Stuart, C.J and Oldfield, J.:— The argument in this appeal was very laboured on both sides, and very unnecessarily so. Numerous references to texts of Hindu law and to various works on that law were referred to; but the simple questions are—(1) whether a right of tenancy at a fixed rate is property, and as such inheritable, within the meaning of s. 9 of the Rent Act; (ii) whether the share of a son in such property can he sold in execution of a decree of a Civil Court against his father on account of the father's criminal embezzlement; and (iii) whether a purchaser at a sale of such property in execution of a decree against the embezzling father may, under the circumstances of the case, be taken to have purchased in, good faith without notice, and the sale to him is therefore valid.

I am quite clear that a right of tenancy at a fixed rate, such as we have in this case, is property within the meaning of s. 9 of the Rent Act, and as such inheritable, or in other words in its nature ancestral, and I am therefore of opinion that a son can object to the sale of such property unless it can be shown that the sale is for a proper and necessary purpose, and that the father's act of embezzlement was not such a purpose; but thirdly, I am of opinion that the purchaser in the present case must be taken to have had at least constructive of the objectionable nature of the debt and that the sale to him was therefore invalid.

Such a view of the case is quite in accordance with the rulings of the Privy Council in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall and Mudun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lally and in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh . This to me clearly appears from what has taken ??? among the parties in the present case. ??? is, however, a peculiar element in the present case which I have not found in any of the Privy Council Reports, nor have discovered any similar case in the books. To my mirul it is a very serious question whether the criminal element in the conduct of the father by reason of the embezzlement of which he was convicted did not, so far as the plaintiffs' rights were concerned vitiate the proceedings ending in the sain from the beginning, intis much as in it was an inherent vice which tainted the sale, and could not fie got rid of, or be removed by the there fact of the decree in the Civil Court. And it is further to be considered whether, under ??? circumstance unit notice to the purchaser was necessary. The maxim, in jure, non remota caused proxima spectatur, does not. It never, apply to any transaction originally founded in fraud, and much less in proved crime, “for the law will look to the corrupt beginning and consider it as one entire act and again, on the same page—“neither does the above rule hold in criminal cases, because in ??? the intention is matter of substance, and, therefore, the first motive, as showing that intention, must be principally regarded” (Broom's Legal Maxima, 2nd ed., 1858, p. 170). The principle of the law so stated appears to me to render the question of notice immaterial.

But if the question of notice be material, I think constructive notice must be taken to have been given to the purchaser, and that as a consequence the father Ranjit Lal took advantage of his own wrong, and at the same time involved the two parties concerned with him in the execution of the decree and in the sale in a similar disability. The embezzlement, which gave rise to all the litigation in the Criminal and Civil Courts, was committed by the father in 1875, and he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two years. While the father was undergoing this punishment the party whose money he had embezzled sued him in the Civil Court, the plaint distinctly stating that the ??? was for the money embezzled, and the plaintiff obtained a decree, the decree was a mere money-decree against the father personally. The plaintiff appears to have applied for execution of this decree in March, 1877 but to have ultimately sold the decree to Sham Sundar Singh one of the defendants in the present suit, and who proceeded to execute the decree by sale of the property—i.e, the right of tenancy at a fixed rate, and it was sold to Baldeo Singh, defendant-respondent.

