ORAL ORDER
(PeR : Honourable Mr. Justice Akil Kureshi)
1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 1.12.2008 read with further order dated 30.8.2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Division-IV, Gandhinagar. The petitioner has also challenged a communication dated 19.11.2010 The petition arises in following factual background:-
1.1 An immovable property, namely office premises of ‘A Wing” 4th floor in a building called Maradia Plaza situated at C.G Road, Ahmedabad was previously owned by one M/s. Hirak Biotech Limited (The Company for short). The Company had, in course of its business, availed of certain bank loans. The Company did not repay dues to the Bank regularly. In addition to such Bank dues, the Company also had to discharge sales tax liability to the Sales Tax Department of the Government of Gujarat. Apparently, assessment proceedings for ascertaining and recovery of such sales tax dues were pending. During pendency of such proceedings, the property in question was purchased by the petitioner from creditor bank directly in discharge of the dues of the principal borrower i.e the Company. It may be noted that such sale was not through any public auction in terms of the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, but through private negotiations. The sale took place on 8.2.2010
1.2 It appears that for dues of the Sales Tax Department pending assessment proceedings to protect the interest of the Revenue, Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax had passed an order of attachment dated 28.11.2008 putting the property under the provisional attachment for a period of 6 months from the date of the order in terms of Section 45 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax, 2003 (VAT Act for short). This attachment was continued from time to time and on 30.8.2010 fresh further order of provisional attachment was passed. If one peruses the order of attachment dated 28.11.2008, it reveals that the Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that Value Added Tax dues of Rs. 2,40,09,444/- approximately including interest is outstanding from the Company to the Department. It is stated that for the year 2006-07 Company was required to pay the tax of Rs. 1,30,95,405/- which along with interest would come to Rs. 2,40,09,444/-. Pending completion of such assessment proceedings, he found it necessary that the property be put under provisional attachment. Order, therefore, directs that the company shall not dispose of the property in any manner without the permission of the competent authority. The provisional attachment was to enure for a period 6 months. Series of fresh orders of provisional attachment were passed, which are also produced on record. When the petitioner approached the department, she was informed vide communication dated 19.11.2010 that the property in question is under provisional attachment to secure the Government dues of the Company.
2. The petitioner has, therefore, challenged the said provisional attachment orders as well as communication dated 19.11.2010 in the present petition.
3. Counsel for the petitioner raised following contentions :-
1) That the power under Section 45 of the VAT Act to order provisions attachment vests with the Commissioner. In the present case, Deputy Commissioner could not have passed any order of provisional attachment.
2) That under Section 45 an order of provisional attachment can have effect only for the period of 1 year and no more. There is, thereafter, no power to pass fresh provisional attachment order.
3) That there is nothing on record to suggest that the Commissioner in terms of Section 45 of the VAT Act formed the opinion that for such period to protecting the interest of Government revenue, such provisional attachment was necessary.
4) Counsel for the petitioner also contended that the petitioner is a purchaser of the property for value without notice.
4. On the other hand learned AGP Ms. Maithili Mehta opposed the petition contending that the powers under Section 45 of the VAT Act have been delegated in Deputy Commissioner. She submitted that when the property was sold, the provisional attachment was also in existence and such attachment continued from time to time. The property therefore could not have been purchased by the petitioner.
5. All these questions were gone into by this Court in SCA No. 14213 of 2010, which came to be disposed of by order dated 4.3.2011 The issues raised were considered in the following manner:-
“5. Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that petitioner is bona fide purchaser of the property for value without notice. The Ahmedabad Peoples Cooperative Bank Ltd. had first charge over the property. On nonpayment of dues by M/s. Hirak Biotech Ltd, property was sold to the petitioner. The petitioner has paid huge sum of money to the bank.
5.1 It was next contended that attachment order could not have been passed by the Assistant Commissioner since Section 45 of the Act authorises only Commissioner to pass such order.
5.2 It was contended that there is nothing on record to suggest that Commissioner has formed an opinion that provisional attachment as envisaged in Section 45 of the Act was necessary.
5.3 It was contended that no attachment proceedings were pending when provisional attachment order was passed. Authorities therefore, had no jurisdiction to exercise powers under Section 45 of the Act.
5.4 In support of his contention, the petitioner relied on decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Baroda City Co-operative Bank ltd. v. The State of Gujarat reported in 2010 (3) GLR 2132, holding that unpaid dues of the Sales Tax do not have priority over the claim of the secured creditors.
6. On the other hand, on behalf of the State, learned AGP Ms. Mehta opposed the petition contending that powers under section 45 of the Act have been delegated to the Assistant Commissioner under Schedule A to order dated 1.4.2006 passed by the Commissioner in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the Act.
6.1 She contended that assessment proceedings were pending when provisional attachment order was passed on 24.6.2008
6.2 She further contended that huge debts of value added taxes are unpaid by the original owner.
6.3 She also relied on the provisions contained in Sections 46, 47 and 48 of the Act to distinguish the Division Bench judgement in case of Baroda City Co-operative Bank ltd. (supra) on the ground that provisions in the said Act are different from those contained in the Sales Tax Act which were interpreted by the Division Bench in the said decision.
