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  • SEA CUSTOMS ACT
  • provisions of Section 29B of the Sea Customs Act and the Rules
  • information; clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 29B
  • Article 226 of the Constitution.3.Upon two Rules
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  • SEA CUSTOMS ACT
  • provisions of Section 29B of the Sea Customs Act and the Rules
  • information; clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 29B
  • Article 226 of the Constitution.3.Upon two Rules

    Agarwal Trading Corporation v. Collector of Customs

    [Judgment per : Debabrata Mookerjee, J.]. - These are two writ appeals which raise a common question of law dealt with by G.K. Mitter, J. in two applications under Article 226 of the Constitution disposed of by one judgment by which they were dismissed and the relative rules for mandamus, certiorari and for other reliefs were discharged. The two appeals are accordingly disposed of by this judgment.

    2.  The question raised is whether the provisions contained in Sections 29A and 29B of the Sea Customs Act, are complementary or whether they are mutually exclusive. It arises between the same Parties in respect of two consignments of woollen fabrics imported into this country from Hongkong by the appellant Messrs. Agarwal Trading Corporation, a registered partnership firm carrying on business in textile goods. The business consists in importing woollen fabrics from abroad, under the Export Promotion Scheme and after processing them in exporting the finished goods out of India. In one case the consignment consisted of four packages and in the other of three, all containing woollen fabrics. The two consignments were brought into the country by two ships, Bradeveratt and Rutheverett. The ships arrived within a few days of each other and bills of entry were filed in respect of the two consignments on the same date. The value of the consignment in one case was declared at Rs. 7,052.50 np. for which the appellant was assessed to duty by the Customs Authorities at Rs. 6,454.31 np. The value declared in respect of the other consignment was Rs. 9,404 for which the appellant firm was assessed to duty at Rs. 8,602. The assessments in the two cases were made approximately at about the same time. In respect of one consignment the Customs Authorities recorded that the assessment had been in order and therefore directed the goods to pass. In the other case a similar note appears to have been made by which the assessment was held to have been in order. The consignments not having actually been taken delivery of for some reason or other, the relevant papers were placed before the Appraiser, Special Section, for further scrutiny into the declarations of value of the consignments in question. Meanwhile samples had been taken from the consignments and eventually orders were passed purporting to have been made under Section 29B of the Sea Customs Act by which the assessments already made were treated to have been made on a provisional basis in terms of the section and the Rules thereunder and the appellant was permitted to take delivery of the consignments on furnishing additional bank security to the extent of 20 per cent of duty for a period of two months or in lieu thereof, on deposit of the equal amount in cash. These orders appear to have been made in one case towards the end of January, 1960 and in the other in February, 1960. Apparently the Customs Authorities required further information on the question of valuation, quantity and description of the consignment and the appellant was required to produce the manufacturers’ price list which they failed to do. Request appears to have been made by the appellant to Eastern Interprisers of Hongkong who was the exporter of the consignments for the price list. The latter declined to supply the same on the ground that it would be against all notions of commercial practice to disclose the manufacturers’ prices, but they offered at the same time to bear the expenses of travel to and from Hongkong of any responsible officer of Customs in order to enable him to make such enquiries as he might deem necessary to be made in connection with the assessments. This request was presumably not acceded to by the Customs and the appellant took the matter to the Bharat Chamber of Commerce of which they were a member firm for interceding on their behalf in order to procure an early release of the consignments. In spite of the Chamber's intercession the Customs Authorities insisted on payment of the extra duty when the appellant demanded Justice by requiring them to cancel the relevant orders. This was followed by applications in Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    3. Upon two Rules Nisi being issued, the Customs contested the proceedings and on their behalf an affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Sri Jyotirmoy Dutta, Assistant Collector of Customs (Appraisement) was used. The affidavit-in-opposition stated that the assessments in these cases in respect of the two consignments had initially been made under Section 29A of the Sea Customs Act, but later the Customs decided to proceed under Section 29B pending production of proof as regards the real value of the consignments. Let the Assistant Collector of Customs Speak for himself.

