Sudhir Agarwal, J.:— Heard Sri. K.N Tripathi, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri. A.N Sinha, Advocate, for petitioner and Sri. Kshitij Shailendra, Advocate, for respondent.
2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 4.2.2003 passed by Addl. District Judge, Court No. 4, Moradabad allowing tenant-respondent's appeal and setting aside release order dated 29.10.1991 passed by Prescribed Authority. Petitioner is owner and landlord of accommodation in question which is a non residential accommodation. Respondent-tenant is running a Hotel business with the name and style of Natraj Hotel. Petitioner instituted proceedings for release of accommodation in question through its application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1972”) registered as P.A Case No. 97 of 1987 in the Court of Prescribed Authority, Moradabad. The application was allowed by Prescribed Authority/Second Addl. Civil Judge vide judgment dated 29.10.1991 but the said decision has been reversed by Appellate Court vide order impugned in this writ petition.
3. Petitioner, Smt. Nidhi, when instituted proceedings was a student of Class XII, and, being minor instituted proceedings through her father Sri. Yogendra Kumar Singh. In the Release Application, the case set up by her is that residential accommodation available with her father is inadequate and she needs more accommodation constituting separate bedroom, drawing room, study room etc. She also stated that her grand parents, for medical facilities, have to be shifted from village to Moradabad, hence she needs accommodation in question released from the tenancy of respondent-tenant.
4. During the pendency of application before Prescribed Authority, when her statement was recorded, she came to be a student of B.Sc (3rd year) and was of marriageable age. She also stated that various other relatives of petitioner were likely to come to Moradabad and, therefore, she needed accommodation in question. Prescribed Authority allowed release application.
5. Before the Appellate Court, when the matter came to be decided, the situation underwent major change. The Court noticed that petitioner after completion of her education was married on 23.1.1996 and her husband was a member of Indian Revenue Services. At that time he was posted at Delhi and presently, as informed by learned Senior Advocate, posted at Mumbai. The sisters of petitioner had also got married and living with their husbands, elsewhere.
6. Petitioner's father, Sri. Yogendra Kumar Singh, was residing in a different house owned by his father. He also had an agricultural land in village Salara. Petitioner completed her M.B.B.S before marriage and, thereafter, started residing with her husband.
7. Sri. K.N Tripathi, learned Senior Advocate, while arguing this matter could not dispute that since marriage in 1996 petitioner is residing with her husband and is not doing any medical practice at all.
8. In these facts and circumstances and looking to the above subsequent events, I am clearly of the view that the alleged need set up in Release Application has completely disappeared long back and, therefore, no relief be granted to petitioner by interfering with the judgment impugned in this writ petition. It cannot be doubted that such subsequent facts which have result of making basic claim of personal need disappear or extinguished have to be taken into consideration.
9. A three-Judge Bench of Apex Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 permitted cognizance of subsequent events, though very cautiously, and said:
“We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take subsequent cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.”
10. Again in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103, the cognizance of subsequent events was held permissible provided it wholly satisfy the requirement of petitioner/landlord who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. The Court said:
“Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events.”
(emphasis added)
11. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram 1992 Supp (2) SCC 623 a two-Judge Bench of Apex Court said that normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced. The only exception is that the Court is not precluded from moulding reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. Hon'ble M.N Venkatachalia, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed:
“The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief.”
12. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava. 2001 (1) ARC 352 (SC), the Court said that for the malady of judicial system of delayed justice, a landlord should not suffer. Every day may result in some kind of development and, therefore, every subsequent development would not deny claim of landlord on the pretext of a subsequent development since no one can be expected to stay idle for all times to come till a litigation is going on. It may happen that the lifetime of litigation may be more than that of litigant-landlord himself. Therefore, the judicial tardiness should not cause an irreparable loss to a landlord. It would be unjust to shut the door of justice to a landlord on the end of litigation after passing through various levels of litigation to deny him justice and relief sought only on the ground of certain developments occurred pendente lite because the tenant has been successful in prolonging litigation for an unduly extended long period. However, if the cause of action is submerged in such subsequent events, in other words, if the subsequent events are such as to satisfy the very requirement of landlord in its entirety, the same can be seen and there is no allergy in considering and taking note of subsequent events of importance which may justify remoulding of relief not on account of mere pendency of litigation but on account of the position and status of landlord and other relevant factors.
13. This matter was further examined in detail in Kedar Nath Agrawal v. Dhanraji Devi 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC) and having considered a number of authorities on the subject, the Apex Court, in para 16 of judgment, crystallized three aspects when subsequent events can be taken note by a Court of law, namely:
(i) The relief claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate; or
(ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation; or
(iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties.
14. In view of above exposition of law and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed above, I do not find any illegality in the impugned appellate order warranting interference.
15. Writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed.