Rajan Roy, J.:— Heard Sri. S.N Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioner as also Sri. Amit Dwivedi, learned Counsel for the opposite party alongwith Sri. Apoorva Tiwari, learned counsel for opposite party no. 4, and the Addl. C.S.C

2. A preliminary objection was raised by Sri. Apoorva Tiwari, learned counsel for the private opposite party regarding maintainability of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 14.8.2014 passed in Panchayat Revision No. 6 of 2013, Chanda Devi v. Brijlata Tripathi, by the Addl. District Judge (Court No. 9), Pratapgarh and the judgment and order dated 8.10.2013 passed in Election Petition No. 15 of 2010, Brijlata Tripathi v. Chanda Devi, by the Prescribed Authority.

3. Contention of Sri. Tiwari was that the judgment passed by the Addl. District Judge under Section 12-C(6) of the Panchayat Raj Act 1947 (hereinafter referred as “Act of 1947”) was a judgment of the Civil Court, therefore, in view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423, a writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India was not maintainable. He contended that the remedy provided before the District Judge under Section 12-C(6) of the Act of 1947 was a remedy before the Presiding Officer of the Principle Civil Court of the District. The “District Judge” referred therein was not a persona designate, but a Court i.e the Civil Court. In support of his contention Sri. Tiwari relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1961 SC 606, Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad .; (1991) 2 SCC 637, Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jayee Drugs & Pharm.; (1995) 5 SCC 5, Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanurayil Aboobacker, and (2002) 5 SCC 510, Iti Ltd. / v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd. . Ltd.

4. Sri. Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that the remedy of revision provided under Section 12-C(6) of the Act of 1947 before the District judge was not a remedy before the Civil Court. The District Judge under Section 12-C(6) is not a Civil Court, but a statutory revisional authority. The revisional powers exercised by the District Judge were different from the revisional powers provided under Section 115 C.P.C Radhey Shyam's case (supra) was applicable in respect of judicial orders passed by a civil court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and other relevant laws, and not the District Judge referred under the aforesaid provision of the Act of 1947. The Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable in the revisional proceedings under the Act of 1947.

5. In order to consider this preliminary objection, first of all it is necessary to consider and understand the issue involved in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) before the Supreme Court and the ratio contained therein.

6. A perusal of the judgment in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) reveals that the matter was referred to a Bench of Three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court to consider the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675, that whether an order of the civil court was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? The Bench referring the matter vide Reference Order reported in (2009) 5 SCC 616 was of the view that the dictum laid down in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) was contrary to the Nine Judge Bench's judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, wherein it was contended in para 62 that “certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of the inferior courts of civil jurisdiction.” The reference order also referred to paragraph 63 of Mirajkar's case (supra) to opine that a distinction had been made between the judicial orders of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and order of inferior tribunals or courts which are not civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. It opined that judicial orders passed by the civil courts of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced in para 63 in Mirajkar's case.

7. In paragraph 5 of its judgment the Three Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) recorded the question to be decided by it i.e whether the view taken in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) that a writ lies under Section 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders of the civil court which has been doubted in the reference order is the correct view? Various judgments of the Supreme Court including the judgment in T.C Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1854 SC 440, were considered by it. After referring to the judgment in T.C Bassappa's case (supra) in paragraph 10 the three Judge Bench in Radhay Shyam's case proceeded to clarify in paragraph 11 of its judgment that the expression “judicial acts” is not meant to refer to judicial orders of civil courts, as the matter before the Supreme Court in the said case arose out of the order of the Election Tribunal and no direct decision of the Supreme Court except Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) had been brought to their notice where writ of certiorari may have been issued against an order of the judicial court. The orders of the judicial courts stood on different footing from the quasi judicial orders of authorities or Tribunals.

8. In paragraph 16 of its judgment the Three Judge Bench again referred to paragraph 16 of Mirajkar's case wherein the issuance of a writ of certiorari in the case of judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction had been considered and in that context the Halsbury Laws of England had been quoted and considered. In the foot-note of the relevant extract of Halsbury Laws it was observed that there appears to be no reported case in which the judgment of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction had been quashed on certiorari; certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction. A distinction was made between inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and other inferior courts and Tribunals.