    “I say that the bill of entry was filed on 8th January 1960 in the Import Department of the Customs House when it was noted. On 9th January 1960 the scrutinising Appraiser returned the bill of entry to the petitioner with the order to produce Indent, Acceptance, Bank Draft, Bank Memo, Marine Insurance Certificate, full correspondence leading to the finalisation of the order and shipment and to produce shipment sample. Between 9th January 1960 and 18th January 1960 the petitioner kept the relative bill of entry with itself without any further action. The said bill of entry was again produced to the scrutinising Appraiser with the aforesaid documents on 18th January 1960. On the said date the goods were assessed to duty prior to their examination on the basis of statements made by the petitioner in the bill of entry under permission from the Principal Appraiser, a Customs Collector, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under s. 29A Sea Customs Act. In addition the petitioner made the following declaration on the bill of entry.
    It is hereby declared that the acceptance of a deposit of duty calculated on the declared value and description of the goods specified in this bill of entry before examination and assessment shall not be deemed to imply acceptance by the Government of such declared value and description to affect the rights of Government under the Sea Customs Act until the Appraising Department shall have finally accepted such declared value and description.”
    Again
    “I say that subsequent to the assessments and on examination of the goods it was discovered that the statements made by the petitioner in the Bill of Entry regarding valuation was not true. As such the Bill of Entry was sent to the Appraiser, Special Section, for ascertaining valuation and for consequential reassessment as authorised by Section 29A of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioner was also informed that the Bill of Entry had been called for verification of the real value”.
    Then again
    “Since further proof from Hongkong could not be procured expeditiously and in order to avoid undue detention of the goods, the Customs Collector (Assistant Collector of Customs for Appraisement) directed that the duty leviable on such goods may, pending the production of such proof, assessed at the time of reassessment in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Section 29B of the Sea Customs Act and the Rules made thereunder.”

    4.  It seems plain that the assessments in these two cases proceeded on the basis of Section 29A of the Act, but later they were converted into another category whereby the assessments already made were treated on the footing of provisional assessments under Sec. 29B.

    5.  On behalf of the appellant it has been contended that once proceedings are taken under Section 29A, they have to be taken in as closed in accordance with the provisions contained in that section. Such proceedings cannot be converted into one under Section 29B which speaks of provisional assessment. On behalf of the respondent, the Customs authorities, it has been argued that the provisions contained in the two Sections 29A and 29B are more or less of a complementary nature. Consequently there can be no bar to a proceeding commenced under section 29A to be converted into another under Section 29B. It has also been argued that in view of the scheme of the Sea Customs Act, the provisions contained in the two Sections, 29A and 29B, cannot be considered mutually exclusive.

    6. The learned trial Judge negatived the appellant's contention that the provisions contained in the two sections were mutually exclusive. He held that the assessment under Section 29A as well as under Section 29B was provisional although he noticed that the two sections were “somewhat different”. The learned judge did not give any indication of his view as to how they were different. He emphasised the language of Section 29A which according to him permitted resort to Section 29B if and when occasion arose, observing at the same time that “action taken under Section 29B may be taken irrespective of action taken under Section 29A”. It has not been very easy for us to reconcile these findings and we feel constrained to observe that the findings taken together do not appear to support the view upon which the learned Judge chose to rest his decision.

    7.  We have now to notice the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act which fall for consideration in these appeals. Sections 29B occur in Chapter V of the Act which deals with the levy of customs duties. Section 20 provides among other things for the levy of duties at prescribed rates for the time being in force on goods imported into the country from any foreign port. Section 29 is the section which obliges the owner to declare the real value of the goods he imports and which have been entered in the bill of entry. It reads as follows :-

    “29.  On the importation into, or exportation from any Customs port of any goods, whether liable to duty or not, the owner of such goods shall, in his bill of entry or shipping bill, as the case may be, state the real value, quantity and description of such goods to the best of his knowledge and belief, and shall subscribe a declaration of the truth of such statement at the fact of such bill.
    In case of doubt, the Customs Collector may require any such owner or any other person in possession of any invoice, broker's note, policy of insurance or other document, whereby the real value, quantity or description of any such goods can be ascertained, to produce the same, and to furnish any information relating to such value, quantity or description which it is in his power to furnish. And thereupon such person shall produce such document and furnish such information;
    Provided that if the owner makes and subscribes a declaration before the Customs Collector, to the effect that he is unable, for want of full information, to state the real value or contents of any case, package or parcel of goods, then the Customs Collector shall permit him, previous to the entry thereof, (1) to open such case, package or parcel, and examine the contents in presence of an officer of Customs, or (2) to deposit such case, package or parcel in a public warehouse appointed under section 15 without ware-housing the same, pending the production of such information.”

