1. This revisional application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was directed against the order impugned No. 24 dated 22.6.2001 passed by Sri B.N Das, learned Additional District Judge, 10th Court, Alipore in connection with Misc. Case No. 8 of 2000 arising out of Matrimonial Suit No. 16 of 2000. It appears from the impugned order that O.P/respondent/wife filed a Matrimonial Suit under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights and also for injunction against the present petitioner husband. The petitioner husband appeared there and challenged the maintainability of the proceeding on the ground that he had already obtained decree of divorce from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen Country, USA in Docket No. FM 02-2298-99 (Civil Action) hereinafter referred to as “foreign decree” to which jurisdiction the wife submitted by giving answers to the summons and accordingly the marriage tie between the parties had since, been dissolved by order dated 22.5.2000 The learned trial Judge after hearing both the parties dismissed the plea of the husband and found the suit maintainable. Against that order the present revisional application arose.
2. The case of the respondent wife in the suit being Mat. Suit No. 16 of 2000 filed by her, as it is gathered from the impugned order itself is very simple and nothing exceptional to many other such cases instituted in different Courts of our country. Thus, one Mr. Atri Guha came from U.S.A to India and married the O.P/respondent Srimati Mahua Guha on 9.8.96 according to Hindu rites and customs. They lived together as husband and wife till 21.8.96 and thereafter Atri left for New York USA where he was employed. At the time of departure he gave out that he would take back Mahua. Thereafter Atri did not show any interest to take her to USA despite all efforts taken by Mahua for the purpose, nor did Atri provide any financial assistance to Mahua. Since then although Mahua lived in her matrimonial house and till today she has been living there. Thereafter to her utter dismay Mahua received a summons from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen Country (Civil Action). In that case Atri prayed for a decree of divorce against Mahua. Mahua replied to that summons to the effect that the said foreign Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case as the marriage was solemnised in India and Mahua never lived in the USA. It was also contended by Mahua in response to the summons that her husband practised fraud upon her as he had no intention to take her to the USA. The husband filed an application before the trial Court in India stating, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable on the ground that the husband already obtained a decree of divorce dated 22.6.2000 from the Superior Court of New Jersey, USA.
3. The contention of the wife against that petition of the husband before the trial Court was that the decree passed by the foreign Court was not binding upon her on the grounds that her case falls within the exceptional Clauses (a) & (b) of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as the purported foreign decree was not pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction and secondly it was not on merits of the case.
4. Mr. S.C Bagchi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner husband stated that the O.P/wife submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court inasmuch as she had replied to some queries of the said Court, but at the same time Mr. Bagchi admits that the decree of the foreign Court was an ex parte one and no written statement was filed by the O.P/wife. Mr. Bagchi has drawn my attention to the Cause Title of the plaint in connection with Matrimonial Suit filed by Shrimati Mahua Guha wherefrom it appears that the address of her husband was shown within the territorial jurisdiction of New Jersey Court. Mr. Bagchi has also drawn my attention to the information filed by the wife to the summons issued by the foreign Court and tries to impress upon me that thereby the wife submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. It is also contended by Mr. Bagchi that the said information to the summons verified on 15.10.99 was virtually the written statements of the wife. Mr. Bagchi has also argued that the judgment of the foreign Court was a reasoned one and that is why it was passed on merits. Mr. Bagchi has referred to a number of case laws which I shall discuss at the material point of time.
5. Mr. S.P Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing for the O.P/wife submits that the parties lived together as husband and wife in India immediately after the marriage only for 13 days and thereafter the wife had no occasion to go to USA. It is also pointed out by him that since her marriage Mahua has been living with her mother in law in Calcutta. Mr. Mukherjee has taken me through the provisions of Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act which determines the jurisdiction of the Court. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the wife never submitted to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Court and the said foreign Court is not at all competent to decide the issue in terms of the provisions of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act. From the complaint filed before the New Jersey Court and order passed by the said foreign Court Mr. Mukherjee tries to impress upon me that the said foreign Court acted on the prevailing Laws of New Jersey. Moreover, Mr. Mukherjee further submits, no evidence or ground for such decree had been discussed in the foreign judgment. It is also pointed out by him that the foreign judgment is conspicuously silent as regards the prayer of the O.P/wife for the provision of passage money for the O.P/wife in order to enabling her to go to the USA and to contest the case there, Mr. Mukherjee has also referred to a number of case laws which I shall discuss later on.
