancellation of works contract also. But the same cannot be allowed to be raised under the M.P. Act of 1983 since the definition of “works contract” unambiguously lays down in explicit terms as to what is the nature and scope of “works contract” and further enumerates the specific nature of disputes arising out of the execution of works contract which would come within the definition of a “works contract”. However, the same does not even vaguely include the issue or dispute arising out of cancellation and termination of contract due to which this question, in my considered opinion, would not fall within the jurisdiction of the M.P. State Arbitration Tribunal so as to be referred for adjudication arising out of its termination.”

5. We find from the definition under Section 2(d) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that even after a contract is terminated, the subject-matter of dispute is covered by the said definition. The said provision has not been even referred to in the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Gyan Sudha Mishra, J.

6. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by Hon'ble Ganguly, J. is the correct interpretation and not the contra view of Hon'ble Gyan Sudha Mishra, J. Reference stands answered accordingly.

7. Taking up appeal on merits, we find that the High Court proceeded on the basis of the judgment of this Court in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. (2011) 13 SCC 261 which has been held to be per incuriam. The M.P. Act cannot be held to be impliedly repealed.

8. We are, thus, in agreement with the proposed opinion of Hon'ble Ganguly, J. in para 42 of the reported judgment which reads as follows: (M.P. Rural Road Development case (2012) 3 SCC 495)

“42. Therefore, appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court which is based on the reasoning of VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB Misc. Appeal No. 380 of 2003 is set aside. This Court holds the decision in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB (2011) 13 SCC 261 has been rendered in per incuriam. In that view of the matter the arbitration proceeding may proceed under the M.P. Act of 1983 and not under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”

The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

CA No. 2615 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 16889 of 2012

9. Leave granted. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

10. Proceedings under the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (the State Act) were pending before the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal at Bhopal. The respondent raised an objection that in view of VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB (2011) 13 SCC 261, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will apply and the State Act will not apply. This objection was rejected. The respondent preferred a writ petition. The High Court has upheld WP No. 8375 of 2010 the objection and quashed the proceedings under the State Act.

11. The learned counsel for the State has drawn our attention to Section 2(4) of the Central Act, which is as follows:

“2. (4) This Part except sub-section (1) of Section 40, Sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except insofar as the provisions of this Part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder.”

12. It was pointed out that the above provision was in pari materia with Section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which was interpreted by this Court in Dhanrajamal Gobindram v. Shamji Kalidas & Co. (1961) 3 SCR 1020, AIR 1961 SC 1285 This Court held: (AIR p. 1293, para 24)

“24. …Section 46 makes the provisions of any other enactment or any rules made thereunder to prevail over the Arbitration Act, if inconsistent with the latter. In view of these several provisions, it is clear that the Arbitration Act applies to all arbitrations and Chapter II makes it applicable also to arbitrations, in which the arbitration agreement is asked to be filed in Court under Section 20 subject, however, to this that the provisions of any other enactment or rules made thereunder, if inconsistent with the Arbitration Act, are to prevail.”

13. The same view was taken in Punjab SEB v. Guru Nanak Cold Storage & Ice Factory (1996) 5 SCC 411 in para 12, which is as follows:

“12. Sections 6(1), 7, 12, 36 and 37 have expressly excluded from the operation of statutory arbitration. The rest of the provisions per force would get attracted. But the provisions of the appropriate statute or rules should necessarily be consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. In that event, despite absence of an arbitration agreement, rest of the provisions of the Arbitration Act would apply (as if there was an arbitration agreement between the parties) and the dispute becomes arbitrable under the Arbitration Act, as if there was an arbitration agreement between the parties. If there is any inconsistency, then the provisions of the Arbitration Act do not get attracted. Section 33 expressly gives power to the civil court to decide the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or the award as such. If this question was to arise, necessarily the civil court would be devoid of jurisdiction to decide the dispute on merits but only in the forum of arbitration. The existence and validity of the arbitration agreement should be decided by the civil court. The arbitrator cannot clothe himself with jurisdiction to conclusively decide it by himself as a jurisdictional issue. It is for the court to decide it. The dispute on merits should be resolved by the arbitrator and the legality of the award would be subject to decision by the court under Section 33.”

14. In view of the above, we are of the view that the State law will prevail in terms of Section 2(4) of the Central Act. The reference under the State law was valid and could be decided in accordance with the State. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order WP No. 8375 of 2010 and restore the proceedings before the Tribunal. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in above terms.

