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    Maharaja Raja Sahib Of Bobbili v. W.S. Venkataramanjulu Naidu

    1. This is an appeal by an auction-purchaser of an undivided share belonging to a coparcener against the decree of the District Judge of Chingleput disallowing his claim for mesne profits in the suit filed by him for partition and delivery of the share purchased.

    2. The appellant rests his case on two grounds. The first is that the members of the family of the coparcener whose share he purchased were divided in status and that consequently he is entitled to mesne profits, and secondly that in any event he is entitled as a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners to mesne profits in respect of the share which he purchased. As regards the first contention there is no oral evidence on record. The appellant relies on Exs. A and B showing that the person whose share he purchased was divided in status from the other members of his family. Ex. A is an affidavit filed by one of the members in a previous suit. The inference required to be drawn from Ex. A is that the parties were divided in status, but reading the affidavit as a whole it seems to us that the dispute was about the management of the properties. It does not appear that there was any decision in the suit in which Ex. A was filed that the members were divided in status, and we do not see how the allegation of one member in a previous suit could be taken to be conclusive in the matter. Ex. B does not help the appellant as it specifically recites that the incumbents “are undivided members and that they are entitled to the shrotriem village,” and we are therefore of opinion that it has not been shown that the appellant's predecessor-in title was divided in status from the other coparceners.

    3. The real question is whether a purchaser of an undivided share is entitled to mesne profits as against the coparceners from the date of his purchase up to the date of the plaint. So far as we are aware there is no authority of any High Court in which the matter has been discussed and decided. Nor has it ever been the practice to allow mesne profits id such cases. Such authorities, as there are, seem to be the other way. In Narayan bin Babaji v. Nathaji Durgaji(1) it was assumed that in a suit by a purchaser from an undivided coparcener for recovery of the share of his vendor, mesne profits should not be granted, and their Lordships reversed the decision of the District Judge awarding mesne profits in the suit.

    4. The ground on which the appellant claim mesne profits is that the transfer to him effects a severance of the coparcenary as regards that share and makes him a tenant-in-common of the share which his vendor had at the date of the alienation and that the right to mesne profits is a necessary incident to the right of property in which a person is interested as tenant-in-commen. Reference has been made to Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya(2); Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti(3) and Subba Row v. Ananthanarayana Iyer(4).

    5. There are no doubt dicta in these cases that where a coparcener makes an-alienation of the whole or portion of his share “the estate that is transferred to and vested in the alienee is not an equitable interest as understood in English law, but a legal estate which has to be reduced to possession by the alienee standing in the shoes of the transferor and effecting a partition on the footing on which the family and the property both stood at the time of the transfer.” This view has been dissented from in Nanjayya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali(5) where Shankaran Nair and Bakewell, JJ. held that an alienation of an undivided share by a member of a joint family does not put an end to the joint tenancy and that the alienee does not become a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners but he is only entitled in equity to enforce his rights in a suit for partition.

    6. We are inclined to the view taken in Nanjayya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali. The right of the alienee to enforce partition does not rest on any text of the Hindu law, but on the equitable doctrine that a purchaser for value should be allowed to stand in his vendor's shoes and work out his rights by a partition; and it seems to us that the doctrine need not be extended beyond what is absolutely necessary to enable the vendee to work out his rights. In the suit for partition which may be filed by the alienee it may be that the property conveyed to him falls to some other coparcener and it is difficult to see how this fact could be reconciled with the theory that by purchase he be comes entitled to a vested interest in the share of his coparcener in the property alienated as from the date of the alienation.

    7. There are also clear authorities that the mere fact that a coparcener makes an alienation does not put an end to the status of the coparcenary as between himself and the other members of his family, and if this be so, it would be unfair that the other members of the family should be required to bear the expenses of the alienating coparcener and the members of his family, and also to set apart a portion of the income of the properties for meeting the claim of the alienee.

    8. It is argued that the purchaser who paid consideration would be kept out of the fruits of his purchase should mean profits be not given to him; but the remedy is obviously in the purchaser's hands as it is open to him to file a suit for partition immediately after the purchase.

    9. Viewing the case from the mere standpoint of hardship we think that the balance is in favour of the members of the joint family. The observations of the learned Judges who took part in Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramaia; Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetts; and Subla Row v. Ananthanarayana Iyar as regards the alienee being a tenant-in-common and not merely entitled to an equity are obiter dicta, and we are of opinion that the broad proposition enunciated in those cases is not supported by any test in Hindu law, and we are not prepared to follow it. It is difficult to reconcile it with the decision of the Privy Council in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh(6); Hardi Narain v. Ruder Perkash(7) and Ramkisore v. Jainarayan(8). The Privy Council has decided that the alienee in possession is liable to be ejected at the instance of the coparceners who are not bound by the alien-nation.

    10. We are of opinion that the mere fact of a person purchasing a share of a coparcener in joint family properties would not entitle him to mesne profits as against such other members of the family and that the purchaser would be in no higher position than his alienor who under Hindu law would not under ordinary circumstances be entitled to demand an account of the past profits.

    11. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The memorandum of objections has not been argued and has been dismissed with costs.

    S.N/R.K

    12. Appeal dismissed.

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    Maharaja Raja Sahib Of Bobbili v. W.S. Venkataramanjulu Naidu
    (Jul 21, 1914)