    8. The obligation to declare the real value, quantity and description of the goods is thus laid on the importer and it gives power to the Customs Collector in case of doubt to require product of invoice and other documents for the purpose of ascertaining the real value, quantity and description of the goods imported. The proviso attached to the section contemplates a case where for want of full information the owner is unable to make the required declaration when he may be permitted to open the packages or parcels containing the goods or deposit them at any public warehouse pending production of the further information required.

    Section 29A provides for assessment of duty prior to examination of goods. It says as follows : -

    “29A. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act; goods chargeable to duty may, prior to the examination thereof, be permitted by the Customs Collector to be assessed for the purposes of this Act on the basis of the statement contained in the bill of entry or shipping bill, as the case may be, but if it is found subsequently on an examination of the goods or otherwise, that any such statement is not true in respect of any matter relevant to the assessment, the goods may, without prejudice to any other action which may be taken under this Act, be reassessed to duty.”
    Reading the words of the section it seems plain that authority has been given to the Customs Collector to permit assessment of goods chargeable to duty before the goods are examined. Section 31 says that goods chargeable to duty upon the value thereof but for which a specific value is not fixed by law for the purpose of levying duties thereon, shall without unnecessary delay, be examined by an officer of Customs. Thus Section 29A permits assessment before examination of the goods where presumably the statement of valuation contained in the bill of entry is accepted, but it provides at the same time that if upon subsequent examination of the goods or otherwise any statement made in the bill of entry relating to assessment is found untrue, the goods may be reassessed to duty. The position then is that the assessment to duty prior to examination becomes final subject only to the assessment being reopened in consequence of an examination of the goods themselves or on receipt of further information or other material justifying revision of the assessment already made. But before the assessment can be reopened and a reassessment made, the precondition has to be fulfilled that the statement made in the bill of entry relating to value is found untrue. It may, therefore, be said that Section 29A is a complete provision which does not lend itself to be buttressed by other provisions in the Act. So read the section means and implies that the assessment made on the basis of statement in the bill of entry prevails and is final, subject only to the duty being reassessed upon proof that the statement on the basis of which the assessment was made is untrue. When that basis is shaken as a result of examination of the goods covered by the entry or in any other way, the Customs Authorities have a right to disturb the assessment already made and to supersede it by an order of re-assessment of duty. It says :-
    “29B. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but without prejudice to the provisions contained in section 29, -
    (a)        Where the owner of any goods makes and subscribes a declaration before the Customs Collector to the effect that he is unable for want of full information to state precisely the real value or quantity of such goods in a bill of entry or a shipping bill, as the case may be, or
    (b)        where the owner of any goods has furnished full information in regard to the real value or quantity of the goods but the Customs Collector requires further proof in respect thereof; or
    (c)        where the Customs Collector deems it expedient to subject any goods liable to duty, to any chemical or other test, the Customs Collector may direct that the duty leviable on such goods may, pending the production of such information or proof or pending the completion of any such test, be assessed provisionally in accordance with, and subject, to the provisions of this section and any rules made thereunder,
    (2) When the owner of any goods in respect of which the duty has been assessed provisionally under sub-section (1) has paid such duty, the officer of Customs may make an order allowing the goods to be cleared for home consumption or shipped or waterborne to be shipped for exportation, as the case may be, and such order shall be sufficient authority for the removal of the goods by the owner.
    (3) When the duty leviable on such goods is assessed finally in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the duty provisionally assessed under sub-section (1) shall be adjusted against the duty finally assessed, and if the duty provisionally assessed falls short of, or is in excess of the duty finally assessed, the owner of the goods shall pay the deficiency or be entitled to a refund as the case may be.
    (4) The Chief Customs authority may, subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section and, in particular, such rules may provide for—
    (a)        the circumstances in which, and the restrictions, and conditions subject to which, duty may be provisionally assessed on any goods and the manner in which such duty may be so assessed;
    (b)        the furnishing of any security for the payment of the deficiency, if any, between the duty finally assessed, and the duty provisionally assessed; and
    (c)        the final assessment of duty, where the owner of the goods fails to furnish full information within a specified period regarding the real value or quantity of the goods.
    (5) All rules made under this section shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after they are made.”