9. In paragraph 21 of Radhey Shyam's case (supra) the Three Judge's Bench categorically laid down the law that an order of the civil court could be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and not under Article 226 thereof.

10. In paragraph 25 of the said judgment their Lordships observed as under:

“It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. [There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of the subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts.] While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227. is constitutional. The expression “inferior court” is not referable to the judicial courts, …….”

11. Further in paragraph 27 of the said judgment their Lordships observed as under:

“Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.”

12. On a holistic reading of the entire judgment this court is not in doubt that the term “Judicial Courts” and “Civil Courts” have been used synonymously. The term “Judicial Court” has been used with reference to regular civil courts, and not other courts dealing with civil issues. In fact, the proceedings in the said case arose from the proceedings of regular ordinary civil courts governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, and the question considered and answered was as to “whether a writ of certiorari would lie against the judicial orders passed by such regular civil courts?”. The dictum of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), therefore, has to be read, understood and applied in the context of the factual scenario, issues involved, considered and answered by it, and not bereft of it.

13. On a perusal of the said judgment, referred hereinabove, this court has no doubt that the legal position clarified therein is with respect to the amenability of judgments and orders of the civil court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure to Article 226 of the Constitution and not other inferior courts or Tribunals. It draws a distinction between orders of civil court which stand on a different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. Radhey Shyam's case uses the term “judicial courts” and “civil courts” as synonymous and distinct from other Courts or Tribunals.

14. The next question which is to be considered is as to whether the the legislature has vested the powers under Section 12-C(6) of the Act of 1947 upon a regular civil court or not?

15. The answer to this question is to be considered in the light of the scheme of the Act of 1947, specially the provisions contained in Section 12-C thereof, which reads as under:

“12-C. Application for questioning the elections - (1) The election of a person as Pradhan or as member of a Gram Panchayat including the election of a person appointed as the Panch of the Nyaya Panchayat under Section 43 shall not be called in question except by an application presented to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed on the ground that -

(a) the election has not been a free election by reason that the corrupt practice of bribery or undue influence has extensively prevailed at the election, or

(b) that the result of the election has been materially affected -

i- by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination or;

ii- by gross failure to comply with the provisions of this Act or the rules framed thereunder.

(2) The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices of bribery or undue influence for the purposes of this Act.

(A) Bribery, that is to say, any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or by any other person with the connivance of a candidate of any gratification of any person whomsoever, with the object, directly, or indirectly of including -

(a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or withdraw from being, a candidate at any election; or

(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election; or as a reward to -

i- a person for having so stood or not stood or having withdrawn his candidature; or

ii- an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.

(B) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of a candidate or of any other person with the connivance of the candidate with the free exercise of any electoral right;

Provided that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this clause any such person as is referred to therein who -

i- threatens any candidate, or any elector, or any person in whom a candidate or any elector is interested, with injury of any kind including social ostracism and ex-communication or expulsion from any caste or community; or

ii- induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaning of this clause.

(3) This application under sub-section (1) may be presented by any candidate at the election or any elector and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.

Explanation-Any person who filed a nomination paper at the election whether such nomination paper was accepted or rejected, shall be deemed to be a candidates at the election.

(4) The authority to whom the application under sub-section (1) is made shall in the matter of-

i- hearing of the application and the procedure to be followed at such hearing;

ii- setting aside the election, or declaring the election to be void or declaring the applicant to be duly elected or any other relief that may be granted to the petitioner, have such powers and authority as may be prescribed.

(5) Without prejudice to generality of the powers to be prescribed under subsection (4) the rules may provide for summary hearing and disposal of an application under sub-section (1).

[(6) Any party aggrieved by an order of the prescribed authority upon an application under sub-section (1) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, apply to the District Judge for revision of such order on any one or more the following grounds, namely -

(a) that the prescribed authority has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law;

(b) that the prescribed authority has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested;

(c) that the prescribed authority has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

(7) The District Judge may dispose of the application for revision himself or may assign it for disposal to any Additional District Judge, Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge under his administrative control and may recall it from any such officer or transfer it to any other such officer.

