Brett, J.:— This appeal has been preferred by the Local Government against the acquittal of 12 persons who were placed on their trial before the Additional Sessions Judge of Chota Nagpur charged with an offence under section 400 of the Indian Penal Code. The principal witness against the accused was one named, Mohendra Bid, to whom, it appears, a pardon was originally granted by the Local Government on or about the 19th February 1906. The 12 persons, accused in the case, were then under trial before the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhoom, and it seems that on that date and before the trial was commenced, the Government Prosecutor appeared in Court and first explained that the name of Mohendra Bid had, by an oversight, been included in the A form and he had been sent up as an accused by mistake, though Government pardon had been extended to him. A petition was at the same time put in by the Public Prosecutor praying to withdraw the case against him under section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that application was allowed.
2. The letter from Government, which was clearly written as an executive order, addressed to the Inspector-General of Police, was, by a mistake apparently of the Deputy Commissioner, read over to the accused, because in the letter to the Inspector-General it was stated that certain conditions should be carefully explained to Mohendra Bid and a note of that fact should be made. The Deputy Commissioner after reading and explaining the letter to the witness, recorded on the deposition of the witness the fact that the letter had been read over to the witness and that the witness had accepted the conditions. There is, however, nothing beyond this so far as we can discover on the record to indicate that beyond reading the letter, the Deputy Commissioner himself on his own responsibility as required by section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, tendered any pardon. Mohendra Bid was then and there, so far as we are able to understand, removed from the position of an accused in the case and was examined as a witness, and the rest of the evience against the accused persons having been heard on subsequent dates they were finally convicted on the 16th March 1905.
3. They appealed against their conviction to this Court and on the 8th May 1906, the conviction and sentence were set aside and an order passed discharging the accused. The main ground on which that order was passed was that the pardon tendered to the witness Mohendra Bid was not tendered in accordance with the provisions of the law and the intention of the learned Judges who disposed of the appeal as expressed in their judgment was that a proper pardon in accordance with the provisions of the law should be granted and then if the Government thought it necessary, there should be a fresh trial. In consequence, the case went back for re-hearing and after a pardon had been tendered by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Gobindpore, to whom the case was made over for enquiry, the witnesses were again examined and on the 19th June 1908, the 12 accused persons were committed to the Sessions Court for trial.
4. When the case came on for hearing before the Additional Sessions Judge, Mr. B, C. Mitter, he came to the conclusion that there were certain illegalities connected with the circumstances under which the pardon had been tendered to Mohendra Bid by the committing Magistrate and he refused to remedy the defect by himself tendering pardon to him under the powers conferred by section 338, Criminal Procedure Code. He held that the evidence of Mohendra Bid, as a witness against the accused, was in consequence inadmissble in law and finding that in the absence of the evidence of that witness there was not sufficient evidence to support the charge, he directed the assessors to acquit all the accused and he then proceeded to acquit and discharge them.
5. Against that acquittal the Government have appealed to this Court.
6. The grounds on which the Additional Sessions Judge has come to the conclusion that the evidence of Mohendra Bid is inadmissible are stated in his judgment. They are, first, that the pardon was not tendered in strict compliance with law, and secondly, that the Magistrate had expressed no opinion that the appearnces had fully recovered from the illegal influence exercised upon him by the Government pardon. On these grounds he holds the appearnces was not a competent witness and that his evidence was inadmissible. He then goes on to explain that as the approver was not detained in custody after the pardon had been granted to him, he on that account was not himself prepared to tender a pardon under section 338, Criminal Procedure Code, because he considered that the approver was still under what he describes as an illegal inducement from persons in authority which seriously jeopardized the foundation of his competency as a witness.
7. We do not find it easy to follow the process of reasoning by which the Additional Sessions Judge has arrived at these conclusions, as his judgment is couched in such extraordinary language that it is not easy to grasp its meaning.