6.4 She pointed out that the petitioner purchased the property long after same was put in provisional attachment.
7. Having thus heard learned advocates for the parties, before adverting to the rival contentions, we may clarify that our only query and scrutiny in the present petition is with respect to legality of provisional attachment orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner under sub-section(1) of Section 45 of the Act. Though in prayers of the petition, formally only provisional attachment order dated 1.12.2008 is called in question and such order has already lapsed due to passage of time and that therefore, prayers made in the petition has become infructuous, in the larger interest of justice, we have looked into the contentions raised since admittedly subsequently provisional attachment orders on the same premise and grounds have been passed and presently also provisional attachment continues.
8. Section 45 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to pass provisional attachment order in following terms :
45. Provisional attachment.
(1) Where during the pendency of any proceedings of assessment or reassessment of turnover escaping assessment the Commissioner is of the opinion that for the purpose of protecting the interest of the Government revenue, it is necessary so to do, he may by order in writing attach provisionally any property belonging to the dealer in such a manner as may be prescribed.
(2) Every such provisional attachment shall cease to have effect after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the order made under sub-section(1).
9. From the above, it can be seen that for assuming jurisdiction to pass an order, the competent authority has to form an opinion that for the the purpose of protecting the interest of the Government revenue, during the pendency of any proceeding of assessment or reassessment of any turnover escaping assessment, it is necessary to put the property belonging to the dealer under the provisional attachment. Sub-section(2) of Section 45 in turn provides that such provisional attachment order shall cease to have effect after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the order.
10. In the present case, though no substantial contention has been raised by the petitioner that when the order of provisional attachment was passed, no assessment or reassessment proceedings were pending, we in order to satisfy our conscience when such issue was raised orally before us, inquired from learned AGP regarding pendency of such proceedings. She made available for perusal several documents including notices to point out that long before passing of the first provisional order of attachment, assessment proceedings with respect to M/s. Hirak Biotech Ltd. were pending.
11. With respect to the contention that power under sub-section(1) of Section 45 can be exercised only by the Commissioner, we find that such power has been delegated under an order dated 1.4.2006 in Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Tax. Provisional orders therefore, passed by the Assistant Commissioner did not lack competence.
12. When we find that Assistant Commissioner on available material on record prima facie believed that huge tax dues of M/s. Hirak Biotech ltd. have remained outstanding and when such assessment proceedings were pending, his satisfaction that provisional attachment was required to be ordered in terms of sub-section(1) of Section 45 of the Act, cannot be stated to be without any basis, particularly in absence of any counter material placed by the petitioner on record.
13. Contention that an order of provisional attachment can last only for one year and that no further order thereafter, can be passed is not borne out from statutory provisions contained in Section 45 of the Act. It is undoubtedly true that Sub-section(2) of Section 45 statutorily provides for maximum life of a provisional order to last not beyond one year from the date of order. There is nothing in the language used in the said section to suggest that upon completion of such a period, no fresh order could be passed. Reading any such requirement or limitation would amount to supplying words not used in the section itself. Section 45 of the Act aims to protect Revenue's interest pending assessment proceedings by empowering the competent authority to pass provisional attachment order. To obviate, obvious inconvenience to an assessee, such provisional attachment order cannot be effective beyond one year. However, that by itself does not mean that if assessment proceedings are not completed within the said period and where the satisfaction of the Commissioner or his delegate that such attachment is required to safeguard interest of the Revenue looking to the dues of the dealer, no such fresh order could be passed. The section thus on one hand, require the competent officer to review the situation compulsorily at-least upon completion of the period, while so doing, does not limit his discretion to exercise such powers again if situation so arises. Contention of the petitioner that upon completion of maximum period prescribed under Sub-section(2) of Section 45, no fresh order of provisional attachment could be passed, therefore cannot be accepted.
14. Rival contentions with respect to priority of the State dues is not arising in the present petition. The Division Bench judgement in case of Baroda City Co-operative Bank ltd. (supra), pertains to the attempted recovery of Sales Tax dues from the owner or a subsequent purchaser of the property. Bench delivered the judgement on the basis of provisions contained in Gujarat Sales Tax Act. Statutory provisions involved in the present case are different. Further, we are concerned with provisional attachment and not sale of property. The property was purchased by the petitioner after final order of attachment is also a distinguishing factor.
15. Counsel for the petitioner also contended that petitioner being bona fide purchaser of value without notice, is not required to answer the State dues of value added tax. Counsel for the respondents, as already noted, pointed out that Sections 46 to 48 of the Act would materially change the situation, so far as value added tax is concerned. We refrain from making any observations on these aspects canvased by both sides simply because these are not issues arising in the present petition.
16. With the limited scope of the petition, examining the validity of the provisional attachment order, we are satisfied that no case is made out. Petition is therefore, dismissed.”
6. Since on all material aspects, facts are similar and contentions raised before us are also similar; following the observations and conclusions in the said order dated 4.3.2011 passed in SCA No. 14213 of 2010, we dismiss this petition also.