(8) The revising authority mentioned in sub-section (7) shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed, and may confirm, vary or rescind the order of the prescribed authority or remand the case to the prescribed authority for re-hearing and pending its decision pass such interim orders as may appear to it to be just and convenient.

(9) The decision of the prescribed authority, subject to any order passed by the revising authority under this section, and every decision of the revising authority passed under this section, shall be final.]”

Section 12-I of the said Act reads as under:

“12-I. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in election matters barred-No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to question the legality of any action taken or any decision given by an officer or authority appointed under this Act in connection with the conduct of elections thereunder.”

Section 110(1) and Clause (ii)(c) of sub-Section 2 read as under:

“110. Powers of State Government to make Rules - [(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.]:-

(2)[ii-c]- presentation and disposal of election petitions and applications for revision under Section 12-C].”

16. Under the scheme of the Act of 1947 after declaration of result of the election to the posts in question such election can be questioned on an application presented to such “authority” within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed under sub-Section (1) of Section 12(c). As per sub-Section (6) of Section 12-C any authority aggrieved by an order of the prescribed authority upon an application under sub-Section (1) may, within 30 days from the date of the order apply to the District Judge for revision of such order. The reference to the District Judge in sub-Section (6) is not a reference to an individual in his personal capacity, but to a particular office, therefore, it could be said that reference to the “District Judge” is in fact a reference to the presiding officer of the Principal Civil Court of the District and therefore the District Judge while exercising his powers under sub-Section (6) is required to act as a civil court and his orders are judicial orders of a civil court thereby attracting the dictum in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), however, on a closer scrutiny of the scheme of the Act of 1947 and provisions contained therein the Court finds the legislative intent to be otherwise.

17. Section 12-I of the Act of 1947 provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to question the legality of any action taken or any decision given by an officer or authority appointed under this Act in connection with the conduct of elections thereunder. The words “any decision taken by an officer or an authority appointed under this Act” occurring in Section 12-I include the authority prescribed under Section 12(1) of the Act of 1947. The word “prescribed” has been defined in Section 2(o) to mean “prescribed by this Act or rules made thereunder”. Under Rule 4 of the U.P Panchayat Raj (Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules 1994 he Sub-Divisional officer tries an election petition under Section 12-C(1). Thus he is the authority prescribed under the Rules made under the Act of 1947, therefore, no civil court has jurisdiction to question the legality of his action or decision in connection with the conduct of elections thereunder.

18. The words used in Section 12-I are of wide amplitude which do not permit the acceptance of the contention of Sri. Tiwari that the said provision applies only to any action taken or decision given prior to the declaration of result of an election and not thereafter. Section 12-I excludes “any action taken or any decision given by an officer or authority appointed under the Act of 1947 in connection with the conduct of elections thereunder”, from the jurisdiction of all civil courts. The prescribed authority under Section 12(1) takes a decision whenever an election of Pradhan etc. is questioned before him on the grounds mentioned thereunder viz. the election has not been a free election by reason of corrupt practice of bribery or undue influence having extensively prevailed at the election or the result of the election has been materially affected by the proper acceptance or rejection of any nomination or by gross failure to comply with the provisions of the Act or Rules made thereunder, thus the dispute which is required to be decided by the prescribed authority under Section 12(1) is in connection with “the conduct of elections under the Act of 1947”.

19. Against such decision no remedy lies before the civil court by way of suit in view of Section 12-I of the Act of 1947, instead, a statutory remedy has been provided against such an order/decision under Section 12-C(6) before the District Judge who has been referred in sub-Sections (8) and (9) of Section 12-C as the “revising authority”. The bar under Section 12-I is not merely for suits, but the bar is in respect to all civil courts, meaning thereby revisional, appellate and all other jurisdictions of all civil courts are also barred. Thus, a revision under Section 115 C.P.C before the civil court under Civil Procedure Code against the order of the prescribed authority under Section 12(1) is also barred and an alternative remedy has been provided under Section 12-C(6) before the revising authority which is the District Judge. The legislative intent in this regard is very clear.

