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  • Tyabji, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ayling, J. and Tyabji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit primarily instituted to enforce a sale under a document described as Ex. A (dated 19 September 1900). Ex. A recorded a sale of land by Raman Ambalagaran to the plaintiff (the appellant), reciting a nominal consideration of Rs. 400 (of which Rs. 41-8-0 was shown as paid in cash and the balance by assumed debts and hypothecation deeds to be discharged by the vendee). The Subordinate Judge found the sale collusive and voidable, with no possession passing and no effective consideration paid for many years.

The plaint lands were attached in execution on 16 December 1900, and were ultimately sold in court on 28 February 1908 to the defendant, with confirmation on 30 March 1908. Separately, mortgagees under one hypothecation deed instituted Original Suit No. 56 of 1906 for recovery of the mortgage amount; that suit resulted in a decree dated 19 March 1907 (Ex. 6) directing realization of the mortgage by sale of the hypotheca.

The appellant (plaintiff below) paid sums to stop sale and to satisfy the decree: Rs. 100 on 19 April 1907, a subsequent Rs. 50, and Rs. 205 on 13 March 1908 (the High Court also records the total as Rs. 355 in one passage). The appellant sued, alternatively, for a declaration of a charge (a lien) on the property to the extent of the moneys so paid; the Subordinate Judge refused to allow such a charge and rejected the claim. The appellant appealed, and in this opinion the High Court considers (1) whether the prayer for a charge was maintainable in the suit and (2) whether the appellant was entitled to subrogation or a lien for the payments made.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prayer for a charge (a lien on the property) to secure the sums paid by the plaintiff in satisfaction of the mortgage-decree was maintainable in a suit primarily brought to enforce the sale under Ex. A.
  2. Whether, on the facts, the appellant (a nominal or allegedly collusive transferee) was entitled to subrogation or a charge on the property for sums paid in satisfaction of the mortgage decree—in other words, whether he could claim subrogation as against a subsequent purchaser for value.
  3. Whether the appellant was a mere "volunteer" (and thus excluded from equitable subrogation), or whether he was under any legal obligation or had any existing right of his own that made the payments necessary to preserve that right.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The vakil for the appellants did not attempt to press the validity of Ex. A before the High Court but confined the appeal to the contention that the Subordinate Judge erred in refusing to allow his client a charge on the property for the sums paid in satisfaction of the decree in Original Suit No. 56 of 1906.
  • The appellant relied on authority (Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu and Palamalai Mudaliyar v. The South Indian Export Co. Ltd.) said to be similar, in which subrogation or an equitable charge had been allowed.
  • The appellant argued that, but for his payment of the mortgage, the defendant would have been liable and that the defendant must be taken to have purchased subject to the mortgage; thus the appellant claimed the right to recover from the defendant the sums by way of a charge on the property.
  • It was also argued (as framed by the appellant and noted by the Court) that he was entitled to relief under the doctrine of subrogation and alternatively under Section 70 of the Contract Act.

