1. The Court: This is a writ petition by five writ petitioners asking for electricity supply to their flats which are all situated in the same five-storied building.
2. They are without electricity from about May, 1998.
The building came up as and by way of a promoting agreement entered into between the respondent Nos. 4 and 6 who are respectively the owner and the promoter.
3. The agreement provided for building by the promoter and thereafter an allocation of 65% space to the promoter, 35% being reserved for the owner.
4. A Power of Attorney was also executed and according to the owner, at least as per his affidavit filed in an earlier matter, the Power of Attorney was valid until January, 1994. The owner has tried to resile from this position in this writ.
5. As per the writ petitioners the original supply stood in the name of the father of respondent No. 4. Some of the old bills allegedly paid by the writ petitioners are annexed to their supplementary affidavit. According to them this supply was got disconnected at the instance of the landlord and then it was got reconnected only to the owner's own benefit, after a lapse of only about one month.
6. (Vision not cleared)……………………………………………………..electricity. The stand of the CESC has been that they are ready and willing to give supply but the fixation of new meters will require some space, or alternatively some civil construction or work in some other part of the building. The CESC are willing to adopt either of the two alternatives, provided of course they are not obstructed physically in doing their jobs.
7. Mr. Roy Chowdhury appearing for the writ petitioners has submitted that under section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the licensee is to give supply on a consent being given either by the owner or the occupier of the premises. He showed me the Division Bench decision in the case of Ratnamala, reported at AIR 1990 Cal 26, wherein the disjunctive between “owner” and “occupier” has been emphasiged as to giving a true alternative. In other words owner or occupier means, what it says, and the occupier need not necessarily be the owner. He also relied on the case of Associated India, reported at 1989 (1) CLT 187, a Single Bench decision of our Court. He showed therefrom that the Court leaned in favour of grant of electricity where the dispute of a civil nature was pending between the applicant and the opponent. Thus Mr. Roy Chowdhury submitted that although disputes are pending between the respondent No. 4 and the petitioners, the petitioners should not be kept out of electricity supply.
8. These civil disputes pending between these parties are two in number. A suit has been filed by the respondent No. 4 against the writ petitioners at Alipore in the year 1998 claiming inter alia eviction and vacant possession. Again, as recently as in June, 1999 the writ petitioners have filed a suit for establishing their right to their flats, again at Alopore. Prior hereto sometime in the year 1995 the respondent No. 4 has obtained an ex parte decree at Alipore against the respondent No. 6, the promoter, whereby the promoting agreement and the Power of Attorney were both declared as cancelled. The writ petitioners were not parties to that suit.
9. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also submitted on the basis of the cases of Mukti Nath Jha and Jenson & Nicholson, reported respectively at 1995 (1) CHN 465 and 1994 (2) CHN 241 that essential supplies like water and electricity should not be withheld without good cause.
10. Mr. Banerjee appearing for the respondent No. 4 submitted that the occupier who can give consent to the licensee under section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, has to be a lawful occupier. He relied heavily upon sub-section (6) of that section which is re-produced below:
“(6) In this section, “occupier” of any building or land means a person in lawful occupation of that building or land.”
11. His submission was that any and every occupier is not entitled to give consent to the licensee and thus cause the licensee's entering into the premises for doing all works necessary for the giving of supply. He showed two instances from the cases of Surajbali Pandey and Aloke Saha, reported respectively at 1995 (1) CHN 533 and 1999 (1) CLJ 567, wherein a Single Judge and a Division Bench of our Court respectively had found the position of the applicant for electricity as not coming within the scope of lawful occupier, although in each case the applicant was an occupier in fact.
12. Mr. Banerjee submitted that at least as between the promoter and the original owner the promoting agreement is now non est. The writ petitioners have come into occupation on the basis of that non est agreement. According to Mr. Banerjee his client has not got possession of 35% floor area and without this the promoter could not give any portion of the 65% area to the writ petitioners. Mr. Banerjee's submission is that the occupation of the writ petitioners is not beyond doubt or dispute; according to the respondent No. 4 such occupation is not lawful and that is why an eviction suit has been filed against the writ petitioners. In these circumstances, the Court should not grant relief to the writ petitioners opining that they are lawful occupiers.
13. In this writ petition two orders were earlier passed by the Trial Court on 4.1.99 and 3.2.99 The effect of those orders was the grant of supply to the writ petitioners without affecting the rights of the private respondents.
14. The learned Judge noted that the order of status quo passed by the Alipore Court in the suit of the respondent No. 4 against the writ petitioners as regards their possession would continue, except for the purpose of giving of supply.