20. In view of the scheme of the Act of 1947, if, it is held that the District Judge functions as a civil court under Section 12-C(6) under Section 12-C(6), it will be incongruous to the express language and specific provision contained in Section 12-I. Merely because the District Judge is not a persona designata, it does not ipso facto follow that he is a civil court thereby attracting the dictum of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam's case. Though the District Judge is not a persona designata. He is also not a civil court. The legislative intent is clear. The remedy has not been provided before the civil courts. In fact, jurisdiction of all civil courts is specifically barred in such matters, as is evident from the use of words “no civil court shall have jurisdiction” to question the legality of any decision given by an officer or authority approved under the Act in connection with the conduct of elections thereunder. If the legislative intent was to provide a remedy against the decision of the prescribed authority before the civil court, then the language of Section 12-I would have been different. It is not in dispute that the authority prescribed for the purposes of Section 12-C(1) is not a court.

21. The decision in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation's case is not applicable to the present case, as, the scheme of the Act of 1947 and the provisions contained in the Act of 1951 which was considered in the said case, are different. The issues were also different. In the said case the question, inter alia, was applicability of C.P.C to the proceedings under Sections 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporation Act 1951 for enforcement of liability under Section 31 read with Section 32 thereof upon a person who had not given any property in security and had given only a personal guarantee. The contention was that the court below veritably passed a money decree against such a person as if under the provisions of C.P.C The Supreme Court firstly taking into consideration the words in Section 31 of the Act of 1951 held that “any surety” would include such a person; secondly, it held that though Sections 31 and 32 had the effect of cutting across and dispensing with the provisions of C.P.C and the order under Section 32 was not stricto sensu a money decree under Section 2(2) C.P.C, considering Section 46(B) of the said Act it held that “in the absence of anything inconsistent in the Act” the provisions of C.P.C shall obviously be applicable for the enforcement of liability of the surety in the same manner as a decree is enforced in a suit instituted in this behalf. It also held that even if Section 46(B) was not there, “in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the Act” such order could have been enforced in the manner provided in C.P.C The legal basis for this was mentioned in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment and it is on these observations that Sri. Tiwari has relied. It was held that the District Judge referred in Sections 31 and 32 was not a persona designata, but a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court relied upon National sewing thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357, wherein it was held that “the rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court”. In National Sewing thread Co.'s case (supra) another decision rendered in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster-General, 1913 AC 546, was cited wherein it was stated “when a question is stated to be referred to an established court without anything more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of procedure of that court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches”. It also referred to the case of Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21, wherein it was held that Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court “and says nothing more about it”, that being so the High Court has to exercise its other appellate jurisdiction by a Single Judge Bench. Therefore, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under Clause 15 of latter's Patent Act, “there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act”.

22. Relying on these decisions the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation' case (supra) held that even in absence of Section 46(B) provisions of C.P.C would have been attracted. In the said case provisions of C.P.C were applicable as per sub-Sections 6, 8, 8A and 9 of Section 32, though not in its entirety, and also in view of Section 46B and as the District Judge functioned under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act of 1951 not as a persona designata, but a civil court, there being nothing to the contrary in the said Act of 1951.

23. However, in the Act of 1947 which is under consideration in this writ petition, as stated earlier, while entrusting the revisional function to the District Judge under Section 12-C(6), the Legislature does not stop at that and it is not as if it does not say anything more, nor that there is nothing inconsistent or contrary to the aforesaid proposition in the Act of 1947. Firstly it has inserted Section 12-I which bars the jurisdiction of all civil courts in respect of any action taken or decision given by an officer or authority in connection with the conduct of elections under the Act, therefore, to say that the District Judge under Section 12-C(6) functions as a civil court will be inconsistent with and in conflict with Section 12-I, as has already been considered and concluded in the earlier part of the judgment. There is no provision in the State Financial Corporation Act 1951 analogous to Section 12-I of the Act of 1947.