    9. In terms of the section, there must be three conditions one or other of which must be present to justify provisional assessment of duty; (a) when the owner subscribes a declaration that he is unable for want of full information to state the precise value or quantity of the goods in bill of entry, (b) or where the owner has supplied full information in regard to the real value or quantity of the goods, but the Customs Collector requires further proof in respect thereof, or (c) where Customs Collector deems it necessary to subject the goods to chemical or other test. One or other of these three conditions must be present to authorise provisional assessment of duty. When such assessment has been made the goods may be cleared for consumption of shipped or water-borne to be shipped for exportation. An order of provisional assessment is declared to be sufficient authority for the owner to remove the goods. This provision authorising removal of the goods even before the assessment has been final, was necessary to be made in view of Section 89 of the Act which provides for clearance of goods for home consumption. That section occurs in Chapter X which is indeed a one section Chapter. It says that when the owner of any goods entered for home consumption, and if such goods be liable to duty assessed under Section 87, has paid the import duty assessed on such goods and any charges payable under the Act in respect of the same, the Customs officer may make an order clearing the same; and such order shall be sufficient authority for the removal of such goods by the owner. It is reasonable to think that the Legislature realised that goods might be detained for an indefinite period pending finalisation of assessment of duty and the importer adversely affected by the delay involved in such finalisation. Accordingly, provision has been made permitting removal of the goods pending the final assessment. The other provisions in Section 29B need not be further considered since they relate to adjustments as between duty finally assessed and duty provisionally charged or relate to the conditions and content of the rules to be framed by the Central Government for making final an assessment provisionally made.

    10. Taking the provisions contained in Section 29B as a whole one can have no doubt that for the purpose of avoiding delay and with a view to enable the importer to clear his goods in as short a time as possible, the procedure of provisional assessment of duty has been evolved; but as we have said one or other of the three conditions stated in the section must be present to justify such provisional assessment.

    11. It has been said that in the present case the Customs desired fuller information in order to able to assess properly the consignment to duty and since the manufacturers’ price list was not readily forthcoming, it was decided to release goods on treating the assessments already made under Section 29A as having been made under Section 29B. We do not think that this procedure is permitted by the law.

    12. Section 29A contemplates a case where no doubt is entertained as to the truth of the statements contained in the bill of entry and the Customs Collector permits assessment to be made without even an examination of the goods imported; but if at a later stage doubt or distrust arises as a result of examination of the goods themselves or otherwise, the Customs Authorities are empowered to reopen the assessment and reassess the goods to duty. In Section 29A doubt as to the truth of the statement contained in the bill of entry arises after the assessment has already been made, whereas in Section 29B the doubt, if any, precedes the assessment and prevents it. Provisional assessment may be made on account of the inability on the part of the importer to supply adequate information; clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 29B properly read does not seem to lend countenance to ‘to the Customs' contention that the information supplied by the importer is doubted. What is emphasized in this clause is that the Customs consider the information to be inadequate with the consequence that they require further proof in respect of the value or quantity of goods covered by the bill of entry. The language of clause (b) seems to be significant. It says that where the owner of goods “has furnished full information” in regard to the real value or quantity of the goods and yet the Customs Collector required “further proof”, a case then arises under clause (b). This in our view, is very different from what is contained in Section 29A. It has been said that in this case the provisional assessment was made in pursuance of clause (b) to which we have just referred. We fail to see how this clause can be pressed into service in a case of this kind. It merely means that the information supplied by the importer is not considered adequate. It does not necessarily imply that the information supplied is untrue. That being so it is not quite easy to see how a proceeding commenced under Section 29A can be converted into one under Section 29B(1)(b). It is one thing to say that the information is insufficient for purposes of correct assessment to duty and a very different thing to suggest that the information supplied has been proved to be untrue as a result of examination of the goods themselves or inconsequence of other information reaching the Customs. Thus to hold that Section 29A and Section 29B can be indifferently applied to every case even for the purpose of reopening an assessment already made under 29A is to accept an argument which seems to be repelled by the provisions of the Act.