8. Taking however his first point, viz., that the evidence of the approver is inadmissible because the pardon had not been tendered by the committing Magistrate in strict compliance with law, we are unable to agree in the opinion which he has expressed. The Magistrate who enquired into the case, has, it is true, recorded only a short note at the top of the deposition of Mohendra Bid to the effect that the pardon was tendered to him and that he understood and accepted the conditions. The Additional Sessions Judge has held that this is not a sufficient compliance with the law which requires that a Magistrate who tenders a pardon under section 337, Criminal Procedure Code, shall record his reasons for so doing. In this case, however, we are not prepared to hold that the omission, though it may be regarded as an irregularity, if indeed it can be placed so high, amounted to an illegality. The circumstances which preceded the grant of the pardon were such that the Magistrate may very properly have considered that they in themselves afforded sufficient reasons for his action without his recording any further reasons of his own, and we think that in the judgment of this Court in the previous appeal sufficient reasons are given from the grant of the pardon. We are unable to accept the view of the Additional Sessions Judge as to the duties of a Magistrate prior to the tender of a pardon. We think that all that the Magistrate had to do; was to proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 337 of the Code, and if he found sufficient grounds as set out in that section for tendering the pardon he was perfectly justified in tendering it. In the present case it is clear from the judgment of this Court delivered on the 8th May 1906, in disposing of the appeal that there were good grounds for supposing that Mohendra Bid had been concerned in or privy to the offence under enquiry, that if a pardon was tendered to him he would make a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence charged and to every other person concerned in the commission thereof, and that his evidence would be corroborated by the evidence of the other witnesses. We think, therefore, that the first ground on which the Additional Sessions Judge has held the approver's evidence to be inadmissible is not good in law.
9. Taking now the second ground set out by the Additional Sessions Judge, viz., that the Magistrate had expressed no opinion that the approver had recovered from the illegal influence produced by the Government pardon, we desire to express an entire dissent from the views which the Additional Sessions Judge has expressed, that the pardon tendered by the Government can be regarded as an influence by means of any promise or threat or otherwise used as an inducement to an accused person to disclose or withhold any matter within his knowledge. The pardon tendered by Government, whether it be regarded as valid in law or not, was clearly tendered without any other ulterior motive than that which would have influenced a Magistrate in tendering a pardon under section 337, Criminal Procedure Code. No such suggestion even is made in the judgment of this Court delivered on the 8th May 1906. in disposing of the appeal and the idea seems to have originated with the Additional Sessions Judge him self. We may observe that the practice of granting a pardon by the Crown to an accused person for the purpose of making him King's evidence is recognized in England and though the legality of such a procedure in this country has been doubted, yet there is no authority for the proposition that the tender of such a pardon by Government amounts to an illegal inducement or threat.
10. We are of opinion, therefore, that the Additional Sessions Judge erred in law in holding that it was the duty of the Magistrate to express an opinion whether the approver had recovered from the illegal influence exercised upon him by the Government pardon.
11. We hold, therefore, that the grounds are invalid on which the Additional Sessions Judge has held that the pardon was not tendered in accordance with the law and, therefore, that Mohendra Bid was not a competent witness.
12. In this case, however, we think we must go further and must hold after a careful consideration of the circumstances under which the evidence of this approver was given at the first trial, that he was then a competent witness and his evidence was admissible as the evidence of an accomplice. After the Public Prosecutor had explained to the Magistrate that the name of the approver had been included in the A Form by mistake, that he had been sent up for trial by mistake, and that Government had granted him a pardon, and afterwards for these reasons the Public Prosecutor had put in an application under section 409, praying to withdraw the case against him and after that application had been granted, the approver Mohendra Bid was then and there withdrawn from the position of an accused and became a competent witness in the case. His evidence was admissible as the evidence of an accomplice, subject of course to all the infirmities attaching to such evidence.
13. The reason which the Additional Sessions Judge has given for himself refusing to tender pardon is one which we fail to understand. The mere fact that the approver was originally charged with having committed the offence jointly with the other accused, would not, after that charge against him had been withdrawn, necessitate his detention in custody. It is not very clear in what state the approver remained so far as this case is concerned after that withdrawal, for we have been given to understand that he was also examined as an approver in another case afterwards. We can, however, find no grounds in law for the view which the Judge has taken, that when a person jointly accused with other persons of a non-bailable offence, has been tendered a pardon and has accepted it he must of necessity be detained in custody and may not be admitted to bail.
14. In our opinion all the facts and circumstances on which the Additional Sessions Judge had based his conclusion that the evidence of Mohendra Bid was not admissible, are such which might well be taken into consideration in determining the credibility of his evidence as a witness when he was examined. They do not of themselves afford sufficient grounds for the conclusion that he was not a competent witness and that his evidence was inadmissible against the accused.
15. We hold, therefore, that the grounds on which the Additional Sessions Judge has acquitted the 12 accused without any trial are bad in law, and we set aside the order of acquittal and direct that the accused be tried on the charges framed against them before the Judicial Commissioner who is also Sessions Judge of Chota Nagpur.
16. We understand that when tho appeal was admitted, orders of this Court were issued for the re-arrest of the accused persona and that notice of this appeal has been given to them.
17. Appeal allowed. Retrial ordered.