24. Further, the Legislature has gone on to say in sub-Section (8) of Section 12-C of the Act of 1947 that the revisional authority “shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed”. Under sub-Section 110(1) of Act of 1947 the State Government is empowered to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Clause (ii)(c) of sub-Section 2 of Section 110 specifically refers to presentation and disposal of election petition and applications for revision under Section 12C. Sub-Section (ii) of Section 110 is without prejudice to the general powers available sub-Section(1). Thus, the State Government is empowered to prescribe the procedure which shall be followed by the District Judge as the revisional authority under sub-Section 6 of Section 12C. The fact that a separate procedure can be prescribed other than the one prescribed in C.P.C for the exercise of revisional powers of the District Judge under the Act of 1947 is indicative of the legislative intent. The fact that no such procedure has been prescribed, as yet, is of no consequence, as, it is the legislative intent as is evident in the express provisions contained in Act of 1947, which is relevant.

25. If the legislature intended to provide a remedy under Section 12-C(6) before the regular civil court, it would have done so without inserting sub-Section (7)(8)(9) to sub-Section 12-C(6) and Section 12-I in the Act of 1947. It could have provided the said remedy before the District Judge as a regular civil court “without saying anything more”, but it did not do so and inserted the aforesaid provisions.

26. Further, vide sub-Section (9) of Section 12-C the Legislature has inserted a “finality clause” thereby giving finality not only to the decisions of the prescribed authority, but also to every decision of the revising authority. Finality clauses are normally inserted to give finality to orders of authorities and Tribunals. Such finality clauses are not inserted in respect of regular civil courts for obvious reasons as they are governed by their own hierarchy of appellate and revisional forums prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure and such other enactments as may apply. The fact that the legislature has inserted a finality clause in sub-Section 9 of Section 12-C is indicative of the legislative intent that the District Judge while exercising his revisional powers under sub-Section 12C was not intended to function as a regular/ordinary civil court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and other related enactments. Reference may be made in this regard to the judgment reported in (1978) 1 SCC 27, Thakur Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh (paragraph 10). The use of word “revising authority” for the District Judge in sub-Sections 8 and 9 is also indicative of the legislative intent.

27. Most importantly, Section 12-I excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect to any action taken or any decision given by an officer or authority appointed under this Act in connection with the conduct of elections therein, therefore, as already stated earlier, in the facts of the present case it would be incongruous to hold that the District Judge functions as a civil court under Section 12-C(6).

28. The power exercised by the District Judge under Section 12-C(6) is of a very limited nature relating to the election disputes. No doubt the proceeding can be said to be civil proceeding, but not that of a regular civil court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Act of 1947 is a special law and the forum of revision before the District Judge has been created under the special law for a limited purpose. The District Judge while performing his revisional functions under the said provisions decides limited issues relating to elections and does not have the general and plenary powers available to regular civil courts.

29. Therefore, for the reasons aforesaid, the dictum of the supreme court in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation's case (supra) does not persuade the court to opine otherwise. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove the other decisions relied upon by Sri. Apoorva Tiwari reported in (1995) 5 SCC 5, Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobbacker, and (2002) 5 SCC 510, I.T.I Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., also do not help his cause. In the former case the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the appellate proceedings under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Control Act was involved. In this context it was held that the District Judge under Section 18 was not a persona designata, therefore, he was a court. Again, provisions of the statute considered in the said case were different from the Act of 1947. The issue involved was also different. The limitation Act applies to courts. Radhy Shyam's case itself draws a distiction between judicial/civil courts and other inferior courts, Tribunals and authorities. Likewise in the latter case the court was persuaded by the absence of provisions to the contrary contained in the relevant statute to hold that the District Judge was a court. As already discussed hereinabove, the statute which is under consideration in this case says something more than merely entrusting a remedy before the District Judge. The scheme and provisions of the Act are very different.

30. In view of the discussion hereinabove, this court is of the opinion that the District Judge functions as a revising authority under a special statute, and not as a ordinary civil court of the country so as to attract the dictum of the supreme court in Radhey Shyam's case and to oust the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against its decisions.

31. In view of the above discussion, the preliminary objection raised by Sri. Apoorva Tiwari is hereby rejected. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the decision of the prescribed authority under Section 12-C(1) and the revising authority under Section 12-C(6) is held to be maintainable.

32. List this case on 17.11.2015 amongst 1 five cases of the day for disposal before the appropriate court.