CA No. 2751 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 11615 of 2012, CA No. 2753 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 11617 of 2012, CA No. 2754 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 11618 of 2012, CA No. 2755 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 11619 of 2012, CAs Nos. 2756-57 of 2018 arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 11633-34 of 2012, CAs Nos. 2758-59 of 2018 arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 11631-32 of 2012 & CAs Nos. 2760-61 of 2018 arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 11628-29 of 2012

15. Leave granted. In view of order passed in Civil Appeal No. 2615 of 2018 [arising out of SLP (C) No. 16889 of 2012], the impugned order is set aside and the application(s) filed by the respondent(s) under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are dismissed.

16. However, since it is stated that proceedings are pending before the arbitrator in pursuance of the impugned order, the same will stand transferred to the State Tribunal and the State Tribunal may proceed further taking into account the proceedings which have already been taken. The learned counsel for the respondent(s) pointed out that in view of Section 16(2), the objection to the jurisdiction could not be raised after statement of defence was filed. This contention cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the SLP was filed prior to the filing of statement of defence wherein this objection was raised.

17. We do not express any opinion on the applicability of the State Act where award has already been made. In such cases if no objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitration was taken at relevant stage, the award may not be annulled only on that ground.

18. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.

CA No. 2616 arising out of SLP (C) No. 35641 of 2011

19. Leave granted. In view of the order passed in CA No. 2751 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 16615 of 2012, no objection having been raised by the respondents in terms of Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 at appropriate stage within the time stipulated, the award could not have been annulled.

20. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment Misc. Appeal No. 2673 of 2006 is set aside and the award is restored. It is, however, made clear that this order will not debar proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

CA No. 2762 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 796 of 2014

21. Leave granted. In view of the order passed in CA No. 2616 of 2018 arising out of SLP (C) No. 35641 of 2011, the impugned order Review Petition No. 35 of 2011 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court for fresh decision under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, in accordance with law.

22. The appeal is disposed of in above terms. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

SLPs (C) Nos. 5076, 7407, 7416, 19637, 20744, 21017, 21037, 23107 & 30773 of 2017

23. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order ARBAs Nos. 19 and 30 of 2015 ARBs Nos. 7-9 of 2015 ARBAs Nos. 15 and 21 of 2015 ARBA No. 11 of 2015 ARBA No. 1 of 2015. The special leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

CA No. 11383 of 2017

24. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order Civil Revision No. 7 of 2013. However, this order will not affect the remedy of the appellants under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

SLPs (C) Nos. 15059 of 2011, 12478 of 2016, 17070, 18212, 21434, 25319, 25321 of 2017, 1631-33, 1635-37 of 2018 and Diaries Nos. 23682, 23685 of 2017

25. List these matters along with CAs Nos. 8984-85 of 2017 & SLP (C) No. 24172 of 2017 on Tuesday i.e. 13-3-2018.

26. Except the matters which are referred to a three-Judge Bench, all other matters are not necessary to be heard by a three-Judge Bench and the same are detagged and be heard separately.

IA No. 3 in CA No. 974 of 2012

27. On oral prayer let the application for intervention be treated as special leave petition and listed separately. Let a formal special leave petition be filed by the applicant. The respondent(s) will be at liberty to file a counter-affidavit. Needful be done by the applicant within one week. Post the matter after two weeks thereafter.

(2018) 10 SCC 838 (1)

Order dated 22-3-2018

(Before Adarsh Kumar Goel, Rohinton Fali Nariman and Uday U. Lalit, JJ.)

SLP (C) No. 15059 of 2011

28. It is not disputed that for purposes of decision of the question arising in the present case the provisions of the Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992 are in pari materia with the provisions of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 which have been considered by this Court vide order dated 8-3-2018 in Civil Appeal No. 974 of 2012 titled M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors.

29. In view of the above, this petition is dismissed.

(2018) 10 SCC 838 (2)

Order dated 18-4-2018

(Before Adarsh Kumar Goel and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.)