Respondent/Defendant and Lower Court Position

  • The Subordinate Judge rejected the appellant's claim on two grounds: (1) the prayer for a charge was not maintainable in a suit primarily brought to enforce the sale under Ex. A (relying on Kutti Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar), and (2) the plaintiff was a mere "volunteer" and could not claim subrogation.
  • The defendant relied on being an innocent purchaser in a court sale and on the finding that the alleged sale to the plaintiff (Ex. A) was collusive and inoperative, so that no equitable charge in favour of the plaintiff subsisted when the defendant purchased.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kutti Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar Authority relied on by the Subordinate Judge to hold that the prayer for a charge was not maintainable in the suit. The High Court found this authority inapplicable to the present case because the plaintiff had sued alternatively for a declaration of a charge and had taken an issue on it in the original Court without objection of misjoinder; accordingly the ruling quoted by the Subordinate Judge did not govern the present pleadings.
Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh and Chandrikah Singh v. Rashbehari Singh Summarizes the principles governing subrogation; stated (via Mookerjee, J.) that subrogation is not applied for a mere stranger or volunteer who pays the debt of another without assignment or agreement. Ayling, J. quoted this exposition to frame the test whether the appellant was a volunteer and therefore excluded from equitable subrogation; the Court applied that principle to find the appellant was not entitled to subrogation.
Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu Authority where subrogation/charge was allowed in circumstances involving an antedated or colorable sale, but where the person claiming subrogation had become a transferee for valuable consideration and had an interest to protect. The Court distinguished this case from the present: in Syamalarayudu the transferee had assumed liability and had a substantial interest, and the payment discharged a liability distinct from the fraudulent transaction; in the present case the claimant had no such beneficial interest and the payment formed part of the fraudulent transaction.
Palamalai Mudaliar v. The South Indian Export Co. Ltd. Case where the transferee (though the sale was voidable) had satisfied an existing mortgage-decree and had paid in circumstances where he had a substantial interest; court considered subrogation/benefit to creditors. The Court treated this as distinguishable because, in that case, the transferee had satisfied a mortgage-decree while possessing an actual interest; here the plaintiff's alleged title was nominal and inoperative and his payments were not to protect a real proprietary interest.
Townsend v. Cleveland Fire Proofing Co. and Durant v. Ennaco United States authorities cited in the High Court's exposition of the wider doctrine of subrogation (definitions and equitable scope of the right). The Court used these authorities to explain the broader, equitable conception of subrogation (a substitution that places the payer in the shoes of the creditor) and to illustrate that subrogation is an equitable remedy subject to prior equities and rules of equity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the appeal in two main parts as identified by the Subordinate Judge and the parties: (1) procedural/pleading question about maintainability of the prayer for a charge in a suit to enforce Ex. A, and (2) the substantive equitable question whether the appellant could claim subrogation/a lien for the payments he made.

On maintainability, Ayling, J. observed that the Subordinate Judge had relied on Kutti Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar to reject the charge claim as not maintainable; but the High Court found that the plaintiff had properly pleaded an alternative claim for declaration of a charge and had taken an issue on it in the original Court without objection on misjoinder. Given those pleadings and the issues taken, the authority relied upon by the Subordinate Judge did not apply and could not dispose of the maintainability point.

The substantive question of subrogation occupied the bulk of the Court's analysis. The Court:

  • Set out the equitable doctrine of subrogation (drawing on Gurdeo Singh and U.S. authorities) as a flexible, equitable remedy that substitutes one person for another in right, but which is fundamentally constrained by equitable maxims (notably that a mere volunteer or stranger who pays without obligation normally cannot claim subrogation).
  • Examined the factual matrix in detail: Ex. A was a nominal/collusive sale dated 19 September 1900 which, on the subordinate court's findings, was voidable, had not passed possession, and had produced no effective consideration; the mortgage suit (Original Suit No. 56 of 1906) resulted in a decree directing realization by sale of the hypotheca (the Court interpreted the decree as a decree for realization by sale rather than a personal liability of the appellant); the appellant paid sums (Rs.100; Rs.50; Rs.205) while the sale to the defendant was pending and partly after the defendant's purchase but before confirmation.
  • Analyzed whether the appellant was under any legal obligation or had a proprietary right which required protection: the Court concluded he had neither. The alleged sale (Ex. A) had never been given effect to and conferred no apparent proprietary interest; the payments were not made to preserve any vested right of the appellant.
  • Distinguished the authorities relied upon by appellant (Syamalarayudu and Palamalai Mudaliar) on the ground that in those cases the persons claiming subrogation were transferees for valuable consideration who had a substantial interest at the time of payment and whose payments were necessary to protect that interest. By contrast in the present case the appellant's payment was part of, or closely connected with, the colorable/nominal transaction and did not protect a genuine proprietary interest.
  • Applied equitable principles (including the maxim that a party seeking equity must come with clean hands): the Court held that it would not be equitable to allow the appellant to obtain a charge against the property to the prejudice of an innocent subsequent purchaser.

