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  • SECTION 90 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 32(3) of the Evidence Act. Kalu
  • Indian Registration Act (1st (1945) Edn.)
  • Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • SECTION 90 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 32(3) of the Evidence Act. Kalu
  • Indian Registration Act (1st (1945) Edn.)
  • Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act,

    Kalu Nimbaji Shingne v. Bapurao Chinkaji Shingne

    1. The plaintiffs-respondents brought the suit out of which this second appeal has arisen for separate possession of their half share after partitioning the field khasra No. 69 (area 21.5 acres) situate in mouza Deulgaon Mahi, taluq Chikhli, district Buldana, in Berar. That field formerly belonged to Nimbaji, father of the defendant-appellant Kalu, and he had sold half of it to Kadtu, grandfather of respondent 1, on 20th September 1894 under a registered sale-deed, of which Ex. P-6 is a certified copy. Subsequently, Kadtu gave half share out of that half share to his nephew Deoji respondent 2, in a partition effected in 1910. There was a dispute between the parties and the revenue authorities asked the plaintiffs in 1928 to establish their claim in a civil Court. This suit was instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Second Class, Buldana, on 7th July 1944 and the learned Judge decreed the plaintiff's claim and the Court of first appeal dismissed the appeal therefrom. Hence this second appeal.

    2. There are concurrent findings of both the lower Courts that the loss of the original sale-deed dated 20th September 1894 is established, that the sale was genuine and that there was amicable settlement at the intervention of the panchas in 1930 when the defendant Kalu agreed to give half the produce of the field in dispute to the plaintiffs annually and accordingly he gave half the produce to them up to 1937–1938.

    3. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the plaintiffs have not established their title to the suit field. The first argument of the learned counsel is that the execution of the sale-deed is not proved. According to the finding of both the lower Courts, which has now become final, the original sale-deed is lost and so under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act, any secondary evidence of the document is admissible.

    4. In this case the plaintiffs have filed its certified copy (Ex. P-6). It can prove the contents of the document but not its execution because though the sale-deed was more than 30 years old Section 90 of the Evidence Act, requires production in Court of the particular document in regard to which it is asked to draw the statutory presumption of execution. This is laid down in Basant Singh v. Brij Raj, 57 ALL. 494 : (A.I.R (22) 1935 P.C 132). We get the following observations in that case:

    “Their Lordships approve of the decision in Shripuja v. Kanhayalal, 15 N.L.R 192 : (A.I.R (5) 1918 Nag. 114) in which the Judicial Commissioner held that production of a copy was not sufficient to justify the presumption of due execution of the original under S. 90, and they are unable to agree with the subsequent overruling of that decision in Shri Gopinath Maharaj Sanathan v. Moti, 30 N.L.R 155 : (A.I.R (21) 1934 Nag. 67).”

    5. Nimbaji, (father of the appellant Kalu), however, had admitted the execution of this sale deed in his deposition in civil Suit No. 148 of 1909, (vide Ex. P. 3). That statement is relevant under Section 32(3) of the Evidence Act. Kalu (d. W. 1) also proves an admission made to him by his lather Nimbaji about the execution of this sale-deed. This admission is also relevant under S. 32(3) ibid. These two admissions of execution of the sale deed are, in my opinion, sufficient to prove the execution of the original sale-deed of which Ex. P. 6 is the certified copy. There is again the admission of execution by Nimbaji in the certificate of registration. Is this certificate of registration prima facie evidence of the execution of the document? As remarked in Chitaley and Annaji Rao's Indian Registration Act (1st (1945) Edn.) in answering the question, documents which are required by law to be attested must be distinguished from documents (which are not so required to be attested. As regards the latter class of documents, it must now be regarded as settled by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji, A.I.R (30) 1943 P.C 83 at p. 87 : (%ILR 1943 KAR PC 69) that evidence of due registration is itself some evidence of execution against the party so making the admission. In that case a registered receipt purporting to be by one Parshotam Das contained the endorsement by the Registrar that execution was admitted by the present Parshotam Das. Their Lordships observed:

    “The Registrar's endorsements show that in 1881 a person claiming to be this Parshotam Das and to have become son of Harish Chandra by adoption made by his widow Manki Bahu, presented the receipt for registration and admitted execution. He was identified by two persons one Sheo Prasad and the other Girja Prasad, who was the scribe of the document and was known to the Regietrar. What remains to be shown is that the person admitting execution before the Registrar was this Parshotam Das and no imposter. The question is one of fact except in so far as there was as matter of law a presumption that the registration proceedings were regular and honestly carried out. It seems clear that any objection to the sufficiency of the proof upon this point would have been idle, the circumstances being such that the evidence of the due registration is itself some evidence of execution as against the plaintiffs. Wills and documents, which are required by law to be attested raise other questions but this receipt was not in that class.”

    6. There is, thus, no doubt that the certificate of registration is some evidence of execution against the party making the admission. The three admissions mentioned above thus satisfactorily prove the execution of the sale-deed.

    7. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that even if the respondents or their predecessors-in-title had acquired any title under the sale-deed it was extinguished by adverse possession of the appellant and his predecessors, in-title for more than 12 years from the date of the sale-deed and his (appellant's) title was perfected some years before the settlement which the two lower Courts found to have taken place in 1930. There are, however, no clear and definite pleadings as to his adverse possession and perfection of title prior to 1930 and consequently no issues about them. It being a question of fact the learned counsel cannot be allowed to raise it at this late stage. Morever, in 1930 there was a settlement between the parties wherein, as found by the learned Additional District Judge, the appellant had recognised the title of the respondents to their half share in the field. That is why the respondents did not file their civil suit. The appellant went on giving the produce of their share to the respondents till 1937–1938, and he cannot now turn round and say that their (plaintiffs) title had been extinguished by adverse possession and that he had acquired title.

    8. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the suit was barred by time because it was not brought within 12 years of the date of dispossession. According to the allegations of the plaintiffs, the defendant dispossessed them in 1925–1926 and so there was a proceeding before the revenue Court wherein they were asked to file a civil suit and then there was a settlement in 1930. The defendant gave the produce of their half share to the plaintiffs up to 1937–1933. So up to the year 1937–1938, the possession of the defendant was permissive. The suit was brought by the plaintiffs-respondents on 7th July 1944, i.e, within 12 years from 1937–1938. So it was not barred by limitation.

    9. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    10. Appeal dismissed.

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    Kalu Nimbaji Shingne v. Bapurao Chinkaji Shingne
    (Oct 22, 1948)