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Acts
  • provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India read with Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
  • Sections 239/240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis Sections 226/227/228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • provision of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code containing Sections 226 and 227
  • Sections 226, 227, 228 Cr.P.C. and under Section 238 and 239 Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Section 226 of the Code
  • provision of Section 239 of the Code.
  • provision of Section 226. Section 227
  • Section 173 of the Code.
  • Section 226 of the Code,
  • Section 239 Cr.P.C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India read with Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
  • Sections 239/240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis Sections 226/227/228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • provision of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code containing Sections 226 and 227
  • Sections 226, 227, 228 Cr.P.C. and under Section 238 and 239 Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Section 226 of the Code
  • provision of Section 239 of the Code.
  • provision of Section 226. Section 227
  • Section 173 of the Code.
  • Section 226 of the Code,
  • Section 239 Cr.P.C.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged the impugned orders dated 13th January, 2017 and 21st June, 2018 passed by the learned 4th Special Court, Kolkata in Special Case No. 5 of 2013 arising out of Taltala Police Station Case No. 101. The orders rejected the application seeking determination of whether the accused persons have the right to begin argument or whether the prosecution must address the court first in relation to an application for discharge of the accused under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). The accused had filed an application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. praying for discharge and contended that they should be allowed to advance arguments first before the prosecution replies. The learned Judge initially held that the accused should argue first and listed the matter for hearing accordingly. The petitioner contested this approach, arguing that the prosecution must open the case first as per relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. and constitutional safeguards.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused persons have the right to begin argument on an application for discharge, or whether the prosecution must address the court first.
  2. The proper procedural mode of hearing at the stage of consideration of charge/discharge under the provisions of the Cr.P.C., especially in warrant trial cases before a Magistrate or Special Court.
  3. The extent of the accused’s right to produce material or evidence at the stage of framing of charge or discharge application.
  4. The interplay between the provisions of Sections 226, 227, 228, 238, 239, 240 of the Cr.P.C. and their application to discharge and framing of charge.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The accused persons argued that since they filed an application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. for discharge, they must be allowed to argue first before the prosecution.
  • They contended that the procedural provisions under Sections 226, 227, 228 Cr.P.C., and Sections 238, 239 Cr.P.C. are similar and require the prosecution to open the case first before the accused addresses the court.

Respondent's Arguments (as summarized by the Court)

  • Relying on provisions of Sections 239/240 vis-à-vis Sections 226/227/228 Cr.P.C., the prosecution must address the court first, pointing out specific materials against the accused and proposing charges before the accused can rebut and seek discharge.
  • Section 4 of the Cr.P.C. mandates that the procedure prescribed therein must be followed for investigation, inquiry, or trial by a Magistrate, including cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • The procedure under Section 239 Cr.P.C. requires the Magistrate to hear the prosecution first upon submission of the police report and then hear the accused before deciding on discharge.
  • The accused do not have the right to produce material or evidence at the stage of framing of charge; their right to produce evidence arises only at trial.
  • The learned Judge’s order was consistent with settled law and procedural requirements, and the accused’s attempt to argue first was a tactic to delay proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hussein Ghadially @ MHGA Saikh & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat, (2014) 8 SCC 425 para 21.3 Statutory provisions must be followed in the manner prescribed; Section 239 Cr.P.C. procedure for discharge hearing. Supported the requirement that the prosecution must be heard first before discharge can be considered.
Rohitash Kumar & Ors. vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 451 Trial court cannot twist clear statutory language; discharge application hearing procedure. Reinforced that the court should not weigh evidence at discharge stage but consider prima facie case based on police report and documents.
Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors, 1999 (3) SCC 259 Court should not adopt hyper-technical approach at initial stage; discharge hearing scope. Confirmed that the court must consider the case broadly at discharge stage without detailed evidence appraisal.
State Anti-Corruption Bureau vs. P. Suryaprakasam, 1999 SCC (Cri.) 373 Scope of Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. at framing of charge; accused's right is limited to hearing. Established that the accused only has the right to be heard, not to produce evidence at framing stage.
Satish Mehra v. Delhi Admn, (1996) 9 SCC 766 Prosecution must describe charges and evidence; accused may produce material at Section 227 stage. Discussed but later distinguished by larger Bench; the accused cannot produce evidence at framing of charge.
State of Orissa vs. Debendranath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 Accused has no right to produce material at framing of charge stage. Held that accused cannot adduce evidence or material at framing of charge; right arises only at trial.
State Of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 Accused's right at framing of charge stage; no right to produce material. Supported the principle that accused cannot produce material at framing stage.
Supdtt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 Accused's procedural rights at framing of charge. Confirmed restrictions on accused's rights at framing stage.
State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi, (2000) 8 SCC 239 Accused's rights at framing of charge stage. Reiterated that accused cannot produce material at framing of charge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the procedural provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to discharge and framing of charges, particularly Sections 226, 227, 228, 238, 239, and 240. It emphasized that the stage of discharge under Section 239 and framing of charge under Section 240 are essentially one procedural stage requiring a single hearing. The Court highlighted that the prosecution must open the case first by pointing out specific materials and proposing charges based on the police report and documents submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The accused has the right only to be heard in response and does not have the right to produce evidence or materials at this stage, which is reserved for trial.