Tyabji, J. wrote separately but in agreement, further discussing the broader concept of subrogation and the relevance of Sections 68–72 (and especially Sections 69–70) of the Contract Act as illustrating how relations resembling those created by contract may arise and why equitable considerations must guide any decision to grant subrogation. He emphasized that subrogation in the wider sense can create a proprietary claim only where equity supports it; on the facts equity did not favour the appellant.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court affirmed the Subordinate Judge's refusal to allow the appellant a charge on the property and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's claim for a charge (lien) on the property to secure the moneys he paid in satisfaction of the mortgage-decree was rejected; the defendant (an innocent purchaser at the court sale) retains possession and title as upheld by the Court.
  • The Court applied and explained equitable principles governing subrogation, distinguishing prior cases in which subrogation was allowed because the payer had a real proprietary interest; on the present facts no equitable subrogation or proprietary charge arose in favour of the appellant.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a new statutory rule; it applies established equitable principles and distinguishes earlier authorities on their facts. The decision leaves intact the principle that a nominal or collusive transferee who holds no real proprietary interest and who pays only as part of the colorable transaction will generally not obtain subrogation against an innocent purchaser.

Order recorded in the opinion: Appeal dismissed.

Show full summary ...

    Karuppan Ambalagaran v. Muhammad Sakuth Levvai

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Ayling, J.:— The vakil for the appellants has not attempted to support the sale deed, Ex. A, before us: but has confined himself to arguing that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in refusing to allow his client a charge on the property to the extant of the money paid by him in satisfaction of the decree in Original Suit No. 56 of 1906, which was brought on a mortgage executed by the owner of the land (the appellant's brother) in favour of one Raman Ambalagaran prior to Ex. A.

    2. The Subordinate Judge rejected this claim on two grounds: (1) that the prayer for the charge is not maintainable in this suit, brought primarily to enforce the sale under Ex. A, (2) that the plaintiff, being a mere “volunteer,” cannot claim to be subrogated. As regards the first, the Subordinate Judge depends on Kutti Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar(1). In the present case, the plaintiff has in his plaint sued in the alternative for a declaration of his charge, and has taken an issue on it in the original Court, while no objection was raised on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. In such circumstances, the ruling quoted appears inapplicable.

    3. The second point requires fuller consideration. The principles, on which the right of subrogation should be applied, have been discussed at length by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh and Chandrikah Singh v. Rashbehari Singh(2), and I cannot do better than quote the remarks of Mookerjee, J., who has thus tersely summarized the matter:

    “The doctrine of subrogation is not applied for the mere stranger or volunteer who has paid the debt of another, without any assignment or agreement for subrogation, being under no legal obligation to make the payment, and not being compelled to do so for the preservation of any rights or properties of his own.”

    4. In the present case, there was no assignment or agreement and the only question is whether, in view of the facts of the case, the appellant can be deemed to have been under any legal obligation to discharge the decree in Original Suit No. 56 of 1906, or whether he was obliged to do so for the preservation of any right of his own. The facts are briefly these: On 19th September 1900, the owner of the property, Raman Ambalagaran, sold it to the plaintiff who was his brother, under Ex. A, for a nominal consideration of Rs. 400. Of this Rs. 41-8-0 is recited as paid in cash, the balance was represented by the debts, one by the vendor under a promissory note and two hypothecation deeds which the vendee was to discharge. The Subordinate Judge has found this sale to be collusive and voidable at the instance of the defendants. Possession did not pass under it and not a pie of consideration was paid under it at the time or till seven years later. So far as appears, it was a purely nominal transaction.

    5. On 16th December 1900, the plaint lands were attached by the defendant in execution of a decree against Raman Ambalagaran; but they were not brought to sale till 28th February 1908, when they were purchased by the defendant himself, the sale being confirmed on 30th March 1908.

    6. Meantime, the mortgagees under one of the hypothecation deeds referred to in Ex. A, filed a suit (Original Suit No. 56 of 1906 on the file of the Negapatam District Munsif) for the recovery of the amount due on the deed; and the, plaintiff was impleaded as a subsequent purchaser of the hypotheca. The result was a decree (Ex. 6) dated 19th March 1907. This directs the defendant in the suit to pay the plaintiffs in the same the amount due under the suit hypothecation bond with interest and costs, failing which the hypotheca were to be brought to sale in the usual way. It was represented to us that this decree makes the present appellant personally liable for the amount, due under the hypothecation deed; but a careful consideration of the document has convinced me that this is not the case. The decree is not drawn up in the form given in the schedule to the present Code of Civil Procedure; but I feel no doubt that it was intended and understood as simply a decree for the realization of the mortgage amount by the sale of the hypotheca. It is specifically recited that the present appellant was impleaded only as a subsequent purchaser; and it is obvious that, as such, he could not possibly have been held personally liable for the mortgage amount.