The plaintiffs in the present case are the minor sons of Ranjit Lal, the father, and they sue through their mother Parbati as their next friend to have the sale set aside and their share of the property restored to them, on the ground that the debt, to satisfy which the property was sold, was not being on them. The first Court gave effect to these views and decreed the claim, but the Judge reversed the decree on speculations and conjectures which I cannot entertain. In second appeal to this Court it is contended that the Judge was wrong, and that it could not be held that the plaintiffs' share of the property in the suit could be sold for a debt incurred by the father's criminal embezzlement. This contention is, in my opinion, well founded, and the present appeal ought to be allowed. With reference to the Privy Council rulings before mentioned two questions arise: first, what is the legal character and scope of such a decree as these rulings appear to contemplate; and secondly, what amounts to constructive notice in such a case as this, in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lull, decided by the Privy Council in 1874, it was decided by their Lordships that “the purchaser * * * was not bound to go further back than to see that there was a decree against those two gentlemen, that the property was property liable to satisfy the decree, if the decree had been given properly against them.” Here the decree was a simple money-decree which on the face of it gave no information as to the property which was intended to be sold under it, but if rend with the plaint, which it ought to be, it would at once appear what was the nature of the original debt, that debt was one incurred by their father's criminal embezzlement, and that the property therefore, so far as the plaintiffs' interests were concerned, was not property liable to satisfy Ibo decree, and that the decree had not been given properly against them. This view off the decree is also supported by the judgment in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh , where it is said (p. 179): “It seems to be clear upon the authorities that if the debt had been a mere bond debt (as in this case) not binding (i.e not necessarily binding) on the sons by virtue of their liability to pay their father's debts, * * * his interest in the property would have survived on his death to his sons, so that it could not afterwards be reached by the creditor in their hands.” Such appeared to be the qualifications and limits under which the law was laid down by the Privy Council as to the question of notice in such cases, that appears to have been also considered in this case of Suraj Bunsi Koer, where, although the circumstances showing constructive notice were a little stronger than is the present case, the two cases in this respect are very similar. In Suraj Bunsi Koer the plaint prayed for the adjudication of their right of the plaintiffs and the confirmation of their right in the property, and the report states that:—“The claim to this relief was founded on the right which, under the law of the Mitakshara, a son acquires on his birth is ancestral property, and the consequent limitation on the father's power to alienate, incumber, or waste that property.” And the Sub-ordinate Judge held that the rights of the purchasers stood on no better grounds than those of the execution creditor, that they were “not innocent purchasers in the proper sense of the term, since notice was given before sale by the plaintiffs that the family property advertizad for sale could not legally be sold for the debt of one of the joint members of the family.” It does not appear from the report that the notice which was said to have been given, was ex areas or constructive notice; it probably was constructive, although either was sufficient, their Lordships in their judgment observing that (p. 173)—“The respondents must be taken to have had notice, actual or constructive, of the plaintiff's objections * * * It follows as against them * * * the plaintiffs have established that by reason of the nature of the debt neither they nor their interest in joint ancestral estate are liable to satisfy their father's debt.” In the present case the facts show reasonable constructive notice. Undoubtedly the original decree-holder could not plead want of notice, for in his own plaint, as I have stated, lie distinctly describes his claim to be in consequence of his debtor's ???. It does not appear whether his purchaser, the defendant Basdeo Singh, bad in fact similar knowledge of the nature of the debt, but it appears to me to be impossible to believe this, ami in any case he cannot be regarded as in better position, as against the plaintiff' interest in the property, than that of the first decree-holder, and lie was bound to see to the nature of the ??? and what thy decree was intendad to cover.

I may here repeat the views I expressed in Salig Rai v. Rampardip Rai where I said:—“As I understand the Hindu Law a bona fide purchaser for value from a father is dog protected from challenge by a son without reasonable inquiry on the part of the purchaser; that is, such inquiry as may be suggested by the proceedings, otherwise gross and fraudulent invasions of the rights of eons might with case be committed, or, as it might be said, quietly and cunningly arranged for. All that would be necessary in such a case to do would be to put matters before the intending purchaser in such a plausible light as that lie would enter in to the transaction with perfect honesty and entire good faith, while all the time the rights of the son had been illegally and frandulently disregarded by the father. Mere good faith then on the part of the purchaser is cit enough. He is bound, at least within reasonable limits, to see to his title, and whether his vendor Ins a right to sell, and he is of to pnrchase the bona fide in question therefore must be reasonable good faith and circumspection, ??? as every in elligent Hindu would be expected to exercise in the management of his own affairs. As to the expressions ‘immoral purpose’ and ‘pious duty,’ they perhaps require a little definition. If the purpose foe which a father raises money on the security of his ancestral property is distinctly immoral, the re cannot be any doubt that the transaction cannot prejudice or in any way injuriously affect the so a or sons of the family. But then the burden of proof is on the objector, and the son or any one in his right must show the immorality of the father's purpose by the character of the debt. The expression ‘pious duty’ in a system of law is peculiar. It is difficult to put it on a separate and distinct footing of its own, either in con-section with legal liability on the one hand or legal immunity on the other. It is the pious, or, as it might otherwise he said, the filial and religious duty of a Hindu son to pay his father's debts, but the pious or religious character of the obligation depends entirely on the nature of the debt, if the debt was incurred by the father clearly for an immoral purpose, there can, of course, he ??? pions duty on the part of the son to discharge it; that is, no pious duty legally recognizable, although, of course, the expression, in a loose and general sense, might be understood and acted upon by a son from a family feeling and from a desire to protect the memory of his father, and the son under such circumstances could no doubt, so far at least as his own estate was concerned, and from filial feeling, meet his father's obligations. But in law there is, I apprehend, no pious duty on the part of a son where it appears that a father's purpose in raising money on the family property was plainly immoral, and it may he in reckless disregard of his sons ignorant—and if minors, necessarily ignorant—of their rights.” These views are, I trust, quite consistent with the rulings of the Privy Council, if indeed ??? do not fairly carry out the principle on which ??? are based. To go upon nothing but good faith on the part of a purchaser of immoveable property and the mere existence of a money decree against the father, would in many, if not most cases of the same, kind lead to gross injustice to the other members of a Hindu family, especially to those who are minors, equally entitled with him.