15. In appeals from those orders, however, both the orders were set aside by an order of the Division Bench passed on 1.3.99 The reason for setting aside of the orders was that there was no finding by the First Court that the possession of the writ petitioners was bona fide, or even prima facie so. In the absence of such a finding the grant of supply could not be sustained.
16. Thereafter, the matter has come before me and it has been finally argued out. The writ petition is for the purpose of enforcing statutory duty of the licensee, CESC to give supply to an applicant, and also, necessarily, for the purpose of removing all obstructions which might crop up in the matter of grant of such supply. Howsoever might the prayers be worded in the writ, since the writ petitioners ask for supply, their claims cannot be fulfilled unless the licensee gives supply and is allowed to do the jobs which are necessary for the grant of such supply.
17. The Electricity Supply Corporation is not unwilling to give supply in this case. However, without the intervention of the writ Court it is more than likely that the respondent No. 4 will not permit the giving of such supply, let alone permit use of required space for fixing of meters or making civil constructions for providing additional space elsewhere.
18. The real point of controversy, therefore, is whether the obstructions, if any, which might be put up by the respondent No. 4 in the way of grant of supply by the CESC should be blocked by passing of appropriate orders and if necessary, by appointment of a Special Officer. If an order of Mandamus is to-day passed against the CESC above then that would not solve the problem at all because the CESC was not unwilling to give supply.
19. If orders are to be passed against the private respondents for the purpose of enabling public respondents to do their duty then a finding has to be reached whether the writ petitioners are lawful occupiers within the meaning of sub-section (6) of section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.
20. If that expression is construed in a strict manner and the meaning ascribed to that expression is that the occupier is lawful, by any standards and without any doubt or dispute being there, in regard to the lawful nature of occupation, then and in that event the writ petition must fail. This is simply because no fewer than two civil suits are pending as between the warring parties here.
21. If, however, the expression lawful occupier is given a dilute meaning, in the sense that it is held as including all occupiers who are not in obviously unlawful occupation, although there might be doubts and disputes which have to be resolved later, then and in that event the writ petitioners must succeed.
22. They are not criminals; when they came into possession in the early 90s there was no force applied by them; they have come in through the promoters who were inducted by the owner/landlord; the owner/landlord being in the same premises, were aware that they are coming into occupations at least as alleged by the writ petitioners they have made payments to the promoter for getting their flats, although lately complaints were being filed in the Police Station the disputes between the petitioners and the respondent No. 4 are purely of a civil nature which might go this way or that and the Writ Court is not the proper Court for making any pronouncement in that respect.
23. This situation is of common occurrence. When civil disputes are pending between two parties it is often the case that one party wants electricity connection and another party, may be the seller, may be the landlord, wishes to stop giving of such connection. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it is most inappropriate to allow any party to utilize the non-giving of essential supplies to the opposite party as a means or tool of putting extraneous pressure in the matter of resolution of civil disputes. Because of this reason I would interpret the words “lawful occupier” in sub-section (6) in a reasonably dilute manner. All occupiers who are peace loving, who have an arguable case which might succeed in the end are entitled to get electricity connection notwithstanding opposition by the opponents. In case they are thrown out they will be thrown out of duly electrified premises and that is not a matter which is likely to affect the substance of the civil dispute or litigation amongst the parties.
24. In our case there is a lot of material which might go to support the writ petitioners. I have mentioned the facts above and I do not want to repeat the positive aspects in favour of the writ petitioners here as, I make it abundantly clear, that the order or observations herein shall not in any manner affect the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court in deciding future litigation amongst the parties there.
25. In this view of the matter the writ application succeeds. There will be rule absolute as prayed for in terms of prayers (a) and (b) subject to what is said hereunder, and subject to this, that the CESC shall allot meters and consumer numbers to the writ petitioner as per their usual rules, conditions and practice.
26. Upon payment of all costs, charges and expenses by the writ petitioners the CESC shall give supply to them and each of them in accordance with law within a period of 12 weeks from date hereof. The respondents are restrained from putting any obstruction in the way of grant of such supply. The respondents shall permit all works necessary to be done by the CESC to be executed within the said premises, if necessary, by making necessary civil construction in that regard, the CESC and its men shall be permitted free access and entry into the premises in question and all necessary parts thereof for the purpose of carrying out of this order.
27. For the purpose of appropriate supervision of the above work, I appoint Mr. Ajoy Dasgupta, formerly Chief Law Officer of the CESC and now a practicing Advocate of this Court as Special Officer for supervising the above works. The parties will render him full assistance. He will be paid a remuneration of Rs. 5,001/- by the writ petitioners in the first instance.
28. All parties, the Special Officer and all others concerned to act on a signed xerox copy of this dictated order on the usual undertakings.
Writ petitions allowed.
A.A