Rajan, J.:— This writ appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P No. 3260 of 1987, dated 21 August, 1996.
2. The second respondent is an employee in the appellant-Pandiyan Roadways Corporation. He absented himself from duty from 7 February, 1985 to 16 February, 1985, for a period of nine days and again on 12 April, 1985, he did not report for duty at 12.45 P.M instead sent a telegram, which was received in the office at 2.10 P.M Subsequently, the second respondent did not send any leave letter in writing. Again from 4 June, 1985 he was absent from duty without any leave letter. The management deducted the salary for the days of his absence without leave.
3. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai, accepted the claim of the petitioner-Corporation for deduction wages for the period from 4 June, 1985 to 7 June, 1985 and did not agree with the order passed by the appellant-Corporation in respect of other deductions on the ground that no notice was given before deductions were made. The appellant-Corporation has filed the writ petition against the order of the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner. Learned Single Judge of this Court by order, dated 21 August, 1996, dismissed the writ petition. It is against the order of the learned Single Judge, the present writ appeal has been preferred.
4. The second respondent though filed vakalath, did not appear when the case was taken up for hearing. Therefore, this Court appointed Sri V. Anantharaju, as amicus curiae, and he has also putforth the case effectively on the side of the second respondent.
5. The only point that arise for consideration in this appeal is, whether notice is necessary before deductions are made from the salary of an employee for the period of his absence from duty.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that as per the Standing Orders, only in case of acts of indiscipline, enquiry has to be conducted. The enumerated acts of misconduct as per Cl. 16 of the Standing Orders, abence from duty does not find a place. Therefore, according to the Standing Orders, the absence from duty of an employee of the appellant-Corporation does from part of misconduct.
7. Proviso to Cl. 7 of the Standing Order reads as follows:
“Ordinarily the previous permission of the head of the department in the establishment shall be obtained before such leave is taken, but, when this is not possible, the head of the department shall as soon as may be practicable be informed in writing of the absence from and of the probable duration of such absence.”
In this case, admittedly, the second respondent had not informed in writing, even on any subsequent date, for the period of his absence from duty. Mere telegram is not sufficient compliance with Cl. 7 of the Standing Orders. The counsel also submitted that when telegram if issued, it is only a prior intimation, which is necessarily to be followed by subsequent leave letter in writing. If such leave letters in writing are not forwarded, the telegram issued even though by the same employee, will not have the effect of compliance with Cl. 7 of the Standing Orders. This argument of the learned counsel is acceptable. The mere issuance of telegram does not amount to compliance with sending a leave letter in writing. Therefore, when such telegrams are issued, it should be followed by a leave letter in writing to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that under S. 7(2)(b) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, hereinafter referred to as the Act, deductions from the wages of an employed person shall be made only in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Deductions for absence from duty is one of the provisions of the Act and by which wages can be deducted. Therefore, the authorities are well within their powers when they deducted the salary for the days the employee was absent from duty. There is no necessity to issue prior notice in case of deduction of salary for the days of absence from duty.
9. The amicus curiae, who appeared on behalf of the second respondent has placed before this Court some of the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court, in Controller of Examinations v. G.S Sunder [1993 Supp (3) SCC 82], the Supreme Court has held that when the employee knew the charges fully, the technicalities of law should not be imported to further the case of such employees. Following this decision of the Supreme Court, the Allahabad High Court in Mohd. Bux v. District Judge, Jhansi, [1997-II L.L.J 372], has held as follows:
“It is now established that withholding of payment of wages for whatsoever reason, when entitlement of the workmen is denied, is a deduction unless liability to pay is admitted. In the facts of this case there cannot be second opinion that the amount represents deduction and such amount has to be refunded, together with the compensation as the authority may deem fit to decide. While the interest of the workman has to be looked into at the same time, the conduct of the employer is also a relevant factor for determining the amount of compensation.”
10. In Pandian Roadways Corporation, Ltd. v. Principal District Judge, Madurai, [(1996) 3 I.L.R 1200], a learned Single Judge of this Court has held as follows:
“But when the petitioner is aware of the consequence of his own action or he is expected to know about such consequences when he does not act, it cannot be said that even in such circumstances, a decision has been taken or order has been passed affecting his rights to the surprise of the person affected.”
11. Similar view was taken by one of us in the decision reported in Pandian Roadways Corporation, Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour [1997 (3) L.L.N 386] which reads as follows, in Para. 5, at page 388:
“… the purpose of notice of enquiry before an order is passed or decision is taken affecting any civil right of the citizen is to give him an opportunity to defend, if there is a possibility to defend. The principle behind the granting of an opportunity is that the affected person should not be taken by surprise, i.e, his right should not be affected in a surprising or unexpected manner, but when the petitioner is aware of the consequences of his own action or he is expected to know about such consequences when he does not act, it cannot be said that even in such circumstances, a decision has been taken or order has been passed affecting his rights to the surprise of the persons affected …”
12. In the recent case reported in Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [(2000) 7 SCC 529 : A.I.R 2000 S.C 2783], the Supreme Court has approved its earlier decision in S.L Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379 : A.I.R 1981 S.C 136], and held as follows:
“if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice.”
13. Further, the amicus curiae appearing for the second respondent took us through various provisions of the Act. Section 7(2) deals with deduction of wages and S. 8 deals with imposition of fine and S. 10 of the Act deals with deduction for damage or loss. Further, the case of the amicus curiae is that prior notice is necessary in case of deduction of wages for the period of absence from duty. However, as per proviso to S. 7(2) of the Act, issuance of such notice is not provided for.
14. It is axiomatic principle that the principles of natural justice can be dispensed with by a statute. Where the Legislature thought fit to provide for prior notice before imposition of fine under S. 8 of the Act and before deductions for damage or loss sustained and for various other acts of commission by the employees, it has not thought it fit to provide for issue of prior notice for deduction of wages for absence from duty. Hence, though notice was not necessary before deduction of wages for the days or absence from duty, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge is not acceptable and hence it is set aside. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed. No costs.
15. We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Sri V. Anantharaju, amicus curiae, in this matter.