I would reverse the order of the lower appellate Court, and, restoring that of the Munsif, I would allow the present appeal with costs in all the Courts.

Oldfield, J.:— In execution of a decree held by one Ram Sundar against Ranjit Lal, a tenant at fixed rates, the tenancy-right in certain land was put up to sale and purchased by the respondent Basdeo Singh.

The plaintiffs are the minor sons of Ranjit Lal, and bring this suit, represented by their mother, described as guardian or next friend, to recover their shares in the property sold on the ground that the debt was contracted for immoral purposes and the property is joint ??? property is which hey have an interest by birth. The Munsif decreed the claim, but the lower appellate Court has dismissed the suit, and the plaintiffs have appealed.

It has been contended by the respondent that the tenant-right in dispute is not property in which sons can by birth take a vested interest under Hindu Law. I understand the contention to be that this right is a creation of the Rent Act and not a right of full and complete ownership in land in respect of which alone such vested interests can arise.

I cannot allow to contention. The property in which a son takes an interest by birth is described in Mitakahara, ch. i, s. v., vv. 3, 4 in the text;—“The ownership of father and son is the earns in land which was acquired by the grandfather, or in a corrody, or in chattels which belonged to him; ‘land,’ a rice-field or other ground; accorrody,’ so many leaves receivable from a plantation of ??? pepper, or so many nuts from an orchard of areca; ‘chattels,’ gold, silver or other moveables (Stoke's Hindu Law Books, pp. 391-392).

This passage, which occurs also in Viramitrodaya, is thus given in Gropal Chandra Sarkar's translation of that book, ch. ii, pt. i, s. 13:—“The meaning of this text is this:—land” significance-field and the like; ‘any settled income’ is what is given by reason of written grants by kings to the following effect:—To such and such a person, so many betel-leaves or the like shall be given from such and such a plantation of betel-leaves or orchard of betel-nuts; ‘moveables’ are gold, & c.;” and the text of Vrihaspati is cited:—In the property acquired by the grandfather, whether immoveable or moveable, the parcenerahip of both father and son is ordained to be co-equal indeed” (p. 66).

From these texts it is clear that a son obtains by birth a right in every kind of ancestral property—but is, in whatever a man has, independent of another's permission; and immoveable property will include any interest in land which is owned by the ancestor.

It is immaterial whether this particular form of tenancy at fixed rates was or was not recognized in Hindu Law, though we may say that there is abundant proof that Law recognizes cultivators rights, for it is a right to hold land at fixed rates of rent which may devolve by succession or be transferred, and is in every sense of the word property, and in consequent a son obtains in it vested rights by birth.

With regard to the pleas in appeal, there is no doubt that the debt for which the decree was obtained ??? one not binding on the sods, the decree ??? obtained for money which Laljit had embezzled; and I concur with the Chief Justice in holding that the respondent is not entitled to be protected as a purchaser at an execution sale without notice, on the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Girdharee Lall v. Karttoo Lal and Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh . The decree was a mere money-decree against the father of plaintiffs personally and the family property was not property liable to be taken in execution of the decree, and the respondent could and should have satisfied himself on these points by examining the decree.

The appeal should there ore he allowed, and the decree of the lower appellate Court be reversed and that of the first Court restored with all costs.

Appeal allowed.