Napier, J.:— This was a suit by the Receiver of the Tanjore Palace Estate to recover possession of certain lands in the possession of the defendant alleged by the plaintiff to be held on a tenancy from year to year. The defendant relied on the terms of the muchilika Ex. A dated 13th June 1889, given to him by the P.W.D authorities, as creating a permanant tenancy and alternatively contended that he was entitled to permanant rights of occupancy under the Madras Estate Land Act. The lower appellate Court found that the defendant had a right of occupancy and the plaintiff appeals. Both defences are relied on in this Court. With regard to Ex. A, it is sufficient to say that it is no more than a license to out Nanal jungle on the right bank of the Vannar river from year to year and in no sense a lease of the land far less a permanaent lease. The P.W.D clearly had neither the intention nor the authority to grant any such lease. The Government order of 25th, Eebruary 1889, in pursuance of which these called lease was executed, informed the P.W.D authorities that the Tanjore Palace Estate was entitled to the grass grown on the padugais and directed the crediting to estate funds of grass out there. In consequence of these directions the right to out grass, was leased by the Executive Engineer for the benefit of the estate and the lease was in 1895 transferred to the Palace Estate. This contention, therefore fails. The next contention has raised very large question as to the nature of the interest vested in the Tanjore Royal Family in these lands by their restoration to the family and the effect of the Act of State on the rights of the tenants in possession.
2. We do not propose to consider these questions, as we are satisfied that the estate does not come within the purview of the Madras Estates Land Act at all, whether the kudivaram interest is vested in the estate or not.
3. It is clearly not within Cl. (a), (b) and (c); S. 3. The only clause that could possibly apply is Cl. (d), any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has been made, confirmed or reoognized by the British Government. The history of the grant is well known and it is to be found in the reports in Secy. of State v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba(1) and Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba(2). The Governor-in-Council in exercise of the sovereign rights of the Crown made over the estate to the senior widow with succession to the daughter of the late Rajah or failing her, the next heirs of the late Rajah vide Jajoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba. It was held in that case this grant was a grant of grace and favour by Government (vide p. 445) and this language does accord with the natural meaning of the word inam. We are satisfied however that we have not to look to the natural meaning of the word in construing the clause. “Granted in inam” is a phrase with which the Courts are very familiar and inam has acquired a definite meaning since the Inam Settlement. It was pointed out in argument that a forfeited zemindari when re-granted is, broadly speaking, “granted in inam” but it is never called an inam. One peculiar feature in inams has always been the intention of the Government to reserve a reversionary right, whether the grant be personal, service or religious. When the grant is personal, that right has been the subject of enfranchisement by the Commission. Could it be suggested that Government has at any time contemplated the position that enfranchisement would give a better title for the heirs of the late Rajah? Both the circumstances of the grant and its subsequent treatment are against any such supposition. The language of the Despatch of the Secretary of State of 23rd October 1862, was that
“His Majesty's Government was willing to relinquish to the surviing members of the late prince's family the benefits accruing from these possessions.”
4. The word relinquish is, I think, indicative. Nowhere is the grant termed inam whereas later on in the same Despatch the Secretary of State approves of the decision of the Madras Government that “Certain alienations of the nature of inam should be dealt with by the Inam Commissioner.” In the District Manual, the mokhasa (as it is there, rather loosely termed), although stated to be treated for all practical purposes as an unenfranchised inam, is carefully distinguished from inams properly so-called. To conclude, the nature of the estate is far more analogous to a permanently settled estate though there is, of course, no revenue liability on it. We cannot include it in the class dealt with in Cl. (d) merely because of the literal meaning of the word inam. The respondent therefore cannot treat it as an estate and his claim to permanent rights of occupancy fails. The second appeal will be allowed with costs, plaintiff being given a decree for possession with mesne profits at Rs. 7 per annum from 1st April 1908, till delivery in execution or three years from the date, whichever first occurs.
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— I concur.
S.N/R.K
5. Appeal allowed.