    13. Taking the two Sections, 29A and 29B, together it seems to us that they contemplate entirely different sets of circumstances. Where no doubt is entertained as to the truth of statement contained in the bill of entry in respect of value or quantity of the goods imported, the Customs Collector permits assessment on the faith of that statement. That assessment is for all purposes final unless and until the examination of the goods themselves or some information received by Customs Authorities establishes the falsity of the statement. In such case re-assessment takes place. But under Section 29B(1)(b) which is said to be the clause under which action was taken, there is no question of any statement having been found untrue. It is only a case of inadequate information and the Customs Authorities therefore feel obliged to make a tentative assessment which becomes final at a later point of time on receipt of further material or information as the case may be. We think it would not be right to hold that a case under clause (b) arises when the essential truth of the information supplied in the bill of entry is doubted; that is not what the language of clause (b) suggests. The clause merely means that the Customs are not in a position to assess finally on the present state of information and desire further proof despite full information furnished by the owner. In the very nature of things in a case of this kind the assessment must be provisional or tentative.

    14. In our opinion the conditions under which an assessment is made under Section 29A are not identical with those made under Section 29B. It would be wrong to think that an assessment made under Section 29A which is final unless disturbed by proof of falsity of the statement contained in the bill of entry which was the basis of such assessment, can be converted into provisional assessment within the meaning of Section 29B of the Act.

    15. On behalf of the Customs it was sought to be argued that Section 29B is very widely worded and that it gives them the power to make provisional assessments under any circumstances. Reliance is placed on the opening words of the section “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 29”. It is true these words appear. The reference to Section 29 is quite intelligible inasmuch as that section contains the parent provision relating to the owner's obligation to declare the value of the goods he imports or exports. It also gives power to the Customs Authorities to require production of various documents which are useful in determining the real value of the goods exported or imported. It is true Section 29B has been sought to be given an independent status and an overriding effect; but at the same time we have also to take into account the fact that Section 29B also begins with the identical words “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act.” The non obstante clause therefore occurs in both. It is not necessary for us to say that the one cancels the others and all we need say is that each contemplates a state of facts peculiar to itself and there cannot reasonably be a mix-up of the two. We are therefore unable to agree that it is open to the Customs Authorities to proceed under Section 29A and to treat the assessment already made as a provisional assessment under Section 29B. Indeed that is the admitted position as will appear from the excerpts we have set out from the affidavit sworn by the Assistant Collector of Customs himself. It has been made plain that the assessment was made in these two cases under Section 29A; the examination of the goods was held under Section 29A, but then the proceedings were converted into one under Section 29B. This is precisely not allowed by the law.

    16. It may perhaps be argued that it matters little whether an assessment is made under Section 29A or under Section 29B since in either case there may be a revised assessment. We are unable to accept this contention. In the case of Section 29A the assessment is final unless facts establish that the basis of that assessment is wrong, the error having been induced by declarations found to be untrue, in which case alone there may be re-assessment. But in the case of Section 29B the assessment begins by being provisional and ends by being final on a later date. When the Legislature has prescribed two different procedures applicable to two sets of circumstances, we do not think it is open to the authorities concerned to inter-change them or mix them up.

