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citation codes
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  • Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C along with Order I, Rule 10(2) C.P.C
  • Order VI, Rule 17 read with Order I, Rule 10(2)
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C along with Order I, Rule 10(2) C.P.C
  • Order VI, Rule 17 read with Order I, Rule 10(2)
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT

    Lakhan Debnath v. Narayan Chandra Dey

    JUDGMENT & ORDER

    This appeal by the claimant is directed against the award dated 6th August, 2004 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala in Case No. T.S (MAC) 408 of 1997 whereby he dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the claimant had failed to prove that the accident occurred with the vehicle in question.

    [2] In the claim petition it was alleged that the deceased who was the elder brother of the claimant was knocked down and hit by a vehicle bearing registration No. TR-01-2585 on 12 May, 1997. It is alleged that due to the injury sustained the deceased died instantaneously. In this case the claimant in his initial claim petition had shown Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey to be the owner of the vehicle, but in the original claim petition filed, it was stated that the vehicle No. TR-01-2585 was a Commander Jeep owned by Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey. Thereafter, the case was adjourned on a number of occasions for taking steps, but when the claimant did not take steps, on 25.08.1999 the case was adjourned sine-die.

    [3] Thereafter on 07.03.2000 the claimant filed a petition for recalling the order adjourning the case sine-die and also filed a petition under Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C along with Order I, Rule 10(2) C.P.C praying for amendment of the claim petition and addition of parties. These applications were allowed. Now, the claim petition was amended by showing one Smti. Mridula Dutta to be the owner of the vehicle, but the description of the vehicle was still given as Jeep.

    [4] Smti. Mridula Dutta appeared and stated that she had purchased the vehicle in question later on. She also stated that the vehicle was not a jeep but an Auto Rickshaw. Thereafter on 20 November, 2000 another application under Order VI, Rule 17 read with Order I, Rule 10(2) was filed. This application was allowed without any reasoned order on 21.05.2001 Again Sri. Narayan Ch. Dey was shown to be the owner of the vehicle but the description of the vehicle was changed from Jeep to Auto Rickshaw. Thereafter the parties led evidence. The claimant appeared as his own witness. He admittedly is not an eye witness to the occurrence. He, however, stated that his brother was knocked down by auto rickshaw bearing No. TR-01-2585 on 12.05.1997

    [5] No eye-witness of the accident was produced. Only reliance was placed on the FIR. This FIR was recorded on 12.05.1997 itself at the instance of one Sri. Subrata Deb who stated that on 12.05.1997 one vehicle dashed against an unknown person on Agartala Bishalgarh main road at Amtali and probably the vehicle was a Commander Jeep. He also stated that the accident occurred due to careless driving of the driver of the vehicle. He was thus an eye-witness to the occurrence but was not examined before the Tribunal. In the FIR relied upon by the claimant it was recorded that the vehicle was a Commander Jeep. No number of the vehicle was mentioned in the FIR. The police prepared the final report which has also been produced by the claimant and as per this final report it was stated that the deceased was a mentally unstable person and that on 12.05.1997 at 9.45 p.m the deceased was hit by a Commander Jeep. It was further stated that despite investigation the number of Jeep could not be traced out.

    [6] The claimant, when he stepped into the witness box did not give any explanation as to from where he came to know about the number of the vehicle. He was admittedly not at the spot and the number of the vehicle is not shown in any of the contemporaneous documents including the FIR or the final police report prepared on 31.07.1997 From where did the claimant come to know that the vehicle was bearing No. TR-01-2585? There is no explanation or answer to this question.

    [7] As pointed out above earlier this vehicle was shown to be a Commander Jeep and both in the FIR and in the final report it is stated that the deceased died as a result of an injury received in an accident with a Jeep. How did the Jeep turn into an Auto Rickshaw? This question also remains unanswered. There is no explanation as to from where the claimant came to know the number of the Jeep. Further there is no explanation why in the claim petition the vehicle was described was a Commander Jeep at the first stage and later the vehicle described as an auto rickshaw. A person who sees an accident may or may not note the number of the vehicle, but he will definitely note what is the type of vehicle which caused the accident. A person may make a mistake with regard to the brand or make over of a vehicle, but under no circumstances can a Jeep turn into an Auto Rickshaw or vice versa.

    [8] I am constrained to observe that in the short span of 5(five) months which I have been in Tripura, I have come across disproportionately large number of false claims filed under the Motor vehicles Act. Totally false facts are given. There have been cases where injuries are not caused in a motor vehicle accident, but later in connivance with some vehicle owner whose vehicle was insured the claimant filed cases to extract money from the insurance companies. In the present case, I have no doubt in my mind that the claimant filed this petition in connivance with Sri. Narayan Chndra Dey, the owner of the vehicle. After Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey was impleaded as a party on the second occasion, he filed a written statement in which he stated that there was no rash and negligence on the part of the driver of the alleged vehicle. He also stated that the vehicle was being properly driven by an authorized driver and the vehicle had proper and valid documents to ply the vehicle. He did not however clearly deny whether the accident had taken place or not. However, it was suggested in para-6 that some authorized driver i.e meaning some other person was driving the vehicle. Surprisingly, when the documents were produced by the claimant with a view to shift the liability by the owner on to the insurance company the license which was produced was of Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey, the owner of the vehicle. Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey should have clearly admitted or denied, whether the accident had taken place or not? Initially he did not admit the accident but later when he was again impleaded he did not deny the accident which would mean that he admitted the accident. In the written statement though the accident was not specifically denied, it was suggested that the there was some other person driving. Now, it is apparent that the Narayan Chandra Dey himself was the driver of the vehicle. If that be so, why did he not clearly state whether the accident had occurred or not and the manner in which the accident had occurred.