    7. Subsequently, as appears from Exs. E and F, the decree-holders took steps to bring the property to sale. The sale was however stopped on payment of Rs. 100 by the appellant on 19th April 1907. The appellant made a subsequent payment of Rs. 50 and the decree was finally satisfied by a payment by the appellant of Rs. 205 on 13th March 1908. This latter date, it may be remarked, is 14 days after the Court's sale to the defendant, and 17 days before its confirmation. It is in respect of these payments that the plaintiff claims subrogation.

    8. After careful consideration, I think theft Subordinate Judge was right in disallowing it. The plaintiff was neither under a legal obligation to make the payments nor had he any right of his own which it was necessary for him to protect. It cannot be held that he enjoyed any interest in the property by reason of the nominal and collusive sale deed, Ex. A, executed, seven years before, which had never been given effect to, and for which not a pie of consideration had ever passed. The appellant's vakil has relied on two cases, Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu(3) and Palamalai Mudaliyar v. The South Indian Export Co. Ltd.(4), as being cases similar to the present in which subrogation was allowed. But a perusal of the judgments in these cases shows that in each the person claiming; subrogation was at the time of making payment a transferee of the property for valuable consideration. He may have been guilty of fraud or misconduct in Connexion with the transfer which might render it voidable at the instance of another property; but he had paid consideration for the transfer and was possessed, at the time he discharged the mortgage, of a substantial interest on the property. The payments for which subrogation was claimed were necessary to protect that interest. This as it seems to me, is a very real distinction between those cases and the present one.

    9. I consider that the Subordinate Judge's decision was right; and would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    Tyabji, J.:— The defendant is in possession of property purchased in Court sale. The plaintiff claimed possession of the same property which he said had been sold to him prior to the Court sale on which the defendant relies. Alternatively, the plaintiff claimed a lien on the property for the moneys paid out by him (on the basis of his having been the valid purchaser of the property) in order to discharge a mortgage then subsisting on it. I agree that the case of Kutti Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar is distinguishable on the ground referred to by my learned brother. It has been found that the alleged purchase by the plaintiff was inoperative. The only question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a lien on the property for the sums so paid by him.

    10. The alleged sale to the plaintiff was by Ex. A, executed on 19th September 1900. The consideration for that sale purported to be Rs. 400, made up of four items one of which was the payment off of the mortgage to which I have alluded and under which Rs. 190 were stated to be due on the property from the ostensible vendor of the plaintiff. It has been found that the plaintiff paid no portion of the consideration for the alleged sale at the time when Ex. A was executed. In 1906, however, the mortgagee instituted a suit against the plaintiff and his ostensible vendor on the basis of the mortgage. A decree was then passed for the sum due on the mortgage, and the plaintiff (who was defendant 2 in that suit) discharged the mortgage claim by paying Rs. 355, which included Rs. 190 for the principal mortgage debt, about Rs. 45 for costs and the rest for interest on the said Rs. 190. I agree with my learned brother that, on the true construction of the decree, the plaintiff was not bound personally to pay the amount of the decree, but in the view that I take of this case, that question is not of much importance and it may be assumed that the construction suggested by the plaintiff is correct, and that the plaintiff permitted a decree to be passed against himself personally. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that he is entitled to a charge on the property for the said sum of Rs. 355 by operation of the doctrine of subrogation, or by operation of the principle laid down in, or forming the basis of Section 70 of the Contract Act. Hence, the question may shortly be stated to be whether under the circumstances of this case, a nominal and collusive transferee without consideration, who being sued jointly with his ostensible transferor by a person holding a mortgage on the property, pays off the mortgage debt in satisfaction of the decree passed in favour of the mortgagee, is entitled as against a, subsequent purchaser for value to have a lien on the mortgaged property for the sum which he has so paid off.