    17.  It has been said that when an assessment has been made under Section 29A and that assessment is proved subsequently on examination of the goods to be wrong and the error induced by untrue statements contained in the bill of entry then there would be re-assessment, but realisation of the re-assessed amount would involve considerable inconvenience to the department. That argument leaves us unimpressed and we think the Legislature was not unmindful of such a situation. That machinery for realisation of the re-assessed amount is provided in Section 39 which speaks of duties not levied or short-levied. That section says that when Customs duties or charges have been short-levied through inadvertance or error on the part of the officers of Customs or through mis-statement as to real value, quantity or description on the part of the owner, the person chargeable with the duty which has been short-levied, shall pay the duty or charge within a prescribed time. Therefore it cannot be said that by construing the provision contained in Section 29A as a provision for final assessment subject only to re-assessment on proof of falsity of statements contained in the bill of entry the department will be left without a remedy. It may be true that Section 29B and the rules made thereunder make it easier for the Customs to realise by adjustment the duty which may on final assessment be found due to them; but that is no ground for permitting the provisions of Section 29A and Section 29B to be mixed up to the detriment of the subject.

    18. Turning now to the learned Judge's findings it is to be observed that he treated Section 29A as authorising provisional assessment as much as Section 29B. We are unable to accept this condition for the reasons we have given-Assessment under Section 29A is final subject to its being reopened only on proof of certain condition, whereas Section 29B expressly deals with provisional assessment. At the same time the learned Judge felt that Section 29A was “somewhat different”; that there is no indication as to what, according to him, made the difference. He seems also to have thought that the word “otherwise” occurring in Section 29A would permit recourse to action being taken under Section 29B. It will be recalled that Section 29A makes the assessment on the basis of the statement in the bill of entry final, except in cases where on examination of the goods or otherwise, the foundation of that assessment is shaken and the Customs Authorities are satisfied that the statements in the bill of entry were untrue. We have to take the word “otherwise” in the context in which it appears. Examination of goods might demonstrate the falsity of the statement-contained on the bill of entry. The word ‘otherwise’ in this context can only mean that besides physical examination of the goods there may be other ways or means by which information may reach the Customs to satisfy them that the statements were false statements. That is the only way in which we think the word “otherwise” has to be construed. It does not in our view permit indiscriminate resort to Section 29B. It merely keeps all avenues of enquiry open to the department. Legislature has not limited the means on the ways by which the Customs can inform themselves of facts and circumstances enabling them to reach the conclusion that the statements contained on the bill of entry are untrue. That, we think, is the sense in which the word “otherwise” should be construed and it cannot be taken to sanction a hybrid procedure which is neither 29A nor 29B but both, being mix-up of the two.

    19. The learned Judge concluded by expressing dissent with the appellant’s contention that the assessment in these cases had become final and that recourse to Section 29B could no longer be had. In our opinion the contention is correct; once the assessment is made under Section 29A it is final for the reasons we have given and it loses finality only on proof of facts which shake the basis and establish the untrue character of the statements on which the assessment was made.

    20. Lastly it was argued on behalf of the Customs that the appellant firm have by their conduct given up the appeals. It was said that although they did not comply with the department’s requisition for making the additional deposit in cash or by way of bank security to the extent of 20% of duty in order to be able to clear the consignments, they have since done so. That being the position, it was argued, that there has been acquiescence in the position that the assessments in these cases have been made under Section 29B. It is to be observed that the appellant made the required deposit and furnished the bond in pursuance of an interim order of this Court which presumably made compliance with the requisition a condition precedent to the issue of an injunction on the Customs prohibiting them from proceeding with the provisional assessment. We do not think this conduct on the part of the appellant can have the effect of giving up the appeals; indeed the Court’s order makes it plain that the Customs were injuncted and that the appeals were directed to be heard and determined in due course.         

    21. Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the orders of G.K. Mitter, J.

    22. The Customs Authorities will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law on the footing that the assessments have been made in terms of Section 29A of the Sea Customs Act.

    23.  We direct refund of the deposit made and order discharge of the bond executed by or at the instance of the appellant. This part of the order will however be stayed for period of three months from date.

    24. Let two writs of mandamus issue directing the Customs authorities to forbear from giving effect to the three orders complained of being orders dated the 28th January, 1960 and the 6th February, 1960 (in appeal No. 45 of 1960) and order dated the 10th February, 1960 in Appeal No. 46 of 1960.

    25. There will be no order as to costs in these two appeals.

    26. [Assent per : H.K. Bose, C.J.]. – I agree.

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    Agarwal Trading Corporation v. Collector of Customs
    (Feb 14, 1962)