The Court rejected the accused’s contention that they should argue first merely because they filed an application under Section 239. It held that the accused’s attempt to argue first was an improper tactic to delay proceedings. The Court relied on authoritative Supreme Court decisions clarifying that the discharge application hearing is not a trial and does not involve weighing or sifting of evidence but only a prima facie consideration of whether there is sufficient ground to proceed.

The Court also noted that the procedure under Section 239 is mandatory and must be followed as prescribed, with the prosecution being heard first. The accused’s fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution are protected by affording them the right of audience at this stage, but this does not extend to adducing evidence. The Court found no merit in the petitioners’ challenge to the impugned orders and concluded that the learned Judge’s approach was consistent with settled law and procedural requirements.

Holding and Implications

The petitioners' revisional application is dismissed and the impugned orders are upheld.

The decision confirms that under Section 239 Cr.P.C., in an application for discharge, the prosecution must be heard first before the accused is given an opportunity to address the court. The accused do not have the right to produce evidence or materials at this stage; their right is limited to being heard. The ruling reinforces the procedural scheme of the Cr.P.C. and the settled legal position as interpreted by the Supreme Court. No new precedent is set; the direct effect is to uphold the trial court’s procedural approach and deny the accused’s attempt to invert the order of hearing, thereby preventing unwarranted delays in the trial process.

    Somen Bal v. State Of West Bengal

    SHIVAKANT PRASAD, J. Petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 13th January, 2017 and order dated 21st June, 2018 passed by the learned 4th Special Court, Kolkata in Special Case No. 5 of 2013 arising out of Taltala Police Station Case No. 101 dated 2nd April, 2018 whereby the learned Judge rejected the application for determination as to whether the accused persons have right to begin or it is for the prosecution to address the court in respect of an application for discharge of the accused persons under the provision of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). Necessary facts which requires consideration in this case is that an application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. was filed by the accused persons and it was argued on behalf of the accused persons at the hearing that since the accused persons have prayed for their discharge under Section. 239 of the Code, they have to advance argument first and then only the prosecution will reply. By the order no. 55 dated 13.01.2017 passed in the Special Case No. 5 of 2013 the learned Judge held that the accused persons having filed an application under Section 239 of the Code are required to advance argument first and accordingly, listed the matter on 14.02.2017 for hearing. Contentions raised by learned counsel appearing for the accused persons are that as per the provision laid down in Sections 226, 227, 228 Cr.P.C. and under Section 238 and 239 Cr.P.C., there is no material difference and the provisions enunciated therein are that prosecution has to open the case first and then only the accused has to address the case for discharge. So, merely because an application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the accused persons, they need not be called upon to begin with the hearing. Accordingly, Mr. Sandipan Ganguly through his written argument submitted that conjoint reading of Sections 239/240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis Sections 226/227/228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure leaves no manner of doubt that the prosecution is duty bound to address the Court first pointing out specific materials against each of the accused persons and proposing charges, if any, against them and only thereafter, the defence can be called upon to rebut the case made out by the prosecution, and press for discharge. My attention is adverted to the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code containing Sections 226 and

    227 wherein it has been provided that prosecutor shall open the case citing the evidence against the accused and thereafter shall propose the charges for framing thereunder the provision of Section