Civil Appeals Nos. 4011 and 4015 of 2018

30. Delay condoned. Leave granted. In view of the judgment of this Court in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB (2011) 13 SCC 261 having been overruled (2012) 3 SCC 495 and as the High Court has relied WPs Nos. 7104-105 of 2010 on the judgment in Mahesh Chandra Garg v. State of M.P. Civil Revision No. 353 of 2004 which was based on VA Tech (2011) 13 SCC 261, the impugned order WPs Nos. 7104-105 of 2010 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal so that the said Tribunal can deal with the matter on merits in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of. The parties may appear before the Tribunal for further proceedings on 9-7-2018. The appellant may serve a copy of this order on the respondents.

(2018) 10 SCC 839 (1)

Order dated 18-4-2018

(Before Adarsh Kumar Goel and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.)

Civil Appeals Nos. 4257-59 of 2018

31. Delay condoned. Leave granted. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. In view of the judgment of this Court in M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors (2012) 3 SCC 495 and the order passed by this Court on 8-3-2018 in the same matter, the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, (the M.P. Act) has the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the dispute in question. Accordingly, the impugned direction 2015 SCC OnLine Chh 1624 2015 SCC OnLine Chh 1623 2017 SCC OnLine Chh 884 2017 SCC OnLine Chh 883 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be sustained and is set aside. The parties are relegated to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal which may decide the dispute as per the provisions of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (the M.P. Act). The appeals are disposed of. The parties may appear before the Tribunal for further proceedings on 9-7-2018. It will be open to the respondents to file the very same claim which has already been filed before the arbitrator.

(2018) 10 SCC 839 (2)

Order dated 18-4-2018

(Before Adarsh Kumar Goel and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 4261 of 2018

32. Delay condoned. Leave granted. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

33. An agreement was executed between the parties on 11-5-1984 for construction of Assembly building in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Dispute arose from the agreement. The High Court of Delhi appointed an arbitrator vide order dated 13-12-1988. The arbitrator gave the award on 21-6-1989 which was made rule of the court by the Delhi High Court on 28-9-1989. Execution proceedings were taken by the appellant. The learned Single Judge allowed the execution vide order dated 6-9-1991 against which an appeal was filed before the Division Bench of the High Court.

34. The Division Bench vide order dated 5-7-2012 2012 SCC OnLine Del 6472 directed that the enforceability of the decree will depend upon the fate of another appeal which was pending between the parties. The said appeal, FAO (OS) No. 23 of 1998, is still pending but the High Court has deferred 2012 SCC OnLine Del 6473 the same pending decision of the larger Bench of this Court in pursuance of the judgment of this Court in M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors (2012) 3 SCC 495. It may be noted that the larger Bench has decided the matter on 8-3-2018. In terms of the said decision, the dispute between the parties has to be settled in accordance with the provisions of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (the M.P. Act). However, since in the present case the award has been rendered long back which was not challenged by the respondents and the matter is pending at the stage of execution, we direct that the award to be treated to have been rendered under the M.P. Act.

35. In view of the above, we transfer pending proceedings before the Delhi High Court being FAO (OS) No. 23 of 1998 and connected matters to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur to be treated as revision petition under the M.P. Act.

36*. Another dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration vide order dated 19-5-1993. However, before the arbitration proceedings could be decided the arbitrators are said to have expired.

37. In the circumstances, pending arbitration proceedings shall stand transferred to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal under the M.P. Act, to be dealt with as per provisions of the M.P. Act in accordance with law. The proceedings may be carried out in continuation of earlier proceedings. The parties may take steps by moving the High Court or any other forum for transfer of records to the transferee courts in the light of this order. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. The parties may appear before the High Court/Tribunal for further proceedings on 9-7-2018.

(2018) 10 SCC 841

Order dated 18-4-2018

(Before Adarsh Kumar Goel and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 4018 of 2018

38. Leave granted. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

39. It is not disputed that the judgment 2012 SCC OnLine MP 10813, (2014) 2 MP LJ 276 relied upon in the impugned order 2016 SCC OnLine MP 3404, (2016) 2 MP LJ 685 has since been overruled by a larger Bench of the High Court in Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. 1448, (2017) 2 MP LJ 681 Accordingly, the impugned order 2016 SCC OnLine MP 3404, (2016) 2 MP LJ 685 is set aside and the appeal is allowed. It is made clear that if any arbitration proceedings are pending, the same will now be governed by the above judgment of the High Court. The appeal is disposed of.

Madhya Pradesh Rural... v. L.G. Chaudhary Engin...

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants/State Authorities

Respondents/Contractors

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority And Another v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers And Contractors .

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