    11. It is necessary, in the first instance, to point out that the plaintiff here claims to fix a charge on the property and his claim is not merely personal as against those with whom he had dealings. Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act, do not refer to any charge or lien upon any property, and seem to contemplate, at least primarily, only a personal liability. No legislative provision contained in any Act was cited to us directly covering the point, but there are decisions of this Court which seem to recognize the right of subrogation in the wider sense in which it is understood in the Courts of the United States. Some decisions of those Courts are referred to by Mookerjee, J., in Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh and Chandrikah Singh v. Rashbehary Singh. It seems desirable to refer to the exposition of the law of subrogation based on those decisions owing to the absence of any statutory definition of that right, and inasmuch as the English authorities seem to contemplate mainly one form of subrogation, viz., the substitution of the insurer to the rights of the assured, [see Smith's Mercantile Law 10th Edn., pp. 502, 503, and Encyclopaedia of Laws of England (Subrogation)]; though subrogation was a creation of the civil law, it seems never to have been recognized to its full extent by the Common law: See the Cyclopaedia of American Law and Procedure, Vol. 37, p. 365, citing Durant v. Ennaco(5).

    12. Subrogation, in its wider signification, has been defined as “a substitution, ordinarily the substitution of another person in the place of one creditor, so that the person in whose favour it is exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in relation to the debt. More broadly, it is the substitution of one person in the place of another, whether as creditor or as the possessor of any other rightful claim. The substitute is put in all respects in the place of the party to whose rights he is subrogated:” see the Cyclopaedia of American Law and Procedure, Vol. 37, pp. 363 and 364, citing Townsend v. Cleveland Fire Proofing Co.(6). The right so defined “does not necessarily rest on contract or privity, but upon principles of natural equity, and does not depend upon the act of the creditor, but may be independent of him and also of the debtor.” It is however a purely equitable right and “there must, in every case where the doctrine is invoked, in addition to the inherent justice of the case, concur therewith some principle of equity jurisprudence as recognized and enforced by Courts of equity. Where the rights of subrogation exist, it is subject to prior equities and all the rules of equity.”

    13. It has been pointed out that one mode in which the question may be considered, whether the right of subrogation may be claimed, is to determine whether the person claiming it is a mere volunteer or stranger; for if so, then the right cannot—at least in the great majority of cases—be claimed. As I understand the law, the rule is merely a test for the application of the general principles stated above, being one aspect of the wider question whether subrogation can be claimed in the particular circumstances of the case on principles of justice, equity and good conscience. That test may not in some cases be conclusive, nor the most convenient, or direct method of arriving at a decision. It may be that a person cannot be described as a stranger, and yet he may not be entitled to the right. There may be other cases (though these would be rare) where the right is given to a person who can be taken out of the category of a volunteer, if at all, only by subtleties and fictions. Hence the determination of the question, whether or not the persons claiming subrogation is a stranger, may often be a circuitous and uncertain means for arriving at a decision on the real point.

    14. In deciding whether in any particular case it would be equitable to allow the right of subrogation, regard should, in my opinion, be had to Sections 68 to 72 of the Contract Act, which illustrate how relations resembling those created by contract may arise; subrogation (when it does not arise out of contract) creates such a relation. Regard should also be had to the recognized principles by which Courts of equity are guided; one of such principles material to the present case is that the party seeking the assistance of the Court must come before it with clean hands. The application of this; general statement of the law to the facts of the present case will be best considered in connexion with the decided cases in which the right of subrogation in the wider, sense has been recognized.