6. New, from the submissions made by the learned Counsels for the parties and the facts and circumstances of the case the following points have come up for consideration:—
1. Whether the O.P/wife submitted to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Court;
2. Whether the foreign decree of divorce is binding upon the O.P/wife in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. Mr. Bagchi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/husband has referred to the ratio decided in the case of Satya (Smt) v. Teja Singh (Shri). ((1975) 1 SCC 120 : AIR 1975 SC 105). In the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court appears to have dealt with the problem of the municipal law or of conflict of laws and was of the view that every such case which comes before an Indian Court must be decided in accordance with Indian Law. The Hon'ble Apex Court was specific in this regard that it is implicit that the foreign law must not offend against our public policy. The Supreme Court also held that the principles of Private International Law governing matters within the divorce jurisdiction are so conflicting in the different countries that not unoften a man and a woman are husband and wife in one jurisdiction but treated as divorced in another jurisdiction. The principles of the American and English conflict of laws are not to be adopted blindly by Indian Courts and thereafter the Hon'ble Apex Court also held that our notions of a genuine divorce and of substantial justice and the distinctive principles of our public policy must determine the rules of our private International Law. But an awarness of foreign law in a parallel jurisdiction would be a useful guideline in determining these rules. The Hon'ble Apex Court then held:—
“The validity of a foreign judgment rendered in a civil proceeding must be determined in India on the terms of Section 13, Civil P.C if the judgment falls under any of the clauses of Section 13 it will cease to be conclusive as to any matter thereby adjudicated upon and will be open to collateral attack on the grounds mentioned in Section 13. It is beside the point that the validity of the judgment is questioned in a Criminal Court and not in a civil Court.”
8. Mr. Bagchi has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh ((1983) 3 SCC 118 : AIR 1983 SC 684) in which it was inter alia held that the judgments or orders passed in admiralty, probate proceedings, incolsvency, matrimonial etc. being judgment in rem would always be admissible irrespective of whether they are inter parties or not. Mr. Bagchi has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of Padmini Mishra v. R.C Mishra in which the ratio decided in the case of Satya v. Teja Singh (supra) has been referred to. It was also observed in that case by the learned single Judge that where, in a suit filed by the wife for obtaining a decree of divorce, the wife alleges fraud by the husband in obtaining decree of divorce in foreign Court, particulars thereof must be given in the plaint and the allegations constituting fraud must be clear, definite and specific. In the said case, the defendant-husband left for USA shortly after the marriage and thereafter the plaintiff wife joined her husband sometime in April 1975. Accordingly to the plaintiff, she lived with her husband in U.S.A till August 1975, during which time she found that the relationship was getting strained and there was termeramentally incompatibility. The facts of this case have got no bearing with the instant case before me, for, in the instant case despite all efforts of the wife she could not join her husband in U.S.A for the utter apathy from the side of her husband.
9. Mr. Bagchi has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of Anoop Beniwal v. J.S Beniwal (AIR 1990 Delhi 305) in which the learned Judge held as below:—
“Where the Courts in England were competant to entertain the petition for divorce filed by the husband (Indian) and the matter was set down for trial as a contested matter and the Judge preferred the evidence of the husband to the evidence tendered by the wife and passed a decree nisi, which was made absolute and thus the decree was passed on the merits and the provision in Indian law, i.e Hindu Marriage Act, covered the same ground as is covered by the similar provisions of the English Act under which the decree was granted and the party, i.e the wife challenging the decision as null and void had the opportunity to defend and requirement as to conferment of jurisdiction was complied with the wife would have no cause of action to challenge the conclusiveness of the judgment of the Court of England as the same did not suffer on account of any of the exceptions made in Section 13 of C.P.C”
10. A xerox copy of the answer of the wife to the summons issued by the foreign Court appears to have been annexed to the revisional application wherein the statement made in the suit filed by the wife before Alipore Court for restitution of her conjugal rights appears to have been echoed. Besides in Paragraph 2 it has been clearly stated that the plaintiff left New York on 31.3.1997 In Paragraph 4 of the answer it was specifically mentioned that “the statement” the parties are separated on or about 1st April, 1997’ is utter falsehood and has been made to invoke the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court.” It was further stated there that under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by which the parties are guided the jurisdiction to try the suit for divorce lies with the district Court, under whose jurisdiction the marriage was slomnised or the parties last resided together as husband and wife. After having stated all this the wife prayed for a direction upon the plaintiff to pay passage money to the defendant/wife for her going “to your Honour's Court and back with one companion and cost of their stay at New Jersey and the litigation cost the amount of which may be fixed by your Honour having regard to the income and status of the plaintiff. “Thus, it is candid from the prayer made in the answer to the summons that the defendant/wife had the intention to contest the matter before the foreign Court and at the same time the jurisdiction of the foreign Court was also challenged by the defendant/wife. In this background the most pertinent question of law arises as to whether by such assertion by way of giving answer to the summons as stated above the wife had submitted the jurisdiction of the foreign Court or not.
11. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the O.P/wife has referred to the ratio decided in the case of Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi ((1991) 3 SCC 451). In that case the appellant/husband married respondent No. 1 in India at Tirupati in 1975 according to Hindu law but they were separated in 1978 for which the appellant filed an application for dissolution of the marriage in the Sub-Court of Tirupati averring that he was a resident of New Orleans, Louisiena, USA and that he was a citizen of India. Meanwhile in 1980 he filed another application for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court of St. Louis Country, Missouri, USA. In the petition he besides alleging that he had been resident of the State of Missouri for 90 days been resident of the State of Missouri for 90 days or more immediately preceding the filing of the petition, alleged that respondent No. 1 had deserted him for one year or morenext preceding the filing of the petition by refusal to continue to live with him in the United State. It was clear from the averments that both the respondent No. 1 and the appellant had last resided together at New Orleans, Louisiena and never within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of St. Louis Country in the State of Missouri. The respondent No. 1 filed her reply without prejudice to the contention that she was not submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. However, the Circuit Court passed a decree for dissolution of marriage on February 19, 1980 in the absence of respondent No. 1 on the only ground that the marriage was “irretrievably broken”. The petition before the Sub-Court of Tirupati was there upon dismissed as not pressed on the application of appellant No. 1. In deciding the case the Hon'ble Apex Court noted certain facts relating to the decree of dissolution of marriage passed by the Circuit Court. This, it was noticed by the Apex Court in the first instance that the foreign Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter on the ground that the appellant No. 1 had been a resident of the State of Missouri for 90 days next preceding the commencement of the action and that petition in that Court. Secondly, the decree had been passed on the only ground that there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marraige between the parties can be preserved, and that the marriage is, therefore, “irretrievably broken,” Thirdly, respondent No. 1 had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The further findings of the Hon'ble Apex Court in this connection are as below:—
“From the record, it appears that to the petition she had filed two replies of the same date. Both are identical in nature except that one of the replies begins with an additional averment as follows: “without prejudice to the contention that this respondent is not submitting to the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, this respondent submits as follows.” She had also stated in the replies, among other things, that (i) the petition was not maintainable, (ii) she was not aware if appellant had been living in the State of Missouri for more than 90 days and that he was entitled to file the petition before the Court, (iii) the parties were Hindus and governed by Hindu Law and they were married at Tirupati in India according to Hindu Law, (iv) she was an Indian citizen and was not governed by laws in force in the State of Missouri and, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, (v) the dissolution of the marriage between the parties was governed by the Hindu Marriage Act and that it would not be dissolved in any other way except as provided under the said Act, (vi) the Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the foreign laws and none of the grounds pleaded in the petition was sufficient to grant any divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act.”
In the said case the respondent No. 1 was neither present nor represented in the Court and the Court passed the decree in her absence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in course of discussing the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the scope of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure observed as under:—
“Under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the “ACT”) only the District Court within the local limits of whose original civil jurisdiction (i) the marriage was solemnized, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at the time, residing outside the territories to which the Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive, has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The circuit Court of St. Louis Country, Missouri had, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain the petition according to the Act under which admittedly the parties were married. Secondly, irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one of the grounds recognised by the Act for dissolution of marriage. Hence, the decree of divorce passed by the foreign Court was on a ground unavailable under the Act.
Under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”), a foreign judgment is not conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the parties if (a) it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction; (b) it has not been given on the merits of the case, (c) it is founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognize the law of India in case in which such law is applicable, (d) the proceedings are opposed to natural justice, (e) it is obtained by fraud, (f) it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.”
