Knox and Aikman, JJ.:— On the 21st of April 1903, the parties to the present application before us appeared before a Magistrate lawfully empowered in this behalf and satisfied him that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace existed concerning lands within the local limits of his jurisdiction. The Magistrate then made an order in writing, in which he stated the grounds of his being so satisfied. Apparently after this had been done one of the parties to this application went to the Magistrate and endeavoured to show that no dispute existed concerning land within the local limits of the jurisdiction of that Magistrate. The Magistrate passed an order upon this representation made to him and that order is by law declared to be final [see the concluding words of sub-section (5) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure]
2. One fact stands out clear in these proceedings, and that is that not only did the Magistrate intend to act under chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also that he did in point of fact act under that chapter. He was, as we have said before, a Magistrate having jurisdiction in this behalf, and with great care and precision he laid the proper foundation for his proceedings under chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and his proceedings, are not merely proceedings in name under chapter XII, but they are in fact proceedings under that chapter.
3. This being so, by the amendment which has been introduced by the present Code of Criminal Procedure into section 435, this Court had no power to call for the record of these proceedings. Proceedings under chapter XII are now clearly laid down as proceedings not within the meaning of section 435, and we know of no other section in the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor has any other section been pointed out, which gives the Court power to call for the record of such proceedings.
4. The learned counsel who presented the application now before us evidently felt the full force of this difficulty; for in the application he has been at considerable pains to avoid any mention of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and applies to the Court under section 15 of the Charter Act, and asks this Court under the powers of superintendence thereby given to set aside the order of the Joint Magistrate of Ballia passed under chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Act referred to is the Act known as the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, being Statute 24 and 25 Vic, Chap. CIV. Under section 15 of that statute this High Court is declared to have superintendence over all Courts which may be subject to its appellate jurisdiction, to have power to call for returns, to direct the transfer of suits or appeals, and to make and issue general rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts. All criminal jurisdiction of this Court is, however, by section 9 of the Indian High. Courts Act, 1861, declared to be such criminal jurisdiction as “Her Majesty may by the Letters Patent constituting the Court grant and direct.” We have therefore to turn to the Letters Patent under Which this Court is constituted and to see what jurisdiction it confers and what direction it contains concerning the criminal jurisdiction of this Court. On making such reference we find that under clause 29 of the Letters Patent it was ordained that the proceedings in all criminal cases, other than those brought before this Court in the exercise of its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction, shall be regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure or by such further or other laws in relation to criminal procedure as may have been or may be made by the Governor General in Council.
5. We have gone into this question at this length because of certain remarks made by the learned Judges, for whom we entertain the highest respect, in the case of Hurbullub Narain Singh v. Luchmeswar Prasad Singh (1). With all deference to those learned Judges we cannot agree with them in holding that the Legislature, when it introduced the amendment to which we have referred above into the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, intended to leave with the High Court the power of calling, under section. 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 (if any such power existed), for the records of proceedings under chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To attribute any such intention to the Legislature would be to make this amendment futile and meaningless.
6. It is not our practice to interpret the law by reference to the debates in the Legislative Council which attend the passing of any particular law, and we do not propose now to deal otherwise with the present case. So far as we can see the language of section 435 admits of no doubt or secondary meaning and it has simply to be obeyed. The power of Bailing for records in revision is a power created by Statute. The Legislature has in section 435 set out the class of cases in which this power can be exercised, and it has by express provision removed proceedings under chapter XII of the Code from such classes of cases, But It is interesting, in view of what has been said, to read in the Pro-ceedings of the Council of the Governor General at its sitting of the 12th March, 1898,* that those who opposed the insertion of these words and figures “under chapter XII” into section 435 took their stand upon the oasis that “by this change all control and supervision is swept away. Neither High Court, Sessions Judge nor District Magistrate can say anything, however outrageous or scandalously absurd the order may be.” Those who supported the insertion of the words set out above did so because the object in view was “to obtain finality in proceedings under chapter XII, in which only an ad interim order can be passed, and to make the parties have recourse to the Civil Court, to which admittedly they must ultimately go.”
7. Two cases of this Court were cited before us in support of the argument that we had jurisdiction to call for and interfere with orders passed in proceedings in this case. The first of these is that of Mahadeo Kunwar v. Bisu (). The learned Judge who decided that case remarks in his judgment that “it is thus clear that no proceedings under section 145 were initiated by the recording of an order under sub-section (1) of that section.” We agree with the learned Judge that the proceedings in that case could, not be held to have been proceedings under chapter XII. The mere adding as a postscript to proceedings which were throughout taken under chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a final order has been passed under section 145, will not make that order a proceeding under chapter XII of the Code. The second case relied on is an unreported decision of this Court in Musammat Darab Koerv. Fateh Chand, being Criminal Reference No. 189 of 1903 decided on the 5th of June 1903. The following is an extract from the judgment of this case:— “The learned Magistrate without observing any of the requirements of section 145 proceeded to pass an order under that section.” The same remarks apply to this as to the previous case. The mere mention of an order as being made under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not, under such cricumstances, make the order an order under chapter XII of the Code. In the present case the proceedings before the learned Joint Magistrate of Ballia were in intention, in name and in fact, proceedings under chapter XII of the Code by a Magistrate who was duly empowered to act under that chapter. This being so, this Court has no power to send for those proceedings either under the Court or under section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861.
8. We dismiss this application, and we direct that the record be returned.
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