    226. Section 227 provides for discharge in Sessions Trial which enjoins that if upon consideration of the record of the case and document submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. It is settled principles of law that the purpose of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code is to ensure that the Court should be satisfied that the accusation made against the accused is not frivolous and there is some material for proceeding against him. So, obviously Court has to take into consideration prima facie case to find as to whether beyond reasonable doubt there is commission of offence for framing of charge. At the time of framing of charge, it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the accusation which the prosecution is bringing against the accused person is brought against him. At the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to see if there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. If the answer is affirmative, the order of discharge cannot be passed and accused has to face the trial. Therefore, only prima facie case is to be seen whether there exist prima facie case of offence punishable against the accused person. If there is no legal evidence, then obviously framing of charge would be redundant and then only it can be said that compelling the accused to go to trial will amount to infringement of his right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Consequently, I am of the view that it cannot be said that the accused persons have been deprived of their fundamental right of inquiry or trial by a Magistrate. It is submitted by Mr. Ganguly that Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that the procedure provided in the Code shall be followed for the purposes of conducting investigation, inquiry or trial by a Magistrate. Even in respect of Special Acts, the procedure laid down in the Code shall be followed unless otherwise provided in the Special Act. Obviously, the provision deals with the trial of all offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions. There is no doubt in it that the case under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are to be guided as per the procedure to be followed by the Special Court in warrant procedure before the Magistrate. The contention is that as per provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India read with Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the procedure laid down for warrant trial cases on police report should have been followed by the learned Judge. Mr. Ganguly relied on a decision in case of Hussein Ghadially @ MHGA Saikh & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2014) 8 SCC 425 para 21.3 wherein it has been observed that if the statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner alone to argue that Section 239 of the Code provides for the mode of hearing at the stage of consideration of charge/discharge. The provision relates to a trial of warrant cases by Magistrate. It provides that upon considering the police report and documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity being heard the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. It means the Magistrate has to afford an opportunity of hearing both to the prosecution and the accused before passing an order of discharge in favour of the accused. That is to say, when the Investigating Officer has submitted charge sheet on completion of investigation, the accused gets an opportunity to urge before the Court that no case is made out for framing of the charge prima facie against him and it is for him to satisfy the Court for discharge under the provision of Section 239 of the Code. Therefore, it is not for the Court to enter upon the processes of appraising the evidence at the stage of framing charge. It has to be on consideration of police report, the statements of the witnesses and other documents in the Case Diary under Section 173 of the Code. Thus, at the stage of consideration of charge though Court is only confined to the consideration of the police report and the documents for its decision as to whether the allegation in the police report is groundless. The discharge connotes that it has to be in relation to specific offence for which the accused has been charged with but it does not mean that the accused cannot be proceeded against for some other offences if there are prima facie materials in the charge sheet and the Case Diary. Referring to decision in case of Rohitash Kumar & Ors. vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 451, para 27 to 29, 32, 35, Important para 28 it is argued that the Court cannot twist the clear language of the enactment in order to avoid any real or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause. The Trial Court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an inquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and the documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed. As observed by the Honble Apex Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors. [1999 (3) SCC 259], the High Court or the Magistrate are also not supposed to adopt a strict hyper-technical approach to sieve the complaint through a cullendar of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with which the accused is charged. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage. In State Anti-Corruption Bureau vs. P. Suryaprakasam reported in 1999 SCC (Cril.) 373, the scope of Sections 239 and

    240 of the Code was considered and it was held that at the time of framing of charge the court is required to consider only the police report referred to under Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent with it. The only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond that. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, Section 239 mandates that the prosecution is required to be heard first even at the time of consideration of the prayer for discharge. Section 239 and 240 provides for a one and the same consideration and lays down a composite compendious procedure and the provisions do not pertain to two different stages but provide for a single or one consideration, one hearing and one procedure. Words upon such consideration, hearing appearing in Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refer to the same consideration, hearing etc., as mentioned in Section 239 of the Code. They are two faces of the same provision split in two provisions for procedural case. So, the stage of discharge under Section 239 and framing of charge under Section 240 of the Code are not different stages but refer to a single stage. Contrastingly, in Chapter XIX, Clause A of the same Code, in warrant triable cases based on police report, Section