12. It may be mentioned here that in deciding the said case the Hon'ble Apex Court had also relied upon relief upon the ratio decided in the case of Satya (Smt) v. Teja Singh (Shri). (supra) as referred to by the learned Advocate for the petitioner and observed that it must be understood that the fraud need not be only in relation to the merits of the matter but may also be in relation to the jurisdictional facts. The Hon'ble Apex Court in deciding the case of Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) had formulated some rules for recognising a foreign matrimonial judgment in this country which has been described as followes:—
“The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign Court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.”
13. From all this the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed once again that those rules further take account of the needs of modern life and make due allowance to accommodate them. Above all, it gives protection to women, the most vulnerable section of our society, whatever the strata to which they may belong. “In particular it frees them from the bondage of the tyrannical and servile rule that wife's domicile follows that of her husband and that it is the husband's domiciliary law which determines the jurisdiction and Judges the merits of the case.”
14. Thus from the decision made by the Apex Court in the case of Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) it is perspicuous as to what is meant by “submission to the jurisdiction”. The said judgment of the Apex Court is suggestive enough as to whether in the instant case the O.P/wife had submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. In the instant case as I have mentioned in the foregoing pages, Mahua in her reply to the summons issued by the foreign Court had specifically challenged the territorial jurisdiction of that Court in terms of the Hindu Marriage Act. It may also be mentioned here that Mahua implored to the foreign Court for making arrangements of passage money for her and for one of her companions to go the USA for the purpose of contesting the litigation there and to come back. But the judgment passed by the foreign Court is conspicuously silent to that effect. In such background the question before me is whether giving replies to the summons of the foreign Court as has happened in the instant case, amounts to submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court or not. In this connection, I am tempted to quote the skimpy judgment passed by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen Country which reads asunder:—
“This matter coming on to be heard in the presence of Herbert F. Savoye, Jr. Esq., attorney for the plaintiff, and no one appearing for the defendant, and the Court having heard and considered the complaint and proofs and it appearing that plaintiff and defendant were married on the 9th day of August, 1996 and plaintiff having pleaded and proved a cause of action for divorce under the statute under such case made and provided and plaintiff was a bona fide residing of the State of New Jersey for more than one year next preceding the commencement of this action; and it further; Appearing that jurisdiction over the defendant has been acquired by service of process upon her by Registered Mail, return receipt requested, in India 77A Ibrahimpur Road, Calcutta in accordance with Rule 4:4(b) 1C and that an answer was filed by defendant on or about December 9, 1999; and it further; Appearing that there were no children born of the marriage and there is no claim made by plaintiff for equitable distribution; and it further; Appearing that the plaintiff has made out sufficient grounds for divorce against the defendant, entitling him to be granted a decree therefor, agreeable to the statutes of this State viz. J.S 2A: 3d-2d.
It is, therefore, on this 22nd day of May, 2000, by the Superior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division, Ordered and ADJUDGED, and such Court, by virtue of the power and authority of this Court, and of the acts of the legislature in such case made and provided, does hereby ordered and ADJUDGE that the plaintiff, ATRI GUHA, and the defendant, MAHUA ROY GUHA, be divorced from the bond of Matrimony for the cause aforesaid, and the parties and each of them be freed and discharged from the obligations thereof and that the marriage between the parties is hereby dissolved.”
15. A copy of the complaint filed in the Civil Action by Atri Guha has been annexed with the revisional application and it appears therefrom that the petitioner claimed himself to be the resident of the said State “ever since and for more than one year next preceding the commencement of the action continued to be such a bona fide resident”. As the grounds for divorce it was stated in the Paragraph 4 of the said complaint. “The parties separated on or about April 1, 1997 ever since which time and for more than 18 months said parties have lived separate and a part in different habitations, plaintiff having resided at 48 Levitt Avenue, Borgenfield, New Jersey and defendant having resided at 77A Ibrahimpur Road, Jadavpur, Calcutta, India. Said separation has continued to the present time and there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.” That was the only ground for divorce taken in the petition. But in replies to the summons sent by Mahua to the foreign Court she had made it abundantly clear as to how Atri is avoiding her from taking her to the United States.
16. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the provisions and grounds for divorce. From the complaint particularly what were stated in Paragraph 4 as I have quoted above it is clear that ground of desertion was the only ground for divorce taken by Atri before the foreign Court. The ground of desertion appears in Clause (1) sub-clause (1)(b) of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which reads as below:—
“Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.”