    15. Much reliance was placed on the case of Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu. There the owner of the property entered into two separate agreements to sell the property at different times with two persons. The latter agreement was antedated by an illegal act of the plaintiff so as to make it appear that his rights had priority. It is argued that this case shows that a valid charge may be made upon property even by reason of payments made by a person who has been guilty of an illegal act for the purpose of depriving another of his right to purchase that property; and that therefore payments made in satisfaction of a decree passed against a person who has taken a transfer of the property in his name (though without consideration) and who is subsequently sued on the basis of his being the transferee of the property, have a greater claim to be considered as a charge upon the property after it is transferred to a later purchaser. It seems to me however that one distinction between the case reported as Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu and the present case is overlooked in this argument. In that case the liability of a rightful purchaser to pay the mortgage was established in the very suit in which the sale to him was upheld. When the rightful purchaser's rights in the property accrued, the property was still subject to the mortgage which was discharged by the nominal purchaser, though it is true that the object for so discharing the mortgage was to strengthen the colorable purchase. On the other hand, in the case with which we have now to deal, the person who is sought to be charged with the mortgage debt was not a party to the suit on the mortgage, and he has had no opportunity of contesting its validity or effect. Again, here the payment off of the mortgage debt, which was made long after the ostensible sale, was, in fact, a portion of the consideration for the sale. In the reported case, the liability had been discharged apart from (though in one sense as a sequel of) the transaction vitiated by fraud, and it was explicitly held that the act of discharging the existing liability on the property under the mortgage was an act lawful in itself and that it did not form part of the fraud. Here a liability was purported to be taken upon himself by a person for the purpose of defrauding creditors, and it was only by discharging or appearing to discharge that liability so taken upon himself that effect was given to the fraud; this is the only payment made for giving colour to the nominal sale which has been found to be fraudulent. Where an act is in itself lawful and is quite distinct from the original fraudulent transaction it may stand on a better footing than an act which forms part of the fraud, though the validity of acts of the former class may be impaired when their connexion with the fraud is so close as to make them indistinguishable from those acts which form integral portions of the fraud, the question being one of degree.

    16. Finally, in Syamalarayudu's case, the purchaser had agreed to purchase subject to the mortgage, and he was not charged with a liability which he had not contracted to meet; the result of subrogation in that case was that a liability which had existed between the rightful purchaser and the vendor was merely transferred in favour of a third party; and such transfer did not put the rightful purchaser in any worse position than when he had contracted to purchase.

    17. The next case, on which reliance was placed, was Palamalai Mudaliar v. Export Co. Ltd.. In that case also, prior to the transfer in question, there was a valid mortgage decree subsisting on the property (not a personal decree against the parties), and the sale, though it was held to be voidable at the instance of creditors, was not a mere nominal transaction without consideration but the transferee had satisfied that decree so as to make the satisfaction enure to the benefit of the mortgagor and of his creditors.

    18. The Court held (not without some doubt) that the sale was voidable at the instance of the creditors, inasmuch as it had the effect of defeating or delaying them; it followed therefore almost as a corollary that in so far as the sale had not delayed or defeated the creditors, but was actually for their benefit, it should be upheld.

    19. Another head of argument on behalf of the appellant was that, but for the payment off of the mortgage by the plaintiff, the defendant would have been liable to pay it off, that the defendant must be taken to have purchased the property subject to the mortgage, and that the plaintiff was entitled to claim from him the sum in respect of the liability for which the defendant was relieved by the acts of the plaintiff. But that does not seem to me to represent the true state of facts. The real question for us is whether when the defendant purchased the property, there was any charge subsisting in favour of the plaintiff or anyone else against the property. In considering the question, it is clear that the case of both parties was that the original mortgage had been discharged and the property was held discharged from the mortgage; the plaintiff claimed to hold the property so discharged himself, and the defendant claimed that it was held by his judgment-debtor. It may be that in the Court sale, in which the defendant purchased the property, the biddings were lower than they would have been had there not been these doubts whether the property did or did not belong to the plaintiff; but there was no question that the mortgage had been discharged. It has been now held that it did not belong to the plaintiff. The fact that the value of the property was depreciated by a fraudulent transaction to which the plaintiff was a party seems to me to be no reason for assisting the plaintiff as against an innocent third party.

    20. Considering the facts of this case broadly, it seems to me that as between the plaintiff and the defendant it would not be equitable to permit the plaintiff to have the charge that he claims and that to do so would be going beyond any decision to which our attention has been drawn. I agree, therefore, that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

    S.N/R.K

    21. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Karuppan Ambalagaran v. Muhammad Sakuth Levvai
    (Oct 14, 1913)