    [9] All Courts including this Court are normally very liberal while considering claim petitions filed under the Motor vehicles Act. While one should be liberal, one must also maintain the sanctity of the judicial process. A party not approaching the Court with clean hands should be dealt with strictly. No person should be permitted to abuse the process of Court. As observed by me above, in the State of Tripura, I have found a number of patently false cases filed under the Motor vehicles Act.

    [10] The Apex Court in a recent judgment in Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh; (2013) 2 SCC 398 dealing with the issue of abuse of the process of the Court held as follows:

    “31. Now, we shall deal with the question whether both or any of the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 111 of 2011 and 125 of 2011 are guilty of suppression of material facts, not approaching the Court with clean hands, and thereby abusing the process of court. Before we dwell upon the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, let us refer to some case law which would help us in dealing with the present situation with greater precision.

    32. The cases of abuse of the process of court and such allied matters have been arising before the courts consistently. This Court has had many occasions where it dealt with the cases of this kind and it has clearly stated the principles that would govern the obligations of a litigant while approaching the court for redressal of any grievance and the consequences of abuse of process of court. We may recapitulate and state some of the principles. It is difficult to state such principles exhaustively and with such accuracy that would uniformly apply to a variety of cases. These are:

    32.1 Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts and came to the courts with “unclean hands”. Courts have held that such litigants are neither entitled to be heard on the merits of the case nor entitled to any relief.

    32.2 The people, who approach the court for relief on an ex parte statement, are under a contract with the court that they would state the whole case fully and fairly to the court and where the litigant has broken such faith, the discretion of the court cannot be exercised in favour of such a litigant.

    32.3 The obligation to approach the Court with clean hands is an absolute obligation and has repeatedly been reiterated by this Court.

    32.4 Quests for personal gains have become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood and misrepresent and suppress facts in the court proceedings. Materialism, opportunism and malicious intent have overshadowed the old ethos of litigative values for small gains.

    32.5 A litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

    32.6 The Court must ensure that its process is not abused and in order to prevent abuse of process the court, it would be justified even in insisting on furnishing of security and in cases of serious abuse, the Court would be duty bound to impose heavy costs.

    32.7 Wherever a public interest is invoked, the Court must examine the petition carefully to ensure that there is genuine public interest involved. The stream of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants.

    32.8 The Court, especially the Supreme Court, has to maintain strictest vigilance over the abuse of the process of court and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be granted “visa”. Many societal pollutants create new problems of unredressed grievances and the Court should endure to take cases where the justice of the lis well justifies it. [Refer: Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 114; Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69 and State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402].

    *************************************

    34. It has been consistently stated by this Court that the entire journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties, as truth is the basis of the justice delivery system.

    35. With the passage of time, it has been realised that people used to feel proud to tell the truth in the courts, irrespective of the consequences but that practice no longer proves true, in all cases. The court does not sit simply as an umpire in a contest between two parties and declare at the end of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but it has a legal duty of its own, independent of parties, to take active role in the proceedings and reach at the truth, which is the foundation of administration of justice. Therefore, the truth should become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue. This can be achieved by statutorily mandating the courts to become active seekers of truth. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood, must be appropriately dealt with. The parties must state forthwith sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability to put forward false and exaggerated claims and a litigant must approach the court with clean hands. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to surpass the legal process must be effectively curbed and the court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain to anyone as a result of abuse of the process of the court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or punitive costs.

    36. The party not approaching the court with clean hands would be liable to be non suited and such party, who has also succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statements, cannot claim relief, especially under Article 136 of the Constitution. While approaching the court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the source of such information must also be disclosed. Totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. A litigant is bound to make “full and true disclosure of facts”. (Refer: Tilokchand and Motichand v. H.B Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam Represented by its President, (2012) 6 SCC 430; Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421; Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 145; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639; Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India, (2011) 3 SCC 287].

    37. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective that are the equi fundamentals of judicious litigation. The legal maxim jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another, is the percept for courts. Wide jurisdiction of the court should not become a source of abuse of the process of law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated by extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the court with clean hands.

    38. No litigant can play “hide and seek” with the courts or adopt “pick and choose”. True facts ought to be disclosed as the Court knows law, but not facts. One, who does not come with candid facts and clean breast cannot hold a writ of the court with soiled hands. Suppression or concealment of material facts is impermissible to a litigant or even as a technique of advocacy. In such cases, the court is duty bound to discharge rule nisi and such applicant is required to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court. K.D Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481].

    39. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process by filing frivolous petitions. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought upon the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be used as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530).”

    [11] In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court, it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the process of Court is not abused and no litigant is permitted to pollute the pure fountain of justice. Relief should not only be denied to such litigant but action should also be taken against such litigant. This will act as a deterrence to others who may feel that they can take liberty with the Courts.

    [12] Another important issue is that if the accident had occurred with the vehicle of Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey he is clearly not only guilty of having committed a criminal offence of rash and negligent driving but even more important is the fact that he left a person dying on the road, not caring to take him to the hospital. If such accident has happened than Sri. Narayan Ch. Dey in my opinion is prima facie guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 304A IPC. From the aforesaid facts it is apparent that either Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey is guilty of committing perjury and trying to mislead this Court or he is guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 279/337 and 304A IPC. The Registry is directed to issue show cause notice to him to show cause, why criminal proceedings be not launched against him. A copy of this judgment shall be annexed with the show cause notice.

    [13] In view of the above discussions, the appeal is dismissed but with a direction that notice be issued to Sri. Narayan Chandra Dey as aforesaid. No order as to costs.

    LCRs be retained.

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    Lakhan Debnath v. Narayan Chandra Dey
    (Oct 1, 2013)