17. And this ground of desertion was emphatically challenged and denied by the wife. In fact, Mahua wanted to contest the matter in order to establish her claim that the said foreign Court had no jurisdiction under the Hindu Marriage Act to decide the dispute for which she also prayed to the said foreign Court for making arrangements for passage money. But the foreign Court did not pass any order on such prayer of Mahua and thereby Mahua was eschewed from contesting the case before the foreign Court. This is not, in my considered view, after having followed the ratio decided in the case of Y. Narasimha (supra) what is called submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court in interpreting clause (b) of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure observed as follows:—
“Clause (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign judgment has not been given on the merits of the case, the Courts in this country will not recognize such judgment. This clause should be interpreted to mean (a) that the decision of the foreign Court should be on a ground available under the law under which the parties are married, and (b) that the decision should be a result of the contest between the parties. The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself herself to the jurisdiction of the Court and contests the claim or agrees to the passing of the decree with or without appearance. A mere filing of the reply to the claim under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court, or an appearance in the Court either in person or through a representative for objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits of the case.”
(underlined for emphasis).
18. Thus, mere filing replies to the summons by the wife to the foreign Court is not what is called submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. Accordingly I am to hold from the facts and circumstances and in view of what has been discussed in the foregoing lines that Mahua did not submit to the jurisdiction of New Jersey Court, USA.
19. The next question for consideration is whether the said foreign decree of divorce is binding upon the O.P/wife. I can come down to the simple answer in view of the fact, as discussed above, that Mahua did never submit to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Court and as such the decree passed by that Court is not binding upon her, Secondly, again after having followed the ratio decided in the case of Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) wherein it is held in terms of clause (d) of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the foreign judgment is unenforceable on the ground that the proceedings in which it is obtained are opposed to natural justice which is elementary principle on which any civilised system of justice rests. I am to hold that the judgment passed by New Jersey Court is neither binding upon Mahua not enforceable against her.
20. The clause of desertion was taken in the complaint of Atri before the New Jersey Court and Mahua made it clear in her replies to the Summons as to how Atri had been eluding her. The judgment of the foreign Court as quoted above is conspicuously silent as regards the statement made by Mahua in reply to the summons and as such the said ex parte judgment does not appear to have been passed on merits. And this is the third ground as to why the said foreign judgment is not binding upon Mahua. The term desertion has been interpreted by the Apex Court in deciding the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey ((2002) 2 SCC 73 : AIR 2002 SC 591) and it was held:—
“Desertion”, for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a State of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e not permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. As desertion in matrimonial cases means the withdrawal of one party from a State of things, i.e a marital status of the party, no party to the marriage can be permitted to allege desertion unless he or she admits that after the formal ceremonies of the marriage, the parties had recognized and discharged the common obligation of the married life which essentially requires the cohabitation between the parties for the purpose of consumating the marriage. Cohabitation by the parties is an essential of a valid marriage as the object of the marriage is to further the perpetuation of the race by permitting lawful indulgence in passions for procreation of children. In other words, there can be no desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties. The basis for this theory is built upon the recognised position of law in matrimonial matter that no one can desert who does not actively or willfully bring to an end the existing state of cohabitation. However, such a rule is subject to just exceptions which may be found in a case on the ground of mental or physical incapacity or other peculiar circumstances of the case. However, the party seeking divorce on the ground of desertion is required to show that she was not taking the advantage of his or her own wrong.”
21. The aspects which have been stated in the above quoted observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court do not appear to have been considered by the foreign Court nor it did consider the case of Mahua as to what prompted her, if not compelled her to remain away from her husband which she had elaborated in her reply to the summons of the foreign Court. From that view also the judgment passed by the New Jersey Court is not on merits. And this is fourth ground as to why the said foreign judgment is not binding upon Mahua.
22. Accordingly, I do not find any merits in the present revisional application for which the same is liable to be dismissed.
23. The present revisional application, is, therefore, dismissed. The order impugned passed by the learned trial Court is hereby affirmed.
24. There shall be no order as to costs.
25. A copy of this order be sent down to the learned lower Court forthwith. On the prayer of learned Advocate for both the parties. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for be given to the parties by the Dept. forthwith.
26. S.K.G
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