    239 provides ...after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard... is used. A question arises as to why the legislature which had enacted a specific mode of hearing of a discharge application under Chapter XVIII of the Code changed the said mode in Chapter XIX. The only possible and plausible interpretation is that because of non existence of a provision like Section 226 of the Code, the legislature has consciously put the burden on the prosecution to address the Court first by pointing out the materials from case record. Accordingly, it is submitted that the learned Judge failed to consider that when the plain language of Section 239 of the Code mandates that the prosecution is required to be heard first, then whether or not an application for discharge has been filed mode of hearing provided in law cannot be digressed. I find from the scheme of the Code relating to framing of charge and discharge of the accused at the sessions trial or trial in a warrant case or in a summons case, the Court has to consider prima facie that a case has been made out against the accused before framing of charge. Sections are Ss. 227 and 228 relating to sessions trial; Ss. 239 and 240 relating to trial in a warrant case; and Ss. 245(1) and (2) qua trial in a summons case. Under Sections 227 and 228 no court takes note of Section

    226 which obliges the prosecution to describe the charge brought against the accused and state by what evidence the guilt of the accused would be proved. This point was considered in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Admn. reported in (1996) 9 SCC 766. It may reduce the workload of the courts if the trial courts insist upon the prosecution to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 226 of the Code inasmuch as the courts can discharge the accused if there is no prima facie case. The Supreme Court observed on the rationale of Section 227 thus: "14. The object of providing such an opportunity as is envisaged in Section 227 of the Code is to enable the court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the case ends there it gains a lot of time of the court and saves much human efforts and cost. If the materials produced by the accused even at that early stage would clinch the issue, why should the court shut it out saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial proceedings. Hence, we are of the view that the Sessions Judge would be within his powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code." The Court examined the purpose of Section 239 and observed: "13. Similar situation arises under Section 239 of the Code (which deals with trial of warrant cases on police report). In that situation the Magistrate has to afford the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard besides considering the police report and the documents sent therewith. At these two stages the Code enjoins on the court to give audience to the accused for deciding whether it is necessary to proceed to the next stage. It is a matter of exercise of judicial mind. There is nothing in the Code which shrinks the scope of such audience to oral arguments. If the accused succeeds in producing any reliable material at that stage which might fatally affect even the very sustainability of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no such material shall be looked into by the court at that stage. Here the 'ground' may be any valid ground including insufficiency of evidence to prove the charge." In consideration of the aforesaid proposition it is not only incumbent upon the prosecution to describe the charge brought against the accused. To conclude, it must be said that the prosecution is obliged to place the material against each of the accused before calling upon the trial court to frame the charges and the trial courts are required by law to record its reasons as to why it proceeded qua the charged accused and as to why it proceeded to discharge the accused for want of materials against each of the accused so that superior courts can examine the correctness of it. Larger Bench of three Judges of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Debendranath Padhi reported in 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 415 : (2005) 1 SCC 568 determined a pertinent question as to whether the trial Court can consider material filed by the accused at the time of framing of charge, the said question was answered in the negative holding that the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material and there is no provision in the Code to grant to the accused any right to file any material or documents at the stage of framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial. It was held that Satish Mehra case (supra) holding that the trial Court has powers to consider even material which the accused may produce at the stage of 227 of the Code was considered not correctly decided. It is well settled law that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his evidence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. Examining the decisions in case of In State Of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh reported in [(1977) 4 SCC 39]; Supdtt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja reported in (1979) 4 SCC 274 and State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi reported in (2000) 8 SCC 239 bearing on the point in issue the Honble Apex Court held that at the time of framing of charge the accused has no right to produce any material. In the context of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that the learned Judge is called upon to consider the charge against the accused person based on the police report submitted under Section 173 of the Code upon giving an opportunity to the accused right of audience to address the Court for their discharge as grant of such right to the accused person petitioner would be in their interest to have right to access to justice and fair trial as enshrined as fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The prosecution is only obliged to show from the police report and materials placed thereon that the charges are made out against the accused persons prima facie of the commission of offence to enable the learned Court to frame charge, however, before such exercise is under taken it is imperative for the Court to give the accused persons right of audience in respect of their application under Section 239 of the Code. Therefore, I find that the petitioners by taking out application for determination by the Court as to whether prosecution has right to begin first or the accused persons have right to address the Court appears to be preposterous steps taken by the accused petitioners only to delay the proceeding before the Special Court. Having regard to the observation made in the order impugned, I do not find it to be devoid of any merit. According, the revisional application being CRR 1839 of 2018 together with CRAN 2074 of 2018 are disposed of. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. (SHIVAKANT PRASAD, J.)

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    Somen Bal v. State Of West Bengal
    (Sep 11, 2018)