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    Sub-Judge, First Class v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand Parwar

    1. This is a reference by the Sub-ordinate Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad, asking this Court to take action in a matter of contempt committed against the presiding Judge of that Court. It appears that the learned Judge who has made the reference was seised of a case in which the opposite party was involved. One Mt. Eadhabai, daughter of Mulchand, had filed Civil Suit No. 11 of 1931 in the Court in question against the opposite party, Jawaharlal and his brothers for, among other things, possession of Mulchand's property including property which had been seized by the District Judge and kept with the Nazir in proceedings under Section 192 of the Succession Act. The defendants set up a will alleged to have been executed by Mulchand in their favour bequeathing all the property to them. The Court over which the learned Judge who has made this reference was presiding decreed the plaintiff's claim in full and held that the will was a forgery. The defendants appealed to the High Court and there the appeal was dismissed and the finding that the will was a forgery was upheld. The decree-holder then took out execution and the judgment-debtors, including the opposite party, set up an adjustment of the decree but gave no evidence in support of their contention and so the application was dismissed and the decree-holder was given possession of the property in the hands of the Nazir. The next day, the judgment-debtor, Jawaharlal sent a letter under a registered cover to the learned Judge and it is in respect of this letter that the present reference has been made. It appears that the Court was then still seised of the case and that the next hearing was fixed for 15th January 1938. The letter therefore was sent to a Judge seised of the case while he was still exercising jurisdiction in respect of it. The letter is in these terms in so far as it is relevant to the present matter:

    I have this day come to know that you have, without giving intimation to me, got the safe broken open and have given all the ornaments together with the safe with a brass lock belonging to me to Mt. Radhabai's mukthyars. You have on your responsibility caused all these proceedings against law to be taken with a view to cause loss to me. In case I succeed in appeal, you yourself shall be responsible for the property as the value thereof, due to the above mentioned unlawful acts.

    2. The underlining (here italicized) is mine.

    3. There can be no doubt that this is contempt of a serious nature. It contains an imputation that the learned Judge has acted unlawfully and with a view to cause the opposite party loss. It contains a threat and contains an imputation against the Judge's impartiality. That is a serious matter which cannot be treated lightly. Judges have to discharge responsible and often disagreeable duties and it is essential that they should be afforded the utmost protection if the administration of justice is to remain independent, clean, fearless, unbiassed and impartial. When notice was issued by the learned Judge to the opposite party, he appeared and after admitting that he had sent the letter in question merely stated that he had nothing to add. No attempt was made to offer an apology and the learned Judge states that he showed no remorse for his conduct and did not utter a single word of regret. In this Court an apology was tendered by the opposite party's learned counsel but not till after the completion of the arguments on behalf of the Crown, and not till after the case had been argued for a few minutes on his behalf on the merits. An apology at that stage has not much value. There appears to be an impression abroad that an apology consists of a magic formula of words which has but to be uttered as an incantation at the last possible moment when all else has failed and it is evident that retribution is inevitable, to stave off punishment. It appears to be felt that a man should be free to continue unfounded attacks upon another's honour and character and integrity with the utmost license till the last possible moment and then when he is unable to stave off the consequences of his infamous conduct any longer, all he need do is to wave this magic formula referred to as an apology in a Judge's face in order to emerge triumphantly from the fray. Nothing can be further from the truth.

    4. An apology is not a weapon of defence, forged to purge the guilty of their offences. It is not an additional insult to be hurled at the heads of those who have been wronged. It is intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong, doer's power. Only then is it of any avail in a court of justice. But before it can have that effect it should be tendered at the earliest possible stage, not the latest, and even if wisdom dawns only at the appellate stage, the apology should be tendered unreservedly and unconditionally before the arguments begin and before the person tendering the apology discovers that he has a weak case and before the Judge (when that happens, as it did here) has indicated the trend of his mind. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace but it ceases to be an apology; it ceases to be the full, frank, manly, confession of a wrong done which it is intended to be. It becomes instead the cringing of a coward shivering at the prospect of the stern hand of justice about to descend upon his head. It then deserves to be treated with the contempt with which cowards and bullies who do not hesitate to threaten others and to impugn their honesty and character without the slightest foundation and who cringe and wail when their own safety is at stake, are treated. However, I do not intend to make a point of this in this case because of the misconception which is prevalent in these parts about the meaning, nature and effect of an apology; nor of course am I intending to lay down any universal rule or to ignore the proviso to Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926. I refer to the matter in these strong terms only in order that there should be no misconception about apologies in the future and about the practice in respect of the tendering of them, and in order that there should be no possible mistake about my meaning and attitude. Mere lip service to a formula without any contrition of heart will not do.

    5. Turning now to the present case, there is no shadow of foundation for the attacks which have been made upon the learned Judge who has instituted these proceedings. I can understand, and make allowance for a disappointed litigant who loses his head and says or does something for which he is afterwards sorry. No Court would deal with that harshly; in fact, few Judges would take any notice at all of a human outburst of that kind. But what I have before me now is something very different. Here there is no sudden outburst but the deliberate and cool planning of a hardened litigant who is familiar with the rules of the game. Notice is given and drawn up with all the formalities which one would expect of a man who knows something of the law. Therefore either the opposite party enlisted the services of a petition-writer or somebody else of that caliber or he himself possessed the necessary knowledge and experience. Then the notice was sent by registered post, acknowledgment due: another act of deliberation. Then again, when the opposite party was called before the Court and given an opportunity to explain his conduct, he showed no contrition or remorse, offered no explanation (nor has he done so here), uttered no word of regret. This certainly negatives all theory of a foolish outburst made at a time when one's mind was temporarily unhinged. Then again what has been the opposite party's conduct throughout the case? He set up a will which two Courts, one of them being the High Court, have held to be a forgery. I do not want to say anything on the merits of that question because the prosecution of the opposite party has already been ordered on charges of forgery and perjury and I am told they are still pending. Therefore those matters are sub judice and I am not assuming that they are true. But a man who in the face of all this has the hardihood to write a minatory and insulting letter of this kind to a Judge who is still seised of his case is not a silly foolish person giving vent to a temperamental outburst but is a cool, deliberate, hardened, litigant who thinks he can coerce and overawe a Judge and thus gain his own ends by crooked means.

    6. One more fact. When the decree-holder took out execution, the opposite party pleaded an adjustment and then made no attempt to support what in the circumstances can only have been a false plea made in order to gain time. When even that dodge failed he resorted to this. I find it impossible to take a lenient view of cool and deliberate action of this kind and I would unhesitatingly have awarded a sentence of imprisonment had it not been for the apology which the opposite party's learned counsel made, though at a belated stage. He explained that his instructions were to ask for mercy and that he did not know just when that ought to be done. He read out to me the post card of instructions which he had received from his client and said that in accordance with them he had told the learned Advocate-General at the outset of the case that he intended to offer an apology if the letter were held to amount to contempt. I have accepted his explanation and am treating the apology as if it had been made at the outset. But, as I have observed, an apology is not something which a man is supposed to keep in his pocket till the last possible minute, nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea. Everything depends upon the circumstances as well as upon the nature of the apology and the manner in which it is tendered.

    7. Quite apart from the fact that it should have been tendered at the earliest possible stage in this case, the fact remains that there has been even now no apology tendered in the lower Court to the person directly injured, and even here the instructions read out to me which came from the opposite party himself merely contain directions to ask for mercy and do not embody any sort of apology. The apology, such as it is, has been tendered by his learned counsel, and very rightly, in the exercise of the discretion which counsel have in matters of this kind. I need hardly point out that an apology tendered to or before a third party who has not been wronged loses all its grace. However, since it has been tendered, even though at a late stage, I will take this much notice of it: I will refrain from passing a sentence of imprisonment which I would otherwise have done. But I feel that it is necessary to take a serious view of the matter in order to protect Judges in the lower Courts who are not as favorably situated as we are here and who have difficulties and obstacles to overcome from which we are happily free; also, in order to leave no mistake or misunderstanding in the minds of the general public that this sort of attempt at intimidation will not be lightly passed over. In the circumstances I do not feel that I can accept the kind of apology tendered here as complete expiation and therefore consider that a fine must be inflicted.

    8. As regards the prohibition contained in Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, this has been explained in (1938) All 548 (’38) 25 AIR 1933 All 358 , 176 IC 110 , ILR (1938) All 548 , 1938 ALJ 430 , 39 Cr LJ 677 and also in 12 Pat 1, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 Pat 142 , 144 IC 351 , 34 Cr LJ 770 , 12 Pat 1 , 14 PLT 605 12 Pat 172 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 Pat 204 , 147 IC 1251 , 12 Pat 172 , 14 PLT 77 and AIR 1932 Cal 705 (*32) 19 AIR 1932 Cal 705 , 137 IC 668 , 35 CWN 648 to refer to offences punish, able as contempt of Court by the Penal Code and not to offences punishable there otherwise than as contempt, and so that forms no bar here even if it be assumed that the subject-matter of these proceedings amounts to an offence punishable under the Penal Code. They do not in any event amount to an offence punishable there as contempt of Court. The property in the suit in respect of which the contempt was committed here is valuable and was valued at Rs. 6700. Therefore, after taking into consideration the proviso to S. 3, I inflict a fine of Rs. 500 and in default, a sentence of 6 weeks simple imprisonment under Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926.

    G.N/R.K

    9. Reference accepted.

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    Sub-Judge, First Class v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand Parwar
    (Sep 20, 1938)